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Abstract 
Global liberalisation of agricultural commodities is generally expected to increase 
world market prices of agricultural commodities and benefit farmers in developing 
countries through increased farm gate prices and production. In this study, it is 
hypothesised that market imperfections would limit both price transmission and 
supply responses. The impacts of global liberalisation on smallholder resource poor 
producers were investigated for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea in Malawi under four 
phases including; (i) review of post liberalisation world market price predictions; (ii) 
analysis of price transmission between world and domestic markets; (iii) investigation 
of commodity supply responses; and, (iv) examination of supply chain organisation 
affecting price transmission and supply responses. 
The study concludes that global commodity liberalisation will increase world market 
prices for all four commodities studied. However, price transmission and smallholder 
supply responses vary between commodities and limit smallholder resource poor 
producers' benefits from global market liberalisation. In tobacco, despite supply 
responses, lack of price transmission will constrain farmers from benefiting from 
global tobacco liberalisation. In sugar and tea, while growers may benefit from 
domestic price gains, overall gains from global commodity liberalisation will be 
limited by lack of supply responses. In cotton, although both price transmission and 
supply responses exist, weak elasticities means that gains from global cotton 
liberalisation will as well be limited. 
2 
Implications for resource poor smallholders in other parts of Sub Saharan Africa, for 
world market price change predictions, and for the organisation of markets along 
supply chains are discussed. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background Information 
The main thrust of this research was to investigate the impacts of removal (partial or 
complete) of market distortions (tariffs and subsidies) on the world marketing systems 
of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea and on small scale poor resource producers in 
Malawi. The research was conducted against the backdrop of on going negotiations in 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and demands from other lobby groups and 
institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, global civil society groups and 
individuals who are calling upon the international community to remove tariffs and 
subsidies in world agricultural markets for the benefit of resource poor small scale 
producers in developing countries. The study was conducted to contribute to existing 
research findings and knowledge on impacts of removal of market distortions on 
different groups of people in different countries and supply chain conditions. The 
study purposively selected four distinct export supply systems in Malawi with 
different market arrangements for supply of inputs and services and for purchase of 
produce and it investigated the impacts of removal of tariffs and subsidies on resource 
poor smallholder farmers producing each of these crops. Lessons from this study are 
likely to apply to other poor resource farmers locked in similar commodity supply 
systems in other parts of Sub Saharan African countries. 
The study investigated each of the 
four commodity supply systems in the following 
four phases; (i) a review of their World market price predictions in post tariff and 
26 
subsidy removal era; (ii) an analysis of price transmission between world markets and 
corresponding domestic markets in Malawi; (iii) investigation of commodity supply 
responses in Malawi; and (iv) examination of organisation of supply systems in 
Malawi to explain patterns of price transmission and supply responses. 
In terms of layout of the Thesis, it is divided into four main parts, namely, 
Introduction, Part One, Part Two and Conclusions. In the introduction, which is the 
current chapter, the report outlines the background to the WTO's call to the 
international community to remove/reduce tariffs and subsidies in world commodity 
markets; describes the underlying theory behind tariffs and subsidies; outlines the 
research problem; spells out the research objectives, hypothesis and research 
questions; and presents briefly macro and microeconomic features of the study area, 
Malawi. Part One constitutes chapters two, three and four. In chapter two, the report 
presents findings of the review of literature on impacts of removal of tariffs and 
subsidies on world commodity markets for tobacco, tea, sugar and cotton. In chapter 
three, the report describes the theoretical framework, analytical methods and findings 
on price transmission analysis between world commodity markets of these 
commodities and Malawi. In chapter four, the report presents theoretical methods, 
analytical methods and findings of the price supply responses of the four commodity 
supply systems in Malawi. Part Two has three chapters. Chapter five describes the 
theoretical and analytical methods for analysing organisation of market linkages in 
Malawi's tobacco, tea, sugar and cotton supply systems. Chapter six discusses 
findings of the organisation of market linkages in Malawi's tobacco supply system 
while chapter seven discusses organisation of market linkages in the cotton, sugar and 
tea supply systems. Chapter eight concludes the thesis and as the name suggests it 
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presents a summary of findings of this research, outlines major conclusions, policy 
recommendations and highlight areas of further research. 
1.2 Calls to remove tariffs and subsidies 
The WTO is the frontrunner institution in global initiatives advocating for removal of 
tariffs and subsidies in world commodity production and marketing systems. WTO is 
the frontrunner organisation because it is an institution that was specifically set up by 
the international community to regulate international trade in goods and services for 
the benefit of producers, manufacturers or service providers on the one hand and 
consumers on the other hand, together with all other supply system players (Ingco et 
al, 2004). The organisation has three major mandates, namely providing a forum for 
negotiating trade issues, setting rules that discipline world trade, and providing 
mechanisms for settling trade disputes (WTO, 2005). Currently, WTO is regulating 
over 97% of global trade in both goods and services and has a membership of nearly 
150 countries of which over three quarters are developing countries (WTO, 2005). 
As an institution, WTO was established on 1 January 1995, but as Josling et al (1996) 
reported, the trading system dates back to 1947. Before the establishment of the WTO, 
world trade was regulated through an accord called the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) which evolved through a series of rounds of negotiations with the 
last and largest being the Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to 
the creation of the WTO (WTO, 2001). Ingco et al (2004) observe that prior to the 
Uruguay Round; trade negotiations in GATT almost entirely excluded agriculture for 
obvious reasons of food security. Most nations considered self sufficiency in 
food as a 
sole responsibility of the state that could not 
be left to the functioning of markets. As 
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a result, protectionism and provision of subsidies flourished in all countries (Croome, 
2004). However, following the collapse of farm policies in many industrialized 
countries in early 1980's, trade policy architects established a GATT Committee on 
Trade in Agriculture (CTA) to exam all trade instruments affecting market access and 
supply, as well as subsidies (Ingco et al, 2004). This work led to the production of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) which was later adopted at 
Uruguay Round. 
Croome (2004) reports that URAA included significant steps for disciplining 
distortive agricultural policies including; tariffication of all forms of trade protection 
measures into bound tariffs and commitments to begin to cut them; codifying of 
earlier agreements and achievements; incorporation of agriculture into trade 
negotiations; and establishment of new mechanisms for dispute settlement. WTO 
(2001) observed that URAA still contained some compromises and weaknesses which 
were manifested through persistency of high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation, 
quantitative restrictions, greater levels of trade distorting domestic support and export 
subsidies. A study by World Bank (2002) estimated that the current market distortions 
in agriculture are costing the world in excess of US$248 billion in welfare losses 
annually of which 70% (US$174 billion) is lost in developed countries and the 
balance 30% (US$74 billion) is foregone in developing countries. 
During the inception of the Development Round of trade negotiations in Doha in 2001, 
WTO members agreed, among other things, to take forward the process of reforming 
world agricultural production and marketing system. Members agreed on a framework 
to fundamentally reform the world agricultural production and marketing system 
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under three objective pillars, namely, (i) elimination of all forms of export subsidies 
affecting world agricultural exports; (ii) elimination of trade distorting domestic 
subsidies under the Amber Box (AMS) including disciplining of Blue and Green Box 
measures; and (iii) elimination of trade tariffs, quotas and other forms of quantitative 
restrictions imposed on agricultural products all within a specified timcframe (WTO, 
2001). WTO argues that these reforms are good for the global community as they will 
(i) free world agricultural markets of all barriers and restrictions to trade thereby 
stimulating and enhancing growth in world agricultural trade leading to rising 
volumes and values of world agricultural trade; and (ii) clean up world agricultural 
distortion policies that have depressed world agricultural prices for many decades. 
WTO (2001) argued that, ultimately, trade in world agricultural commodities and 
products would deliver a diversity of better quality and larger volumes of value for 
money agricultural products and commodities to all consumers across the globe while 
at the same time reward appropriately all agricultural supply chain players globally. 
Specifically for masses of poor rural growers in Sub Saharan Africa, WTO reforms 
suggest increased prices for their land based outputs, greater market access for their 
outputs and general rise of returns from their agricultural work, which will 
subsequently lead to significant reductions in their poverty and food insecurity. In a 
sense, these reforms are hoped to create a world agricultural trading system that is fair, 
efficient and responsive to development challenges facing the world's developing 
countries whose populations constitute the majority of the world's poor and hungry. 
This research investigates the impact of removal of global tariffs and subsidies on 
poor smallholder producers of cotton, tobacco, tea and sugar in Malawi to determine 
whether indeed they will benefit from these reforms as suggested by the arguments set 
out above. 
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1.3 Theory behind tariff and subsidy removal 
Virtually all trade theories beginning with classical trade theory which was developed 
by Adam Smith and David Ricardo (Tweeten, 1992) through to neoclassical trade 
theory (Colman et al, 1989; Pomfret, 1991; Tweeten, 1992) and a collection of 
various other trade theories that form part of the new trade theory (Krugman, 1990; 
Winters, 1985; Tweeten, 1992; Alam, 1995) unanimously agree on gains that 
countries enjoy if they trade freely without any impediments. In addition, trade 
theories are explicit regarding the merits and demerits of various restrictions to trade 
(Pomfret, 1991; Sodersten, 1980; Tweeten, 1992). By imposing trade restrictions 
(either through import tariffs, bans, quotas or any other measure on imports of goods 
and services and their competing products) or supporting a particular industry (either 
through domestic or export subsidies), a country raises domestic output of a particular 
good or service (Lipsey et al, 1995; Tweeten, 1992; Colman et al, 1989; Harrigan et al, 
1992; Pomfret, 1991). However, several other dynamic changes and consequences 
follow such policy measures both in the policy instituting country and the rest of the 
world as diagrammatically presented in Figure 1, which has been sourced from 
Tweeten, 1992. 
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The partial equilibrium analysis of impacts of countries imposing tariffs on imports is 
well documented in Pomfret (1991) and Tweeten (1992). Both authors postulate that 
by imposing an import tariff (t) in country A, a wedge is created between world 
market price (P,, ) and domestic price (PN, + t), thus, products becomes expensive on 
the domestic market. In light of this price increase, simultaneously local producers up- 
scale supply from ql to q2 while local importers cut back on imports from (q4 - ql) 
to (q3 - q2) resulting in falling total domestic consumption from q4 to q3. This 
consumption means that consumers move down from a higher level of indifference 
curve to a lower one and therefore experience greater consumer welfare losses 
(Tweeten, 1992; Pomfret, 1991; Colman et al 1989). On the other hand, the rise in 
domestic prices means that economic players in tariff imposing countries redistribute 
their factors of productions away from efficient industries to less efficient ones in 
order to produce in abundance the protected product to meet its rising domestic 
market demand, according to Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper- Samuelson theories as 
outlined in Tweeten (1992) and Sodersten (1980). As a result of this shift, wages for 
factor intensity markets falls in favour of the less abundant factors of production 
(Stolper- Samuelson's theory). 
On the world market, a tariff in country A limits the volume of a product that the 
country imports from the world market and this translate into a shift in commodity 
demand from ED to ED-t resulting in falling world market demand from q6 to q5 and 
a drop in prices from P,, to P',, (Tweeten 1992). As a result of this drop, exporting 
countries respond by cutting back on supply from q10 to q9 (Tweeten, 1992; Colman 
et al 1989). Ultimately, this limits both the volume and value of goods and services 
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that countries produce and trade on the world market, hence reducing consumer 
surplus globally (Tweeten, 1992; Pomfret, 1991; Colman et al 1989). However, 
sometimes a tariff can be strategically used by a large economy to alter terms of trade 
on the world market in its favour (Krugman, 1990; Colman et al 1989; Sodersten, 
1980; Pomfret, 1991; Tweeten, 1992). Thus, a country can set an optimal tariff which 
can enable it enjoy net benefits by reaching out to a higher indifference curve. This is 
only done at the expense of its trading partners who may decide to retaliate. 
Impacts of imposing an import quota and providing domestic and export support in 
country A are fairly similar to those of a tariff (Tweeten, 1992). All these instruments 
favour increases in domestic supply at the expense of imports, hence suppressing 
world market prices and supply. By reducingtremoving these market distortive 
measures, the exact opposite process sets in (Tweeten, 1992; Pomfret, 1991; Colman 
et al 1989; Colman et al 1989; Sodersten, 1980). Removal of tariffs, quota and 
subsidies (domestic and export) reduces domestic supply in country A in favour of 
increased import supply from the world market. The rising demand for world market 
products leads to increases in world market prices in the short run which in turn 
stimulate increased supply from the rest of the world. As a consequence of this, both 
volume and value of goods and services traded on the world market increase 
dramatically (Tweeten, 1992; Pomfret, 1991; Colman et al 1989; Colman et al 1989; 
Sodersten, 1980. Accordingly also, consumer welfare increases across the globe in 
line with falling domestic prices and increased world market supply (Tweeten, 1992; 
Pomfret, 1991; Colman et al 1989). Further, due to reallocation of resources from 
inefficient sectors to more efficient sectors in which countries have resource 
endowments (Sodersten, 1980), a situation termed specialisation (according to 
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Stolper-Samuelson's theorem), countries gain rising returns to factors of production, 
which results in global equalization of rates of return to factors of production 
(Twcctcn, 1992; Sodersten, 1980). Thus, the shifting away of resources from 
inefficient industries creates better paying jobs both in upstream and downstream sub- 
sectors which will eventually bring about agricultural growth, which analysts argue is 
good for Sub Saharan Africa and other developing regions of the world (Reimer, 
2002). A number of empirical studies have confirmed predictions of the Hecksher- 
Ohlin theory and their findings are presented and discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Two. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
Current literature on impacts of removal of tariffs and subsidies on world commodity 
markets predicts two profound outcomes on the supply side, which are; (i) increase in 
world market prices for commodities which will translate into increased producer 
prices and incomes; and, (ii) increase in traded volumes in world market which means 
increased market access for export commodities from developing countries. These 
predictions are, however based on neoclassical economic assumptions regarding 
market structures (Colman et al, 1989; Pomfret, 1991; Tweeten, 1992) in that 
commodity markets and supply systems are generally working well such that price 
increases on world markets will be fully transmitted to domestic markets in producing 
countries and that producers in supplying countries will fully respond to increased 
price signals and accordingly adjust their supply upwards. However, as Reimer (2002) 
argues, there is extensive literature which suggest that markets and commodity supply 
systems, both global and domestic, are far from perfect, they have imperfections 
which will limit both the speed and extent at which prices will be transmitted from the 
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world market to domestic markets as well as limiting the degree to which commodity 
supply systems will respond to price signals. 
On price transmission, FAO (2004) observed that there are two extremes in 
commodity markets and supply systems. In one extreme are commodity markets and 
supply systems which have unitary price transmission elasticities, an indication of 
frictionless and well functioning markets. In the other extreme are supply systems 
with completely no transmission of prices between their various marketing points. 
Transmission of prices in all other markets and supply systems fall between these two 
extremes. Sharma (2003) point out that the degree of price transmission between two 
market points in a supply system provides an indication of sufficiency and efficiency 
of price arbitrage in the supply system. FAO (2005) argue that full arbitrage of prices 
is only possible in market structures and supply systems where economic agents are 
able, either immediately or within a short period of time, to absorb information on 
price changes and adopt new contractual arrangements that reflect changes in world 
market prices. However, as Melyukhina (2003) pointed out, in reality, commodity 
markets and supply systems especially those involving small scale producers in Sub 
Saharan Africa, have imperfections such as information asymmetry (Melyukhina, 
2003), presence of monopoly players who exercise considerable market power 
(McCulloch et al, 2003), high marketing costs (in transport, processing, handling and 
logistics, information and communication and advisory systems) due to poor 
infrastructure status, uncompetitive provision of these services and poor provision of 
public goods in Sub Saharan Africa (FAO, 2004), extremely high unit risks and costs 
of transactions in Sub Saharan Africa (where these are classified according to 
Williamson to include information, negotiation, monitoring and enforcement costs) 
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Dorward et al, (2003) and exchange rate overvaluation problems, all of which limit 
transmission of prices from the world market to domestic markets of growers. This 
research argues that, as a result of all these bottlenecks, small scale resource poor 
producers in Malawi and other Sub Saharan African countries may not benefit fully 
from global liberalisation of commodity markets. 
On supply response, we know from the theory of supply that apart from own prices of 
goods and services, supply is also dependent on several other factors such as (i) 
changes in costs of production which may come about due to changes in prices of 
inputs or raw materials, changes in technology, changes in organisation of supply and 
changes in government policy; (ii) changes in profitability of alternative enterprises; 
and (iii) other exogenous factors such as random shocks or unpredictable events such 
as weather changes (Sloman, 2000). In commodity supply systems in Sub Saharan 
Africa, Dorward et al (2003) summarize conditions facing small scale resource poor 
producers in low level equilibrium poverty traps in which they argue that markets for 
inputs, services and produce are thin due to weak effective demand and variability in 
supply, poor infrastructure, subsistence nature of most commodity suppliers (who 
may also be illiterate and of poor health status), poor systems of information flow, and 
difficulties in enforcing interpersonal contracts - which all affect the amount of 
produce these farmers supply. This research argues that even if some gains in prices 
on world commodity markets may be transmitted to domestic markets in Malawi, 
supply responses may still be limited due to difficult conditions farmers in Malawi 
and other Sub Saharan African countries face. The research argues that the 
combination of limited price transmission and limited supply responses means that 
small scale resource poor producers of tobacco, tea, sugar and cotton will benefit very 
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little from removal of tariffs and subsidies on world commodity market. The study 
uses Malawi as a case study country, and tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea as case study 
commodities and investigates whether removal of tariffs and subsidies on commodity 
markets would benefit small scale resource poor producers of these commodities. 
Lessons from this study are likely to apply to other poor resource farmers locked in 
similar commodity supply systems in other Sub Saharan African countries. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the impacts of removal of tariffs 
and subsidies on world commodity markets of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea on small 
scale resource poor producers in Malawi. Specific objectives of the study included: 
(i) Determination of percentage changes in world market prices for tobacco, 
cotton, sugar and tea due to global removal of tariffs and subsidies; 
(ii) Determination of nature of price transmission between world commodity 
markets of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea and Malawi's domestic markets; 
(iii) Determination of nature of supply responses in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, 
sugar and tea supply systems; 
(iv) Understanding of factors affecting price transmission and supply responses 
in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea supply systems; and, 
(v) Determination of whether small scale resource poor producers of tobacco, 
cotton, sugar and tea in Malawi will benefit from global removal of tariffs 
and subsidies in commodities of their interest. 
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1.6 Research Hypothesis 
The overall hypothesis of this research was that removal of tariffs and subsidies on 
world markets would not significantly benefit small scale poor resource producers of 
tobacco, cotton, tea and sugar in Malawi. The alternative hypothesis was that removal 
of tariffs and subsidies on world markets would substantially benefit small scale 
resource poor producers of these commodities in Malawi. Specific null and alternative 
hypotheses included: 
(i) Removal of tariffs and subsidies on world markets for tobacco, cotton, tea and 
sugar will raise world market prices of these commodities; 
Removal of tariffs and subsidies on world markets of these commodities will 
not raise their world market prices; 
(ii) Changes in world market prices for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea are fully 
transmitted to corresponding domestic market prices in Malawi; 
Changes in world market prices for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea are not fully 
transmitted to corresponding markets in Malawi; 
(iii) Malawi's supply systems of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea do not fully 
respond to changes in domestic prices; 
Malawi's supply systems of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea fully respond to 
changes in domestic prices; 
(iv) Organisation of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea supply systems in Malawi limits 
price transmission and supply responses; 
Organisation of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea supply systems in Malawi does 
not limit price transmission and supply responses; 
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(v) Small scale resource producers of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea would not 
substantially benefit from global removal of tariffs and subsidies in their 
commodities of interest; 
Small scale resource producers of tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea would 
substantially benefit from global removal of tariffs and subsidies in their 
commodities of interest. 
The research argues that if the null hypotheses (i), (ii) and (iv) hold then producer 
gains from liberalisation will be very limited. If all of these do not hold but (iii) holds 
then existing producers and production will benefit from liberalisation but these gains 
will be largely captured by existing producers as rents and will not lead to expanded 
supply, with increases in factor prices and consequent `upstream' linkage or multiplier 
benefits. 
1.7 Research Questions 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
(i) On review of model results on world commodity price changes due to removal of 
tariffs and subsidies: 
> By how much would world market prices for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea go 
up with global removal of tariffs and subsidies? 
(ii) On analysis of price transmission between world commodity markets and 
corresponding domestic markets in Malawi: 
> Is there price transmission between world markets for tobacco, cotton, sugar 
and tea and Malawi's domestic markets? 
40 
¢ What is the duration that domestic prices take to adjust in line with world 
market price changes? 
What are the elasticities of price transmission in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, 
sugar and tea supply systems? 
(iii) On commodity supply responses in Malawi: 
> Are there price supply responses in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea 
supply systems; 
> What are the supply response elasticities in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar 
and tea supply systems? 
(iv) On organisation of market linkages for supply of inputs, services and purchase of 
produce in commodity supply systems in Malawi and benefits of small scale 
resource poor smallholder producers: 
¢ What are the structures, conduct and performance of market linkages for 
supply of inputs, services and purchase of produce? 
> What are the supply system features that explain the observed price 
transmission? 
> What are the supply system features that explain the observed supply 
responses? 
> How do structure, conduct and performance of market linkages in commodity 
supply system impact on small scale farmers' incomes? 
1.8 General features facing commodity producers in Malawi 
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1.8.1 Land size 
Malawi is a very small landlocked developing country south of Sub Saharan Africa. 
The country has a total territorial area of about 11.8 million hectares of which 9.4 
million hectares is total land area while 3.4 million hectares is marine resource (NSO, 
2005). Out of the total territorial land area, 6.2 million hectares is customary land and 
is divided among smallholder farmers, 1.2 million hectares is leasehold and freehold 
land area held by estate farmers and the remaining 1.8 million hectares is public land 
reserved for parks, urban areas and other purposes (NSO, 2005). The agriculture 
sector in Malawi is thus broadly divided into small and large scale sub sectors. The 
large scale sub sector constitute 35,000 estate farmers with land holding sizes ranging 
from 10.0 hectares to over 500.0 hectares cultivating predominantly export crops such 
as tobacco, tea, sugar and coffee (NSO, 2005). On the other hand, the smallholder sub 
sector comprises 2.4 million farmers locked in subsistence farming of both food crops 
such as maize, cassava and sweet potatoes and cash crops such as tobacco, cotton, 
paprika, sugarcane, groundnuts and tea (NSO, 2005). The average land holding size 
among smallholder farmers is very small, estimated to be around 1.2 hectares per 
household (or 0.33 ha per capita) of which 0.95 hectares is rain fed. It is estimated 
that 30% of smallholder farmers hold less than 0.5 hectares of land, 30% between 0.5 
hectares and 1.0 hectares, 30% between 1.0 and 2.0 hectares while only 10% hold 
more than 2.0 hectares of land (NSO, 2005). This clearly demonstrates that land is a 
critical factor in smallholder sub sector. 
1.8.2 Agricultural Productivity 
Productivity in Malawi's agriculture sector has stagnated since independence in 1964 
with no significant increases in crop yields of all types including maize, tobacco, tea, 
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sugar and cotton (Malawi Government, 2006). Yields for maize, a major staple 
commodity for Malawi accounting for 70% of the national kilocalorie rcquircmcnt 
and 50% of total cultivated land under small scale agriculture, have remained static at 
around I ton/ha for the past four decades compared to 1.2 ton/ha for Sub Saharan 
Africa, 2.9 ton/ha for Latin America and 3.2 ton/ha for Asia (FAO, 2004b). Yields for 
the other commodities have as well followed a similar pattern. A number of factors 
are recognised as constraining agricultural productivity in Malawi (NSO, 2005): 
drought; inadequate use of improved seeds, pesticides, and fertilisers (estimated to be 
7 kg/ha compared to 9 kg/ha for Sub Saharan Africa and 120 for Asia - FAO, 2004b); 
limited use of irrigation technology (only 2.4% of cultivated land is irrigated 
compared to 3.8% for Sub Saharan Africa, 14% for Latin America and 40% for Asia 
- FAO, 2004b); declining soil productivity (over 50% of cultivated land is estimated 
to be undergoing serious soil erosion and fertility mining and leaching - Malawi 
Government, 2001); limited access to agricultural finance and advisory services - 
with only 12% of farming households accessing credits in 2005 (NSO, 2005); low 
levels of crop margins (as a result of a combination of low prices and high production 
costs, partly due to high input costs); poor rural infrastructure of road and transport 
networks (with most rural communities situated 20 kilometres away from tarmac 
road), water and energy, markets, information technologies and other health, 
education and social amenities; rampant poverty; poor macroeconomic conditions; 
and prevalence of HIV/AIDS . As a result of all these problems, smallholder 
productivity for most agricultural commodities in Malawi has remained static over the 
past four decades. In addition, the Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment 
study (Malawi Government, 2006) estimated low levels of technical', allocative2 and 
' Technical efficiency defined as the ability of farmers to produce on the maximum possible frontier 
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economic3 efficiencies in a number of crops in Malawi including hybrid maize and 
tobacco. Land, fertiliser and labour constraints were highlighted as major reasons for 
low productivity in smallholder sub sector in Malawi. 
1.8.3 Poverty in Malawi 
Malawi's total population was estimated to be 12.3 million people in 2005 of which 
60% were below the age of 20 (NSO, 2005). Of the total population, 52% (or 6.4 
million) of people live below the poverty line consuming less than US$116 per capita 
per year (NSO, 2005). Within the category of the poor, 22% (or 2.7 million people 
which is one in every five Malawians) are categorised as ultra poor with very limited 
access to basic needs of clean water, electricity, telecommunication facilities, 
education and health facilities (NSO, 2005). Poverty is most rampant in rural areas 
where 56% are categorised as poor and 24.2% are ultra poor compared to 25% and 
7.5% of poor and ultra poor people in urban areas respectively (NSO, 2005). The Gini 
coefficient, which is a measure of equality, is estimated to be 0.38, an indication of 
high inequality. It is estimated that the richest 10% have median per capita income 
that is eight times higher than that of the poorest 10% of the population (NSO, 2005). 
Severity of poverty in Malawi is also reflected in country's poor social economic 
indicators which include high infant mortality rates (estimated to be 133 per 1000 live 
births), high maternal mortality rates (920 per 1,000 deliveries in 2005, up from 620 
in 1992), extremely low level life expectancy (estimated to be 37 years in 2005, down 
from 46 years in 1987 largely due to HIV/AIDS), high malnutrition rate (50% for 
2 Allocative efficiency defined as the ability of farmers to produce a given level of output at cost 
minimizing input ratios 
3 Economic efficiency defined as capability of farmers to produce predetermined quantities of outputs 
at minimum costs given the available technology 
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under fives of which 22% are stunted and 18% underweight, with 9% for mothers 
with babies), high food insecurity incidences and general vulnerability to many 
different kinds of preventable diseases and infections (NSO, 2005). Groups of people 
hardest hit by poverty include small scale farmers, women headed households, tenants 
in farms, seasonal/casual labourers, children, and urban poor. The major causes of 
poverty in Malawi include low agricultural productivity, low incomes, high illiteracy 
rate, poor health, weak institutional structure, rapid population growth and 
environmental degradation (Malawi Government, 2005). As a result of rampant 
poverty in Malawi, demand for most goods and services is highly constrained, 
including food products even though they take up a large share of household budgets 
and expenditures (NSO, 2005). 
1.8.4 Weak macroeconomic outlook 
The economy of Malawi is heavily reliant on agriculture (a sector which contributed 
40% of GDP, employed over 80% of the country's labour force, accounted for around 
90% of total foreign exchange earnings and supplied 65% of industrial raw materials 
in 2004 (NSO, 2005)) and within this on a narrow set of export commodities, namely, 
tobacco, tea and sugar which respectively represented 69%, 9% and 6% of total 
export earnings in 2000 (Table 1) and on maize, the country's staple food crop, which 
contributes about 70% of the national kilocalorie requirement and uses 50% of the 
total land area cultivated in the smallholder agriculture sector (NSO, 2005). Other 
important sectors of the economy are distribution, manufacturing, government 
services, and financial and professional services which respectively accounted for 
22%, 12%, 9.5% and 9% of GDP in 2000 (Government of Malawi, 2001b). These are, 
however, partly dependent upon the agricultural sector so that in seasons when 
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agriculture is hard hit with shocks, either due to climatic variability or market shocks 
(domestic, regional or international), the impact on the economy has been 
considerable such as the 1991/92 and 2001/02 droughts. 
Table 1: Structure of Malawi's export trade, 1990 and 2000 
Product 1990 2000 
Value (USD 
million) 
% Share Value (USD 
million) 
% Share 
Tobacco 208.7 66 278.3 69 
Tea 38.3 12 35.5 9 
Clothing 5.3 2 26.3 6 
Sugar 25.7 8 22.5 6 
Coffee 11.0 3 6.5 2 
Textiles 5.9 2 3.8 1 
Cotton 4.4 1 3.7 1 
Nuts 2.6 1 2.5 1 
Other 17.1 5 29.1 7 
Total 314.8 404.6 
Source: Chiputula et al (2005) 
The other factor that impacts on the economy of Malawi is Government's 
macroeconomic policy. Sound macroeconomic policies promote economic growth 
and development whereas poor macroeconomic policies fuel high and volatile 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates which in combination erode private sector 
profitability, make credit expensive, and distort the cost of inputs relative to outputs 
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and therefore ultimately slow economic growth and development. Furthermore, weak 
management of public finances leads to inefficient allocation of resources and under 
funding of public sector projects necessary for supporting private sector investments. 
On economic growth, it is estimated that between 1996 and 2005, the economy in 
Malawi grew by an average of 3% annually and considering that population grew by 
2% over the same period; it means per capita growth was only about 1% (Malawi 
Government, 2005). High and volatile inflation rates, interest rates and exchange rates 
coupled with shocks in weather conditions have limited the extent of economic 
growth in Malawi in the last decade. Inflation rates increased from 20% in 1992/93 to 
a record high of 83% in 1995 mainly due to flotation of the local currency and 
Government over expenditure. By 1997, inflation had dropped to 9% due to 
stabilisation of exchange rate, fiscal discipline and favourable weather conditions. 
However, due to relaxed fiscal discipline inflation rates rose up again to 45% in 1999 
before gradually falling again to 14% in 2005 (Malawi Government, 2005). 
On interest rates, the trend has also been volatile rising from 20% in 1992 to 49% in 
1995/96 before falling to 30% in 1997/98 and rising up again to an all time high of 
56% in 2000/01 (Malawi Government, 2005). By 2006, interest rates had fallen again 
to 27%. On exchange rates, the Malawi kwacha devalued from Mk4.00 to US$1.00 in 
1994 to Mk121.00 to US$1.00 in 2005 (Malawi Government, 2005). Flotation of the 
currency, performance of the tobacco sector, donor inflows and Government fiscal 
policies are major factors that have determined levels of exchange rates in Malawi in 
the last two decades. Variability in financing of Government expenditures has also led 
to rising domestic debts from Mk1.6 billion in 1999 to Mk47.1 billion (or US$450 
million) in 2004 (Malawi Government, 2005). Apart from increasing interest rates, 
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large domestic borrowings by the state also crowded out private sector borrowings 
from commercial banks. The vicious cycle of budget deficits, large state borrowings, 
high interest rates, high trade imbalances, high underemployment and high inflation 
rates have all impacted significantly on private sector investments and profitability. 
Furthermore, as a result of relatively small development budgets and irregular flows 
of donor funds in the past decade, Government has been unable to provide adequate 
resources towards maintaining and developing infrastructure for essential public 
goods and services in transport, health, education, markets, information technologies, 
research and development, water and power sectors to complement and support the 
efforts of private sector entrepreneurs. The failure of government to provide these 
essential public goods and services is heavily constraining economic productivity in 
Malawi and costing economic operators. For instance, inadequacies in the current 
transport network in Malawi are estimated to lead to transport costs accounting for up 
to 50% of total costs for imports and exports compared to 17% for Least Developed 
Countries and 8% for OECD (Malawi Government, 2006). It must be noted that the 
higher transport costs in Malawi are also partly due to the fact that Malawi is a 
landlocked country. In general terms, the infrastructure problem in Malawi is 
impacting on economic players in three main ways: first, unavailability means players 
may need to work out alternatives, failing which their activities will be hampered; 
second, where goods or services are provided at high cost, then it means the players 
incur higher costs leading to higher prices or loss of competitiveness; third, where 
goods or services provided are of poor quality it means quality and standards of 
player's output will be compromised. A combination of infrastructure problems and 
general macro economic weaknesses is adversely affecting productivity and 
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competitiveness of Malawi's goods and services both on the domestic market and 
export market. 
1.8.5 Service Delivery 
The structure and organisation of delivery of services in Malawi to different economic 
actors (including supply chain actors in tobacco, tea, sugar and cotton) is also poor, 
weak, uncompetitive and costly. This issue will be addressed in detail later in chapters 
six and seven, but we note here that in general markets for delivery of such services as 
inputs, finance, farm machinery, processing facilities, transport, information, power 
and water services, to mention a few, are frequently either under monopoly or 
oligopolistics market structures, in part due to difficulties in conditions for delivery of 
these services and in many cases these services are delivered at high costs which 
subsequently also increases farmers' costs. Although Malawi liberalised markets for 
provision of most of these services, entry into these markets has been limited due to a 
variety of structural and institutional bottlenecks. As a result of these, productivity for 
most economic activities including those from the agricultural sector, has been 
constrained. 
1.8.6 Low level equilibrium trap 
A combination of characteristic features from 1.8.1 through to 1.8.5 suggest that some 
economic actors in Malawi face low level equilibrium poverty traps as defined by 
Dorward et al (2003), in particular a majority of small scale growers of farmers who 
partly grow maize and other cash crops such as tobacco, tea, cotton and sugar. Major 
conditions facing these farmers include; thin markets for inputs, outputs and finances, 
low volume of transactions and high transaction costs and risks. As part of this study, 
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investigations will be made to determine how tariff and subsidy removal on world 
commodity markets due to reforms will impact on livelihoods of these groups of 
people, taking into account all their prevailing conditions. 
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PART ONE 
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Chapter Two: Review of model findings on impacts of 
removal of distortions on world commodity markets 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses findings of a review of literature on models that have simulated 
impacts of removal of tariffs and subsidies on world markets for tobacco, cotton, 
sugar and tea. The main purpose of this review was to determine the most likely post- 
tariff and subsidy removal world market prices for these commodities. In terms of 
theoretical framework for tariffs and subsidy removal, chapter one section 1.3 has 
outlined the theory behind tariff and subsidy removal. As for analytical methods used 
in models predicting outcomes of removal of tariffs and subsidies, a study by Reimer 
(2002) categorised available model simulations into two broad categories, namely, 
partial equilibrium analysis models and general equilibrium analysis models. Partial 
equilibrium analysis models simulate impacts of removal of tariffs and/or subsidies on 
a single market whereas general equilibrium models take into account related markets 
and secondary effects of the changes in their model simulations. 
McCulloch (2003) also reported that apart from the two broad categorisations, 
simulations also differ in their model specifications. He observed that geographically, 
model simulations differ in their coverage with some simulating their impacts on a 
single or group of countries level whereas others simulate impacts of removal of 
tariffs and subsidies on the world market as a whole. Models also differ in their scope 
of commodity coverage with the majority of partial equilibrium analysis models 
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focussing on only a single good or service whereas others, especially general 
equilibrium models, cover more than one good or service in their model simulations. 
Furthermore, model simulations also vary in their policy combinations, with some 
only covering partial or complete reductions in tariffs and subsidies while others 
simulate different scenarios of tariff and subsidy reductions. Model simulations also 
vary in their structures (which range from simple to complex models), in their 
parameter values (such as estimates of elasticities of demand and supply, with some 
models basing their estimates from previous studies while others using value 
judgements), in their base year, data sources, and market structures (unitary versus 
segmented). As a result of all this diversity, predictions of tariffs and subsidy removal 
on world markets have resulted in diverse outcomes. 
It was not the intention of this study to develop yet another model simulation, but 
rather to review available model results on impacts of removal of tariffs and subsidies 
on world markets for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea. On top of the review of available 
model results, the study ran the Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) 
to generate comparable results for the four selected commodities from a single model 
simulation. ATPSM was chosen primarily because of its robustness in that it takes 
into account different commodities under different policy options and combinations 
for different geographical zones and countries. ATPSM was developed by United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with funding from UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID) and is used widely by global 
institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and WTO. 
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In terms of layout of this chapter, each commodity is discussed in turn, examining 
trends in global commodity supply, demand, direction of flow of trade, and terms of 
trade. The chapter also discusses both current and past trends in global market 
distortions affecting supply and demand for each of these commodities. Further, the 
chapter discusses model results of simulations that have attempted to analyse impacts 
of removal of distortions on world markets of each of these commodities. 
2.2 Cotton 
This section discusses global production and trade of cotton and the impact removal 
of market distortions will have on world market cotton prices. Data used in this 
section has been drawn from FAO website databases. 
2.2.1 Production 
Worldwide, area under cotton has fluctuated between 30 and 35 million hectares over 
the last three decades (Figure 2). The largest allocation was achieved in 1996 when a 
total of 36 million hectares was allocated to cotton and the lowest was in 1987 when 
29 million hectares was grown to cotton (Figure 2). Figure 2 also shows variability in 
cotton area over the stretch of this period. 
Figure 2: World Cotton Area, Stock, Production and Supply 
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World cotton production has grown by about 8 million metric tonnes (or 61%) from 
13 million metric tonnes in 1972) to 21 million metric tonnes in 2004 (Figure 2). 
Figure 3 attributes all this growth to improvements in yields which have almost 
doubled over the same period rising from 390 kg/ha in 1972 to 638 kg/ha in 2004. In 
terms of overall supply, apart from increases in annual outputs, global cotton supply 
has steadily increased partly due to increases in stocks. Figure 2 indicates a doubling 
of global cotton stocks from just under 5 million metric tonnes in 1972 to 10 million 
metric tonnes in 2003. Taking into account growth in both annual productions and 
stocks, world cotton supply has grown by more than half from 23 million metric 
tonnes in 1972 to 36 million metric tonnes in 2004. 
Figure 3: Graph showing trends in global cotton yields 
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Although cultivation of cotton takes place in over 70 countries, its production is 
highly concentrated in major production centres (World Bank, 2000). Figure 4 shows 
that China and the US produces roughly half of the world's cotton output and that 
when outputs from Pakistan, India, and Uzbekistan are added to their total, the five 
countries account for close to two-thirds of the world's cotton production. When 
outputs from Brazil, Turkey and Australia are also taken into account, the total for the 
top eight countries come to three-quarters of the world's cotton output. 
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Figure 4: Graph showing trends in cotton production in selected countries 
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As Figure 4 demonstrates, overall, there have been sustained increases in cotton 
production in major centres of production despite some years of troughs and sharp 
increases. In China, the number one producer of cotton lint, annual output has more 
than doubled from 2 million metric tonnes in 1972 to 5 million metric tonnes in 2004. 
Similarly for the US, the second major producer, output has doubled from 2 million 
metric tonnes to 4 million metric tonnes from the 1970's to 2004. India and Pakistan 
have also trebled their outputs from a million and half a million metric tonnes 
respectively to 3 million and 2 million metric tonnes. 
2.2.2 Cotton lint consumption 
Over the last three decades, the largest growth in demand for cotton has occurred in 
Asia in response to expansions in spinning, textiles and cloth-making industries in the 
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region (World Bank, 2000). Thus, although the region is by far the major centre of 
cotton production, it is at the same time a leader in cotton consumption. In particular, 
China is on record as consuming a quarter of the world's cotton output in the 1990's 
(Anderson, 2004). India and the US also recorded very high cotton consumption 
figures in the 1990's so much so that when consumption figures from China and 
Turkey are added to those of India and US, the four countries make up three quarters 
of global cotton consumption. Other emerging Asian countries with significant 
demand growth in cotton consumption are Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan. 
Globally, Baffes (2004) observed a growth rate of 1.8% in cotton consumption 
between 1960's and 2004. He argued that per capita consumption has remained the 
same as that of the 1960's considering that world population has also grown by a 
similar margin. 
2.2.3 Trade in world cotton lint 
Figure 5 suggest that out of the total annual output, only about a third is disposed to 
world markets leaving the bulk of cotton outputs retained in producing countries for 
downstream manufacturing activities. Despite annual variations, the volume of cotton 
traded internationally has grown by about 18% between 1990 and 2004. The largest 
growth in exports occurred in the US, the world's leading exporter. Anderson, (2004) 
attributed growth in US exports to contracting domestic milling industries. As Figure 
5 shows, by 2004 up to 3 million metric tonnes of the 4 million metric tonnes of 
cotton produced in the US was exported to world markets representing half of all 
global traded cotton. Alongside the US, other traditional exporters of cotton lint 
(namely Sub Saharan Africa, Uzbekistan and Australia) also sustained their share of 
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global cotton exports. Together with the US, these countries accounted tier more than 
two thirds of the world's total exports. Other major cotton producers, in particular, 
China, India, Pakistan and Turkey scarcely export their cotton as their domestic 
industries consume their entire productions. 
Figure 5: Graph showing major exporters of cotton 
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Figure 6 demonstrates that Asia is the leading destination for cotton exports 
accounting for up to half of all exports. In particular, China, Indonesia, Thailand, 
India, Korea and Taiwan are dominant importers of cotton. Apart from Asia, the EU, 
Turkey, Mexico and Russia are also growing destinations for cotton lint. Figure 6 
suggest that totals of Asia and EU imports make-up two thirds of global cotton lint 
imports. 
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Figure 6: Graph showing major importers of cotton 
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One other factor worth noting in the world cotton trade is the holding or piling of 
stocks of cotton. Figure 2 shows that these stocks have doubled between 1972 and 
2003 from just under 5 million metric tonnes to 10.5 million metric tonnes. Annually, 
it is observed that these stocks roughly represent half of total global annual outputs. 
Baffes (2004) was critical of these stocks in that they considerably influence price 
instability in world cotton markets. He observed that stockholding policies of two 
countries, in particular, the United States and China, led to large price volatility in 
world cotton prices in the 1980's and 1990's. He specifically cites sharp price falls in 
1985 and 1996 as caused by changes in United States and China's stockholding 
policies. 
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2.2.4 Terms of trade in world cotton lint 
Figure 7 shows trends in rcal4 world market prices for cotton. As the figure shows, 
real world market prices for cotton have been falling gradually since their peak in 
early 1970's and have generally followed a similar declining pattern as many other 
commodity prices on the world market. A closer look at trends in real world market 
prices suggests that there have been one notable structural break in cotton prices at 
around 1986. The period before the break is largely characterised by significant 
declines in prices while the period after the break is mainly characteristic of price 
fluctuations. Baffes (2004) attributed the general decline in cotton prices to a number 
of reasons including general reductions in cost of productions (mainly as a result of 
technological improvements), sluggish growth in global commodity demand, and 
strong competition from synthetic lint. ODI (2004) also argued that the unpredictable 
supply and demands in India, Pakistan and China coupled with shifts in domestic 
policies in the US and China also led to instability, volatility and downward 
movement of prices. Anderson (2004) added the problem of stockholding policies 
together with their subsequent release policies as compounded the instability problem 
in world cotton prices. 
Base year for real world market prices was 1990 
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Figure 7: Graph showing trends in real world market prices for cotton 
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2.2.5 Tariffs and subsidies for cotton 
In the last four decades, world cotton production and trade has been subject to 
interventions by different Governments. Anderson (2006) observed that during the 
early 1990's, up to 90% of global cotton output was produced and traded under some 
form of Governments' interventions. The three most common forms of interventions 
included; imposition of tariffs, price support programs and provision of input 
subsidies. 
On tariffs, almost all countries of the globe impose some form of import tariffs (see 
Appendix I for details of import tariffs by country). The majority of countries impose 
a single form of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate of tariff to all imports of cotton, 
irrespective of where the imports are coming from. However, some countries do 
impose differential tariff rates with imports from certain countries attracting low 
tariffs while others attract extremely high tariffs. As Appendix 1 indicates, the world 
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average MFN rate for cotton falls between 10% and 15% with minimum MFN rates 
of 2.5% in some countries and maximum rates of 100%. A closer look at the tariff 
structure suggests that high tariffs are prevalent in net exporting countries although in 
some exceptional cases, net importers impose unusually high tariffs. As observed, 
tariff rates in China, the EU, the US and other major consumers of cotton, are 
relatively low. 
On support, Baffes (2004), ODI (2004) and Anderson (2004) observed that since 1997, 
total subsidies given to cotton sectors by eight leading producing countries (US, 
China, EU (through Greece & Spain), Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and Egypt) ranged from 
US$3.8 billion to US$5.3 billion annually. In 2001 alone, direct assistance by the US 
government to the cotton sector totalled US$2.3 billion. China remitted US$1.2 
billion while EU through Greece and Spain provided subsidies to the tune of US$0.8 
billion. India gave out US$0.5 worth of support while Turkey, Brazil Mexico and 
Egypt gave their farmers a combined sum total of US$150 million. ODI (2004) 
suggested that these subsidies directly affected 52% of global cotton lint. The report 
argues that this is slight improvement considering that in 1986 up to 69% of cotton 
and 25 countries were involved in subsidizing cotton production. ODI (2004) 
compared support levels for 1999/00 and 2001/02 and summarised them as in Table 2. 
Table 2: Comparisons in levels of support 
Unit assistance in USS/kg 
Total assistance in ÜS 
million 
Country 1999/00 2000/01 1999/00 2000/01 
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China 0.43 0.23 1534 1200 
EU 1.39 1.37 844 700 
Turkey 0.24 n. a 198 
Brazil 0.07 n. a 44 
Mexico 0.2 n. a 28 
Egypt 0.09 n. a 20 150 
Total 4733 4350 
ODI(2004) 
As Table 2 depicts, although the US is by far the largest provider of support in terms 
of overall support, EU is on the other hand the biggest provider of support in terms of 
per kilogram support, providing as high as double and quadruple that provided by the 
US and China respectively. Coming second to EU in terms of per kilogram support is 
the US which is followed by China and the others. Table 2 also highlight the drop in 
per kilogram support of close to 50% in the US and China between the two years 
although the total outlays for US went up while that of China dropped as well. Per 
capita support for EU remained fairly static over the period in question. ODI (2004) 
reports that for 1999/00 agricultural season, per kilogram assistance level averaged 
around US$0.58/kg representing 48% of global cotton lint price. 
2.2.6 Impact of removal of distortions in world cotton production and trade 
The likely impacts of removal distortions in world cotton production and trade have 
been widely researched and reported in the recent past, in part because of the high 
profile which the cotton debate has assumed in current WTO Doha Development 
trade negotiations. Detailed reviews of findings from various model simulations have 
been reported by Baffes (2004), ODI (2004) and Anderson (2004). Some of the 
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researchers that have simulated impacts of removal of tariffs and subsidies on cotton 
markets include Revees et at (2001), Quirke (2002), FAPRI (2002), ICAC (2002), 
Goreux (2003), Tokarick (2003), Oxfam (2002), Sumner (2003), Poonyth et al (2004), 
Gilson et al (2004), ODI (2004), Shephered (2004), Karagiannis (2004), Anderson 
(2005) and Winters et al (2005). 
Analytically, there are two main approaches researchers have used to analyse impact 
of removal of distortions on cotton production and marketing. The first approach is 
the use of a more detailed partial equilibrium model in which the majority of studies 
fall. In this approach, simulation models are developed using a set of supply and 
demand equations. The second approach is the use of less detailed but more 
aggregated general equilibrium models, on which institutions such as the World Bank, 
IMF and UN have based their analysis and publications. Notably, there are two main 
general equilibrium models that have been developed and used to analyse impact of 
removal of tariffs and subsidies on commodity markets: these are the GTAP and 
ATPSM models and their various revised versions. 
Another point of departure in model simulations is that while some simulations 
concentrate on determining how distortions affected past market conditions, the 
majority of studies focus on examining how removal of current distortions will impact 
on future world market equilibrium positions. A review by FAO (2004c) pointed out 
another feature in that predictions are tied to the base year, meaning that in the 
absence of distortions, what would have been prevailing supply, demand and price 
market conditions. 
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'f'ahle 3 presents a summary of some of the partial equilibrium model predictions 
made on impacts of prices due to removal of different current distortions on world 
markets for cotton lint. As can he observed, predicted world market price increases 
range from 3% (Tokarick, 2003) to 71°/a (ICAO, 2002). Banes (2004) suggests that 
the result of 71% price increase may be an outlier considering that it tills by itself far 
away from the rest of other predictions. Taking into account this view, Anderson 
(2004) considers the feasible and possible range to be between 3% and 30%. Ignoring 
other non trivial distinctions in parameter estimates, Anderson (2004) argues that 
estimates at the higher end of the spectrum; (i) try to take into account all distortions 
and tie all subsidies to production, (ii) use base years with extremely low prices, (iii) 
use parameter estimates of demand which are relatively inelastic and (iv) parameterise 
low supply elasticities. On the other hand, estimates at the lower end of the spectrum 
often (i) ignore or deliberately leave out some subsidy programs such as decoupled 
payments, crop insurances and export subsidies, (ii) base analysis using base years 
with prices already relatively high, and, (iii) assume high demand and supply 
elasticities. 
Table 3: Comparison of predictions from selected partial equilibrium models 
Model 
Base 
Year Distortions removal simulated 
Increase in 
world price 
ICAC (2002) 2000101 US Subsidy removal alone 21% 
ICAC (2002) 2001/02 US, EU & China subsidy removal 30% 
Goreux (2003) All subsidies and tariffs removed 13 - 18% 
Quirke (2003) 2001/02 EU & US subsidy removal 10.70% 
Tockarick (2003) 2002 US subsidies removal alone 2.80% 
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FAPRI 2002 US and EU subsidy removal 12.70% 
Summer (2003) 2002 US Subsidy removal alone 12.60% 
Winters (2004) 2001 US, EU & China subsidy removal 24% 
ICAC (2003) 2001/02 All distortions removed 72% 
Sources: MU (Luu4e), Uui (luu4) anu otner mucpetwent sIUmCS (IIerenceu) 
On baseline, Anderson (2004) argues that base year prices matter a lot considering 
that the size of subsidy programs in US depends on expected price in that year such 
that high prices go with low subsidy level and vice versa. Further, size of subsidy 
determines area planted and output harvested. As such, differences in base years 
create disparities in predictions especially in light of fluctuations and volatility in 
prices. On demand elasticities, Anderson (2004) argues that substitution effect with 
synthetics is the major determinant factor and therefore suggests short-term 
elasticities of below -0.5 and long term elasticities of close to -1.0 to be more 
consistent. On the other hand, on supply elasticities, he argues elasticities of 1.0 to be 
consistent with major economies where farmers are closely linked to markets whereas 
estimates of 0.5 are considered appropriate for most developing countries, considering 
most farmers in these countries are relatively insulated from world markets owing to 
(i) domestic policies, (ii) infrastructure problems, and (iii) land and other resource 
constraints. Anderson (2004) argues that taking into account all these factors, a 10% 
to 20% increase in world market prices is considered as more realistic prediction from 
partial equilibrium models. 
On model findings from General Equilibrium Models, the study reviewed results from 
GTAP and ATPSM models. Results from GTAP were drawn from the World Bank 
publication edited by Beghin and Aksoy (2004) which showed that removal of world 
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market distortions in world cotton production and marketing system will increase 
world market prices for cotton by 10 - 20%. On the other hand, results from the 
ATPSM model were generated by this study after running the ATPSM model and the 
model shows that removal of tariffs and subsidies in world cotton production and 
marketing system would result in world market price increases of 10 to 16%. These 
results were similar to those reported by UNCTAD (2004) as they came from the 
same ATPSM model. Taking into account both the findings of the partial and general 
equilibrium models, the study considers that removal of distortions in world cotton 
production and marketing system would likely increase world market prices for cotton 
and that the increase is in the region of 10% to 20%. 
2.3 Sugar 
This section discusses trends in global sugar production, consumption, trade and 
pricing. The section also discusses the situation analysis of tariffs and subsidies in 
world sugar production and marketing system. The section concludes by discussing 
model predictions on impacts of removal of market distortions in world sugar 
production and marketing. Data on global sugar production, consumption, marketing 
(exports and imports) and pricing were drawn from FAO database. 
23.1 World Production 
Worldwide, sugar production is carried out in over a hundred countries. Globally, 
sugar is produced from both sugarcane and sugar beet. During the early 1900's, sugar 
beet constituted 60% of global sugar production, however, over the course of the 
century, the proportion of sugarcane in global sugar has been steadily increasing so 
much so that by 2000 sugar beet only constituted 27% of global sugar production 
68 
(Chiputula et al, 2005). Primarily, sugarcane is grown in tropical and sub tropical 
climates while sugar beets are grown in temperate regions. Some countries, such as 
the US, produce significant amounts of both, sugarcane and sugar bect, while others 
specialise exclusively in production of either sugarcane (mainly countries in tropical 
regions of the southern hemisphere) and sugar beet (especially countries in temperate 
zones of the northern hemisphere) (Chiputula et al, 2005). 
Figure 8 indicates that world sugar production doubled between 1972 and 2003, rising 
steadily from 72 million metric tonnes to 148 million metric tonnes. Alongside this 
growth, closing stocks and annual total sugar supplies have as well grown in size in 
the last three decades. Sugar stocks held in different countries across the globe have 
quadrupled from just under 17 million metric tonnes in 1972 to 65 million metric 
tonnes in 2004. Total sugar supplies have also more than doubled from 91 million 
metric tonnes in 1972 to 210 million metric tonnes in 2004. 
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Figure 8: Graph showing trends in world sugar supply 
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Although sugar production is widely spread across the world, global output is highly 
concentrated in major production centres. Until 1990, Brazil was a mere middle 
ranked producer of sugar producing just about 8 million metric tonnes of raw sugar. 
Since then, the country has undergone rapid expansions in sugar production raising its 
output in excess of three fold from 8 million metric tonnes in 1990/91 to 30 million 
metric tonnes in 2004/05. With this level of output, Brazil has overtaken the 
traditional leader in global sugar production, the European Union, and is currently 
supplying a fifth of the world's sugar production. India has also gone through rapid 
expansions of its sugar industry and has also outpaced the European Union. Despite 
set backs in 2004 and 2005, the country has more than trebled its sugar output from 
the mid 1980's, rising from 6 million metric tonnes in 1983 to 22 million metric 
tonnes in 2003. Sugar output in the European Union, a long time leading producer of 
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sugar, has remained fairly stable at just over 15 million metric tonnes for the last two 
decades. Cumulatively, the sum total of the top three producers account for close to 
half of the world's annual sugar output. Figure 9 also shows modest and sustained 
growth in middle ranked sugar producers, namely, China, USA, Mexico, SADC, 
Australia, Thailand and Russia. Together with the top three producers, these countries 
produce up to 80% of world's sugar output. 
Figure 9: Graph showing outputs of sugar from major producers 
35000 
30000 
25000 
20000 
15000 
I ýr 
10000 
5000 
pl T. ý 
-*-Australia -a- EU f- Mexico US -i- Brazil -a- China f-- India -*-Thailand 
Source: FAO 
Note: K rse means 'thousand raw sugar metric tonnes equivalents' 
2.3.2 Sugar Consumption 
Global sugar consumption has grown by about 2% annually over the last three 
decades, and between 1972 and 2004 consumption has doubled from 74 million 
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metric tonnes to 145 million metric tonnes. Figure 8 indicates annual production 
figures as going hand in hand with consumption figures. Globally, per capita 
consumption has remained the same as that of the 1970's considering that growth in 
population is also around 2%. However, country and region specific consumption 
figures indicate that there are huge disparities between regions. Figure 10 indicate that 
per capita consumption is exceptionally high in some countries such as Cuba (62 
kg/year), Brazil (59 kg/year), Australia (59 kg/year) and Russia (53 kg/year) while in 
others, per capita consumption is relatively low, in particular in China, Mozambique 
and Malawi, with per capita consumption lower than 15 kilograms per person per year. 
Figure 10: Per capita sugar consumption in selected countries 
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2.3.3 Trade in sugar 
Figure 8 indicates that volume of traded sugar internationally is only a third of the 
world's output, suggesting that the bulk of sugar is retained and consumed in 
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producing countries. For instance, out of a total output of 28 million metric tonnes of 
sugar produced in Brazil in 2004, only about 16 million metric tonnes was exported, 
retaining a total of 12 million metric tonnes for domestic purposes. Similarly for India, 
the second largest producer of sugar, out of total production of 19 million metric 
tonnes, 22 million metric tonnes and 16 million metric tonnes in 2002,2003 and 2004 
respectively, the country only exported about a million metric tonnes in each year 
leaving almost the entire outputs for domestic purposes. As for total exports, Figure 8 
suggests that between 1981 and 2004, world sugar exports have almost doubled rising 
from 28 million metric tonnes to 44 million metric tonnes. 
Figure 11 show that Brazil and EU are the biggest exporters of sugar. However, it 
must be recognised that exports from Brazil constitutes both raw (>65%) and refined 
(<40%) sugar while that of EU is mainly refined sugar. Owing to accelerated growth 
in production and exports in recent years, Brazil is now accounting for half of all 
traded sugar on world market. Together with EU exports, the two production blocks 
supply about two thirds of global traded sugar. Other major exporters of sugar 
supplying between 2 million and 4 million metric tonnes annually are Thailand, 
Australia, Cuba and South Africa, who supply largely raw sugar which is the most 
popular traded sugar on the world market. Between 1997 and 2004, exports of sugar 
from Brazil have gone up three fold from just under 6 million metric tonnes to 16 
million metric tonnes and those of Thailand have gone up by about 2 million metric 
tonnes jumping from 3 million metric tonnes to 5 million metric tonnes during the 
same period. As for the other major exporters, their supplies have remained fairly 
stable during the same period. 
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Figure 11: Graph showing trends in sugar exports 
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Figure 12 shows a contrasting picture that while EU is the second leading exporter of 
sugar, it is at the same time a number one importer of sugar from the world market 
and that its demand for sugar in the world market is steadily growing in recent years 
rising from 4 million metric tonnes in 1997 to 7 million metric tonnes in 2004. It must 
be recognised however that while EU exports largely white sugar to both the rest of 
the world and within EU community, imports of sugar into the Union mainly 
constitute raw sugar from the rest of the world. The second major importer of sugar is 
Russia, whose imports jumped from 3 million metric tonnes to 5 million metric tonnes 
in one season in 1997/98 and since then the country has sustained this level of imports. 
Between the two, EU and Russia, their imports account for slightly over a quarter of 
global traded sugar. Other major destinations of world sugar exports are Indonesia, 
United States, Japan and Canada, who each import roughly between one and two 
million metric tonnes. However, as observed in Figure 12, imports by US have 
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dropped by close to 2 million metric tonnes between 1997 and 2004 declining from 3 
million metric tonnes to just over a million metric tonnes. Indonesian sugar imports 
on the other hand, have grown three field from just over half one million metric tonnes 
to 2 million metric tonnes within the same period. In total, the six countries account 
for up to half of sugar imports from the world market. The remainder is spread and 
sold in different countries and regions across the globe depending on the dietary and 
industrial requirements of this commodity in each country and upon the size of each 
country. 
Figure 12: Graph showing trends in major importers of sugar 
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2.3.4 Terms of trade in world sugar 
Real world market prices for raw sugar have been among the most volatile prices on 
the world market, especially during the 1970's and 1980's (Figure 13). Prices jumped 
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from US$400/tonne in 1972 to US$1,350/tonne in 1975, the highest world market 
prices for raw sugar have ever reached in recent years, and immediately slumped 
downwards in the following four years, reaching as low as US$200/tonne in 1979. In 
1981, prices rose up again to US$700/tonne and since then, world market prices fir 
raw sugar have been gradually and consistently billing to less than US$200/tonne. It 
can be argued that sugar prices have mirrored declining trends in world market prices 
for other primary commodities. 
Figure 13: Graph showing real world market prices of sugar 
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Source: FAO 
2.3.5 Tariffs and subsidies in world sugar production and trade 
For decades, production and trade in sugar have been undertaken under some form of 
Government intervention and support in different parts of the world. Hertel et al (2004) 
observed and reported that up to 60% of global sugar production and 80% of trade is 
affected by distortions. Elobeid (2004) added that the sheer scale and range of 
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Governments' intervention in sugar industry makes the commodity one of the most 
distorted commodities on world markets. Mitchell (2004) reported that virtually, all 
countries in the world, including developing countries as well as those considered low 
cost producers (such as Brazil), do intervene in the sugar industry, although the 
degree and nature of interventions differ from one country to another. Common forms 
of interventions include border tariffs, Tariff Rate Quarters (TRQ's), Quota systems 
of trading, price support mechanisms, and provision of domestic and export subsidies. 
These interventions affect producers and consumers all over the world in different 
forms and magnitudes. 
Mitchell (2004) traces back state intervention in the sugar industry to colonial policies 
in the 16`h and 17`h Century. He argued that at the time governments in Europe shifted 
sugar production from temperate climatic countries to colonies in the tropical 
Caribbean, Pacific and Southern Africa. However, with repeated rebellions and 
resultant disruptions in world sugar supply, European countries opted to subsidise 
their own sugar production. This led to eventual growth in sugar production in Europe 
which subsequently necessitated a second set of policies, namely, border interventions 
which took the form of import tariffs, quota restrictions and tariff rate quotas. Today, 
both rich and poor countries of the globe intervene in their sugar industries. 
Border interventions are by far the most popular policy instruments which countries 
use to regulate their trade in sugar. Tariff Rate Quotas and import tariffs (both in- 
quota and out of quota tariffs) are border interventions that are prevalent in global 
sugar trade. Annex 1 shows that in comparison with other commodities in this 
research (namely cotton, tea and tobacco), sugar is the commodity with by far the 
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highest import tariffs. Mean MFN rates for sugar goes as high as 156% in Taiwan. 
Other countries with exceptionally high sugar tariffs arc; Panama (152%), Turkey 
(137%), India (100%), Poland (96%), Mauritius (80%), Slovakia (75%), Hungary 
(68%), Romania (60%), Czech Republic (64%), China (58%) and Kcnya (58). MFN 
rates for the rest of the world fall between 20% and 50% with a mean of 38%. Table 4 
shows that with exception of Japan, Russia, China, Argentina and India, whose tariffs 
have been rising and/or maintained, many countries have lowered their import tariffs 
over the last three decades. Tariffs in the EU have dropped from Euro424/tonne in 
1983 to Euro339/tonne in 2004/05, while those of the US have fallen from 
US$399/tonne in 1990 to US$339/tonne in 2004/05. Despite these reductions, these 
tariffs are still as much as double the world market price for raw sugar. 
Table 4: Trends in tariffs in selected countries 
Country Unit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina ARS/t 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Brazil 
Tariff 
rate (%) 52,8 50,6 40 46,1 43,9 41,7 39,4 37,2 35 35 35 
Canada CAD4 27 26,3 25,5 24,8 24,1 24,1 24,1 24,1 24,1 24,1 24,1 
China 
Tariff 
rate (%) 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 50 50 50 
EU Euro/t 396 382 368 354 339 339 339 339 339 339 339 
India 
Tariff 
rate (%) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Indonesia 
ff Tari 
rate (%) 107 106 0 0 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Japan JPY/kg 82,4 80,3 78,1 76 73,9 71,8 71,8 71.8 71,8 71,8 71,8 
Mexico MXN/ton 3326 3209 3689 3809 4260 4465 4514 
Russia 
Tariff 
rate (%) 7,1 6,6 6,2 5,7 5,3 40 40 60 103,3 92,6 120,1 
US USS/t 379 369 359 349 339 339 339 339 339 339 339 
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Tariff 
SA 1 rate ("%) 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 103 1 103 1 105 1 105 1 105 1 103 1 103 1 103 
Source: OECD (2006) 
Table 5 shows that there is a wide variety of state sponsored domestic support policies 
which countries use to support sugar producers in their economies. As can be 
observed from Table 5, a common form of support is the imposition of import 
restrictions through import quotas and Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ's). While TRQ's for 
the US have been halved from 2.1 million metric tonnes to 1.1 million metric tonnes 
in the last decade, TRQ's for other dominant importers of sugar, namely, the EU, 
China and Russia, have remained stable over the same period. Notably, the EU and 
Russia have understandably maintained very high TRQ's owing to the fact that the 
two countries are the biggest importers of sugar in world market. It must be pointed 
out that not only do TRQ's restrict flow of imports into countries, they also create a 
tiered system of tariffs in which in quota tariffs are lower than out of quota tariffs. As 
a result of this differential treatment in market access, some countries find themselves 
benefiting from preferential market price margins as well. In particular, TRQ's in both 
the EU and the US are a good example of this, with countries in the ACP and other 
developing regions having guaranteed preferential market access at price margins 
higher than those on world markets. 
Table 5: Support polices in selected countries 
Area Policy Unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
China TRQ auger 000't 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1764 1852 1954 
EU 
intervention 
price Euro/t 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 632 
from A quota 000't 13053 13053 13053 13053 13053 13053 13053 13053 12929 16004 
Effective 000't 19077 18974 19019 18478 18670 18598 18651 18293 18096 18753 
79 
quota 
Subsiduaed 000' 
export euro 773100 686300 639500 592700 545900 499100 499100 499100 499100 499100 
intervention 
India price INRi 425 459 485 527 S61 593 620 643 750 750 
stabilisation 
Japan price JPY/kg 146 143 152 152 152 152 132 152 152 152 
TRQ, raw 
Russia sugar 000't 3650 3650 3650 3950 
Loan rate. 
US cane USSt 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 397 
Loan rate. 
beet USSt 504.9 504,9 504,9 504,9 504.9 504.9 504,9 504,9 504,9 504,9 
TRQ, raw 
sugar 000t 2145 2075 1578 1143 1113 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 
TRQ, refined 000' t 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Source: OECD (2006) 
The other form of support countries provide to their producers is the price support 
mechanism. In the EU and India, this support is known as Intervention price, in Japan 
it is termed as stabilisation price, whereas in the US it is called a Loan rate. Despite 
minor differences in administration, this support is in form of a minimum price of 
sugar paid to farmers and is above the world market price and is designed to give 
farmers a better price thereby improving their production incomes and rural life. As 
can be observed from Table 5, producers in the EU, the US, India and Japan, just to 
mention a few, receive very high prices for sugar compared to world market prices. In 
the EU, farmers are receiving prices that are three to four times higher than the world 
market price, in the US farmers are receiving about double the world market prices 
while in India, farmers receive an additional 50% on top of the world market price. 
With the exception of the USA, nominal price supports have been rising in Japan, 
India and the EU. In the EU, intervention prices to sugar producers have increased 
from Euro211/tonne in 1970 to Euro632/tonne in 2004 while that for the US has been 
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maintained at USR$397/tonne over the same period. In Japan, minimum stabilisation 
prices have sharply increased from JPY43/kg in 1970 to JPY152/kg in 2004 and for 
India, it has grown from INRI30/kg to INR750/kg in the same period. 
Table 5 also shows that the EU is the only region which provides export subsidies to 
firms exporting sugar to the world market. This support is essentially a payment to 
exporters to compensate for the difference between higher intervention producer 
prices and extremely low world market prices. Thus, exporters in the EU buy their 
sugar at artificially high set prices and sell at very low world market prices but they 
are given compensation for the loss they incur as a result of the discrepancy between 
the two prices. Elobeid (2004) added that through this support, EU producers are able 
to export excess sugar on to the world market. However, as Table 5 indicates, export 
subsidies in the EU have been gradually brought down from Euro773 million in 1995 
to Euro499 million in 2004. This reduction also in part explains the downward trend 
in volumes of exports from the EU to the rest of the world. 
2.3.6 Impact of removal of distortions in world sugar 
Research into impacts of removal of distortions in world sugar has generated a lot of 
interest among analysts all over the world, in part because of the apparent high levels 
of state interventions in world sugar production and trade. Analysts all over the world 
have been interested to quantify the likely effects of removal of distortions in world 
sugar on different elements of the commodity (supply, demand and prices) and 
subsequently on different regions and countries. Both partial and general equilibrium 
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models have been developed and used to simulate the impacts of removal of 
distortions in world sugar. 
Under partial equilibrium analysis, models have simulated outcomes in either static or 
dynamic scenarios. Table 6 presents predictions of some of these simulations, 
indicating areas of differences including the year the models were developed (both 
recent and fairly old ones), data that was used in the simulations, the policy 
combinations in the simulations, and, perhaps more importantly, their predicted 
outcomes with removal of distortions on world market prices. Under general 
equilibrium analysis, both GTAP and ATPSM models have also simulated impacts of 
removal of distortions in world sugar. 
Table 6: Snapshot of model results on post distortion reform on sugar 
Change in 
world market 
Model Base Year Distortions price 
: \, ndcrson &I }res Liberalisation by Last Asia 
(1986) 1986 Western Europe 10% 
Web et at (1987) 1984 Global Complete Liberalisation 53% 
OECD (1988) 1981 Cut in support in OECD 11% 
Complete liberalisation of Japan, US 
Wong et al (1988) 1985 and EU alone 33% 
Borrel and Duncan 
(1990) 1984 Complete liberalisation in EU alone 17% 
Huff and Moreddu 
(1990) 1982 - 1988 Multilateral trade liberalisation 5- 25% 
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Lord and Barry 
(1990) 1990 Multilateral trade liberalisation 10 - 30% 
UNCTAD (1995) 2000 Uruguay Round agreement alone 5% 
ABARE (1998) 2000 Uruguay Round agreement alone 5.30% 
Borrel and Pearce 
(1999) 2000 Complete liberalisation 30 - 38% 
NEI (2000) 2000 10% cut in EU support 8% 
CIE (2002) 2000 50% cut in EU price support 16% 
ISO (2004) 1993 - 1995 Complete global liberalisation 43% 
CARD (2005) 2002 - 2003 Complete Liberalisation 66% 
Table 6 show results of some of the partial equilibrium analysis models that have been 
developed since the 1980's to predict the outcomes of the impacts of removal of 
distortions in world sugar. As the table shows, the first four results are for models that 
were developed in the 1980's, the next six are for models developed in the 1990's and 
the last four are for models developed in 2000's. As depicted from the table, in line 
with their years of development, models developed in the 1980's used database for 
that decade and the same is true for those developed in the 1990's and 2000's. In 
terms of distortions considered in simulations, the table shows that levels of 
distortions considered in models were in some cases similar whereas in others they 
differed, with some simulating complete removal whereas others only looked at 
limited removal of distortions. Although for each model, there were other policy 
scenarios and combinations examined, the table has only highlighted results of 
removal of maximum distortion for each model simulation. As the table indicates, 
models predict that with partial or complete removal of distortions in world sugar, 
world sugar prices will likely go up by between 5% and 66% with predictions of 5% 
to 33% coming from models analysing partial removal of distortions whereas those 
83 
models predicting 38% price increase or higher simulated complete distortion removal. 
Specifically, four models from the table included full removal of distortions in their 
simulations and their predictions in terms of world sugar price increase arc 38%, 43%, 
53% and 66%. Apart from other unseen parameter differences, these simulations have 
yielded different results partly due to differences in base year and the time the models 
were developed. Considering that the last two models had benefited from 
contributions from former models, the next three to four paragraphs discusses further 
these last two simulations. 
The most recent simulation in Table 6 was developed by the Centre for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa state university. This model was developed 
based on a simulation by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) 
in 2003 and uses a 2002/03 database. The model simulates both the dynamic and 
static effects of removal of distortions in world sugar under different scenarios in 
different regions and countries. In the static analysis, the model simulates what the 
world sugar market conditions of supply, demand and prices could have been in the 
2002103 season if some or all of the distortions in world sugar were removed whereas 
in the dynamic scenario the model simulates what the removal of some or all of the 
distortions in 2002/03 season will mean in 2011/12. The model simulates three main 
policy scenarios, first, the removal of border interventions only (import tariffs, TRQ's, 
export subsidies and state trading), second, the removal of both border interventions 
and domestic production support programs and thirdly, removal of all distortions 
including those in the consumption side. 
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Under scenario one, the model simulates that if different countries across the globe 
could have removed border interventions in 2002/03, world market prices for sugar 
could have gone up by 32%. The simulation further predicts that these prices could 
have triggered changes in world sugar supply and demand and due to these secondary 
changes, eventual world market prices could have stabilised at an increase of 27% in 
2011/12. On world supply and demand, the model predicts a world trade increase of 
only about 4% in 2011/12, mainly because support programs and policies have been 
maintained under this scenario. When scenario two is considered (if countries had 
removed both domestic support policies and border interventions), world market 
prices for sugar could have gone up by as much as 66% in 2002/2003 and 48% in 
2011/12. The simulation predicts that removal of domestic support policies and border 
interventions will result in major changes in production and flow of world sugar. The 
model predicts that the EU, the long time traditional leading exporter of sugar, will 
experience contraction in sugar production of around 60% which will eventually turn 
the region from being a net exporter to a net importer. Production in other highly 
protected and supported economies will also experience contractions. In Japan, the 
model predicts a fall in sugar production of as much as 84%. India and to a lesser 
extent Mexico and USA are also projected to experience modest declines in their 
sugar productions. On the other hand, in less protected and supported economies such 
as Brazil, Australia and Cuba, increases in world prices are predicted to be an 
incentive for increased sugar production. With further removal of consumption 
distortions in scenario three, the model predicts little further impact on world market 
prices for sugar, as these distortions are proportionally small and highly localised. The 
model simulates that world market prices may be 47% above the base in 2011/12, 
instead of 48%, with substantial effects in countries with consumer support policies 
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such as Cuba, where removal of such distortions may lead to a collapse in domestic 
consumption. 
The model by International Sugar Organisation (ISO, 2004) is also a multi region, non 
spatial equilibrium model consisting of production, consumption and stock demand 
equations for different countries and regions. This model uses a database for 1993 to 
1995 as base year and assumes seven policy scenarios, namely (i) effect of trade 
liberalisation under Uruguay Round Agreement, (ii) effect of complete global 
liberalisation, (iii) effect of partial liberalisation, (iv) effect of complete liberalisation 
in rich countries only, (v) effect of partial liberalisation in rich countries only, (vi) 
effect of complete liberalisation in major developing countries only, and (vii) effect of 
partial liberation in major developing countries. The simulation predicts that with 
complete global trade liberalisation in world sugar, world market prices for sugar will 
go up by 43.2% compared to projected baseline prices of US$267/tonne for 2005. The 
model shows that in many countries production will fall while consumption will rise 
owing to differential impacts of removal of border interventions and support programs. 
The simulation shows that in countries with fewer distortions, such as those in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, price increase will lead to fall in consumption and 
increases in export. On the other hand, for the US, Japan, India and the EU, the model 
shows that these countries will experience the largest increases in imports because of 
relatively high consumer responses to price changes. These impacts are shown to be 
lower in the other scenarios as compared with the complete liberalisation scenario. 
From the partial equilibrium analysis models, it can be concluded that models are 
predicting price increases of between 40% and 60% if all distortions are removed in 
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world sugar. Predictions from general equilibrium models including different versions 
of ATPSM, GTAP, GTAPEM (modified version of GTAP), LINKAGE (dynamic 
GTAP database) and CGE dynamic by different analysts such as ABARE (2000), 
Anderson et at (2000), Beghin et at (2002), Francois (2000), Elobcid, (2004), Borrell 
(1999), and UNCTAD (2005) and results from the ATPSM model run by this study, 
have all predicted world sugar price increases of between 20% and 40% with 
increases nearing 40% under scenarios of complete liberalisation. Further to this, 
these models have simulated aggregate welfare gains of up to US$4.7 billion (Beghin 
and Aksoy, 2002). 
2.4 World Tobacco 
2.4.1 Production 
Figure 14 shows that world tobacco acreage has significantly grown over the last two 
decades. The area under tobacco cultivation almost doubled between 1980 and 1996, 
rising from just over 2.5 million hectares to just under 5.0 million hectares. Since then, 
the area under tobacco cultivation has stabilised at around 3.5 million hectares. Jaffe 
(2003) observed that much of the tobacco expansion has taken place in developing 
countries, especially in China and Malawi. He reported growth in the area under 
tobacco cultivation in developing countries to be around 1.46% per annum. 
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Figure 14: Graph showing trends in global tobacco cultivation 
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On top of expansions in area under tobacco cultivation, tobacco yields have also gone 
up in the last two decades. Figure 15 shows that yields for tobacco leaf have steadily 
and progressively increased from 1,200kg/ha in 1980 to 1,570kg/ha in 1997 and 
finally stabilised at around 1,500kg/ha. FAO (2003) however observed differential 
growth in tobacco yields across countries. They observed that while high yield growth 
have been observed in some countries (such as the USA, China, Japan and Brazil), 
there has been very little increases in yields in some low income countries, such as 
Malawi. 
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Figure 15: Graph showing trends in world lohacc(º yields 
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Figure 16 shows world production of tobacco crop between 1980 and 2005. As the 
figure shows, in line with changes in yields and area of tobacco, total tobacco 
production has fluctuated with a gradual slight increase in total output. Despite the 
fluctuations, world tobacco output has increased from just under 5.0 million metric 
tonnes in 1980 to around 6.0 million metric tonnes in 2005. FAO (2003) reports that 
world tobacco production increased by about 60% between 1975 and 2002, mainly as 
a result of increases in yields and hectarage. Nearly all growth came from developing 
countries, which registered growth in excess of 128% during this period. Increase in 
tobacco cigarette demand, perceived higher faun returns for tobacco leaf and 
increased farm efficiency are sore e of the reasons for the growth in tobacco 
production in developing countries (Koester et al, 2004). Figure 16 shows that world 
tobacco production has stabilised at around 6.0 million metric tonnes annually. 
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figure 16: Graph showing trends in world tobacco production 
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Globally, tobacco production is undertaken in nearly 100 countries, of which 80 arc 
developing countries (FAO, 2003). Geographically, cultivation of tobacco is highly 
concentrated with China, the leading world producer of tobacco leaf, accounting for 
close to half of global tobacco output. The three other countries after China (namely 
India, USA and Brazil) in combination account for up to 25% of global tobacco leaf 
output. When a further seven other countries (namely, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, 
Italy, Greece, Malawi and Argentina) are added to the sum total of the top four 
producers, the total comes to 80% of global output. 
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Figure 17: Graph shoeing trends in tobacco production in four major producer 
countries 
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Figure 17 shows that tobacco production in China (around 2 million metric tonnes) is 
more than four times output in each of the second and third major world producers of 
tobacco leaf. As can be depicted, outputs in China, India and Brazil have remained 
fairly steady while output in USA has been falling. As for varieties of tobacco, the 
most widely grown types are Flue cured, Burley and Oriental, which respectively 
account for about 60%, 15% and 10% of global tobacco output. China produces more 
than half of the world's flue cured tobacco supply, with other major producers of this 
tobacco variety being the US, Brazil, India and Zimbabwe. The largest producers of 
burley tobacco are the US and Malawi, followed by China and Brazil. Turkey is by 
far the biggest producer of oriental tobacco, accounting for up to 40% of global 
oriental output. The other major producer of oriental tobacco is Greece. 
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2.4.2 Tobacco Consumption 
Tobacco leaf is largely consumed by humans as cigarettes. Jaffee (2003) reported that 
among the various cigarette types, greater demand is now going towards consumption 
of American tobacco blends which are produced with a mixture of Flue, Burley and 
Oriental tobacco varieties. lie reported that out of the 5.5 trillion units of tobacco 
consumed in 2000,43% were American tobacco blends, up from 33% in 1990. 
Figure 16 shows that world tobacco production increased from just under 5.0 million 
metric tonnes in 1980 to 6.0 million metric tonnes in 2005. Jaffee (2003) observed 
similar trends in world tobacco leaf use since the 1960's. He reported growth rates of 
2% per annum between 1998 and 2005 and projected a further increase of up to 2.3% 
per annum growth rates for the period 2005 to 2010. However, growth in tobacco 
consumption has not been even in all countries and regions across the globe. While 
there have been annual increases of 3.2% in Developing countries, consumption in 
developed countries has been falling by around 0.7% over the same period. Asia, and 
in particular, China is the country and region where much of the growth in tobacco 
use have been experienced. Rising incomes coupled with growing middle class 
populations in the region have contributed to more people joining the habit of 
smoking. In contrast, taxation policies, campaigns on health risks from smoking 
cigarettes, and general restrictions on smoking have reduced consumption levels in 
developed countries (Kydd et al, 2006). 
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Figure 18: Graph showing tobacco consumption 
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Figure 18 confirms suggestions that tobacco leaf consumption is still growing in 
China while in all other major consuming countries consumption of tobacco is either 
stable or declining. As can be observed, between 1999 and 2003, tobacco leaf use in 
China rose from 2.4 million metric tonnes to 2.8 million metric tonnes, representing 
45% of annual global tobacco use in 2003. The US, India, Russia and Indonesia are 
other equally important consumption areas and regions of tobacco after China. In total, 
these countries consume close to half of the total volume consumed in China and 
about 18% of global tobacco consumption. As observed earlier-on, consumption in 
the US, is steadily and progressively declining. 
2.4.3 World trade in tobacco leaf 
About a third of global annual tobacco leaf output is traded on world markets. This is 
a significant increase from the 1980's and 1990's when only 22% and 24% were 
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traded internationally, respectively. Figure 19 demonstrates that out of 6.0 million 
metric tonnes of annual global tobacco output, only around 2.0 million metric tonnes 
is traded internationally leaving the bulk of tobacco leaf going through cigarette 
manufacturing processing in countries of production. 
Figure 19: Graph showing trends in world tobacco trade 
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Figure 20 shows that although Brazil is the third major grower of tobacco after China 
and India, it is a leading exporter of tobacco leaf on the world market. Tobacco leaf 
exports from Brazil trebled in the last two decades rising from 153,000 metric tonnes 
in 1980 to 450,000 metric tonnes in 2003. Similar trends have also been experienced 
in Zimbabwe and Malawi, where exports of tobacco leaf have jumped from 103,000 
metric tonnes and 49,000 metric tonnes in 1980 to 174,000 metric tonnes and 138,000 
metric tonnes respectively. Overall, tobacco leaf exports from developing countries 
have increased significantly between 1980 and 2000, rising from 814,000 metric 
tonnes to 1.3 million metric tonnes respectively. In contrast, exports from developed 
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countries have fallen substantially over the same period. For instance, Figure 20 
shows that exports of tobacco leaf from the US have progressively gone down from 
158,000 metric tonnes in 1999 to 150,000 metric tonnes in 2003. Considering that US 
was exporting as much as 265,000 metric tonnes in 1980, the current exports are 
down by over 60%. 
Figure 20: Graph showing major exporters of tobacco leaf 
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Figure 21 show that not only is China the major producer of tobacco leaf, it has also 
emerged from being a net exporter of tobacco leaf to the number one importer of 
tobacco leaf from the world market. Imports of tobacco leaf have risen from virtually 
nothing in 1999 to 450,000 metric tonnes in 2003 representing roughly 20% of total 
tobacco leaf traded on the world market. Russia has also increased its imports from 
250,000 metric tonnes to 300,000 metric tonnes within the same period. Other 
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countries which have experienced marginal increases in tobacco leaf' imports are the 
US and Netherlands. In contrast, the UK and Germany have both cut hack on their 
tobacco leaf imports from the world market. Apart from these major importing 
countries, tobacco leaf is imported in numerous other countries across the globe as 
manufacturing of tobacco cigarettes is spread all over the world. Tobacco imports in 
the majority of these countries have remained steady with marginal increases in some 
destinations in the last two decades. 
Figure 21: Graph showing major importers of tobacco leaf 
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2.4.4 Terms of Trade in world tobacco leaf 
Figure 22 shows real world market prices for tobacco for the period between 1972 and 
2004. As the figure shows, real world market prices for tobacco have fluctuated 
between US$2.50/kg and US$4.00/kg with a general declining trend in prices over the 
period. The declining trend in prices is similar in many respects to other commodity 
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prices while on fluctuations, Kydd et al (200) argued that stockpiling of tobacco 
stocks is in some instances responsible for price instability in world market. 
Figure 22: Real world market prices for tobacco 
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2.4.5 Distortions in world tobacco leaf production and Trade 
Distortions in world tobacco leaf production and trade are mainly in two main forms: 
border distortions and price support programs. On border interventions, almost all 
countries importing tobacco leaf from the world market impose some form of tariffs. 
Annex I shows the MFN rates for different countries which range from 3.5% to as 
high as 200%. Some of the countries with exceptionally high tariffs are; the US (58%), 
Thailand (60%), Shri Lanka (60%), Slovakia (64%), Solomon Islands (60%), 
Seychelles (200%), Saudi Arabia (100%), Poland (104%), Oman (100%), Mexico 
(56%), Mauritius (55%), Kuwait (70%), Bhutan (100%) and Barhain (100%). 
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Globally the average MFN rates for tobacco leaf is around 38% with the majority of 
importing countries imposing between 10% and 50% tariffs. 
On price support, the US is leader in provision of price support to its growers. 
Anderson (2004) reported that the US provides its growers a faun gate price which is 
higher than the world market price for tobacco leaf. China, India, the EU and Brazil 
also provide tobacco leaf producers with price support mechanisms which effectively 
allow growers to receive tobacco leaf prices which are above the world market prices. 
In developed countries, in particular, in the US and the EU, price support mechanisms 
are given to primarily support farm incomes whereas in developing countries, price 
support are given to boost the quality and quantity of tobacco leaf. FAO (2003) noted 
that while tobacco export taxation was the most common policy instrument for most 
low income countries in the 1970's and 1980's, price support mechanisms have 
remained the major form of intervention in tobacco industries in developed countries. 
Other forms of interventions in world tobacco production and trade are import 
restrictions through non tariff measures and provision of export support and 
safeguards to protect domestic producers. The US and EU provide the highest levels 
of support followed by China, India and Brazil. 
2.4.6 Impact of removal of distortions in world tobacco leaf 
In comparison with cotton and sugar, there have been very few studies that have 
simulated impacts of removal of distortions in tobacco leaf production and trade using 
partial equilibrium analysis models. The majority of studies that have simulated 
impacts of removal of distortions are general equilibrium models which have only 
included tobacco as one of the many commodities in the analyses. Three main reasons 
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can explain why tobacco has failed to generate much interest: (i) worldwide anti 
smoking campaigns means that global policy makers are not interested in long term 
prospects for the crop; (ii) compared with cotton and tobacco, global distortions in 
tobacco arc relatively low, both in terms of scale and size; and (iii) production and 
trade in tobacco is much more south to south, with relatively weak participation from 
the North. GTAP and ATPSM are again the two main general equilibrium models that 
have included parameters for tobacco leaf production and trade in their simulations. 
Results from the ATPSM model, which was run by this study, found that removal of 
tariffs and subsidies on world market for tobacco will increase world market prices by 
9%. Other results mainly from GTAP and GTAPEM as reported by Peters (2006) and 
Beghin et al (2002) indicate that removal of market distortions in world tobacco will 
increase world market prices by between 8% and 12%. 
2.5 Tea 
2.5.1 Production 
There are two main types of tea, namely black tea and green tea. Apart from variety 
differences, the two teas differ in the types of processes they go through. Black teas 
are a result of full oxidisation of tea leaves while green teas go through steaming, 
rolling and drying without any oxidisation. Worldwide, black tea constitutes about 
75% of global tea production while green teas make up the remaining 25%. This 
research only focused on black tea, hence all the following discussion relates to black 
tea only. 
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Figure 23 shows that global black tea production has progressively risen since the 
1970's. Global output for black Ica has risen by about 75% from 1.78 million metric 
tonnes in 1978 to 3.1 million metric tonnes in 2003 representing an annual increase of 
around 3%. Improvements in yields mainly as a result (it' improved varieties and 
expansion of hectarage are among the major reasons for the increase in global outputs 
for black tea. The International Tea Committee (ITC) projects an annual increase of 
1.9% in black tea output between 2005 and 2010 with much of the growth coming 
from yield improvements rather than expansion in cultivated area. 
Figure 23: Graph showing trends in global production of black tea 
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Global production of tea is highly concentrated in tropical and semi-tropical countries. 
Although there are up to 36 producing countries in the world, 19 of which are ACP 
countries, global production is highly concentrated in a very few countries, five in 
Asia and one in Africa. Figure 24 show that India is the major producer of tea 
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followed by its neighbouring country, China. In combination, the two countries 
constitute over half' of the world's tea production annually. In comparison to India. 
where production of tea has been growing at an average of 2% between 1978 and 
2003. in China tea production has brown by about 7.5% annually rising from 268.000 
metric tonnes to 768. (K)O metric tonnes. When outputs from other major producing 
countries in Asia. namely. Sri Lanka and Indonesia are added to those cif ('hing and 
India, the region ends up producing just over 80% of world's tea output. The only 
major tea producing country outside Asia is Kenya in Sub Saharan Africa, producing 
about 10% of global tea output leaving the remainder of 10% tea output as sum total 
of all the other countries that produces tea on the globe. 
Figure 24: Graph showing major producers of black tea 
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2.5.2 Consumption 
Figure 25 shows that global tea consumption has grown at par with production at 
around 2.6% growth per annum between 1992 and 2001. Global tea consumption rose 
from 2.0 million metric tonnes in 1982 to 3.0 million metric tonnes in 2001. India and 
China are major consumers of tea in the world. India is by far the largest consumer of' 
tea accounting for up to 20% of the world's tea output. China is the second leading 
consumer of tea, taking up to 13% of global tea production annually. UK, Russia, 
Pakistan and Japan are other countries that account for large quantities of tea from 
global production. 
Figure 25: Graph showing relationship between production and consumption of 
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In terms of per capita consumption, data from the International Tea Committee (2006) 
shows that Northern Ireland is the leading country with per capita tea consumption of 
2.71kg per person. The second, third, fourth, and fifth countries are Libya, Turkey, 
Qarta and UK which have per capita tea consumptions of around 2.65kg, 2.39kg, 
2.33kg and 2.28kg respectively. ITC (2006) data shows that in all these countries, per 
capita tea consumption has been gradually falling from their 1970's peaks of around 
4.0kg per person to around 2.35kg per person at the beginning of 2000's. Despite the 
fall in per capita consumption in these countries, per capita consumption in other 
countries has been picking up pace. 
2.5.3 Trade in world tea 
Figure 25 shows that up to 60% of global tea production is retained for consumption 
in producing countries while 40% is traded on the world market. Figure 25 also 
indicates that the volume of traded tea has doubled from just over 700,000 metric 
tonnes in 1972 to 1.4 million metric tonnes in 2003. Between 1972 and 1990, volumes 
of traded tea increased by 3.4% annually. Increases in incomes in most developing 
countries, including those in the Middle East, explain the sharp increases in both tea 
production and trade (ITC, 2006). Figure 25 also demonstrates that there is equal 
growth in retentions of tea in producing countries. This is particularly the case for the 
two major producers, namely, India and China. 
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Figure 26: Graph shorn ing trends in world tea exports 
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Figure 27 shows that India and Sri Lanka have been the major exporters of tea in the 
world since the 1960's. In the early 1970's the two countries were accounting for up 
to two thirds of global tea trade. However, since the early 1980's, the share of export 
trade on world market from the two countries has been declining substantially as 
exports from Kenya and China have sharply increased. While tea exports from India 
and Sri Lanka have more or less remained the same at around 200,000 metric tonnes 
annually, exports from both China and Kenya have increased five fold from 50,000 
metric tonnes in 1972 to 250,000 metric tonnes in 2003, making the two countries 
major exporters of tea together with Sri Lanka and marginally ahead of India. In 2003, 
the four countries accounted for about 75% of total traded tea on world market. Other 
exporters of tea with considerable world tea exports are Malawi, Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Uganda, Vietnam and Indonesia. Theses countries together with the 
major four exporters make up over 90% of total traded tea on world market. 
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Figure 27: Graph showing major exporters of tea 
Source: ITC 
Figure 28 show that the United Kingdom, other European countries, Russia and the 
US are traditionally the major export destinations for tea. Over the last three decades, 
imports of tea in the UK, the long time number one importer of tea, have been 
gradually falling from 200,000 metric tonnes in 1972 to just under 150,000 metric 
tonnes. Imports in other European countries and in Russia rose sharply between 1980 
and 1990, from under 100,000 metric tonnes each to 340,000 metric tonnes and 
235,000 metric tonnes respectively. However, since those peaks, imports in these two 
regions have fallen back to around 100,000 metric tonnes, and they have since been 
maintained at between 100,000 metric tonnes and 150,000 metric tonnes. In contrast 
to the UK, imports of tea in the US have gradually gone up from around 70,000 
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350000 t- 
metric tonnes in 1972 to I (X), OOO metric tonnes in 2(1)3. In total, the three regions or 
countrics arc importing close to a third of total tea traded on the world market. In all 
the other regions and countries, tea imports have, by and large, increased. 
Figure 28: Graph showing trends in major importers of tea 
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2.5.4 Terms of trade in world tea trade 
There are two main methods by which tea is traded internationally. The first method, 
which is by far the biggest method by which tea is transacted internationally, is by 
means of auction markets. Tea auctions began in 1679 with the opening of the 
London market and in the 19`h Century two more markets were opened in Colombo 
and Calcutta. With the closure of the London auction market in 1998, there are now 
five major auction markets across the world including two in Africa, namely 
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Mombasa (in Kenya) and I. imbe (in Malawi), and fur in Asia (Jakarta. Calcutta, 
Colombo and Chittagong). The second means by which tea is exchanged 
internationally is through private contracts, whereby international buyers sign specific 
contracts with growers across the globc who supply them with tea at agreed prices and 
other contractual terms. This method is increasingly becoming attractive to many 
transacting partners owing to supply chain management changes in global marketing. 
Figure 29 show trends in real world market prices fair tea at London auction market 
between 1974 and 1998. As the figure shows, real market prices for tea have 
fluctuated significantly between US$ I. 50/kg and US$5.00/kg with general declining 
trend in prices over the period in question. While fluctuations were considerable in the 
1970's. the trend was more gradual decline in prices since the early 1980's and the 
pattern is similar in many respects to declining trends in other primary commodities 
on the world markets. 
Figure 29: Trends in real market prices for London auction market 
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2.5.5 Distortions in world tea production and trade 
Distortions in world tca production and tradc are mainly in two arcas. The main form 
of intervention, which is by far the most common and widely used, is border 
intervention, through which countries impose tariffs on imports of tea thereby limiting 
the flow of trade. Annex 1 shows how widespread this intervention is in different 
countries across the globe in both rich and poor countries. As can be observed, MFN 
rates for tea range from 5% to 145%, with countries with exceptionally high tariffs 
including Turkey (145%), India (100%), Tunisia (73%), Thailand (60%), Slovakia 
(52%), Seychelles (50%) and Bhutan (50%). MFN rates for tea in the majority of 
countries of the globe are concentrated around 10% and 40%, with a world average 
MFNrate of3l%. 
The other major state intervention is support to production given to growers in major 
tea producing regions and countries. State support to production is mainly apparent in 
China and India, where growers are given price supports with guaranteed premium 
prices for their tea. This intervention helps to enhance production and output of tea in 
these countries. However, comparing with cotton and sugar, the scale of support in tea 
production and trade is proportionally smaller globally. 
2.5.6 Impact of removal of distortions in world tea 
Research into impacts of removal of distortions in world tea production and trade is 
generally thin, in part because of the proportionally small usage of state intervention 
in tea in comparison with other primary commodities. The only studies that have 
incorporated tea as one of the commodities in their simulations are the general 
equilibrium models. Two main institutional models, namely GTAP and ATPSM 
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together with their various revisions, are the two well known general equilibrium 
models that have included tea database in their simulations. Findings from the 
ATPSM model, which this study conducted, indicated that removal of tariffs and 
subsidies in global tea production and marketing will result in world market price 
increases of 9%. Results from GTAP models shows that removal of market distortions 
in world tea will lead to increases in world tea prices ranging from 7% to 10% using 
2002 world market prices (Beghin at al (2002) and Peters (2006)). 
2.6 Summary of findings, conclusions and policy implications of the analyses of 
model results on removal of tariffs and subsidies on world markets 
Findings of the review of literature and model simulations on impacts of removal of 
tariffs and subsidies on world markets for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea have shown 
that global removal of tariffs and subsidies in these commodities would result in 
world market equilibrium positions with higher prices and higher quantities demanded 
and supplied. For cotton, the review has shown that global removal of tariffs and 
subsidies would likely increase world market prices by between 10% and 20%. In 
world sugar, the review has shown that removal of market distortions will increase 
prices by 20% to 40% whereas in tobacco and tea, removal of tariffs and subsidies 
will increase world market prices by 8% - 12% and 7% - 10% respectively. High price 
increases in sugar and cotton are explained by existence of high levels of market 
distortions both in terms of high tariffs and large volumes of subsidies in these 
commodities. It is therefore concluded that global removal of tariffs and subsidies will 
indeed increase world market prices of commodities and that the magnitude of price 
increases will depend on the extent of existing market distortions in global production 
and marketing systems of individual commodities. The study has observed this 
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conclusion to be consistent with postulations of economic theory as outlined in 
chapter 1. The policy implication for this outcome is that global removal of market 
distortions in export commodities produced by resource poor producers of the world 
has the potential to increase world market prices of these commodities. This 
observation is in line with those arguing for removal or reductions in global market 
distortions. 
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Chapter Three: An empirical analysis of price transmission 
between world markets and domestic markets in Malawi 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of an empirical analysis of price transmission between 
world commodity markets and their corresponding domestic markets in Malawi. The 
analysis builds on work from the previous chapter and quantitatively investigates the 
nature of the relationship between world commodity market prices and domestic 
market prices for tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea in Malawi. Specifically, the research 
investigated three research questions during this analysis: (i) whether there is price 
transmission between world commodity markets and domestic markets for tobacco, 
cotton, sugar and tea in Malawi; (ii) what is the duration that domestic prices for 
commodities in Malawi take to adjust in line with world market price changes; and, 
(iii) what are the elasticities of price transmission in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar 
and tea supply systems. These research questions were pursued with the underlying 
aim of determining whether a rise in world commodity market prices due to removal 
of distortions will result in corresponding increases or decreases in domestic market 
prices of these commodities in Malawi. 
In terms of layout of this chapter, the chapter begin with presentation of the theory 
behind price transmission concept followed by analytical methods that were used in 
this investigation. Then the chapter discusses each commodity in turn, describing the 
relationship between Malawi's commodity supply systems and the corresponding 
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world commodity markets, in terms of production, export supply and terms of trade. 
The chapter later discusses results of price transmission analysis for each commodity 
and interpretation of the results. The chapter concludes with summary of findings of 
this analysis. 
3.2 Theoretical Framework of Price Transmission 
Price transmission between two marketing points, separated either vertically or 
spatially, has been widely studied and documented in literature. As a concept and 
analytical tool, price transmission is conceptualized within the framework of 
neoclassical economic perfect market structures and is based on the Law of One Price 
(FAO, 2005). Carman (1997) defined the Law of One Price (LOP) as a condition 
where differences in prices of a good or service between two marketing points 
separated either spatially or vertically is equal to transfer or value addition costs 
respectively. Specifically for the case involving world commodity market prices and 
domestic prices, Margarido (2005) interpreted LOP to mean long run unitary price 
transmission elasticities between the two prices as the differences between the two 
prices will always equal transfer costs. Thus, as long as domestic markets are strongly 
linked to world market, changes in global market prices will exhibit an equal impact 
on the domestic market. Price transmission analysis therefore is concerned with 
investigating the extent to which a price change at one point affects price changes at 
another point, and this indicates broadly whether there is sufficient and efficient 
arbitrage between the two prices (Sharma, 2003). 
There are two main approaches that have been used to analyse price transmission in 
current literature. The first approach is termed non-structural and focuses on dynamics 
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of price transmission processes and uses properties of co-integrated time series and 
related econometrics. In this method, factors determining transmission are treated as 
external prior information rather than the outcome of a theoretical framework (FAO, 
2004). In other words, this method uses data as starting point, and tests indicate the 
extent to which prices adjust toward equilibrium position. In this methodology, testing 
for price transmission is mainly aimed at checking the degree of efficiency of markets, 
in terms of their being close to the perfect market structure model, or as tests for 
market integration. A comprehensive analytical framework for this econometric 
approach is described by Balcombe and Morrison (2002). In this methodology, co- 
integration between the price series analyzed implies that two prices may behave in a 
different way in the short run, but that they will converge toward a common 
behaviour in the long run. If this property is verified, the characteristics of the 
dynamic relationship between the prices are described by an Error Correction Model 
(ECM). Despite a number of caveats, Rapsomanikis et al. (2003) argued that the 
short-run adjustment parameter of this type of model is interpreted as a measure of the 
speed of price transmission, while the long run multiplier is interpreted as a measure 
of the degree of price transmission of one price to the other. Prakash (1999) also 
added that the properties of co-integrated series also imply the existence of causality 
relationship as defined by Granger (1987) that can be tested by assessing if the past 
observations of one of the two prices predict or fail to predict those of the other. 
Balcombe and Morrison (2002) indicated that most analyses start by investigating the 
dynamic properties of the price series through to tests for the presence of unit roots, 
then proceed with co-integration tests, and end up with specification of the ECMs. 
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The second approach is structural methodology and uses an cntircly different 
behavioural rule from the simple equalization of price behaviour (FAO, 2004). This 
methodology is frequently used with vertical price transmission analysis as opposed 
to spatial. It uses industrial economic applications to address presence of market 
power and/or increasing returns to scale in production. Fackler and Goodwin (2001) 
contain a wide critical review of findings of recent studies using this methodology. 
3.3 The Analytical Framework 
This research used the non structural econometric modelling approach to investigate 
price transmission between world commodity markets for tobacco, cotton, sugar and 
tea and Malawi's commodity markets. Relevant world and domestic market prices 
were collected and used in this analysis. Modelling of the relationship in prices, 
especially for tobacco and cotton took into account structural changes introduced as a 
result of policy changes (these are discussed in their respective commodity sections). 
Drawing from Mo Zhou et al (2005), each commodity data set was tested to three 
stages of analyses as outlined below. 
3.3.1 Testing for stationarity or non stationarity of data 
In the first step, both sets of price data, domestic and world market reference prices, 
were first tested for stationarity and/or non stationarity of data using relevant orders of 
the Dicky Fuller test (Dickey et al, 1991). This test was conducted following the 
observation by Weinhagen (2005) that price transmission models are difficult to 
construct using non stationary data sets and that any follow up tests aimed at 
estimating significance of coefficients of any models derived from such data sets tend 
to be invalid. By definition, time series data is considered stationary when mean, 
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variance and covariance of the time series is not dependent on time (Balcombe and 
Morrison, 2002). Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is a one tailed test which is 
used to test whether a time series data set is stationary or not and this test has a null 
hypothesis which postulates that any time series data is non stationary unless 
otherwise proven (Dickey et al, 1991). Once an ADF test has been taken, the null 
hypothesis is rejected when the observed ADF test statistic has a higher negative 
value than the critical value of -2.8989 (Weinhasen, 2005). In this respect, rejection 
of the null hypothesis means that the time series data set is stationary and failure to 
reject means the data set is accepted as non stationary. Where a data set is observed to 
be stationary, then it is taken straight into the next step of formulating the model 
equation for the relationship between the two price series using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS estimation) and Unrestricted Vector Auto Regression scenario, 
otherwise, where data is non stationary, a different pathway of data analysis is 
adopted where restrictions to vectors are introduced (Mo Zhou et al, 2005). 
3.3.2 Construction of Vector Auto Regression Models 
In the second stage the two time series data sets were analysed for existence of long 
run relationships between them with a view to determine whether the two data sets 
move together in a predictable way or simply wander around arbitrarily from each 
other. Thomas (1993) defined co-integration as the statistical implication of the 
existence of long run relationships between variables. Principally, co-integrated 
variables move together over time such that short run disturbances are normalised in 
the process (Manning and Adriacanos, 1993). A lack of co-integration on the other 
hand means that there is no long run relationship between the variables, thus variables 
simply wander around arbitrarily from each other (Dickey et al, 1991). Testing for co- 
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integration was done using the modified version of Vector Auto Regression (VAR) 
model in Mundlack and Larson (1992) which hypothesises non linear relationship 
between two time series variables. In data sets where the null hypothesis was rejected, 
the coefficient of the independent variable was interpreted as measure of degree of 
price transmission such that when it is close to unity then it means changes in one 
market fully passes on to the other market. The Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model 
by Mundlack and Larson (1992) assumes domestic prices of a single commodity 
being a function of its respective world market price and the disturbance term and is 
represented as follows: 
" Pm 
=a+ßJtm+ctm 
Where, P. refers to prices for commodity m in the domestic market in Malawi in time 
t and P, ; is corresponding world market price for commodity ni in time t. a is a 
constant (an intercept) and ß is the elasticity of the domestic price against its 
international price, thus, it is the elasticity of price transmission (Margarido, 2005). 
The interpretation of ß is that when it is unity then it means variations in the 
international market are fully passed on to domestic market in Malawi and if the value 
is zero, then it implies variations in world market prices do not lead to any responses 
in domestic prices. As Mo Zhou et al (2005) observed, the most common situation is 
that the value of fl lies between 0 and 1. The study will therefore determine the short- 
run adjustment parameter, which is essentially the measure of the speed of price 
transmission, and the long run multiplier or ECM, which is the measure of extent of 
price transmission. 
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3.3.3 Testing for causality 
In the third and final analysis, the two data sets where co-integration was established 
were tcstcd for direction of causation to determine which of the two prices causes the 
other to change. This analysis followed Granger (1987) and the tests analysed to 
determine which of the two price series predicted or failed to predict the other. The 
hypothesis in this analysis is that there is no causation relationship between the two 
time series data. Where such a hypothesis was rejected it meant causation was verified. 
3.3.4 Data collection and use 
Two main types of data sets covering a period of thirty years and above were required 
in the price transmission analysis for each of the four crops (tobacco, cotton, sugar 
and tea). The first type of data was time series data on world market prices for each of 
the four crops. World market prices for tobacco, cotton and sugar were collected from 
FAO database while prices for tea were supplied by the International Tea Committee. 
The second type of data was time series price data on domestic prices of the four 
commodities. Ideally, two types of domestic prices were required for each of the four 
commodities: export prices (for partially processed tobacco and for processed cotton 
lint, sugar and tea) and producer prices (auction market prices for tobacco and 
smallholder farm gate prices for cotton, sugar and tea). The study encountered 
difficulties in accessing these data sets from the respective industries. The industries 
could not supply the required data partly because they argued price data is sensitive 
and partly because of general poor record keeping and data management systems by 
majority of industries in Malawi. The study went around this problem by sourcing the 
data from secondary sources such as Government Departments, International 
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Agencies and regulatory institutions. Thus, the study sourced data on domestic sugar 
and cotton prices from Ministry of Agriculture, tea prices from the international Tca 
Committee and tobacco prices from the Tobacco Control Commission. 
The study encountered two main problems associated with the data that was used in 
this analysis. The first problem related to the general availability of required data. The 
study could not access time series data on export prices for cotton and producer prices 
for sugar and tea. As a consequence, rather than using producer prices for all the four 
commodities (the prices that smallholder farmers receive), the study used export 
prices in tea and sugar, which are prices for factory owners as opposed to smallholder 
farmers' prices. Thus, the study used smallholder farmer producer prices for cotton 
and tobacco price transmission analysis while for sugar and tea, the study used 
processed prices for factory owners. It was not possible to use smallholder farmer 
producer prices for tea and sugar primarily because of lack of properly recorded time 
series data sets. Further to this, apart from tea, where the study accessed the desired 
disaggregated data to monthly level, the study could not get consistent monthly price 
data series for the other crops, hence, the study used monthly data in tea price 
transmission analysis alone whereas in the other crops, the study used annual price 
data. 
The second limitation of the price data used in this analysis related to quality of data 
in general teens. The study observed that where data was sourced from two or three 
secondary sources, there were sometimes significant variations in some data points, 
and this raised problems of determining which source was correct. The study 
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considered this as evidence of qucstionability of quality of data from secondary 
sourccs. 
3.4 Price transmission in Tea 
3.4.1 Malawi and the global tea market 
Tea was introduced in Malawi in 1880. Up to 1968, tea was the single largest foreign 
exchange earner for the country. Since then, tobacco and sugar have both overtaken 
tea as first and second major foreign exchange earners for Malawi respectively. 
Among other factors, Figure 30 suggests that there has been limited expansion in area 
under tea over the last four decades. Hectarage under tea increased marginally from 
I4,500ha in 1972 to 18,000ha in 1979 and since then it has stalled at around 19,000ha. 
This is in sharp contrast to global tea hectarage which has steadily risen due to 
expansions in major growing countries such as India, Indonesia, China and Kenya. 
Overall, area under tea in Malawi is close to 0.8% of the global tea plantation area. 
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Figure 30: Area of Tea in N1alam i 
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Figure 31 shows that tea production in Malawi doubled between 1972 and 1982 from 
20,000metric tonnes to 40,000 metric tonnes mainly as a result of expansions in 
hectarage from around 14,500ha to 19,000ha (Figure 30) and yield improvements 
from around 1.5 metric tonnes per hectare to 2.0 metric tonnes per hectare. Since then, 
production of tea in Malawi has fluctuated between 30,000 metric tonnes and 45,000 
metric tonnes mainly depending on climatic and weather conditions (TAM, 2006). As 
Figure 31 demonstrates, there have been substantial falls in tea output in three seasons, 
namely, 1982/83,1986/87 and 1991/92. These seasons were recorded as major 
drought years for Malawi in the 1980's and 1990's. 
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Figure 31: Trends in Malawi tea production 
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Globally, Malawi tea accounts roughly 1.1% of annual global tea output. Figure 32 
shows that although Malawi more than doubled its tea output between 1972 and 2003 
as observed from Figure 31, its share of global tea production has steadily fallen from 
around 2% to 1.1% over the same period mainly as a result of sustained increases in 
global tea production. Figure 32 shows Malawi's output to be very small when 
compared to global tea output. Figure 24 on the other hand, showed rather a 
contrasting picture to Figure 32 in that it presented Malawi as significant player in 
global tea output as it ranks the country among the twelve leading producers of tea in 
the world. 
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Figure 32: N1alaw-, "i tea versus global tea outputs 
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3.4.2 Malawi in the global tea supply and consumption system 
Malawi exports 95% of its annual tea outputs to the world market. This is in sharp 
contrast to the global tea production system which only trades around 40% of global 
output. with the balance of 60% is consumed in producing countries, mainly in India 
and China. Figure 33 shows Malawi's tea exports to have mirrored national outputs 
doubling from 20,000 metric tonnes to 40,000 metric tonnes between 1970's and 
1980's. Since then tea exports from Malawi have fluctuated between 35,000 metric 
tonnes and 50,000 metric tonnes mainly as a result of fluctuations in tea production. 
On average. Malawi tea exports account for between 3.5% and 5% of global traded 
tea. 
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Figure 33: Graph showing trends in Malami tea exports 
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Malawi is the eighth major exporter of tea after Sri Lanka, China, India, Kenya, 
Indonesia, Argentina and Vietnam in that order (Figure 27). Table 7 shows that 
United Kingdom is the biggest export destination for Malawi's tea, taking close to 
45% of Malawi's tea exports. The second leading importer of Malawi tea is South 
Africa, which takes approximately 15% of Malawi's tea exports. Continental Europe 
and the US are the third and fourth major export destinations for Malawi's tea each 
importing around 5% of Malawi's tea exports. Around 10% of Malawi's tea export is 
also channelled through the Mombasa tea auction market in Kenya, while the 
remainder of Malawi tea is exported to countries in other African countries, Middle 
East, Asia and other North and South American countries. TAM (2006) indicated that 
recently there has been a major shift in Malawi tea export destinations, with more and 
more of its tea shifting away from the UK market to the other markets, mainly in 
emerging tea markets in the Middle East and Africa. 
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Table 7: Export destinations for Malawi tea in metric tonnes 
CO('NTRY 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
('K 16158 19009 14580 17511 20101 
Germany 837 848 524 344 III 121 
Netherlands 3971 2427 2469 821 1180 661 
Continental 
Europe 576 3170 1420 1796 1835 1519 
Canada 521 473 399 482 313 476 
USA 1989 1735 1390 2476 1455 1750 
Pakistan 2704 2572 2909 1664 926 1255 
Other Asia 286 541 530 560 763 854 
Botswana 276 695 857 500 525 600 
Egypt 14 264 655 430 792 445 
Kenya 752 3076 5418 2726 2627 4531 
South Africa 9904 6709 6818 8666 9291 9177 
Zambia 6 29 38 9 2 4 
Other Africa 255 836 121 89 95 475 
overseas 429 330 329 207 186 46 
Total 32648 42734 38437 . 18261 39386 42015 
1 
source: IR 
In terms of marketing arrangements for export of tea in Malawi, there are two main 
ways by which tea is sold. The first is through the auction market in Limbe. This 
market was established well before independence of Malawi in 1964 and is among the 
leading ten major tea auction markets in the world, in particular it is one of the only 
two tea auction markets in Africa. The second method is through direct and forward 
contract sales of tea to buyers, and this is steadily growing in its importance. Detailed 
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discussion on forms of contractual arrangements and other aspects of market 
transactions in these markets is presented later in the thesis in chapter six. 
3.4.3 Tunis of trade for Malawi teas 
Apart from volatility in priccs in all major tca auction markcts, Figurc 34 also shows 
that Limbe prices are the lowest of all the other major tea auction markets of the 
world. This issue is discussion in more detail in chapter six. The other thing noted 
from Figure 34 is the extreme volatility in Indian auction market prices. Compared to 
other auction market prices which seem to exhibit a gradual and stable pattern of 
fluctuations, volatility in Indian price is rather deep and severe. ITC (2006) argue that 
being world's major producer, consumer and exporter of tea, India's internal market 
changes heavily influence its price volatility. This being the case, with the closure of 
London auction market which was considered as the world's reference tea price point, 
FAO, UNCTAD and other leading research institutions adopted the more stable 
Kenyan auction market prices as representative of world reference prices for tea. This 
research also uses Kenyan prices as world reference market prices for tea. On the 
other hand, Limbe auction prices were also adopted as Malawi prices considering that 
these are the market prices for Malawi tea at freely open market. 
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Figure 34: Graph showing trends in monthly tea prices in major Auction markets 
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3.4.4 Tests for stationarity for Malawian and world reference tea prices 
Before conducting formal econometric tests for price data stationarity using ADF test 
statistics and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion, both sets of data, Malawi prices and world 
reference market prices, were graphically plotted to make visual observation of the 
trends prevailing between the two data sets. As can be observed from Figure 34, the 
two price data sets seem to follow each other in a more predictable way with Limbe 
auction market prices effectively following changes in world reference prices. 
Table 8 show results of stationarity test for Malawi tea prices. In principle, time series 
data are considered stationary when ADF test statistics for the data sets are higher 
than the ADF critical value of -2.8835 where only intercept is included and -3.445 
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whcrc both intcrccpt and timt trcnd arc includcd in the tcst statistic (Wcinhabcn, 
2005). In this research, up to twelve orders of ADF were considered but only results 
of orders one to four arc presented in tabular forms in this research. Furthermore, this 
research has examined stationarity of price data series at two levels, first where only 
an intercept was included and second where both an intercept and time trend were 
included in the analysis. As can be observed from the first part of the test results 
where only an intercept was included in the test, Malawi tea prices arc shown to be 
stationary under all the orders of ADF, as negative values of ADF test statistics are 
much higher than the ADF critical value of -2.8835. In the second part of the results, 
where both intercept and time trend were included, Table 8 show that with exception 
of order zero, Malawi prices are shown to be stationary under all the other orders, as 
ADE test statistics are higher than the ADF critical values of -3.445. In terms of 
choice of order of ADF to take forward to the next analysis of price co-integration, the 
principle is to use order of ADF with the highest Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) 
(Balcombe and Morrison, 2002). In this respect, order one with both intercept and 
time trend would be ideal to take forward to the test of co-integration. However, the 
final decision on the choice of order of ADF and whether to include time trend 
depends on the outcome of ADF test for the other price trend in this case, the world 
market reference price. 
Table 8: Unit Root Test results for Malawi prices 
Unit Root 
Test with 
Order of 
ADF 
ADF Test 
Statistic SBC 
an 0 -3.304 117.95 
Intercept 1 -3.784 117.78 
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only 2 -4.013 116.226 
3 -4.134 114.328 
4 -3.923 111.891 
Unit Root 
0 -3.229 115.531 
Test n Ith 
1 -3.709 115.349 
time trend 
2 -3.938 113.791 
and 
3 -4.059 111.890 
Intercept 4 -3.848 109.454 
Table 9 show results of stationarity test for reference world tea market prices for 
orders one to four. As the results show, orders one to four of the first test where only 
an intercept was included are shown to have higher negative values of ADF test 
statistics which are above the 95% critical value of ADF of -2.8835. This means that 
reference world market prices are stationary with intercept in orders one to four and 
such being the case, the choice of order is to go to an order of ADF with the highest 
SBC and thus, order one. In the second part of the ADF test where both time trend 
and intercept are included in the test, the results show that all ADF test statistics are 
lower than the ADF critical value of -3.445. In this case, it means that inclusion of 
time trend in the follow up econometric analysis will weaken the outcome as 
inclusion of time trend in reference world market price result in data set which is not 
demonstrated to be stationary by the ADF test. 
Table 9: Unit Root Test results for reference world market prices 
Unit Root Order of ADF Test 
Test with ADF Statistic SBC 
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an 0 -2.517 170.414 
Intercept 1 -3.099 172.247 
only 2 -3.247 170.318 
3 -3.073 167.905 
4 -3.961 165.469 
Order of 
ADF 
AUF Test 
Statistic SBC 
Unit Root 0 -2.494 168.171 
Test h lth 1 -3.072 169.951 
time 2 -3.216 168.007 
trend & 3 -3.037 165.597 
Intercept 4 -2.918 163.163 
Two main outcomes have been derived from stationarity tests for both Malawi tea 
prices and world market reference tea prices, outcomes which are to be taken up to the 
next level of co integration analysis. The first observation is that both prices are 
stationary when intercept is included in the ADF tests. This means that the two price 
data series can be treated as stationary data series in all follow up analysis work. 
Secondly, SBC test results of the two time series data sets show order one to be most 
ideal for next level co integration analysis. This suggests that doing a co integration 
analysis of order one where only intercept is included in the analysis will provide the 
most ideal and best model results of the nature and extent of co integration of the two 
price series. Thus, the next level analysis will proceed on the basis that the two price 
series are stationary under order one where only an intercept is included in their tests. 
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3.4.5 Results of Vector Auto regression Models 
Prior to cstimating the vcctor auto regression modcl for the rclationship bctwccn 
Malawi tea prices and world tea market rcfcrcnce prices, a test statistic and choice 
criteria for selecting the most ideal order for the vector auto regression model was 
conducted. The two main tests used in this choice criterion are Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Schwartz Baycsian Criterion. The principle is to select the order 
of VAR with the highest AIC and SBC (Balcombe and Morrison, 2002). Table 10 
show results of this test where Malawi tea prices and world market reference prices 
were considered as variables and Intercept was considered as exogenous variable. As 
the table shows, the highest AIC and SBC are observed under order two of VAR and 
as such, order two was selected to be taken further into model estimation of the vector 
auto regression. 
Table 10: Test statistic and choice criterion for order of VAR model selection 
Order AIC SBC 
4 335.254 308.779 
3 336.672 316.080 
2 339.687 324.979 
1 336.933 328.109 
0 152.282 149.339 
Table 11 show model results of the auto regression model estimation where Malawi 
prices (LP) were considered as the dependent variable and world reference market 
prices (KP) as the independent variable with intercept (INT) as the exogenous 
variable. The null hypothesis that was being tested in this vector auto regression 
model was that there is no relationship between the dependent variable and 
130 
indcpcndcnt variables. In other words, there is no predictable relationship bctwccn 
Limbc auction market prices and world market reference prices. As the results show, 
with probability value of 0.018 for independent variable KP(-1) which is the world 
market reference price for the previous month (time t-1), the null hypothesis is 
rejected. This result means that Malawi tea prices in time (t) arc strongly related to 
world market reference prices in time (t-1). In other words, the results demonstrate 
that the two price series move together in a more predictable way with monthly 
Malawi prices being explained by world market prices in the previous month. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of 0.36 on variable KP(-1) means that if there is an 
increase or decrease in world market price in month (t-1), then it means that Malawi 
prices will also follow suit in month (t), however its change will only be 36% of the 
change in world market price in time (t-1). 
Table 11: VAR Model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
1P (4) 0.84437 (0.000) 
LP (-2) 0.13047 (0.186) 
KP (-1) 0.36481 (0.018) 
KP (-2) 0.17419 (0.251) 
Intercept 0.22866 (0.189) 
R Squared 0.77345 
S. E Regression 0.09497 
DW statistic 2.0432 
R. Bar. Squared 0.76684 
F Stat F(4,137) 116.932 (0.000) 
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From the estimated vector auto regression model, three things have been drawn in as 
far as the relationship bctwccn world market rcfcrcncc Prices for tea and those of 
Malawi arc concerned. The first is that price transmission has been established 
bctwccn the world market for tea and Malawi. Thus, the analysis has showed that 
Limbo auction market prices move together with world reference market prices in a 
predictable manner such that an increase in world market results in a corresponding 
predictable increase in domestic market prices in Limbe auction market in Malawi. In 
this respect, this result has answered the research question as to whether there is price 
transmission or not between the world market for tea and Malawi and as the results 
shows, the answer is, yes. 
The second observation from the results of price transmission analysis above relate to 
the speed of price transmission itself. As the results shows, changes in world 
reference market prices for tea in time (t) gets transmitted and reflected in Limbe 
auction market prices in Malawi in time (t+l). Thus, price transmission between 
world reference market prices and Limbe auction market prices in Malawi take only 
one period or cycle and in this case, since the data that was used was monthly, the 
results shows that changes in world market reference prices in month one gets 
transmitted and reflected in Malawi tea prices in the following month. In other words, 
the results shows that price transmission between the world market and domestic 
market in Malawi is only one lag between the two price series. This finding answers 
the research question as to how long prices take to be transmitted from the world 
market for tea to domestic markets in Malawi. The answer to this research question is 
that it takes only one lag/period/cycle to have price changes on the world market for 
tea to be fully transmitted and reflected in Limbe auction market in Malawi. 
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The third observation from the analysis of price transmission bctwccn world market 
prices for tea and Limbe auction market prices is the extent of price transmission 
between the two price series. The coefficient of 0.36 on variable KP(-1) means that 
the elasticity of price transmission between the world market reference price for tea 
and Limbc auction market prices is 0.36. This result suggest that only about 36% of 
the change (increase or decrease) in world market reference price is transmitted and 
reflected in the domestic Limbe auction market price in Malawi. This finding answers 
the research question as to what is the elasticity of price transmission between the 
world market for tea and corresponding domestic market prices in Malawi and as the 
results shows, the answer is 0.36. This transmission means that only less than half of 
price changes in world reference market prices for tea are transmitted to the Limbe 
auction market prices in Malawi. Thus, the transmission of prices between the world 
market for tea is less than half unitary suggesting that the transmission is not very 
strong. Other tests in the result table including R squared and DW statistics seem to 
reinforce the acceptability of the model, for instance, DW statistic of 2.0 is considered 
ideal (Mo Zhou et al, 2005) and R squared of 0.77 means that 77% of the variation in 
data is explained in model. 
3.4.6 Results for the Granger Non Causality Test 
Following the observation of price transmission between world market reference 
prices and Limabe auction market prices in Malawi, Granger Non Causality test was 
conducted to confirm that world market changes cause changes to domestic prices in 
Malawi and not vice versa. The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no 
causation between two time series data and depending on outcome, this hypothesis 
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can be rejected or not. Probability of Granger Non Causality test for world market 
prices (KP) causing changes to the Malawi prices (LP) was 0.000 and the one for the 
oppositc, thus LP causing KP was 0.805. Following this result, the null hypothesis for 
KP causing changes to LP was rejected meaning that world market prices for tea 
causes changes to the domestic tea prices in Malawi. Results for LP causing KP were 
not rejected meaning that only world market prices causes changes in Malawi tea 
prices and not vice versa. These results confirm that changes in the world market for 
tea arc transmitted to the domestic Malawi tea market and cause changes. 
3.5 Price transmission in Malawi's cotton supply system 
35.1 Malawi and the global cotton market 
Cotton was first introduced and grown in Malawi by the White Settlers in 1902 and 
by 1907, cotton had become an economically important cash crop for Malawi. In post 
Malawi independence, cotton was ranked fourth after tobacco, sugar and tea in terms 
of foreign exchange earnings and it accounted roughly around 2% of foreign 
exchange earnings. As Figure 35 shows, both hectarage and production of cotton in 
Malawi have fluctuated significantly over the last four decades, with a general trend 
of decline in cultivated area and contrastingly general increase in output mainly as a 
result of improvements in yields. Hectarage for cotton declined from 50,000ha in 
1972 to 30,000ha in early 1980's before an historic rise to 80,000ha in 1997 and fall 
to just over 40,000ha in 2000's. As a proportion of global cotton land allocation, 
Malawi cotton acreage accounts for only between 0.1% and 0.2% of global cotton 
area. The same proportion is also true for contribution of Malawi's cotton output to 
the global cotton production. 
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Figure 35: Cotton hectarage and output in Malawi 
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3.5.2 Malawi and the global cotton supply system 
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Prior to liberalising the cotton sector in 1997, priority for Malawi cotton was given to 
satisfying the local spinning and cloth making industry. At the time, ADMARC, a 
state owned company, was monopoly buyer of all seed cotton from farmers, which 
was only produced by smallholders, not by commercial estates. Once purchased, 
ADMARC ginned the seed cotton and supplied the lint to David Whitehead and Sons 
Limited (DWS), another state owned spinning and cloth making company. Any 
excess lint which DWS could not absorb was exported to regional markets, especially 
South Africa. With respect to cotton seeds, ADMARC sold part of it to domestic oil 
manufacturing companies while the remainder was supplied back to farmers as seed 
for the next season. During this period, there was strong inter linkage between 
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diffcrcnt stakcholdcrs in the cotton industry in Malawi, from growcrs to tcxtilc 
manufacturers. This kind of industrial linkage is similar to that in major cotton 
produccrs such as the US and China, whcrc the bulk of the cotton lint is fed to thcir 
domestic textile industries, while excess is exported to other countries. In terms of 
volumes of cotton cxportcd from Malawi, it fluctuated from year to year depending on 
demand from the local supply, nonetheless, exports from Malawi never exceeded 1% 
of global traded cotton lint. 
In post liberalisation, Malawi began to export almost all its cotton lint to regional 
markets. This followed the structural changes that took place in Malawi's cotton 
industry. In particular, both ADMARC and DWS withdrew from buying and spinning 
cotton respectively and in their place private sector companies are buying cotton from 
farmers and ginning it before exporting to regional markets. The domestic spinning 
company has considerably scaled down its operations in Malawi and as a result, it is 
demanding very little cotton lint from the local supply system. Between 1997 and 
2005, over 95% of cotton lint produced in Malawi was exported to regional markets. 
However, even though the bulk of Malawi's cotton lint is now exported, overall 
contribution to the global traded cotton lint still remains marginal mainly due to small 
volumes of Malawi's cotton production. 
333 Terms of Trade for Alalawi's cotton 
Before liberalisation, there was one method by which growers were selling their seed 
cotton and that was through ADMARC. The state corporation was buying seed cotton 
from growers at state determined prices which were announced at the beginning of the 
growing season each year. Once purchased, ADMARC was ginning the seed cotton 
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bcforc supplying the lint to DWS at conccssionary priccs Which were sometimes paid 
attcr long periods of time. As for cotton lint exports to regional markets, negotiations 
on prices were based on the Liverpool A index prices. In post libcralisation, cotton 
growers in Malawi now sell their seed cotton to private sector buying companies who 
in turn gin the seed cotton into cotton lint which they export to regional markcts at 
prcvailing priccs. 
Figure 36 compares producer prices for seed cotton in Malawi and world market 
reference prices for cotton lint for the period 1972 and 2003. The study compared 
world market prices for cotton lint and domestic Malawi prices for seed cotton mainly 
due to lack of properly recorded and documented time series data of cotton lint prices 
in Malawi. Nonetheless, as the figure shows, prices for seed cotton in Malawi trail far 
below the world market reference prices for cotton lint. To some extent, this is 
obvious considering that there are ginning costs involved which have not been 
included in the Malawi seed cotton prices. However, the study noted the wide 
disparity between the two prices series and discusses this issue further and in more 
detail in Chapter seven. Notwithstanding, World Bank (1996) attributed part of the 
low domestic seed cotton prices in Malawi due to Government policy of setting 
extremely low producer prices in the pre liberalisation period with the aim of spurring 
growth in the industrial sector of the cotton sector. World Bank (1996) argued that the 
low seed cotton prices were intended to supply the growing cotton industry sector 
with cheap cotton which they could process and make big profit gains which would in 
turn be invested back in the cotton industry and spur growth of the industry. Chirwa 
(2006) noted that even though Government withdrew its intervention in cotton prices 
in the post liberalisation era, producer prices generally remained low. 
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Figure 36: Comparison of Malawi seed cotton prices and world market cotton 
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3.5.4 Test for stationarity of price data 
Figure 36 show contrasting picture of the movement in Malawi seed cotton prices and 
world market cotton lint prices. Apart from the fact that Malawi seed cotton prices arc 
observed to be very low compared to world market cotton lint prices, Malawi prices 
are flat, stable and less volatile. On the other hand, world lint prices are characterised 
by large fluctuations and instability. Visually, it would be appear like Malawi prices 
have their own pattern independent of changes in world lint prices. This may be 
explained on grounds that Malawi prices were set by the state up to mid 1990's. 
Contrary to leading producers of cotton where Governments also set prices which are 
often above the world market prices, in Malawi, the state was setting prices which 
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wcrc far too low than world market prices, which was in a way explicit taxation of the 
cotton growing sector (World Bank, 1996). 
Table 12 show results of stationarity test for Malawi seed cotton prices. As the table 
shows, Malawi prices arc stationary only under ADF order one both when intercept 
only and intercept and time trend arc included in the test. When intercept only is 
included in the test, ADF test statistic is -3.2822 and this is a higher negative value 
than the 95% ADF critical value of -2.8995. All other orders where intercept only was 
included in the test resulted in ADF test statistics which were lower than the ADF 
critical values, hence the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Similarly, in the test 
where both intercept and time trend were included in the test, it was only under ADF 
order one where the hypothesis for non stationarity was rejected as the ADF test result 
of -4.2325 was higher than the ADF critical value of -3.5867. In all the other orders, 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected as ADF test statistics were lower than the 
95% critical value for ADF. This outcome means that Malawi seed cotton prices can 
be treated as stationary data series only under ADF order one when either intercept 
only or intercept and time trend are included in Vector Auto regression model. 
Table 12: Unit root test results for Malawi seed cotton prices 
Unit Root test 
with intercept 
Order of 
ADF ADF Test Statistic SBC 
only 0 -3.3846 -22.2879 
1 -3.2822 -23.5084 
2 -2.3115 -24.8870 
3 -1.7309 -26.1908 
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4 -1.5347 -27.8265 
5 -0.5664 -29.3523 
0 -3.9535 -22.2570 
1 -4.2325 -22.3860 
Unit root test 2 -3.2653 -24.0184 
%lth both 3 -2.6507 -25.6545 
intercept and 4 -2.4803 -27.2620 
time trend 5 -0.7704 -23.1733 
Table 13 show results of stationarity test for world market prices for cotton lint. As 
the results show, world market lint prices are stationary under ADF order one only 
when intercept only is included in the test. Thus, the null hypothesis for non stationary 
data is rejected for world market lint price series when intercept only is included in 
the test under order one of ADF test as the ADF test statistic of -3.0172 is higher than 
the critical value of -2.8995. In all the other orders, the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected as their ADF test statistics were lower than the critical value. On the other 
hand, when both time trend and intercept are included in ADF test, the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected under any order as their ADF test statistics are below the critical 
value of -3.5867. This outcome means that world market lint price data series can 
only be considered as stationary data when intercept only is considered in order one of 
ADF only. 
Table 13: Unit root test for world market lint prices 
Unit Root Test Order of 
Nith Intercept ADF ADF Test Statistic SBC 
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only 0 -2.8452 6.9052 
1 -3.0172 5.9113 
2 -1.8931 4.6580 
3 -2.5991 4.8747 
4 -2.3369 3.3095 
5 -2.1662 1.6908 
0 -3.0909 6.0398 
1 -3.4049 5.4665 
Unit Root Test 2 -2.3665 4.2173 
hith both 3 -3.1484 4.8963 
Intercept and 4 -2.7707 3.2549 
time trend 5 -2.4793 1.6197 
Taking into account stationarity test results for both Malawi seed cotton prices and 
world market cotton lint reference price data series, the outcomes demonstrate that the 
only order and exogenous variable to be included in vector auto regression model are 
order one and intercept only respectively. This outcome is reinforced by results in 
Table 14 which show high AIC and SBC figures for order one of VAR selection. In 
this test statistic, only intercept was included and as the choice criterion stipulates, the 
goal is to select order of VAR with the highest AIC and SBC, hence, the choice of 
order one for the auto regression model. 
Table 14: Test statistic and choice criterion for VAR order selection 
Order AIC SBC 
2 -17.7172 -26.3211 
1 -14.9530 -20.6890 
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3.5.5 Results of vector auto regression model estimation for cotton prices 
Table 15 show results of the Vector Auto regression cstimation model for the 
rclationship bctwccn Malawi sccd cotton prices and world market lint rcfcrcncc prices 
for period 1972 through to 2004. As the results show, the null hypothesis of abscncc 
of co integration could not be rejected with probability value of 0.798. In this model 
estimation, Malawi prices (LP) were taken as dependent variable while world market 
prices (LW) and intercept were regarded as independent variables and as probability 
values for both independent variables show, there is no sufficient ground on which the 
null hypothesis of absence of co integration can be rejected. With this result, it can be 
argued that there is no apparent empirical evidence of observable relationship 
between seed cotton prices in Malawi and world market cotton lint prices. Each price 
series seem to follow its own pattern independent of the other. As a consequence of 
failure to reject the null hypothesis, the Granger causality test was not performed as 
its outcome and subsequent interpretation would in any case become irrelevant. 
Table 15: VAR Model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
LW (-1) 0.1090 0.798 
LP (4) 0.2782 0.152 
Intercept 1.9092 0.366 
R Squared 0.1988 
S. E Regression 0.4723 
DW statistic 1.85840 
R. Bar. Squared 0.1098 
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IF Stat F(3,27) 1 2.233 1 0.107 1 
Following result of lack price transmission between the world market for cotton lint 
and Malawi prices for the period 1972 to 2004, the study introduced a dummy 
variable that separated pre liberalisation and post liberalisation periods to determine 
whether price transmission improved in the post liberalisation era. Table 16 show 
results of the estimated price transmission model for the post liberalisation period in 
Malawi's cotton marketing system. As the results shows, price transmission is 
observed at 8.6% significance level which is an indication that transmission of prices 
from the world market to the domestic market in Malawi improved with liberalisation 
of the cotton marketing system. Thus, although price transmission could not be 
established at 5% significance level, it was established at 8.6% significance level 
during the post liberalisation period. This means that the current Malawi's cotton 
marketing system transmit price changes from the world market to the domestic 
market, in particular, to producers/farmers. As the table shows, the elasticity of price 
transmission at this level is 31% which indicates that a third of the price change at 
world market is transmitted to the domestic market in Malawi in the current structure 
of the cotton marketing system. 
Table 16: Estimated model for post liberalisation period 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
LW (-1) 0.3094 0.086 
LP 0) 0.3618 0.036 
Intercept 0.5073 0.513 
Dummy -0.1183 0.121 
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R Squared 0.42517 
S. E Regression 0.20035 
DW statistic 1.82380 
R. Bar. Squared 0.36358 
F Stat F(3.28) 6.9034 0.001 
3.5.6 Results for the Granger Non Causality Test 
Following the observation of price transmission between world market prices for 
cotton lint and Malawi domestic prices for seed cotton, Grangcr Non Causality test 
was conducted to determine whether indeed changes in world market prices for cotton 
lint were causing changes in domestic Malawi prices of seed cotton and not vice versa. 
The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no causation between the two time 
series data and depending on outcome, this hypothesis can be rejected or not. 
Probability of Granger Non Causality test for world market prices (LW) causing 
changes to the Malawi prices (LP) was 0.001 and the one for the opposite, thus LP 
causing KP was 0.721. Following this result, the null hypothesis for LW causing 
changes to LP was rejected meaning that world market prices for cotton lint causes 
changes to the domestic seed cotton prices in Malawi. Results for LP causing LW 
were not rejected meaning that only world market prices for cotton lint causes 
changes in Malawi domestic prices of seed cotton and not vice versa. These results 
confirm that changes in the world market for cotton lint are transmitted to the 
domestic Malawi seed cotton market and cause changes. 
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3.5.7 Conclusions from the cotton price transmission analysis 
This analysis was conducted to dctcrminc: (i) whether thcre is pricc transmission 
bctwccn the world market for cotton lint and that of Malawi seed cotton prices; (ii) 
how long seed cotton prices in Malawi take to adjust in line with world lint price 
changes; and, (iii) the elasticities of price transmission between world cotton lint 
prices and Malawi's seed cotton prices. At 5% significance level, the results showed 
that there is no price transmission between the world market prices for cotton lint and 
that of Malawi's seed cotton prices. Howcvcr, at 8.6% significance level, the results 
showed that in post liberalisation period, seed cotton prices in Malawi moved together 
with world market prices for cotton lint in a predictable way. The results shows that 
while price transmission could not be established for the period between 1972 and 
2004, transmission was observed between 1990 and 2004 at 8.6% significance level. 
The study has concluded that the state insulated cotton producers in Malawi from 
changes in world market cotton prices during the pre liberalisation period while 
during the current liberalised market structure, private sector companies have 
improved the situation and that they are transmitting price changes from the world 
cotton lint market to the domestic seed cotton market in Malawi. 
In terms of speed of price transmission, changes in world cotton lint prices in time (t) 
are transmitted and reflected in Malawi's domestic seed cotton prices in time (t+1) 
meaning that the speed of price transmission is only one lag or period. This finding 
answers the research question as to how long prices take to be transmitted from the 
world market of cotton lint to the domestic market of seed cotton in Malawi and as 
shown, they only take one lag/cycle/period. 
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As for the extent of price transmission, the coefficient of the independent variable 
(L\V) is 0.309 meaning that the elasticity of price transmission from the world market 
of cotton lint to the domcstic markct of sccd cotton in Malawi is 0.31. This finding 
means that 31% of the change in world market lint prices is transmitted and reflected 
in the domestic market price of seed cotton in Malawi. In other words, producer prices 
of sccd cotton in Malawi changes by at least a third of the change that takes place in 
world cotton lint prices. This observation answers the research question as to the 
extent of price transmission between world cotton lint prices and Malawi's domestic 
seal cotton prices. 
3.6 Price transmission in sugar 
3.6.1 Malawi and the global sugar market 
Intensive cultivation and subsequent processing of sugarcane into sugar took off in 
Malawi immediately after independence in 1964. Since then, as Figure 37 shows, both 
area and production increased sharply in the 1970's before tailing-off around the mid 
1980's. In only a decade period, between 1972 and 1982, area grew six fold from 
2,500ha to 15,000ha while production grew roughly seven fold, from 30,000 metric 
tonnes to 200,000 metric tonnes. Since then, area has edged around 20,000 ha while 
production has now reached 260,000 metric tonnes of processed sugar. In comparison 
with global sugar area and production, Malawi's area and output represents roughly 
between 0.1% and 0.2% of global area and production respectively. In Southern 
Africa, however, Malawi is the fifth leading producer and exporter of sugar after 
South Africa, Mauritius, Swaziland and Zimbabwc. 
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Figure 37: Sugar hcctaragc und production in Malawi 
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Production and processing of sugar in Malawi is built around the Sugar Corporation 
of Malawi (SUCOMA) Limited. The company owns both sugar plantations and 
processing mills located in Chikwawa and Nkhotakota districts in the country. 
SUCOMA's own sugarcane plantation produce 1.9 million metric tonnes of sugarcane 
annually, which represents 90% of total national sugarcane production. The remainder 
of 200.000 metric tonnes is grown by small holder farmers who are based in and 
around SUCOMA's plantations and mills in both Chikwawa and Nkhotakota districts. 
Illovo Sugar Group, a multinational company with majority shareholdings in 
SUCOMA also grows and processes sugar in Zambia (95% of national output), 
Tanzania (55%), South Africa (50%), Swaziland (35%) and Mozambique (30%). 
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3.6.2 Malawi and the global sugar supply system 
Malawi produces two types cif sugar, namely retined sugar, otherwise known as white 
sugar. and lower value unrefined sugar, also known as raw sugar. Figure 38 show the 
proportions of refined and unrefined sugar as produced in Malawi since 2001. As the 
figure shows, around 60% of Malawi's total sugar output is raw sugar while the 
balance of 40% is white (refined) sugar. The bulk of refined sugar is consumed 
domestically while the bulk of unrefined low value raw sugar is exported. For 
instance, in 2004, out of the total sugar export of 120,000 metric tonics, 30,000 
metric tonnes only was refined sugar while an overwhelming 90,000 metric tonnes 
was unrefined. Of the exported refined sugar, the hulk of it was exported to the Rest 
of the World. 
Figure 38: Proportions of refined and unrefined sugar in Malawi 
200000 
150000 
100000 
50000 
0 
-A Raw (mt) --- Refined (mt) 
Source: SUCOMA (2006) 
148 
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there are two main outlets for Malawi sugar and these are. domestic market and 
export market. Just like in other mayor sugar producing rýºuntries, Malawi also retains 
much of its sugar tier domestic consunmption. As Figure 1) suggests, in some years 
just over half of sugar production is exported while in others the opposite happens in 
that just over half of total production is consumed domestically. In terms of the 
overall picture. Chiputula et al (2005) indicated that in recent years, domestic sugar 
consumption has been increasing but production has been increasing faster so that in 
terms of proportions of total sugar production, domestic sugar consumption has fallen 
from 61 % in the early 1990's to around 501% in 2000's, with exports rising from 39% 
to around 50% as well over the same period. 
Figure 39: Quantities of exported and domestically consumed sugar 
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Malawi sugar is cither exported to Rcst of the World (ROW), otherwise known as 
world market or sold under preferential market arrangement scheme. Figure 40 show 
that sugar to preferential market schemes is stable at around 60,000 metric tonncs 
while that of ROW fluctuates depending on domestic consumption. This is the case, 
because the Malawi industry first satisfies the domestic demand followed by meeting 
quota requirements of preferential market schcmcs and any cxccss sugar is then sold 
to the world market. Malawi Govcrnmcnt (2004) reports that in 1990's, sugar exports 
to the regional markets have been growing to the extent that they are now close to 
sugar exports destined for the preferential markets. Figure 40 demonstrates this aspect 
in 2003 and 2004 where half of exported sugar went to ROW while the other half was 
destined to preferential market schemes. In the case of Malawi sugar export markets, 
ROW mainly include countries in the region which are outside the SADC sugar 
protocol and important export destinations in this respect include Kenya, Egypt, 
Burundi and Rwanda. Malawi Government (2004) also estimates that 20% of Malawi 
sugar deemed consumed domestically also leaks to Zambia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania through informal cross border trade. 
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Figure 40: Sugar exports to Rest of World and Preferential schemes 
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Malawi has preferential marketing arrangements with three main markets, namely, the 
EU. the US and the Southern Africa Development Cooperation (SADC) mainly South 
African market. Through these schemes, Malawi exports unrefined sugar volumes to 
the level of quota agreements. Figure 41 show specific schemes through which 
Malawi exports its sugar. As the figure shows, under the EU preferential market 
arrangement, Malawi exports around 20,000 metric tonnes under the Ell-ACP 
protocol, 10,000 metric tonnes under the Special Preferential Sugars (SPS) and 
another 10,000 metric tonnes under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme giving a 
total of around 40,000 metric tonnes. Under the US preferential market scheme, 
Malawi exports about 10,000 metric tonnes of unrefined sugar. SADC is also a 
growing regional market and Malawi is currently exporting up to 13,000 metric 
tonnes of refined sugar and has potential for further increases. Currently, the EU 
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preferential market scheme is undergoing re iorms which will remove quota 
restrictions while at the same time bring down prekrential market price margins. 
Figure 41: Preferential schemes for Malawi sugar 
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3.6.3 Terms of trade for Malawi sugar 
Malawi sugar prices differ substantially from one market to the other. Within Malawi, 
due to Government protection of the domestic sugar industry, prices fier sugar in 
Malawi are almost double the world market prices. Exports to different preferential 
market arrangements also attract prices that are above the world market prices. Figure 
42 show prices of Malawi sugar to different destinations. As observed, EU prices are 
much higher, followed by US prices, then SADC prices, and finally Rest of the World 
(ROW) prices. Figure 42 shows that SADC prices are only higher than ROW in the 
last couple of years. Nonetheless, as a consequence of differences in prices, 
interviews with Management of SUCOMA indicated that the Malawi sugar industry 
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first satisfies the donicstic sugar markst demand hctiorc exporting to I tI and US. Any 
cxcess is then exported to regional markets and ROW where prices are relatively 
lower. 
Figure 42: Malawi sugar prices for different preferential schemes 
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Figure 43 compares weighted Malawi sugar prices and world market prices for sugar. 
As can be observed, Malawi prices are higher than the world market prices by a good 
margin. The high prices in Malawi are explained by high domestic market prices and 
preferential price margins for Malawi sugar. In both sets of prices, the period between 
1972 and 1983 was characterised by high price instability and volatility. Being a small 
player in world sugar, volatility in Malawi prices were visually as a result of 
fluctuations in world market prices and not the other way round. 
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Figure 43: Weighted M1alaý%i sugar prices versus i%orld market prices 
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3.6.4 Tests for stationarit'' of Malawi's weighted average sugar prices and 
world market sugar prices 
Figure 43 show one structural break on the relationship between the world market 
prices for sugar and weighted average prices for sugar in Malawi. The break is 
observed to be around 1983 with the period before that showing big volatility in 
prices while the period after is in some degree consistent with weighted average 
Malawi sugar prices following changes in world market prices for sugar. 
Table 17 show results of stationarity test for Malawi sugar price series. As can be 
observed, it is only under ADF order one that Malawi sugar prices are stationary 
when intercept only is included in the test. Thus, ADF test statistic for order one of - 
3.015 is higher than critical value for ADF test of -2.9750. In all the other ADF orders, 
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the ADF test statistics are lower than the critical value of the ADF test statistics. In 
the ADF test whcrc both intcrccpt and timt trend arc included, results in the last part 
of Tablc 17 show that thcrc is no ordcr with ADF tcst statistics which arc highcr than 
the critical value of -3.5867. In this rcspcct, it can be argued that when both time trend 
and intercept arc included in the test, Malawi prices arc not stationary under any ordcr. 
Table 17: Stationarity test for Malawi prices 
Order of 
ADF 
ADFTest 
Statistic SRC 
0 -3.625 2.932 
1 -3.015 1.317 
2 -2.598 -0.316 
3 -1.866 -1.511 
Unit Root Test with 4 -1.905 -2.976 
an intercept only 5 -1.855 -4.591 
0 -3.528 1.451 
1 -2.973 -0.137 
2 -2.594 -1.755 
Unit Root Test with 3 -1.900 -2.984 
both intercept and 4 -1.981 4.337 
time trend 5 -1.970 -5.841 
Table 18 give results of stationarity test for world market prices of sugar and as can be 
seen, ADF test statistics for orders one and two have values that are higher than the 
critical value of -2.9750 when intercept only is included in the test. This means that 
when intercept only is included in test statistic, world market prices are stationary 
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undcr ADF orders one and two only. On the other hand, results in the last part of the 
table sccm to suggest that when time trend is included in the tcst, world markct prices 
arc not stationary as valucs of ADF tcst statistics arc lowcr than the critical valuc of - 
3.5867 in all ADF orders. This result means that in vector auto regression model 
estimation, only intercept will be included and possible orders will be only one and/or 
two. 
Table 18: Stationarity test for world market sugar prices 
Order or 
ADt: 
AD1+ Test 
Statistic SUC 
0 -2.576 -10.185 
1 -3.191 -10.202 
2 -3.058 -11.597 
3 -2.911 -13.000 
Unit Root Test %ith 4 -1.483 -12.878 
Intercept only 5 -1.271 -14.503 
0 -2.576 -11.656 
1 -3.217 -11.546 
2 -3.158 -12.776 
Unit Root Test With 3 -3.101 -13.948 
both intercept and 4 -1.677 -14.008 
time trend 5 -1.466 -15.646 
3.6.5 Results of the vector auto regression model estimation 
Before running a vector auto regression model estimation for the relationship between 
Malawi sugar prices and world market sugar prices, a test statistic for selecting order 
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of VAR was conducted to determine the appropriate order. Table 19 presents results 
of this choice criterion test and as the results shows, AIC test statistic favours order 
one as ideal order for the auto regression model estimation while SIC test statistic 
shows order two as more appropriate. The study adopted both and conducted two 
model estimations, one with order one of VAR while the other used order two of 
VAR. 
Table 19: Choice criterion for order of VAR 
Order AIC SBC 
2 -7.514 -16.118 
1 -8.495 -14.231 
Table 20 show results of two Vector Auto regression models, one with order one of 
VAR and the other with order two of VAR. As the results indicate, in both cases the 
null hypothesis of absence of co integration between Malawi sugar prices and world 
market sugar prices could not be rejected as probability values for both models fell 
outside the 5% confidence interval. However, at 10% significance interval, the model 
estimation with order two could not have its hypothesis of absence of co integration 
not being rejected, as probability values for both LW'VP(-1) (0.097) and LWP (-2) 
(0.078) fall within the 10% significance level. Also considering that visual 
observation of the graphical outlook of the two price series seem to show some level 
of predictability from 1983 to 2004, a separate model estimation was conducted 
which investigated co integration of the two price series between 1983 and 2004 and 
results of this analysis have been presented in Table 21. 
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Table 20: VAR model estimation (1), 1972 to 2004 
Model estimation under order one of VAR 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
LD (-1) 0.24328 (0.181) 
LWP(-1) 0.05145 (0.680) 
Intercept 2.594 (0.000) 
R Squared 0.16863 
S. E Regression 0.23237 
DW statistic 2.066 
R. Bar. Squared 
F Stat F(3,28) 1.893 (0.154) 
Model estimation under order two of VAR 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
LD (-1) 0.024986 (0.906) 
LID (-2) (-0.027944) (0.871) 
LWP (-1) 0.22825 (0.097) 
L%VP (-2) (-0.22892) (0.078) 
Intercept 3.661 (0.000) 
R Squared 0.20347 
S. E Regression 0.21541 
DFV statistic 2.006 
R. Bar. Squared 0.044 
F Stat F(5,25) 1.277 (0.305) 
Results in Table 21 show that world market prices for sugar for the period 1983 to 
2004 have been moving together with weighted average Malawi sugar prices in a 
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more deterministic and predictable way. 'thus, with probability value of 0.047, null 
hypothesis of lack of co intcgation has been rcjcctcd under order one of VAR. This 
ordcr of VAR was sclcctcd following a choice criterion which showed high AIC and 
SBC values for order one over this period (but not presented in detail). This result 
thcrcforc suggests that recent trends in world market sugar price movements impact 
on Malawi sugar prices in a more predictable way. Further, with coefficient of 0.366 
on variable LWP(-1), which is world markct pricc for sugar in the prcvious scason, 
this means that a rise or fall in world market price of sugar in time (t) will result in a 
36% rise or fall in weighted Malawi's sugar price in time (t+l). Of course, this result 
suggests that only less than half of the change in world market price for sugar is 
transmitted to Malawi sugar prices. 
Table 21: VAR model estimation (2), 1983 to 2004 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
LD (4) -0.43619 0.128 
LWP (4) 0.36612 0.047 
Intercept 4.2984 0.000 
R Squared 0.26587 
S. E Regression 0.13986 
DW statistic I 
R. Bar. Squared 0.16099 
F Stat F(2,14) 3 0.115 
A null hypothesis for block Granger Non Causality test for the two price series 
between 1983 and 2004 was also rejected following a test which resulted in 
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probability value of 0.026. This test showed that changes in Malawi sugar prices 
could be explained by changes in world market sugar prices and not vice versa. This 
clearly demonstrate that there is relationship between world market prices of sugar 
and Malawi sugar prices and that changes in Malawi sugar prices can be explained by 
world market price changes. 
3.6.6 Summary of findings front the price transmission analysis of Malawi's 
sugar supply system 
In summary, the price transmission analysis for Malawi's sugar supply system has 
shown that thcrc is price transmission bctwccn the world market for sugar and 
weighted average sugar prices for Malawi's sugar. This finding answers the research 
question which intended to determine whether there is price transmission between the 
world market prices for sugar and sugar prices in Malawi. The study shows that 
Malawi's sugar prices move together in a predictable way with world market prices 
for sugar indicating that increases or decreases in world market prices for sugar are 
transmitted to the domestic Malawi's sugar prices. In terms of research question on 
duration of price transmission between the world market for sugar and Malawi's sugar 
prices, the results have shown that the period is (t+I ). Thus, the results have shown 
that changes in world market prices for sugar take one lag to get transmitted and 
reflected on the domestic market in Malawi. On the research question of the elasticity 
of price transmission, the results have shown that the elasticity of price transmission 
between world market prices for sugar and Malawi's sugar prices is 0.36 suggesting 
that only less than half of the world's sugar market price change is transmitted and 
reflected on the domestic market in Malawi. 
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3.7 Price transmission in 11aIam i's tobacco supple system 
3.7.1 Malawi and the global tobacco 
Malawi has a long history of tobacco production traceable as tar hack as the early 
I 920's. Ifowever, steady and rapid expansion in both area and production of tobacco 
only took off from the late 1970's. Figure 44 shows that total tobacco area rose by a 
factor of thirteen from just under I3,000ha in 1972 to I70,000ha in 2000 hcfiorc 
falling off again to around IOO. 000ha in 2005. Two main varieties of tobacco are 
grown in Malawi, burley and flue cured, and as Figure 44 indicates, over o)S% of total 
tobacco land in Malawi is allocated to hurley. In terms of global tobacco land 
allocation, Malawi accounts for a maximum of 3% of global tobacco area, however, 
the figure is higher for burley as Malawi is the second leading producer of'hurley aller 
the US. 
Figure 44: Trends in tobacco hectarage in Malawi 
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Source: TCC 
Figurc 45 show that tobacco production in Malawi sharply incrcascd in the last three 
dccadcs rising from just undcr 14,000 mctric tonncs in 1972 to a pcak of 174,000 
metric tonnes in 2004. As the figure indicates, almost all this growth in output has 
come from increases in burley tobacco. While the late 1970's and early 1980's saw 
signs of increases in flue cured tobacco, its growth turned into a gradual process of 
decline by the middle of the 1980's. Figure 44 suggests that increases in area have 
been the major driver of increases in tobacco output in Malawi. In particular, yields 
for tobacco in Malawi have fluctuated between one tonne per hectare and one and a 
half tonnes per hectare in the same period, reinforcing the argument that tobacco 
increases in Malawi are mainly a reflection of increases in area. It must be pointed out 
however that the main cause of sharp seasonal drops in burley and total tobacco 
outputs in Malawi are mainly as a result of droughts experienced in the country. 
When Malawi tobacco output is compared to global tobacco output, tobacco outputs 
from Malawi only account for a maximum of 5%. However, as with area, the 
proportion of Malawi tobacco rises significantly when compared against global burley 
output, where Malawi is second only to the US in its production. 
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Figure 45: Trends in tobacco production in MaImi 
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As for contribution of the tobacco industry to the Malawi economy, tobacco is by tsar 
the largest single most important source of foreign exchange earnings. It accounts tier 
up to 60% of Malawi's total annual export earnings (Malawi Government, 2005). In 
addition, the tobacco industry contributes about 10% of total GDP and 17% of 
agricultural GDP (Malawi Government, 2005). Furthermore, the tobacco supply chain 
is estimated to have employed between 650,000 to 1.2 million Malawians whose work 
ranges from small scale growers, to tenants on large scale tobacco plantations, and to 
workers in tobacco processing plants. In this way, the tobacco industry accounts for 
up to 20% of the total Malawi labour force. Specifically for small scale growers, 
tobacco is the major source of cash income for their households. In predominantly 
tobacco growing areas, it is estimated that up to 95% of household incomes are 
derived from tobacco related activities (Jaffee, 2003). 
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3.7.2 Malawi and the global tobacco supply system 
Virtually, all tobacco grown and produced in Malawi is exported for processing 
outside the country. The only forms of post harvest processes that the Malawi tobacco 
leaf goes through are curing and partial processing (otherwise known as stripping) 
whereby leaf stems are separated from leaf blades. The former process is done right in 
farms by growers while the latter is done by buyers using capital intensive equipment. 
Globally, Malawi is an important source of tobacco leaves, mainly burley tobacco as 
the country is leading exporter of burley tobacco onto the world market. Exports of 
burley from Malawi account for 26% of total world burley exports and it is followed 
by the European Union (20%), the US (18%), and Brazil (17%) (Jaffee, 2003). In Sub 
Saharan Africa, Malawi is second producer and exporter of all tobacco leaves after 
Zimbabwe and globally, Malawi is sixth largest producer and exporter of all tobacco 
leaves after China, Brazil, India, USA and Zimbabwe. In terms of destinations of 
Malawi tobacco, Malawi tobacco leaves are spread to different cigarette 
manufacturing plants located in different countries across the globe 
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Figure 46: Tobacco exports frone different countries 
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3.7.3 Terns of trade for Malawi tobacco 
Figure 47 compares movement of Malawi auction tobacco prices (burley tobacco 
prices, flue cured tobacco prices and average auction prices for all tobacco) with 
world market average prices for tobacco leaves. The first thing that can be deduced 
from the figure is that although flue cured tobacco constitutes only less than 5%! % of 
Malawi's tobacco output, its prices are slightly higher than burley tobacco which 
constitute roughly around 9510 of Malawi tobacco production. As already pointed out, 
the majority of growers in Malawi shun away from growing flue cured tobacco 
mainly because of the extra costs and investments needed in curing flue cured, which 
some growers argue cancel out any price benefits from growing and selling flue cured 
tobacco. The second observation from the figure is that while world market prices for 
tobacco rose sharply from US$1.00/kg in 1972 to US$2.50/kg by 1981 and thereafter 
fluctuated between US$2.50/kg and US$3.50/kg. Malawi tobacco prices have only 
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nscn from US$0.50/kg to US$1.00/kb and fluctuated between US$ I . O()/kg and 
USS2.00/kg within the same period. Thus, Malawi auction prices for tobacco have 
been substantially below their corresponding world market prices tier tobacco. This 
issue is discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
Figure 47: Comparison of Malawi and world market tobacco prices 
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3.7.4 Tests for stationarity of price data 
Table 22 show results of stationarity test for Malawi tobacco prices. As the results 
indicate, Malawi tobacco prices are stationary only under ADF order one when only 
the intercept is included in the test as its ADF test statistic has a higher negative figure 
than the ADF critical value. Thus, the ADF test statistic for order one of -3.1923 is 
higher than -2.8950 which is the critical value of ADF test, hence the hypothesis of 
lack of stationarity was in this case rejected. However, in all other orders including in 
those orders where both intercept and time trend were included in the test, the null 
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hypothesis could not be rejected as their ADP test statistics were lower in negative 
tcnns than the ADF critical valuc. 
Table 22: Unit Root Test for Malawi tobacco prices 
Order of ADF 
AI 
Test 
Statistic SBC 
Unit root test 0 -2.5012 2.3619 
pith intercept 1 -3.1923 0.7339 
only 2 -2.1854 -0.7264 
Unit root test 0 -2.5422 0.9409 
Hith intercept 1 -2.2483 -0.6656 
time trend 2 -2.3222 -1.9209 
Results of stationarity test for world market prices for tobacco seem to be the same as 
those of Malawi tobacco prices. Table 23 shows that when only the intercept is 
included in the test, only order one of ADF has a test statistic which is higher in 
negative terms than the critical value. In this respect, it is only under order one of 
ADF where the null hypothesis of non stationarity was rejected whereas in all other 
orders, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The other part of the results in Table 
23 shows that when both intercept and time trend are included in the test, the null 
hypothesis of non stationarity could not be rejected in all orders as non of them has 
higher negative value than the critical value of -3.5867. This result suggests that in 
vector auto regression, only intercept will be included in the test and only under order 
one of ADF test statistic. 
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Table 23: Unit Root Test for world market tobacco prices 
Order of AD1~ 
ADF 
Test 
Statistic SIBC 
Unit root test 0 -2.2316 22.9811 
pith intercept 1 -3.0520 21.3784 
only 2 -2.0165 19.7687 
Unit root test 0 -2.1063 21.6693 
Nith Intercept 1 -1.8307 20.0657 
& time trend 2 -1.8961 18.6887 
3.7.5 Estimated VAR model 
Before estimating the vector auto regression model that explains the nature of 
relationship between Malawi tobacco prices and world market tobacco prices, a test 
statistic and choice criterion for selecting the most ideal order for the vector auto 
regression model was conducted. Table 24 show results of this test where Malawi 
tobacco prices and world market tobacco prices were considered as variables and 
Intercept was considered as exogenous variable. As the table shows, the highest AIC 
and SBC are observed under order one of VAR and as such, order one was selected to 
be taken further into model estimation of the vector auto regression. 
Table 24: Results for choice of VAR test 
Order AIC SBC 
2 29.7506 21.3434 
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I11 32.9479 1 27.3431 1 
Table 25 shows model results of the auto regression model estimation where Malawi 
tobacco prices (LB) were considered as the dependent variable and world market 
tobacco pricc(L`'V) as the independent variable with intercept (INT) as the exogenous 
variable. As the results show, with probability value of 0.471 for the independent 
variable LW(-1) which is the world market prices for tobacco for the previous month 
(time W), the null hypothesis could not be rejected at 5% confidence interval. Results 
for the model estimation for the period 1990 and 2004, which is the post liberalisation 
period, were also similar in that the hypothesis of lack of price transmission between 
world market prices and domestic prices could not be rejected both at 5% and 10% 
confidence intervals. This being the case, changes in world market, whether a rise or 
fall in price, result in a very limited if any corresponding rise or fall in prices in the 
domestic market. Chapter six discusses further why Malawi auction prices appear to 
behave largely independently of world market price changes. 
Table 25: VAR model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient Probability 
L13(-1) 0.4822 0.007 
LW(-1) 0.1171 0.471 
Intercept 1.8478 0.014 
R Squared 0.4275 
S. E Regression 0.1941 
DW statistic 1.85740 
R. Bar. Squared 0.3866 
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F Stat F(3,28) 10.4547 0.0001 
3.8 Summary of findings, conclusions and policy implications for commodity 
price transmission analysis 
11c study carried out an empirical examination of pricc transmission betwccn world 
commodity markets and domestic markets in Malawi. The purpose of this analysis 
was to determine whether an increase or decrease in world commodity price is 
transmitted to domestic markets in Malawi. The analysis used econometric methods 
of co-integration of time series data and had three specific research questions: (i) 
whether there is price transmission between world commodity markets and domestic 
markets in Malawi; (ii) how long do prices take to be transmitted from world markets 
to domestic markets in Malawi; and, (iii) what arc the elasticities of price transmission. 
On research question number (i) on whether there is price transmission or not between 
the world commodity markets and domestic markets in Malawi, the study found price 
transmission in sugar, tea and cotton. The study did not find any clear evidence of 
price transmission in tobacco. The study concluded that it is only in sugar, tea and 
cotton that changes in world markets gets transmitted and reflected in domestic 
markets in Malawi in a predictable way. Thus, increases or decreases in world market 
prices for tea, sugar and cotton result in predictable corresponding increases or 
decreases in their respective domestic markets in Malawi. In tobacco, the study 
concluded that since price transmission could not be established, then changes in 
world commodity markets do not necessarily and automatically result in predictable 
corresponding changes in domestic prices in Malawi. 
170 
On the second research question of spccd of pricc transmission, the study found that 
in all commoditics whcrc pricc transmission was cstablishcd, nanmcly, tca, sugar and 
cotton, world market price changes in time (t) become transmitted and reflected in 
Malawi prices in time (t+l). The study concluded that price transmission in tea, sugar 
and cotton take one lag, period or cycle to get transmitted and rctlcctcd in domestic 
markcts in Malawi. Thus, an increase or decrease in world market price of tlicsc 
commodities take one pcriod/cyclc to set transmitted and reflected in their respective 
domcstic markcts in Malawi. 
On the third research question of extent of price transmission, the study found price 
transmission clasticity of 0.36 for both sugar and tca and 31% for cotton. Those 
elasticities mean that just over a third of changes in world market price changes of 
these commodities are transmitted to respective domestic markets in Malawi. Thus, 
the transmission of prices between the world markets for tea, sugar and cotton are a 
third of unitary price changes suggesting that price transmissions are weak. The study 
concluded that the three commodities arc not strongly linked to their corresponding 
world commodity market prices 
From the empirical analysis of price transmission, the research has concluded that 
price transmission from world commodity markets to domestic markets in different 
parts of the world is variable and dependent on individual commodities and countries. 
In some commodities (and we may presume countries), price transmission is 
negligible or weak, while in others transmission is strong. The implications of these 
findings in terms of benefits of removal of market distortions to resource poor 
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producers of the globe is that they will be variable and need to be determined on a 
case by case basis. Resource poor producers in supply systems well linked to world 
markcts should benefit from pricc incrcascs duc to removal of markct distortions 
whereas those in supply systems poorly linked to world markets will benefit only 
marginally from libcralisation. In Malawi, resource poor produccrs from tobacco, 
cotton, Ica and sugar supply systcms will not bcncfit fully from removal of world 
markct distortions partly due to weak and/or ncgligibic price transmission. 
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Chapter four: An empirical analysis of price supply 
responses in Malawi's commodity supply systems 
4.1 introduction 
This chaptcr prescnts findings of the cmpirical analysis of price supply responses in 
Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar and tca supply systcros. This analysis builds on 
findings from the previous two chapters first on world market price changes due to 
tariff and subsidy removal and then on price transmission, and specifically addresses 
two research questions, which are: (i) whether there are price supply responses in 
Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea supply systems; and, (ii) what are the 
elasticities of price supply responses in these supply systems in Malawi. The 
underlying aim of this analysis was to determine whether a rise or fall in commodity 
prices in Malawi results in a corresponding rise or fall in commodity supply of 
tobacco, cotton, tea and sugar. In terms of layout, the chapter begins with theoretical 
framework surrounding price supply responses, followed by the description of the 
analytical methods that were used in this analysis. Later, the chapter discusses each 
commodity in turn, with a brief outline of the key features of each supply system and 
discussion of results of supply response analysis. 
173 
4.2 Theoretical framework of commodity supply rcsponscs 
Figure 48 presents a simple graphical presentation of the theoretical relationship 
between price of a good or service and its supplied output. As the figure shows, as the 
price of a good or service rises, its supplied output increases as well, ceteris paribus 
(Sloman, 2000). Thus, all things being equal, firms or farmers increase output of a 
particular commodity in response to an increase in price of that particular commodity. 
According to this theory, the slope of any supply curve largely depends on the time 
period suppliers take to respond to price changes. Factors in the celerfs paribus, 
which are essentially other variables apart from own commodity price, but which also 
determine supply of that particular commodity include: (i) changes in costs of 
production, which may come about due to changes in prices of inputs or raw materials, 
changes in technology, changes in organisation of supply and changes in government 
policy; (ii) changes in profitability of alternative enterprises; and (iii) other exogenous 
factors such as random shocks or unpredictable events such as weather changes. All 
these factors affect the amount of output suppliers produce. 
Figure 48: Graphical presentation of relationship of supply and price 
FPrice 
Quantity produced 
Source: Sloman (2000) 
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This study draws from the thcory of supply and determines whcthcr a risc or fall in 
commodity prices leads to corresponding incrcascs or dccrcascs in commodity supply 
in Malawi. This analysis aims to draw some conclusions as to whether incrcascs in 
producer prices due to removal of tariffs and subsidies in world markets will lead to 
corresponding increases in domestic commodity supply in Malawi. With respect to 
previous research, ßchrman (1968), Mamingi (1997) and Smith ct al (1999) 
documented comprehensive reviews of some of the studies that have investigated 
supply responses among small scale poor resource farmers in different parts of Sub 
Saharan Africa. These reviews reported weak supply responses among small scale 
poor resource farmers in Sub Saharan Africa and they attributed this observation to 
two main reasons. First, with the peasant nature of small scale farmers in Sub Saharan 
Africa, they argued that, small scale poor resource farmers in Sub Saharan Africa sit 
on the verge of the market and non-market divide and therefore concentrate on 
survival needs, hence, they respond sluggishly to price incentives. Secondly, they 
attributed the sluggish supply response to market failures in Sub Saharan Africa. They 
argued that households depend primarily on their own labour and home-produced 
foods and as a result they are constrained in their ability to respond to prices. This 
view considers poor infrastructure and technological under-development, 
unavailability of irrigation and productive inputs, weak credit markets, seasonal 
labour shortages, and lack of industrial consumer products that might motivate efforts 
to earn cash income as constraints that stifle small scale farmers from responding 
fully to price incentives. 
Specifically for Malawi, there are four documented supply response studies that used 
econometric methods to analyse supply responses for agricultural commodities in 
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Malawi. The first study was by Dean (1966) and it analyscd supply responses in the 
smallholder tobacco scctor bctwccn 1926 and 1960. Dcan found a positivc supply 
response of 0.48. T'hc sccond study was by Minford and Ohs (1968) and their work 
analysed supply responses in total markctcd output bctwccn 1949 and 1968 and they 
found a supply response elasticity of 0.6. The third study was by Colman and Garbctt 
(1973) and they invcstigatcd supply responses in cotton between 1954 and 1972 and 
they reported supply response elasticity of 2.36.11c fourth and final study was by 
Kydd (1980) and his analysis looked at supply responses in smallholder tobacco 
sector between 1954 and 1971 and he reported supply response elasticities of 0.58 to 
0.68. The current analysis picks up from some of these findings but looks at the 
period between 1972 and 2004, a period during which there are no documented 
commodity supply responses for any of the commodities under study, and also a 
period within which there has been structural changes compared to the period before 
it. 
4.3 The Analytical Framework 
This analysis used an adapted dynamic commodity supply response model which was 
developed by Marc Nerlove about half a century ago. This model is considered by 
many economists as one of the most notable econometric contributions to analysis of 
commodity supply responses (Tiffin, 2004). Nerlove's model is a distributed lag 
model and is capable of estimating both short-run and long-run commodity supply 
response elasticities (Tiffin, 2004). In this model, farmers are assumed to make their 
own production decision based on their own assessment of future market conditions 
which arc shaped by their experiences and available information. They arc more 
likely to grow more of a particular crop in the following year as long as they perceive 
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priccs for that commodity to be highcr in that particular scason and vicc vcrsa. 
Moreover, in the short run, it is assumed that the most important costs involved in the 
production of one crop is the foregone opportunity to produce another crop. The most 
important cost factor for a crop then is the quantity of other crops not produced or 
reduced. Although the original model has undergone widespread modifications 
globally, its fundamental constructs have remained the same, as have its objectives (to 
estimate price supply responses for agricultural crops). 
According to this model, in order to capture planned output from a single crop or an 
agricultural output due to price or technological change, the ideal dependent variable 
is planned output itself, however, data on this is obviously unavailable, hence, there is 
a need to use proxy variables. One such proxy variable, which has been extensively 
used by analysts, is the actual output itself. However as Bchnnan (1968) argued, 
actual output often differs considerably from planned output mainly due to 
environmental factors which are in effect beyond the control of farmers. As a result, 
use of land area as opposed to actual output has been preferred mainly because actual 
land area planted is by far a better proxy of planned output of the farmer since this is 
under full control of the farmer. As Behrman (1968) again observed, caution still 
needs to be excercised in using land as dependent variable in supply response models 
mainly due to; (i) land is heterogenous in the sense that a farmer can up scale 
production of a particular crop by simply allocating more of good quality land without 
necessarily expanding crop area and (ii) land is one of the many inputs a farmer can 
alter in order to get increased output, hence, the best proxy of planned output would in 
this respect entail an all input inclusive index which is more complex to construct and 
may bring in other secondary problems. 
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Taking into account both mcrits and dcnicrits of using planted land as proxy to 
planncd output, the study adoptcd this variable as dcpcndcnt variablc. In adopting 
land as dcpcndcnt variable, the study analysed supply responses from the view point 
of land or cxtcnsification rcsponscs to changes in producer prices. Thus, the rcsponscs 
obscrvc* in this analysis wcrc arcs rcsponscs to changes in produccr priccs. Thcsc 
responses take into account entry and/or exit of farmers into producing a particular 
crop and/or incrcascs/decrcascs in area of existing fanners. In addition, as fanners 
cntcr/cxit production of a particular crop and/or incrcasc/dccrcasc arca, they also take 
into account other production factors such as labour, inputs and services (mainly 
processing), hence, the extent to which farmers adjust their area in response to 
changes in producer prices is also affcctcd by such factors as availability and access to 
labour, inputs, services and produce markets. However, as argued carlier above, area 
responses do not take into account intensification initiatives by farmers. Thus, farmers 
can also choose to respond to changes in producer prices by altering inputs usage 
which cannot be captured by supply responses based on land. Considering the 
importance of the intensification response, the study also analysed supply responses 
using actual output as the dependent variable, while being mindful of the weather 
variability concerns associated with actual output. The main aims of these analyses 
were to investigate intensification responses by the farmers. 
The adapted commodity supply response model in this analysis was drawn from 
Tiffin (2004) and is defined as follows: 
4=a0+o1+ii, (1) 
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/it = /it-I + O(A - At-I) (3) 
u, N (0,6, ', ) (4) 
Where the first relates to desired crop area Aý in time t to an cxpcctcd price I, ` at 
that time. The second equation relates expected price to observed prices lagged t, _, 
and expected prices lagged J,. The third equation relates observed crop area A, to its 
lagged value A, _, and 
desired area. When solved, the three equations result in 
equation (4) which is reduced form of the combined equation where everything is 
expressed in terms of observed variables. 
ý =4 +b +44-4 +baý z +er (5) 
In this equation, 
b, = ao y6 (6) 
b2 = ayO (7) 
b3 =(1-r)+(1-O) (8) 
b, = -(1- r)(1- ©) (9) 
Co = (Jk,, - [©(1- r)]ur-, (10) 
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The long run supply response Willi respect to pricc can be rccovcrcd from the 
paramctcrs of the rcduccd form cquation as follows: 
b2 
= t, 1-b, -b4 S2 
Where 5, aI- b3 - b4 and when cstimatcs of b,, b, and b4 arc used in evaluating 
equation (11), the distribution of a will, in gcncral, be multimodal. 
It must be pointed out that during estimation of the model equation in equation (5), 
the study logged all the variables in the first instance thereby turning the relationship 
into log linear relationships, hence, coefficients of independent variables were in this 
way turned into elasticities of supply responses. This being the case, there was no 
need to recalculate elasticities of price supply responses separately. Furthermore, 
where supply responses were measured using actual outputs, variable for area `A' in 
all the equations above was replaced by output variable 'Q'. 
4.4 Data collection and use 
Two main types of data sets covering a period of thirty years or more were required 
for each analysis of price response. The first types of data were time series data sets 
on producer prices for the four crops. As already pointed out in section 3.3.4, the 
study only managed to get producer prices for cotton and tobacco but could not access 
time series producer prices for smallholder sugar and cotton farmers. The study 
therefore used producer prices for tobacco and cotton and prices for processed sugar 
and tea. The second type of data that were required for the price supply response 
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analyses were disaggrcgatcd data on arras of smallholdcr and large scale farnicrs. The 
study only accessed smallholder area data for cotton farmers, primarily bccausc cotton 
is cxclusivcly a stnallholdcr crop and national data is also snallholdcr total area data. 
In tobacco, tca and sugar, the study could not acccss properly rccordcd and 
documcntcd time scrics data for disaggrcgatcd area data for largo scalc and small 
scalc producers. 
In view of the difficulties in accessing the required data, the study analysed price 
supply responses in tobacco using national arca/output data (which includcd both 
smallholdcr and estate arcas/outputs) and producer prices, for cotton the study 
analysed price supply responses using smallholder producer prices and smallholder 
arcaloutput, while in tea and sugar the study analysed price supply responses using 
prices of processed products (effectively prices of factory owners) and national crop 
arcas/outputs (which include both small and large scale farmers' areas/outputs). These 
differences in the analyses of both price transmission and supply responses were 
unavoidable given the data availability problems discussed in section 3.3.4. In tenns 
of specific sources of urea/output data, the study sourced cotton and sugar area/output 
data from Ministry of Agriculture, tobacco arealoutput data from TCC and tca 
area/output data from ITC. 
4.5 Supply responses in Malawi's tobacco supply system 
4.5.1 Structure of Malawi's tobacco supply system 
The structure of the tobacco supply system in Malawi can be vicwcd historically in 
two main periods. The first is the period between 1964 and 1989 when burley tobacco 
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was cxclusivcly an cstatc cntcrprisc and the sccond was bctwccn 1990 and to dato 
when the crop is grown by both small and large scale growers. In the former period, 
the statc through the Spccial Crops Act legislation of 1964 excluded smallholdcr 
farmers from growing burley tobacco. Small scalc fanners only provided labour to 
cstatc owners. On the other hand, all large scale growers interested to grow tobacco in 
any scason wcrc rcquircd to obtain a liccncc from the Tobacco Control Commission 
(TCC), an arm of Government responsible for regulating the Malawi's tobacco 
industry. The licence clearly spelt out the area that the growcr was allowed to 
cultivatc and the type of tobacco to be produced. Kydd ct al (2006) reported that the 
idea behind the legislation and licensing system was (i) to match tobacco production 
with market requirements and (ii) to maintain very high quality of Malawi tobacco, 
especially since tobacco was and still is the major export commodity for the country. 
Kydd et al (2006) further indicate that not only did the licence system serve the two 
intended purposes, but it also acted as a form of political patronage in which the state 
rewarded its political supporters. 
On top of Special Crop Act restrictions, institutions surrounding contracts for labour, 
credit, inputs and produce markets were all shaped in such a way that they were 
supporting and enhancing productivity of the tobacco sector in Malawi. In labour 
markets, the tenancy system, a form of labour contracts where estate owners were 
hiring farm workers (known as tenants) who were given allotments within estates in 
which to provide their labour in return for food and other support services during the 
season with the costs for this deducted from their pay after sale of tobacco at the 
auction. This system flourished in the pre liberalisation period and at the beginning of 
each agricultural season Malawi would see a large migration of labour taking place to 
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(and latcr from) tobacco growing rcbions. On finance, the two major commercial 
banks thcn institutionalism credit arrangements for tobacco growcrs and created posts 
for tobacco credit advisors in thcir cstablishmcnts. Thcsc officers provided a link 
bctwccn the banks and cstatc owners so that acccss to credit by cstatc owners was 
madc casicr and fastcr. In this way, cstate owncrs found it casy to financc all their 
tobacco opcrations. 
With respect to inputs, in particular, tobacco sccds and fcrtiliscrs, supplying 
companies too entered into different flexible contractual arrangements with estate 
owners on supply of these inputs. These arrangcmcnts ranged from spot markcts to 
long period payment contracts in which estate owners were able to access inputs at 
any time in the growing season and pay back after sale of produce. In this case, land 
was used as collateral for most of inputs and finance. Similarly, on produce markets, 
services such as transport were negotiated under a variety of forms of flexible 
contracts. As a result of the privilege of being sole producers as provided for under 
the Special Crops Act and of flexible and favourable contractual arrangements in 
labour, credit, input and output markets, estate tobacco production nourished 
throughout the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's in Malawi. The number of estates and the 
area under estate tobacco both grew rapidly during this period. 
However, as Kydd (2006) reports, the exclusion of the masses of small scale farmers 
later resulted in resentment among the majority of Malawians in 1980's and this 
forced the Government to relax restrictions on tobacco cultivation. More and more of 
medium scale land owners were beginning to be given quotas for tobacco production. 
This relaxation gave rise to increased tobacco production from medium scale tobacco 
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growers in the late 1980's and early 1990's. In 1989 the Government finally repealed 
the Spccial Crops Act, allowing anyonc intcrestcd in the cultivation of tobacco to 
bcgin growing the crop. Considcring that some vcry small scalc produccrs would have 
cndcd up incurring higher per unit costs in transport and in logistics expenses for 
marketing their tobacco at the auction, the repeal also introduced Intermediate Buying 
Schemes (113s) allowing interested agents to buy tobacco from far mcrs and to sell at 
auction markcts. The 1ß's were in this casc the oncs who wcrc liccnscd to buy 
tobacco leaf from farmers and sell it to the auction market instead of individual small 
scale growers. Alongside the 113 scheme, small scale growers were organised into 
clubs through which farmers were working closely with cach other and agricultural 
cxtcnsion officers in producing and sclling tobacco. 
With removal of restrictions on tobacco cultivation, between 1989 and 1997, the 
number of small scale farmers cultivating tobacco rapidly grew from almost zero to 
350,000, leading to increases in both area and production (Figure 44 and Figure 45). 
Five main reasons have been attributed to the ovenvhelming response from small 
scale farmers and these include: 
(i) tobacco is considered by the majority of small scale farmers in Malawi as 
far more remunerative than competing commodities, hence, the opening up 
of tobacco production meant that small scale farmers in dominant tobacco 
production regions speedily switched from other enterprises to tobacco 
cultivation; 
(ii) the majority of small scale growers that started growing tobacco 
immediately after the introduction of the new policy were once tenants in 
tobacco estates, and as such they had prior knowledge of the crop 
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husbandry practiccs for growing tobacco so thcy simply startcd growing 
tobacco using knowlcdgc thcy had a1rc idy acquired whilc working as 
tcnants; 
(iii) the introduction of farmers' clubs hclpcd small scale growers conic 
togcthcr Helping and encouraging one another, and, 
(iv) Credit support which tobacco fanners enjoyed from the Malawi Rural 
Finance Company of Malawi (MRFC). This company was born out of the 
defunct Smallholder Credit Administration (SACA) of Malawi. 
On the other hand, while the number of small scale growers has been growing, with 
their share of tobacco area and production, the number of large scale tobacco growers, 
and their share of area and output, has been going down since the mid 1990's. 
Currently, it is estimated that large scale tobacco growers only account for 13% of 
Malawi's annual tobacco output while the remaining 87% is supplied by small scale 
tobacco growers. Some of the underlying reasons explaining the exodus of estate 
farmers include: (i) the collapse of the tenancy system, as the majority of tenants have 
walked away and established themselves as small scale tobacco growers. This has 
been a big blow to the estate sector as estate owners now find it extremely difficult to 
compete for labour which is otherwise happy to work independently; (ii) the increase 
in costs of tobacco production (mainly finance, and fertilisers), due to macroeconomic 
hardships in late 1990's and early 2000's, has squeezed profit margins for most 
enterprises to the point that some large scale farmers have shifted to other enterprises; 
and, (iii) increases and introduction of new taxes has again affected profitability of 
most estates. Small scale growers are by law exempted from most of the taxes. 
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Changcs in the structurc of tobacco cultivation also affected markct arrangements for 
supply of inputs (mainly fcrtiliscrs, improvcd sccds and pcsticidcs), crcdit and 
services (in particular transport). Chaptcr six discusses in dctail changes in thcsc 
market linkages and their implications on industry level set performance indicators 
such as yield, quality and prices. 
4.5.2 Impact of smallholder farmer entry into tobacco cultivation 
Firstly, entry of smallholder tobacco farmers into cultivation of tobacco meant that 
more land was put under tobacco cultivation in Malawi which also translated into 
incrcascd tobacco output cspccially burley tobacco. Figure 44 and Figure 45 (in 
chapter 3) show that while area and production of tobacco grcw by only about 10% 
annually before entry of smallholder farmers into tobacco cultivation, area and output 
grew by an average of 30% annually between 1989 and 1997 following the entry of 
smallholder farmers. Since then, both hectarage and production have fluctuated 
bctwccn 80,000ha and 180,000ha and 120 million kilograms and 180 million 
kilograms respectively. 
Secondly, on tobacco yields, Figure 49 shows that tobacco yields in Malawi were 
steadily and continuously rising from 1.0 tonne per hectare in 1972 to 1.4 tonnes per 
hectare in 1984. From then on, tobacco yields became unstable. Between 1984 and 
1989, tobacco yields steadily fell from 1.4 tonnes per hectare back to 1.0 tonne per 
hectare before rising to 1.5 tonnes per hectare in 1990. In the following two seasons, 
tobacco yields dropped again to 1.2 tonnes per hectare before recovering again to 1.5 
tonnes per hectare in 1993 and 1994. From 1995 to 2002, tobacco yields in Malawi 
took a downward spiral that saw yields falling to just below 1.0 tonne per hectare. 
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Thirdly, on composition of tobacco varictics in Malawi, Figurc 50 shows that until 
1983, flue cured was the major tobacco varictics produced in Malawi followed by 
burlcy and other typcs of tobacco stylcs such as Southcm Division Dark Fircd 
(SDDF), Northern Division Dark Fircd (NDDF) and Sun/Air cured tobaccos. 
However, since late 1980's which also coincided with influx of medium to small scalc 
tobacco growcrs, the composition and trcnds in production of different varictics of 
tobacco's dramatically changcd. As the figure shows, sincc latc 1980's, thcrc has been 
sharp increases in burley tobacco while all other tobacco varieties have been gradually 
declining. Interviews with stakeholders in the industry indicate that the majority of 
small and medium scale tobacco growers who joined tobacco production since late 
1980's conccntratcd on growing burley tobacco, mainly because of its less expensive 
and easy method of curing process. Thus, although prices arc higher for other types of 
tobacco at the auction, the majority of new tobacco growers opted for burley mainly 
because of curing method. The decline in other types of tobaccos has also been 
worsened by the downsizing and complete withdrawal of former major estates that 
were growing these types. This scaling down and in some cases complete withdrawal 
of some estate producers has not been associated with new entrants into growing these 
types and therefore has meant that their volumes have bccn going down to the point 
that in some types, mainly Sun/Air cured tobacco, they have not been produced since 
2000. With respect to flu cured tobacco, due to its market demand, buyers have gone 
into contract agreements with larger scale growers to produce for them flue cured 
tobacco. These contractual arrangements commenced in 2004 and buyers agree to 
supply growers (both large and small scale) with all their input requirements in order 
for growers to produce an agreed volume of tobacco which is sold at negotiated prices. 
All input loans are deducted from growers during sale of their tobacco. 
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Figure 50: Quantities of different tobacco types in Malm i 
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On quality of tobacco leaves, there appears to be claims and counterclaims as to the 
quality of Malawi tobacco leaf. Growers argue it is good while buyers counter argue 
that quality has fallen since the entry of smallholder farmers. Commentators argue 
that growers claim they are supplying superior grade because they are seeking higher 
prices for their tobacco while buyers claim the grade is inferior in order to justify their 
low prices. TCC and AHL argue that the quality of tobacco has gone down slightly 
compared to the time that the crop was under Crops Special Act. They argue that due 
to large numbers of tobacco growers who are diverse in many ways in terms of 
resource availability and level of knowledge of tobacco production, differences in 
quality of tobacco produced by these growers was inevitable. Some growers are better 
resource endowed and are able therefore to access high quality seeds and optimal 
levels of fertilisers while those with limited resources use poor quality seeds without 
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fcrtiliscrs. It has been difficult to determine dccisivcly as to how cntry of smaliholdcr 
farmcrs into cultivation has impacted on quality of tobacco duc to lack of time scrics 
data on graded tobacco qualities. Nonctbclcss, chaptcr six takes up and discusses this 
issuc in more detail. 
4.5.3 Determinants of tobacco supply in Malawi 
Use of land, labour and inputs (mainly good quality sceds and fcrtiliscrs) are the main 
dctcrminants of the amount of tobacco produccd by the Malawi supply systcm. One 
othcr factor that affects supply of tobacco in Malawi is wcathcr conditions. Statistics 
indicate that tobacco production has bccn obscrvcd to fall in seasons of prolonged dry 
spells and droughts. 
4.5.4 Results of price supply response analysis in Malawi's tobacco supply 
system 
Table 26, Table 27, and Table 28 presents findings of the supply response analyses for 
Malawi's tobacco supply system. Table 26 has supply response analysis results for 
burley tobacco; Table 27 has supply response findings for flue cured tobacco while 
Table 28 has supply response analysis results for aggregated Malawi tobacco. The 
desegregation into burley and flue cured tobacco varieties were considered necessary 
in order to determine whether there are supply response differences between burley 
and flue cured tobacco varieties, two of the most economically important tobacco 
varieties for Malawi. In each tobacco variety, the study analysed responses based on 
both area and output. Reasons for using both land and output as determinants for 
supply responses have been discussed earlier in this chapter in the Analytical Methods 
section (1.3). A further distinction that has been made in each of the table results is 
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the pcriod of covcragc of the analysis. Two pcriods wcrc considcred; one covering the 
pcriod bctwccn 1972 and 2004 and anothcr coming the post libcralisation cra only. 
The study dccmcd it ncccssary to analysc scparatcly the supply responses in post 
libcralisation period in order to dctcrminc whether libcralisation of Malawi's tobacco 
supply system impacted on supply responses of the supply system. 
Table 26 shows the four supply response model results for burley tobacco. Model 
equation RI is for the area supply response for the period 1972 to 2004, model 
estimation R2 is for the area supply response for the post liberalisation era, model R3 
is the actual output supply response for the period 1972 to 2004 while equation R4 is 
the actual output supply response model for post liberalisation. Probability values for 
the independent variable lagged price (P, _, 
) in the four equations are 0.01 for RI, 
0.007 for R2,0.000 for R3 and 0.001 for R4. These probabilities demonstrate that in 
all the four model estimations, the independent variable `lagged price' ( f; _, 
) 
coefficients, arc significant. This observation means that burley tobacco prices are 
determinants of both area and output of burley tobacco in Malawi's tobacco supply 
system for both the periods; 1972 to 2004 and post liberalisation period. This finding 
answers in the affirmative the research question whether there are observable supply 
responses in burley tobacco in Malawi's tobacco supply system. 
As for the nature of responses, coefficients for independent variable lagged prices 
(P, 
_, 
) in all the four model estimations in Table 26 arc positive meaning that the 
relationship between producer prices and area/output is positive. This observation 
means that an increase in producer prices in burley tobacco result in a 
correspondingly predictable increases in arcaloutput for burley tobacco. This finding 
191 
suggcsts that if buricy prices are incrcascd on the world market due to policy reforms 
and that such price gains are reflected on the domestic burley tobacco market, then 
farmers in Malawi arc likely to respond to such price incrcascs by increasing 
arm/output of burley tobacco and vice versa. 
As for the elasticities of supply responses, Table 26 show that model equation RI has 
a price supply response elasticity of 0.6; model equation R2 has a supply response 
elasticity of 0.69; model estimation R3 has price supply response elasticity of 0.59 
while model equation R4 has price supply response elasticity of 0.63. These 
elasticities indicate that comparing the two periods; 1972 to 2004 and post 
liberalisation, elasticities appear to be slightly higher for post liberalisation period, 
(thus, 0.6 and 0.69 for area supply responses and 0.59 and 0.63 for output supply 
responses respectively). In addition, these 
findings show that comparing between area 
responses and output responses, although 
differences arc small, elasticities for area 
responscs arc slightly 
higher compared to elasticities for output responses (0.6 and 
0.59 for the period 1972 and 2004 respectively; and 0.69 and 0.63 for the post 
liberalisation era respectively). As noted, the gap is slightly wider under post 
libcralisation. These findings suggest that there is no intensification response in burley 
tobacco supply responses and that 
in post liberalisation period, farmers expand their 
area in response to price 
increases without necessarily matching the increase in area 
with increases in 
inputs. Overall, in answering the research question of elasticities of 
burley tobacco, it can be argued that supply response elasticities in burley tobacco 
rangc s from 0.6 to 
0.69 and the study discusses these findings further in chapter six as 
it examines market linkages 
in Malawi's tobacco supply system. 
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Table 26: Supply response model results for burley tobacco 
A, =1.43 + 0.6P_1 + 0.8A, _, + 
0.08A1_2 (it, ) 
(0.06) (0.001) (0.000) (0.628) 
(R2 = 0.96, DW=1.8, F-stat probability value - 0.000) 
4 =1.99+0.69P 1+0.854-1+0.1,4-2 (112) (0.11) (0.007) (0.001) (0.640) 
{ Ile = 0.96, D%V=1.9, F-stat probability valuc - 0.000) 
Qý =1.56+0.59P_, +0.5Q1_, +0.4Q, _2 (Ri) (0.4) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) 
{ R2 = 0.97, DNV=1.7, F-stat probability value = 0.000) 
0 =1.5+0.6 1 
+0.5Q-1 +O. Q-2 
(R4) 
(0.226) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) 
1 R2 = 0.97. D\'V=1.8. F-stat Probability value = 0.000) 
Table 27 shows model supply response estimations for flue cured tobacco variety. 
! Model equation R5 is for area supply response for the period 1972 to 2004; model 
estimation R6 is 
for area supply response for post liberalisation period; model 
equation R7 is for output supply response 
for the period 1972 to 2004 while model 
estimation R8 is 
for output supply response for post liberalisation period. As the 
probability values for 
independent variable lagged prices (P, _, 
) for the four model 
equations shows, equations 
R6 and R8 with probability vales 0.06 and 0.007 
respectively arc significant at 
10% and 5% confidence intervals whereas, probability 
values of 0.55 and 0.344 
for equations RS and R7 are outside the two confidence 
intervals and therefore not significant. These findings suggest that there are 
observable supply responses 
both in terms of area and output supply responses in flue 
cured tobacco sub sector 
in Malawi in post liberalisation period. 
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Furthcrmorc, positive coefficients for independent variable lagged prices (1, _, 
) for 
significant model equations R6 and R8 entails that the relationship between producer 
prices and cultivated area and/or output for flue cured tobacco is positive, meaning 
that an increase in flue cured tobacco prices result in a corresponding increase in area 
of cultivated flue cured tobacco and/or output. In addition, with coca iicients for 
indcpcndcnt variable lagged prices (P, _, 
) for model equations R6 and R8 as 0.29 and 
0.55 rcspectivcly means that elasticities of area supply responses for flue cured 
tobacco in Malawi are 0.29 while those for output responses arc slightly highcr at 0.55. 
Thcsc findings demonstrate that output responses are slightly stronger in Malawi's 
floc cured tobacco sub sector in post libcralisation period compared with area 
rcsponscs. The study discusses further this issue in chapter six as it examines market 
linkages for inputs, services and produce for tobacco supply system. 
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Table 27: Supply response model results for Flue Cured Tobacco 
A, =1.6 + 0.07]_1 + 0.79At_1 (ýt5ý (0.26) (0.55) (0.000) 
{ R2 = 0.64, DW=1.5, F-stat probability valuc = 0.000) 
Al = 0.72 + 0.29P_1 + 0.78At_, (R6) (0.6) (0.06) (0.000) 
{ R2 = 0.72, DW=2, F-stat probability valuc = 0.000) 
=2.5+0.2P 1 +0.3Q_i +0.5Q_2 O (117) 
(0.390) (0.344) (0.287) (0.064) 
( R2 = 0.52, DW'V=1.5, F-stat probability value = 0.000) 
O =1.0+0.55P 1+0.4Q_1+OAQ_2 (Rg) (0.67) (0.007) (0.001) (0.082) 
{ R2 = 0.71, DW=1.5, F-stat probability value = 0.000} 
Table 28 shows model estimation for aggregated tobacco area and output supply 
responses for Malawi's tobacco supply system 
for the period 1972 to 2004 and for 
post liberalisation period. 
Model estimation R9 is for area supply response for the 
period 1972 to 2004; model equation 
RIO is for area supply response for post 
liberalisation; model equation RI I is for output supply response for the period 1972 
to 2004 while model equation R12 is 
for output supply response for post liberalisation. 
As probability values for independent variable 
lagged prices (P_, ) for the four model 
equations shows 
(0.027 for R9; 0.05 for R10; 0.000 for RI 1; 0.001 for R12), they arc 
all significant. Thus, the 
findings suggest that tobacco area and output in Malawi 
r sponds to changes 
in producer prices. Furthermore, with positive coefficients of 
independent variable lagged price (P, _, 
) in all the four model equations, it means that 
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incrcascs in producer prices results in corresponding increases in arca/output for 
aggrcgatc tobacco in Malawi. 
in tcrms of clasticitics of supply responses, equations in Table 28 show that post 
tibcralisation responses both under area and output supply responses have higher 
clasticititics of supply suggesting that supply responses have improved in post 
liberalisation period in Malawi's tobacco supply system. Furthcnnore, the results also 
show that elasticities for output responses are higher than elasticities for area 
rrsponscs. The study suggests that higher output supply responses in aggregate 
tobacco could be partly due to stronger output responses in flue cured. Overall, it 
would be argued that supply responses for aggregate tobacco in Malawi's tobacco 
supply system falls within the range of 0.4 and 0.52. The study discusses further these 
findings in chapter six, but considering that burley tobacco constitutes 95% of 
: Mlalawi's tobacco and that it is the crop that majority of small scale tobacco farmers 
in Malawi grow; the study focuses much of the discussion in chapter six on burley 
tobacco supply response findings. 
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Table 28: Supply response model results for all Malawl tobacco 
.4 =0.11+0.4P 1+0.8,4-1+0.04_2 (R9) (0.88) (0.027) (0.000) (0.883) 
(R2 = 0.93, DW=1.8, F-stat probability value - 0.000) 
4 =0.13+0.47P 1+0.9.4-1+0.014_2 (RIO) (0.94) (0.05) (0.000) (0.95) 
{ R2 = 0.93, DW=1.8, F-stat probability valuc - 0.000) 
Q =1. O+O. 49I1 +0.4Q_, +0.4_2 (1111) (0.134) (0.000) (0.012) (0.003) 
{ R' = 0.96, DW=1.8, F-stat probability valuc = 0.000} 
Q =O. 5+O. 521 1 +0.4Q-1 +0AQ-2 (1112) (0.735) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004) 
{ R2 = 0.96, DW=1.8, F-stat probability value = 0.000) 
45.5 Summary of results from the tobacco supply response system 
Results from the supply response analyses, in which burley tobacco is a dominant 
siety, shows that the tobacco supply system in Malawi respond to changes in 
producer prices both in terms of area and output responses. The results further shows 
that in post liberalisation era, area and output supply responses in Malawi's tobacco 
supply system were marginally better compared to the period covering three decades 
betwc cn 1972 and 2004. In addition, the results show that burley tobacco farmers in 
Malawi mainly respond to changes in producer prices by adjusting their cultivated 
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On clasticitics of supply responses, the results shows that burley tobacco has high 
clssticity responses of between 0.6 and 0.69 compared to 0.29 and 0.55 for flue cured 
tobacco in post liberalisation period and 0.4 and 0.52 for aggregate Malawi tobacco 
responses. Overall, the study concludes that the tobacco supply system in Malawi 
responds to changes in producers mainly through area adjustments and that these 
responses arc relatively inelastic. Chapter six discusses these observations further by 
cxamining market linkages for land, labour and other inputs to determine why the 
supply response elasticities (both through cxtcnsification and intensification) in 
Malawi's tobacco supply system are relatively inelastic and are particularly low for 
intensification responses in burley tobacco. 
4.6 Supply responses in Malawi's cotton supply system 
4.6.1 Structure of cotton production in Malawi 
historically, cotton cultivation is exclusively a preoccupation of smallholder farmers, 
although there are no 
known barriers to entry by large scale farmers. Farmers grow it 
as a way of earning 
household income and as such, cotton competes with other 
traditional cash crops such as tobacco, groundnuts and rice on the one hand and with 
the major staple food crop, maize, and other 
food crops, on the other. In terms of 
changes in structure of production of cotton 
in Malawi, the only major structural 
change involved the change 
in institutional arrangements for supply of inputs (mainly 
seeds and pesticides), services 
(mainly hiring out of pesticide spraying equipment) 
and purchase of produce within the cotton supply system 
in the last four decades. This 
change took place 
in the 1989/90 growing season. Until that time, the state through 
ADMARC was supplying all inputs to smallholder farmers and purchasing their seed 
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cotton while the Department of Extension in Ministry of Agriculture provided 
3ci,. isory services to cotton farmers. However, following rc-organisation of various 
market linkages in the cotton supply system, the state withdrew its services and in its 
place private sector companies entered the supply system to supply inputs and 
scr%ices to cotton farmers as well as purchase their seed cotton. Chapter seven 
discusses in detail both the pre- and post- libcralisation market arrangements for 
supply of inputs, services, and for the purchase of produce in the cotton supply system, 
including the impact such changes had on industry set performance indicators such as 
yiclds, quality and output. On determinants of cotton supply in Malawi, apart from 
weather conditions, cotton supply is determined by the amount of land allocated to 
cotton and levels of inputs applied, especially, usage of high quality seeds, application 
of pesticides, and usage of fertilisers. 
4.6.2 Results of cotton supply responses to producer prices 
Table 29 show four model equations depicting supply responses in cotton supply 
system. Equation R13 is the area supply response model for the period 1972 and 2004; 
model estimation R14 is the area supply response model for post liberalisation; 
equation R1S is the output supply response model 
for the period 1972 to 2004 and 
model estimation R16 is the output supply response model for post liberalisation. As 
probability values for independent variable 
lagged price (P, _, 
) shows for the four 
equations, the independent variable 
lagged price is significant for equations R15 and 
R16 only where probability values are 0.002 and 0.035 respectively. Probability 
values for independent variables 
lagged price (P, _, 
) for equations R13 and R14 arc 
0.24 and 0.84 and therefore not significant. These findings suggest that there arc only 
output supply responses 
in Malawi's cotton supply system and not area responses. 
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Fusthcrmorc, with positive coefficients on significant independent variables lagged 
prices for equations, R15 and R16, output responses arc positive entailing that the 
relationship between producer prices and cotton output in Malawi is positive hence an 
increase in prices result in corresponding increases in cotton output and vice versa. 
As for clasticitics of cotton output supply responscs, coefficients of 0.23 and 0.45 for 
equations R15 and R16 suggest that cotton responses in Malawi arc high in post 
Iibcralisation period compared to the period between 1972 and 2004. These findings 
suggest that cotton output supply responses arc better in liberalised period and the 
study considers better coordination in input supply and access by fanners in post 
liberalisation period in Malawi as explaining the better output supply responses in 
Malawi's cotton sub sector. These findings are discussed further in chapter seven as 
the study examines further market linkages for cotton supply system in Malawi. 
Table 29: Supply response for cotton supply system 
At = 6.2 + 0.03 Pt_1 + 0.42 At_, (R13) 
(0.03) (0.24) (0.02) 
{ R2 = 0.29, DW= 1.8 F-stat probability value = 0.009) 
ý1 = 7.1 + 0.02 Pt-1 + 0.33 A1_, (R14) (0.001) (0.84) (0.08) 
{ R2 = 0.35, DW= 1.9, F-stat probability value = 0.02) 
Q, = 13 .2+0.23 Pt-1 + 
0.2 Q 
1_1 (R15) 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.556) 
{ R2 = 0.38, DW= 1.9, F-stat probability value = 0.002) 
Qt = 14.69 + 0.45 Pt-1 + 0.16 Q, _1 (R16) (0.000) (0.035) (0.364) 
{ R2 = 0.42, DW= 1.9, F-stat probability value = 0.005) 
. 4.7 Supply responses in Malawi's sugar supply system 
4.7.1 Structure of sugarcane production in Malaw l 
production of sugarcane in Malawi is carried out by two main groups of growers. The 
first is SUCOMA, which is a Limited Company with sugarcane plantations and sugar 
processing mills. The second group of producers arc smallholder sugarcane farmcrs 
who arc further categorised into there separate smallholder fanner schemes which arc: 
D%vangwa Cane Growers Limited (DCGL), Kasinthula Cane Growers Limited 
(KCGL) and independent smallholder outgrowcr schemes. SUCOMA was established 
in early 1960's while DCGL joined SUCOMA as sugarcane plantation scheme in 
1976. Farmers in the outgrowcr schemes followed in mid eighties while KCGL is 
relatively new and its plantations were 
developed in 1997. 
4.7.2 Impact of entry of smallholder farmers' schemes in Malawi's sugar 
production 
Cultivation of sugarcane is both labour and capital intensive venture. At 
commencement of sugarcane cultivation, 
large sums of capital are required to access 
land, level the fields, install expensive irrigation equipment and purchase and plant 
the first sugarcane ratoon crop. 
Installation of irrigation facilities has also implications 
on national power and water resources. 
On top of the initial capital outlay, sugarcane 
cultivation also demands commitment of 
land to sugarcane cultivation for a long 
period of time, sugarcane 
being a perennial crop. Furthermore, during growing season 
of sugarcane, apart from variable 
inputs, sugarcane cultivation also demands 
considerable supply of 
labour resource. Entry of smallholder farmer schemes 
therefore, contributed in all these aspects as 
follows; (i) they enabled injection of 
additional capital investments 
into cultivation of sugar in Malawi; (ii) they ensured 
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that more land could be sourccd from customary land and dcvvclopcd into sugarcanc 
plantation ficids; and, (iii) they expanded the pool of labour resource for the sugar 
industry in Malawi. Consequently, entry of smallholder sugarcane growing schemes 
directly contributed to increased area and production of Malawi sugar (Figure 37). In 
particular, while room for further expansions could have been limited for SUCOMA 
for various reasons, not least land constraints, potential for increasing both area and 
output of sugarcane was achieved through expansions in smallholdcr sugar schemes. 
The introduction of smallholder schemes contributed positivcly to both yields and 
sucrose content of Malawi's sugarcane. Generally, sugarcane yields are a function of 
type of variety used (high yielding varieties result in high yields), management styles 
(good management through better crop and husbandry practices leads to better yields), 
fertilisers usage (adequate use leads to higher yields), number of years of rattoon crop 
(new plantations have high yields) and timing of harvesting. As a result of faring well 
in all these determinants of yields and sucrose content mainly due to institutional 
arrangements in smallholder schemes (discussed in detail in chapter 7), entry of 
smallholder farmers in sugarcane cultivation positively contributed to Malawi's 
sugarcane yields and sucrose content. In particular, yields for DCGL and KCGL 
schemes are higher than SUCOMA and sucrose content for outgrowcr schemes are 
higher than SUCOMA and as a result, yields for overall processed sugar per hectare is 
highest in DCGL scheme (Table 30). Detailed discussions on underlying causes of 
variations in yields, sucrose content and processed sugar levels are made in chapter 7. 
Table 30: Comparison of 10 year average yields and sucrose content 
Grower Yield (nit/ha) % Sucrose Content Sucrose (nit/ha) 
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SUCOMA 91.17 14.14 13.10 
OGCL 100.94 13.83 13.96 
KCGL 105.34 13.46 13.07 
Outgowcr Schemes 43.71 14.91 6.52 
Source: Managcments of inuiviauat scncmcs 
4.7.3 Determinants of sugarcane supply 
There arc two main determinants of amount of sugarcanc supply in Malawi and thcsc 
arc; land and capital. As pointed out carlicr-on, land is one of the most critical factor 
in sugarcane production. Currently, anecdotal reports from SUCOMA indicate that 
the company has developed and planted to sugarcane about 15,000 ha and has about 
3,000 hectares of idle land which it can develop and plant to sugarcane. KCGL has 
also 400 hectares of land which is earmarked for future development into sugarcane 
plantation. Outside these two potential areas, the industry doesn't seem to have 
greater options for expansion of sugar plantations other than converting more of 
customary land from growing other crops into sugarcane, something which may be 
politically sensitive. On capital investments, injections are required in both field 
developments and processing facilities. Anecdotal information from SUCOMA 
indicated that recent investments in sugar processing mills can enable processing of 
additional 60,000 metric tonnes annually which effectively means that beyond that 
then additional investments in milling facilities may be required apart from 
investments of sugarcane plantation fields. As for development of already available 
land under KCGL, reports from the scheme indicate that the scheme is currently 
servicing debts from development costs of existing plantations and once they 
finish 
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thcn thcy may considcr to dcvclop additional plantations. All these indicatc that both 
capital and land are indccd critical factors in sugarcanc production. 
The othcr way that the industry can improvc Malawi's sugar output is through 
rcplanting of sugarcane plantations with varictics of high yielding and high sugar 
contcnt attributcs. The adoption of high yiciding and high sucrosc content Icvcl 
sugarcane varieties can help the Malawi sugar industry to improve its productivity of 
sugar. Advances in research and development and subsequent adoption of such 
cultivars of sugarcane arc likely to benefit the sugar industry in Malawi. Currently, 
SUCOMA is conducting trials for a number of varieties used in many high yielding 
sugarcane producing countries such as Brazil and outcomes from such trials would 
Icad to introduction of such varieties in Malawi. 
4.7.4 Results of supply responses to sugar prices 
Table 31 shows area and output supply response model results for the sugar supply 
system. Equation R17 is for area supply response with one lag while equation R18 
is 
for area supply response with three lags. On the other hand, equation R19 is for output 
supply response with one lag while equation R20 is the output supply response model 
with three lags. The lagging of prices to three seasons in sugar supply system was 
considered necessary considering that sugarcane is a perennial crop and that supply 
responses may take slightly longer than one season because of this 
feature. 
As probability values for the lagged prices, (P, _I 
), (PI_2) and (P, _3) 
for the four 
equations shows; thus, 0.038 for (P, _, 
) in equation R17; 0.7 for (P, -, 
), 0.085 for 
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(Pi-t ) and 0.961 for (Pr_3) in equation R18; 0.299 for (1', _, 
) in equation R19; and, 
0.151 for (P, -, 
), 0.302 for ( P, 
_2 
) and 0.392 for ( P, _3, 
) in equation R20, it is only in 
cquations R17 and R18 where sugar prices were lagged once and twice and area was 
uscd as dcpcndcnt variables where probabilitics for indcpcndcnt variables "laggcd 
priccs' (I; _, 
) and (P, -2 
) wcrc observed to be significant. This obscrvation means 
that the observable response in Malawi's sugar system is an area or cxtcnsilication 
response and that this response is only observable is short term price changes 
(precisely up to the past two seasons only). Thus, the findings suggest that even 
though sugar is a perennial crop, in as far as allocation of land to sugarcane is 
concerned, farmers respond to changes in sugar prices for the past two seasons only. 
In terms of nature of supply response, the coefficients on independent variables 
. lagged prices' (p_1) and (P1_2 ) are positive suggesting that the area supply 
responsc in Malawi's sugar supply system is positive meaning that an increase in 
producer prices result in increases in area and vice versa. Actual coefficient of 
indcpcndent variables `laggcd prices' (P, _, 
) and (P, _2 
) arc only 0.17 and 0.15 
respectively indicating that area supply responses in Malawi's sugar supply system 
arc marginal and very small. The implication 
for this finding is that even though 
farmers respond to changes in sugar prices for the previous season and the other one 
in their allocation of land to sugarcane crop, these responses are marginal. Chapter 
seven discusses these observations in 
detail. 
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Table 31: Price supply response results for sugar 
4 =0.97+0.17P,. 1+0.69,4-1+0.144_2 (1117) (0.042) (0.038) (0.000) (0.362) 
(R2 = 0.95, DW=2.3, F-stat probability valuc - 0.000) 
f =1.89+0.03P , +0.4.4-1 +O. 15P, _2 +0.17fß, _2 1-3 (R , g) (0.007) (0.7) (0.07) (0.085) (0.403) (0.961) 
1 R2 = 0.95, DW=1.9, F-stat probability valuc - 0.000) 
Q =1.89+0.09P 1+0.67Q-1 +0.14Q_2 (1119) (0.04) (0.299) (0.001) (0.388) 
(R2 = 0.94, DW=2.0, F-stat probability value = 0.000) 
Q =1.1+0.14/ 1 +0.6Q_1 +0.09P, _2 +0.99Q-2 +0.061 3 (fo) (0.136) (0.151) (0.002) (0.302) (0.215) (0.392) 
{ R2 = 0.95, DW=1.9, F-stat probability value 0.000} 
4.8 Supply responses in Malawi's tea supply system 
4.8.1 Structure of tca production in Malawi 
Tea cultivation in Malawi constitutes both small and large scale producers. Until 
independence in 1964, tea cultivation was exclusively done by large scale plantation 
owners who had investments in processing plants as well. however, in 1967, as part 
of the Special Crops Act, Government established the Smallholder Tea Authority 
(STA) of Malawi to introduce, develop and manage the smallholder tea sub sector. 
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Sincc then, tea production in Malawi has cvolvcd along thcsc two sub sectors, namely, 
large scale tea plantations owners and smaller scale tea growers. 
Figurc 51 show area and production of tea by largc scalc plantation owncrs in Malawi 
sincc 1958. As the figurc shows, tca area by large scalc produccrs in Malawi doubled 
within twcnty ycars in Malawi bctwccn 1958 and 1978 rising from just undcr 9,000 
ha to 18,000 ha. Since then, area under cstatc tea production stalled without any 
further significant incrcascs. With respect to production, figure 51 show that cstatc 
tca production rose five fold from 8,600 metric tones in 1958 to 38,000 metric tones 
in 1982. Since then, production from the estate sub sector has fluctuated between 
30,000 metric tones and 40,000 metric tones depending on climatic conditions and 
other factors. While increases in area under estate are attributed to expansions of tea 
fields into virgin lands, increases in tea outputs are in large part explained by 
expansion in area under estate. In terms of the number of estate owners in Malawi, 
there have been significant changes in ownership of estates in the last two decades. 
The number of estate owners has fallen from 24 in the late 1980's down to 12 in the 
2000's, through acquisitions and mergers. As a result of these changes, average sizes 
of individual cstatcs have grown biggcr, with some major cstatc owners having 
extremely large plantations of tea. With respect to specific owners of estates, 
multinational companies and European family business people own all large scale tea 
plantations in Malawi. In addition to owning tea ficids, large scale tea plantation 
owners also own tea processing facilities in and around their plantations, entailing 
vrriical integration. 
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Figure 51: Large scale area and production of tea in Malimi 
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Smallholder tea cultivation in Malawi started in 1967 with the establishment of the 
STA (Smallholder Tea Authority). As an institution, the STA was established under 
the authority of the Special Crops Act (Cap 65: 01 of the laws of Malawi) with the 
main objective of promoting and fostering development of tea cultivation by 
smallholder farmers. The first phase of development of smallholder tea plantation 
fields lasted between 1967 and 1971 and during this phase, STA bought a total of 760 
hectares of idle land from estate owners, which it developed and planted to tea before 
distributing to farmers willing to venture into tea cultivation. These farmers were 
organised into blocks for management purposes. The arrangement was that these 
growers would pay back the development costs over a period of 30 to 35 years 
through deductions from their annual proceeds. Phase two was between 1971 and 
1980 and during this period, STA secured from customary land tenure system a total 
of 1,660 hectares of land which it likewise developed and distributed to smallholder 
tea farmers. As awareness of the benefits of tea growing spread to other farmers, more 
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farmers approached STA asking the institution to Convert their arable lickis into tea 
plots and as Figure 52 shows, by 1984, a total 4 4,400 f nncrs had been recruited 
into tea growing and the number remained fairly stahlt until 1992 and 1993 when a 
further 16(X) farmers joined. Since then, the number of small scale tea growers has 
remained stable at around 6,500. With respect to area. Figure 52 shows that 
smallholder tea area increased marginally from 2,300ha in 1984 to 2,6O0 ha in 1997 
suggesting that the average holding cif individual fanners went down over this period 
considering that the numbers of growers entering tea growing was high. The figure 
clearly demonstrates that there have not been major increases in either total land area 
under smallholder tea sub sector or in individual small scale holding sizes. On the 
other hand. smallholder tea production has for the past decade varied between 2.0(X) 
and 3.000 metric tonnes depending on climatic conditions and other factors. 
Figure 52: Area and number of smallholder tea producers 
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4.8.2 Implications for changing structure of tea production 
Introduction cif small scale tea growing meant that more area and tea production were 
realised and added to the otherwise stagnating large scale plantations and outputs. 
Thus, the smallholder sub sector provided a window of opportunity tier increasing 
area under tea and general tea output without which there are strong possibilities that 
neither area nur production could have substantially gone up in the 1 ()R()'s. 1 ow s and 
2000's. 
In terms of productivity. Figure 53 shows that despite annual variations. overall there 
was steady growth in tea yields in Malawi from 1972 to 1990. During this period. 
annual average tea yields rose from 15(x)kg/ha to 2500kg/ha. However, since 1990, 
tea yields have fluctuated around 2200kg/ha. Time series data comparing between the 
two tea growing sub sectors is not available, but Chapter seven discusses in detail 
indicators of tea yields for the two sub sectors. 
Figure 53: Yields of Malawi tea (both small and large scale tea farmers) 
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4.83 I)ctcrminants of supply of ten leaves in Malawi 
Thcrc arc a numbcr of factors that influence the amount of tca Icavcs produccd in 
Malawi. First, and as aircady shown, is the amount of land cultivated to tca. Incrcascs 
or dccrcascs in the amount of land under tea determines the amount of tea leaves 
produced in Malawi. Secondly, the proportion of clonal to old varieties of tea 
determines both the quantity and quality of tea produced. Until the early 1980's, all 
tea plantations in Malawi constituted tea varieties that were low yielding and inferior 
in both quality and value. However, from the 1980's, the industry engaged in a major 
replanting exercise replacing the old tea bushes with more superior clonal tea varieties 
which are considered to be high yielding and of higher market value. To date, about 
10% of the country's plantation is clonal and the remainder is still planted to old 
lowly valued tea bushes. The expensive nature of the exercise, mainly in form of loss 
of revenue in the five to six year of gestation period of the tea plantation, is the main 
explanation for the slow pace of the replanting exercise. Nonetheless, substantial 
progress in replanting exercise is expected to significantly improve both yields and 
output of tea from the tea industry. Comparing between estate and smallholder sub 
sectors, it is reported that the smallholder sub sector is the one which has made more 
progress in turning their fields into clonal tea varieties, as many of these were planted 
under clonal varieties from the start. 
The third factor determining the amount of tea leaves produced in a season is the age 
of plantations. Very young plantations (of less than six ycars) and vcry old plantations 
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arc considcrcd low yielding and hence producc low output. On the othcr hand, 
plantations with optimal age of maturity produce more output. 
Thy fourth dctcrmining factor is moisturc rcgimc. Bcing a predominantly rain"fcd 
production systcm, the frcqucncy and intcnsity of rainfall, including the scqucncc 
bctwccn sunshinc and cloud cover during the tea season, arc crucial for tea leaf 
dcvclopmcnt. Hcncc, a combination of well spread rainfall rcgimc and optimal 
sunshine hours means that tea plantations can produce optimal tea lcavcs for the 
season. 
The fifth factor is the amount of inputs used. Thcrc arc two inputs of particular 
importance in as far as tea leaf output is conccmed. First is the seed rate, otherwise 
known as plantation cover. Plantations with full field cover result in optimal yields 
and outputs while those with scattered plantations achieve less than optimal yields. 
Comparing between estate and smallholder sub sectors, it is reported that currently 
smallholder tea fields are more scattered as a result of difficulties within STA to 
multiply and distribute adequate quantities of tea seedling to smallholder farmers. The 
second input of importance is fertilisers. Plantations with adequate and well timed 
fertilisers are likely to yield more output compared to those with less fertiliser use. It 
is again reported that managerial problems within STA since 1990 have meant that 
smallholder farmers no longer access timely and right amounts of loans and fertilisers 
from STA, and this has led to most smallholder farmers not applying any fertilisers. 
As a consequence, smallholder tea yields and outputs have sharply gone down 
compared to early 1980's. 
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Last but not Icast, is the quality and timing of wccding and plucking of tca Icavcs. On 
wccding, timcly and appropriatc wccding leads to rcalisation of optimal yields from 
tca plantations. The samt is truc for timing of plucking of tca lcavcs. lt is 
recommended that tea leaves arc plucked cvcry 14 days in order to harvest tcndcr 
Icavcs, which bring out highcr tca quality and highcr ovcrall output of tca lcavcs. The 
cxtcnt to which this rccommcndation is adhered to dctcnnines both the quality and 
output of tea leaves from a particular plantation in a particular season. Both weeding 
and harvesting of tea leaves depends on style and quality of management of the fields. 
In estates where there is good management, yields are by far higher than those where 
management is poor. Equally, in smallholder fields where management and labour 
resources arc available, more yield returns are realised. 1-iowevcr, of particular 
importance in as far as smallholder tea harvesting is concerned, the managerial 
problems within STA in the 1990's meant that the organisation could not send 
transport to farmers fields in time and consistently as a result although farmers could 
ably harvest in time, their tea leaves could not be transported for processing in 
factories. This led to a set of problems which eventually pushed farmers to arrange 
with surrounding estate and factory owners to transport and process their tea. This 
development has further weakened the STA. 
4.8.4 Results of price supply responses in Malawi's tea supply system 
Table 32 and Table 33 show area and output supply response equations for the tea 
supply system under one lag, two 
lags and three lags scenarios. Equation R21 is for 
area supply response under one lag; model estimation R22 is 
for area supply response 
equation under two lags; equation R23 
is for area supply response model under three 
13gs; equation R24 is for output supply response model under one lag; equation R25 is 
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for output supply rcsponsc modcl under two lags while equation R26 is for output 
supply rcsponsc modcl undcr three lags. The lagging of priccs to thrcc past scasons 
was considcrcd ncccssary considcring that tca is a perennial crop and that supply 
responscs, cspccially output supply responses are likely to take a longer period to be 
rcncct«d. 
Results in Table 32 and Table 33 shows that probability values for independent 
variables `laggcd prices, (P, _, 
)'(1; 
_2) and 
(P, 
-3)' 
in the six cquations arc 0.436 for 
equation R21; 0.053 and 0.002 for equation R22; 0.029,0.001 and 0.085 in equation 
R23; 0.707 for equation R24; 0.658 and 0.802 for equation R25 and 0.668,0.854 and 
0.915 for equation R26. These probabilities show that it is only under area supply 
responses where prices have been lagged twice and three times where probabilities arc 
significant. These findings suggest that there arc area (or cxtensitication) responses in 
Malawi's tea supply system and that these responses take at least two seasons to be 
reflected in area. Thus, once prices changes, the supply system takes at least two 
seasons to adjust area in response to prices. 
As for elasticities of supply responses; coefficients for independent variables lagged 
prime (pand (P, -3 
) in equations R22 and R23 range from 0.01 to 0.04 
suggesting that even though the probabilities are significant, elasticities of supply 
responses are negligible. Chapter seven takes further this argument as it investigates 
why there arc negligible supply responses in area (extensification) responses and none 
in output responses. 
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Table 32: Area supply response equations for the tea supply system 
A =1.88+0.111 1+0.954-1+0.054-2 (R21) (0.02) (0.436) (0.000) (0.47) 
(R2 = 0.9075, DW=1.9, F-stat probability valuc - 0.000) 
f =1.43+ 0.03P, -, + 
1.064 
_i + 
0.224-2+0.04P, 
-2 (R22) (0.02) (0.053) (0.000) (0.144) (0.002) 
{ R2 = 0.95, DW=1.65, F-stat probability valuc a 0.000} 
4 =1.53+0.03P_, +1.2k1 +0.41, -2+0.06P, -2+0.03P, -3 (fj3) (0.003) (0.029) (0.000) (0.115) (0.001) (0.085) 
(R2 = 0.95, DFV= 1.9, F"stat probability value - 0.000) 
Table 33: Output supply response equations for the tea supply system 
Q =3.96+0.03J 1 +0.23Q_1 +0.38Q-2 (4) (0.016) (0.707) (0.223) (0.002) 
{ R2 = 0.44, DW=2.3, F-stat probability valuc = 0.000} 
= 3.9 + 0.04P j+0.22. Q-1 + 0.02P 2+0.3 8, Q_2 (R25) 
(0.018) (0.658) (0.235) (0.802) (0.025) 
IR 2=0.44, DW=2.3, F-stat probability value = 0.025) 
=3.97+0.04P 1 +0.2 _1 +0.02P 2 +0.39Q_2 +0.01P, _3 (R26) (0.02) (0.668) (0.243) (0.854) (0.025) (0.915) 
(R2 = 0.44, D\V-2.3, F-stat probability value = 0.013) 
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4.9 Summary of findings and conclusions front the analysis of supply responses 
T he chapter discussed findings of the empirical analysis of the relationship between 
producer prices and commodity supply responses in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar 
and tea supply systems. The analysis used the adapted version of the dynamic 
commodity supply response that was developed by Marc Ncrlovc in which actual 
cultivated area and/or output arc used as dependent variables while lagged producer 
priccs arc considcrcd as one of the independcnt variablcs. As for arca/output and 
producer price data sets, due to difficulties in sourcing the same types of data sets for 
the four commodities, the study analysed price supply responses in tobacco using 
national arca/output data (which included both smallholder and estate areas/outputs) 
and producer prices, for cotton the study analysed price supply responses using 
smallholder producer prices and smallholder areas/outputs, while in tea and sugar the 
study analysed price supply responses using prices of processed products (effectively 
prices of factory owners) and national crop areas/outputs (which include both small 
and large scale farmers' arcas/outputs). 
In tobacco and cotton, considering that the liberalisation of the supply systems 
resulted in substantial changes in structures of growers (in tobacco) and in 
coordination of market arrangements for inputs and outputs (especially in cotton), the 
study introduced dummy variables in their analyses to investigate impacts of 
liberalisation on supply responses. Furthermore, in tobacco supply system, 
considering that there are two varieties, burley and flue cured, which have significant 
economical importance's, the study disaggrcgatcd further the supply response 
analyses for tobacco into these two varieties. In tea and sugar, the study lagged the 
prices once, twice and three times considering that these commodities arc perennial 
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crops and that their responses may take slightly longer periods especially for output 
supply responses. The study also analysed both area and output supply responses in 
all the four commoditics in ordcr to invcstigatc both intensification and 
cxtcnsification rcsponscs. 
In tobacco, the study found that the tobacco supply systcm in Malawi responds to 
changcs in produccr priccs both in tcrms of area and output responses. The results 
further showed that bctwccn post liberalisation cra and the period bctwccn 1972 and 
200, area and output supply responses were higher in Malawi's tobacco supply system 
in post liberalisation. In addition, the results of burley tobacco supply responscs, 
which constitute 95% of Malawi's tobacco output, shows that area response or 
cxtcnsification is the main source of supply responses in Malawi's tobacco output. 
On clasticitics of tobacco supply responscs, the study found that burley tobacco has 
slightly higher elasticity of responses as compared with flue cured tobacco (thus, 
bctwccn 0.6 and 0.69 of burley compared to 0.23 and 0.55 for flue cured tobacco in 
the post liberalisation period and between 0.4 and 0.52 for aggregate Malawi tobacco 
responses). Results suggest that elasticities in tobacco supply system may have 
improved slightly with liberalisation and that responses in Malawi's tobacco supply 
system arc mainly due to area (extensif i cation) responses. Chapter six take further 
these findings and examines market linkages for land, labour and other inputs to 
dctcrminc why the supply response elasticities (both through extensification and 
intensification) in Malawi's tobacco supply system arc inelastic and particularly low 
for intensification responses in burley tobacco. 
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In the cotton supply system, the study found positivc supply responses for output 
supply responses only for the pcriod 1972 to 2004 and in the post libcralisation period. 
The study obscrvcd slightly bcttcr responses in the post libcralisation pcriod 
compared to the period bctwccn 1972 and 2004. The study concluded observing 
output supply responses only and chapter seven takes further this discussion and 
examines the underlying reasons for this. 
In sugar, the study found area responses in sugar prices which were lagged once and 
twice. The study did not find supply responses in output response analyses and in 
scenarios undcr area supply responsc analyses where prices were lagged more than 
twicc. This observation means that responses in Malawi's sugar system are only area 
or cxtcnsification responses and that this response is observable is short term changes 
only. This observation means that even though sugar is a perennial crop, in as far as 
allocation of land to sugarcane is concerned, farmers respond to changes in sugar 
prices for the previous season and the other one only. In terms of elasticities of supply 
responses, the study found area response of only 0.15 to 0.17 indicating that area or 
extensification responses in Malawi's sugar supply system arc marginal. The 
implication for these findings are that even though farmers respond to changes in 
sugar prices for the previous season and the other one in their allocation of land to 
sugarcane crop, these response are marginal. Chapter seven discusses these 
observations in detail by examining the underlying explanations behind negligible 
arcs and output responses in Malawi's sugar supply system. 
Similarly in tea, the study only observed area responses in supply response analyses 
where prices were lagged twice and/or three times. The study did not establish any 
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output rcsponscs in short or long tcrm modclling sccnarios. The study obscrvcd arca 
supply responses ranging from 0.01 to 0.04 suggcsting that cvcn though the 
probabilities arc significant, elasticities of supply responses arc negligible. Charter 
seven takes further this argument as it investigates why there arc negligible supply 
responses in area (cxtcnsification) responses and none in output responses. 
From the analysis of supply responses for the four commodities, the study concludes 
that even though elasticities of supply responses are inelastic and weak across the 
commodity supply systems, supply responses arc particularly low, indeed negligible, 
in tea and sugar. The study also concludes that any observable supply responses in all 
the four commodities arc predominantly due to area (or cxtcnsification) except for 
cotton where responses are observed to be due more to output (intensification) 
responses. These findings suggest that burley tobacco farmers arc relatively better at 
adjusting their area but not their intensity of production in response to changes in 
producer prices whereas cotton farmers seem to respond through more usage of inputs. 
In tea and sugar sub sectors, farmers find it difficult to adjust both their area and 
intensity of production in response to changes in producer prices. Chapter six and 
seven examines market linkages in these supply systems to determine why we have 
these various supply response analysis results. 
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PART TWO 
5.1 introduction 
Part two prcscnts findings of the analysis of organisation of markct linkages for the 
supply of various inputs and serviccs and for the purchasc of producc from farnncrs in 
tobacco, cotton, sugar and tea supply systems in Malawi. The main purpose of these 
analyscs was to understand why there arc weak price transmissions in sugar, tea and 
cotton and no transmission in tobacco (as discusscd carlicr in chapter 3) and also why 
thcrc arc inclastic supply responses in tobacco and cotton and negligible supply 
responscs in sugar and tea (as discussed earlier in chapter 4). The study used the 
Structure, Conduct and Performance (SCP) analysis tool to analyst the various market 
linkages. In terms of layout of this part of the thesis report, the next two sections in 
this chapter discusses the theoretical and analytical methods used in the analyses of 
market linkages in commodity supply systems. The rest of part two of the thesis is 
divided into two main chapters, six and seven. Chapter seven presents SCP results for 
the tobacco supply system while chapter six presents results for the cotton, sugar and 
tea supply systems one after the other in that order. 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Neoclassical Economics 
thcorics of markct structures togcthcr with insights from New Institutional Economic 
(NIE) theory. Neoclassical theory identifies three broad groups of market structures 
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and thcsc arc; monopsony/ monopoly, oligopoly/oligopsony and pcrfcctly competitive 
market structures. Under monopoly/monopsony, one player (buyer/scllcr) transacts 
his/her good/scrvicc with many customers (Elill, 2003). In oligopoly/olipsony market 
structures, few players transact a homogenous good or service with several customers 
whereas in perfectly competitive market structures, there arc many buyers and sellers 
of a homogenous product or service (Barriss, 1993). Under perfectly competitive 
market structures, prices arc discovered through market forces of supply and demand 
and no single player influences prices of goods/serviccs being transacted (Kydd and 
Scarborough, 1991). This being the case, competitive forces mean that perfectly 
competitive market structures achieve high levels of (i) technical efficiency (the 
degree to which production of output achieves maximum output from inputs used), (ii) 
allocative efficiency (the degree to which resources are combined and used at least 
cost) and (iii) economic efficiency (product of technical and allocative efficiencies) 
than imperfect market structures (Kohls and Uhl, 1991). 
Under monopoly/monopsony market structures, the sole buyer/seller has control over 
prices and quantity of goods/services being transacted (Hill, 2003). These prices may 
either be lower (in order that competitors are inhibited from entering the market) or 
higher (to increase producer/ buyer surplus), especially where prices are aggressively 
protected through such measures as advertisement and promotion (Kydd and 
Scarborough (1991). Whichever price strategy is adopted, the market is less efficient 
technically, allocatively and economically if there are no economics of scale (Kohls 
and Uhl (1991). Under oligopoly/oligopsony, the few buycrs/seliers take strategic 
decisions based on how they perceive the behaviour of competitors on price 
determination. They can compete aggressively on prices or choose to collude by way 
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of forming a cartct. Whatcvcr is the outcomc, their priccs arc considcrcd distortcd and 
Icss optimal than the pcrfcctly compctitivc idcal. Whcrc markcts completely fail, such 
a situation is described as market failure and this too result in less optimal allocation 
of scarcc resourccs. This study used this theory as a basis for assessing the 
implications of different market structures on prices, quality and quantity of 
transacted goods and services in the supply systems, and hence on the of iciency, 
under neoclassical assumptions, of the different market linkages for supply of various 
inputs and services and purchase of produce in Malawi's tobacco, cotton, sugar and 
tea supply systems. However, the study also used insights from New Institutional 
Economics to demonstrate how concentrated market structures may yield efficiency 
benefits in conditions of high transaction costs and risks. 
ME theory extends the neoclassical theory by relaxing some of the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics by incorporating transaction risks and costs in economic 
analysis of players' behaviour and in evaluation of efficiency of different market 
structures. Thus, rather than simply considering price mechanism alone as only means 
for determining the efficiency of transactions, transaction risks and costs arc also 
analysed. Dorward et al (2004) defined such risks as losses incurred as a result of (i) 
failure to enforce property rights, (ii) failure to enforce standard attributes of property 
rights and (iii) failure to complete the intended transaction. According to Williamson 
(2000), the main source of transaction risks are human actors. He argued that (i) 
humans look for opportunistic gains in transactions and these may be reflected 
through such things as; adverse selection, moral hazard and shirking; (ii) humans may 
unreliably disclose information, with motives of deceit; and (iii) humans have limited 
foresight of precise outcomes. On the other hand, transaction costs are defined as 
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costs incurred to reduce risks in transacting (Dorward ct al, 2004). Thcsc costs are 
ovcr and abovc transformation costs and differ in magnitudc, hcncc, transactions costs 
producc hctcrogcncous priccs (Gabrc-Madhin, 2003). Klcin (1999) observed 
transaction costs to include costs for (i) information search (ii) bargaining (iii) making 
contracts (iv) monitoring contractual terms (v) enforcing contracts and (vi) protecting 
property rights. Dorward ct al (2005) categorized both transaction costs and risks as 
falling into three major components, namely, commitment (those associated with 
complimentary investments necessary for a transaction), opportunism (those 
associated with capturing of an undue share of revenue) and rent seeking (where 
actors outside a transaction look for opportunitics to cxpropriatc something out of a 
transaction). 
On vertical and horizontal contractual relations, North (1995) argues that individual 
actors develop vertical and horizontal contractual relations in order to reduce both 
transaction risks and costs so as to maximise profits/nct gains. Klein (1999) defined 
contractual relations, sometimes referred to as govcmancc structures or institutional 
arrangements, as specific guidelines governing the relationship between transacting 
parties. According to Williamson (2000), contractual relations vary markedly between 
differcnt contracts and transactions due to such things as differences in asset 
specificity, variations in extent of uncertainty surrounding transactions; complexity of 
the trading arrangement; and frequency of transaction occurrence. All these determine 
the nature of the contractual relationship. Williamson (2000) obscrvcd contractual 
relations to fall along a spectrum with spot markets at one end and hierarchy on the 
other. He remarked that spot markets are adequate for simple transactions while 
hicrarchics and firms dominate in circumstances where transactions involve large 
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amounts of specific assct invcstmncnts. Williamson (2000) obscrvcd that hicrarchics 
offer grcatcr protcction for specific invcstmcnts and providc a relatively cficicnt 
mcchanism for responding to changes in conditions after contractual tcnns have bccn 
agrccd. Dorward ct al (2004) argued that as contractual rclations movc from spot 
markcts to hybrids, additional sccurity features arc addcd to dctcr breach of contracts, 
to cnsurc provision of corrcct information and to providc for disputc scttlcmcnt 
mcchanisms. As a result, as transaction costs incrcasc, associated risks dcclinc. 
Furthcr to the coordination argumcnt, Poulton ct al (2003) argucd that thcrc arc 
tradeoffs bctwecn competitive market structures on one hand and coordinated market 
structures on the other. He observed and reported from experiences from some Sub 
Saharan African countries that where numbers of companies in a sector were observed 
to be high, meaning that competition was strong in neoclassical sense were weak in 
coordination and vice versa. Coordination in this respect was defined as coordinated 
ciTorts among players of the market system aimed at achieving a common goal in a 
common or complimentary way. Notable goals in this respect include; achieving 
cff cient delivery of inputs to smallholder farmers through an effective mechanism for 
disbursement and recovery of seasonal credit; supporting research and development 
into improved seeds, effective pesticides and better crop husbandry practices; and, 
ensuring large volumes of high quality agricultural outputs from smallholder farmers. 
They observed that concentrated markets were relatively more successful in meeting 
coordinated challenges in a sector and they concluded that concentrated market 
structures may yield efficiency benefits in conditions of high transaction costs and 
risks. 
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5.3 Analytical Framework 
hic analytical mcthod used in chaptcr six and seven is an adapted vcrsion of the 
standard SCP tool to includc dctcrmination (and whcrc possibic mcasurcmcnt) of 
transaction risks and costs. SCP is a standard markct analysis tool Which has bccn 
cxtcnsivcly used in the US and UK (Bain 1959) and in scvcral othcr dcvcloped and 
dcvcloping countries since the 1960's (Ilarriss, 1993). The analytical framework of 
this tool was claborated by Bain in 1959 and has since achieved the status of an 
orthodox methodology (Jones, 1968). As a tool, SCP is cxccuted through the analysis 
of structurc, conduct and performance of the markets. 
On structure, Harriss (1993) indicated that the interest is to dctcnninc whether the 
market is monopoly/monopsony, oligopoly/olipsony or perfectly compctitivc. Kydd 
and Scarborough (1991) added that this analysis involves three main things, namely, 
(i) determination of market shares and concentration ratioss, (ii) a more qualitative 
assessment of barriers to entry 
6; and (iii) an assessment of agent and product 
differentiation. Harriss (1993) argued that degree of scilcr and buyer concentrations 
has implications on power relations which ultimately impact on prices and outputs, 
control over supplies and resources, costs and availability of inputs, and profit 
margins. This study used indicators of market structures outlined by Bain (1959) 
(Table 34) to determine how concentrated market structures arc. 
This measure was developed by Kohls and Uhl in 1985 and is measured as ICRn'- (XP/IP)"l00} 
where C is index of concentration, XP is the aggregate output of a certain number (n) of the largest 
enterprises in monetary or volumetric terms, IP is the total output of the commodity. As a rule of thumb. 
the higher the concentration ratio, the greater the degree of influence that large firms may have over 
prices and the lower the concentration ratio, the 
less the likelihood of influence hence structural 
competitiveness 
" Kydd and Scarborough (1991) observed that indicators of barriers to market entry include; where (i) 
there is heavy capital requirements or other factors leading to economics of scale, (ii) absolute cost 
advantages enjoyed by existing firms, (iii) product differentiation (especially where entry requires an 
xtcnsive advertising campaign) and (iv) agent differentiation associated with accumulation of 
knowledge or experience such as gaining market competences which may require high capital 
investments and long periods of time to be achieved 
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Table 34: Concentration ratio interpretations 
Conccntration ratios 
Intcrprctation CR8 CR4 
I lighly conccntratcd oligopolics >85% >65% 
f iigh"modcratc conccntratcd oligopolics 70 - 85% 50 - 65% 
Low grade oligopolies 45 - 70% 35 - 50% 
Unconccntratcd markets <45% <35% 
SC><utC Dail, IYJY 
Conduct rcfcrs to the behaviour of playcrs in a markst and is cxpresscd through 
pricing and markcting strategics and in inter- and intra-firm cooperation strategies 
(Kydd and Scarborough, 1991). Indicators of conduct include; (i) pricc7discovcry 
mcthods, (ii) promotions strategies, (iii) nature of coordination mechanisms, and (iv) 
cxtcnt of predatory or exclusionary tactics directed against established rivals or 
potential entrants (Bain, 1959). Coordination includes both vertical and horizontal 
market integration. Vertical integration is where actors in supply chain tic up two or 
more successive functions in order to secure large volumes of goods and services to 
transact. These arrangements range from loose contracts to outright acquisition (Fariss, 
1997). Two main forms of vertical integration arc apparent, namely, forward 
coordination where players coordinate disposal of outputs so that it is profitable, and 
backward coordination, where players coordinate supply of raw materials so that 
' Under perfect competition, prices are determined by market forces of supply and demand. Under 
monopoly and oligopoly structures, firms have some control over prices. 
' Promotion may be used (i) to expand market share thereby altering the market structure so that 
players enjoy considerable market power which they can use to influence prices and (ii) to create an 
image in buyers that their product is unique and differentiated from everybody else hence assume a 
position of a monopoly supplier in the market (l larriss, 1993). 
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supplicrs arc rcliablc and of dcsircd quality and quantity. Through vcrtical integration, 
firms arc able to achieve grcatcr coordination of supply of inputs, production, 
processing and exporting activities, hence achieving greater cflicicncy in supply 
chains (K), dd and Scarborough, 1991). In addition, they substantially rcducc risks 
associated with contracts for procurement of various materials and services and have 
encouraged greater investments. Furthermore, players with strong vertical integration 
with suppliers manage to monitor production systems and influence them to include 
other aspects such as ethical and fair trading concerns. In the agriculture sector, Kydd 
and Scarborough, (1991) observed interlocking and sharecropping behaviours to be 
among the most common forms of vertical integration in developing countries. Slater 
(1993) also observed horizontal integration as another form of important behaviour of 
firms in supply chains. He defined horizontal integration as a condition where 
functionally similar firms come together or merge. These help players cut unit costs in 
some cases but also help to boost market shares which in some cases can help firms 
compete effectively. Poulton et al (2003) added a dimension of duo coordination 
where functionally similar players may come together and agree to support production 
of smallholder farmers through provision of inputs on loans (thus, vertical 
coordination) while at the same time seeking ways of restraining free riding actions of 
competitors through horizontal coordination. In this analysis, the study determined 
how prices for commodities, fertilisers and seeds, credit (interest rates) and services 
such as labour, processing and transport costs were discovered. The study also 
investigated forms of existing vertical and horizontal relationships, their underlying 
reasons, attributes, benefits/pitfalls and implications on prices and costs of various 
goods and services transacted in the four supply systems. 
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Pcrformancc rcflccts the economic outcomes of market structure and conduct of 
individual playcrs (Kohls and Uhl (1991). Pcrformancc is thcrcforc all about how well 
the market is achicving cxpcctcd outcomes in terms of output produced and prices 
paid or received. Kydd and Scarborough (1991) indicated three main measures of 
performance: technical efficiency, allocativc efficiency and economic cilicicncy. In 
light of the practical difficulties in measuring both technical and allocativc 
efficiencies, Fariss (1997) noted that techniques which have been widely used to asses 
pcrformanccs havc mainly focusscd on mcasuring profit or pricc-cost margins. lic 
obscrvcd marketing margins to be the most widely used indicators for economic 
cf(icicncy; bargaining power and transparency in supply chains. Marketing margins 
arc dcfined as pricc diffcrcnccs bctwccn two succcssivc stagcs in supply chains. There 
arc two main approaches for analysing margins, namcly, macrocconomic approaclics 
and microcconomic approaches. Macrocconomic approaches have focussed on 
examining the role of margins in the overall economy and have used national 
accounts and input-output tables of different economic categories to develop the 
margins. The main handicap for these analyses has been aggregation. Microcconomic 
approaches on the other hand give information regarding components of costs, 
structure and financial situation for cntcrpriscs involved in a particular supply chain 
function. These approaches have been further categorised into functional approaches 
and vertical or product focussed approaches. Functional approaches focus on 
economic activities whereas product focused approaches focus on commodities, as the 
name indicates. This study first assessed performance based on industry lcvcl best 
practiccs9 as highlighted by Kydd and Scarborough (1991) and second on commodity 
margins. 
' indicators included rates of fertilizer usage, seed rates, levels of pesticide use, yields obtained, 
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On transaction risks and costs, Wang (2005) observed that there arc two methods of 
measuring transaction risks and costs: Direct Methods and Indirect hlcthods. 
According to Wang, Direct Methods involve actual quantification (monetary or 
otherwise) of transaction risks and costs. North ct al (1986) used this methodology to 
measure what he termed 'the transaction sector of the American economy' in which 
he divided the whole American economy into transformation and transaction costs 
and he found out that the proportion of the transaction cost sector to GNP grew from 
25% to 45% between 1870 and 1970 and concluded that as countries develop, total 
transaction costs increase due to more division of labour. On the other hand, Indirect 
Methods pays little attention to measurements of actual absolute figures of transaction 
risks and costs. As Williamson (1975) pointed, this method focuses on assessing the 
rclative ranking of transaction risks and costs associated with different contractual 
relations. Thus, rather than measuring transaction risks and costs directly, emphasis is 
put on identifying attributes associated with contractual relations and comparing their 
relative performance on that basis. Ivy (2000) explained this by comparing the 
transaction costs of two contractual relations where he showed TC' = ±TC, and 
I. ' 
w 
TC 2 TC, to represent sum total of transaction attributes of contractual rclations 
r"ý 
"w 
and ATC = TC'- TC 2= 
>TC, - TC, as comparison of their performance and 
i"i i"l 
a 
cff cicncy and argued that 
J: ATC, no longer focuses on actual magnitude of 
quality of output, and conversion rates in processing 
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componcnts of TC' and/or TC', but rathcr on attributcs that contributc to their 
diffcrcnccs. 
The study used insights of both Dircct Methods and Indircct Methods to make 
qualitativc asscssmcnt of the transaction risks and costs in supply chain transactions. 
Drawing from Dorward ct al (2005), the study investigated critical transaction costs 
and risks associated with commitment, opportunism and rent sccking. 
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Chapter Six: An analysis of market linkages in Malawi's 
tobacco production and marketing system 
6.1 Introduction 
Rcsults from chapter two have shown that if distortions in global tobacco production 
and markcting system are removed, world market prices for tobacco leaves arc 
cxpcctcd to rise by 8% to 12% and a new world markct equilibrium position will be 
cstablishcd with higher demand and supply for tobacco leaves. However, results from 
chapters three and four have shown contrasting outcomes. Results from chapter thrcc 
have shown that there is lack of price transmission between the world market for 
tobacco leavcs and Malawi's auction market system which suggest that gains in prices 
in world market due to removal of tariffs and subsidies will not be transmitted to 
small scale poor resource tobacco producers in Malawi in a predictable way. On the 
other hand, results in chapter four shows that although supply responses in Malawi's 
tobacco supply system arc inelastic and predominantly area (or cxtensification) 
responses, the tobacco supply system in Malawi respond to changes in producer 
prices suggesting that if price gains on world market due to removal of market 
distortions are transmitted to the domestic market in Malawi, then growers are likely 
to respond and bcncfit from such global rcforms. 
The study in this chapter presents findings of the analysis of market linkages for land, 
labour, inputs (mainly seeds, fcrtiliscrs and pesticides), services (mainly transport and 
processing) and produce; and explains why thcrc is lack of price transmission between 
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the world markct for tobacco and Malawi's auction market and also why supply 
response elasticities (for both cxtcnsification and intensification) in Malawi's tobacco 
supply system arc inelastic and particularly low for intensification responses in burley 
tobacco. 
The chapter begins with discussion on data collection methods that were used in this 
study. This is followed by a description of profile of smallholder tobacco growers. 
The discussion tlicn focuses on the general organisation of the tobacco production 
system in Malawi, emphasising on how market linkages affect both intensification 
and/or cxtcnsification of the tobacco system. Particular focus is placed on market 
linkages for the supply of improved seeds, fertilisers and finance and on land and 
labour markets. Structure, conduct and performance of these markets arc examined in 
order to determine their impact on elasticities of tobacco supply responses. Finally, 
the chapter discusses the organisation of tobacco marketing in Malawi to understand 
the nature, conduct and performance of market linkages between various players in 
the marketing system and most importantly to explain why there is lack of price 
transmission between the world market for tobacco and the auction market system in 
Malawi. 
6.2 Data collection 
The study used both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods and analysis. 
Quantitative methods involved administration of structured questionnaires to a 
randomly selected sample of smallholder tobacco growers whereas qualitative data 
collection and analysis involved (a) in depth interviews with Key Informants 
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rcprcscnting all the various stakeholder groups in the tobacco industry in Malawi and 
(b) focussed group discussions with smallholdcr tobacco growcrs. 
On quantitativc data collection methods, the study purposivcly selected Lilongwc as a 
district whcrc questionnaires targctcd at smallholdcr tobacco farmers were 
administcrcd. Tlurc main factors were takcn into account in sclccting Lilongwc as a 
district of study. The first rcason is that it is one of the major tobacco growing 
districts in Ccntral Rcgion, where the bulk of smallholdcr tobacco cultivation takcs 
placc. Sccondly, it borders three other major tobacco growing districts in the region, 
namcly, hMchinji, Dowa and Ntchisi, hence interviews with fanncrs along the 
pcriphcrals of the district also reflected aspects of farmers in neighbouring districts. 
Thirdly, conducting a survey in Lilong-, vc meant that expenses on fuel, 
accommodation and meals for survey personnel were relatively lower than the other 
districts and this was particularly important considering that the budget for the survey 
was limited. 
A total of 50 tobacco farmers were randomly selected from a complete list of 
registered smallholder tobacco growers in the district. Out of the sampled farmers, 46 
turned out to be male headed household farmers while four were female headed 
houschold farmers and this reflects the dominance of male headed households in 
tobacco growing activities in Malawi. These farmers were individually interviewed 
using questionnaires (attached in annex 2) which collected information on land and 
labour use patterns, linkages with input suppliers (mainly fertiliser and seed suppliers), 
arrangements for credit supply and produce marketing, their association with known 
farmer groups, and opportunism and rent seeking behaviours in the tobacco supply 
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and markcting systcm. The survcy was conductcd bctwccn March and May 2006 and 
it involvcd six cnumcrators from the Ministry of Agriculturc. Training of cnumcrators 
and prc-tcsting of questionnaires were donc at the beginning of the survcy pcriod. 
Data entry was done concurrently with collection. 
On qualitative data collection, the study conducted five focussed group discussions 
with farmers from five villages in Lilongwe District. The study also conducted in- 
dcpth interviews with Key informants from different stakeholders of the tobacco 
supply and marketing system including; large scale tobacco growers, fertilizer 
suppliers, seed provider, credit lenders, produce buyers, transporters, Auction 
Holdings Limited (AHL) officials, Tobacco Control Commission (TCC), and 
representatives of farmers associations. A list of those interviewed and their 
organisations is attached in Annex 3. The main instruments used in these interviews 
and discussions were stakeholder checklists and these arc attached in Annex 7. The 
study also used findings of the nationwide IHS2 survey by NSO (2005) and findings 
from other secondary sources to triangulate with some of the findings of this study. 
63 Profile of smallholder tobacco growers 
This section outlines some of the underlying features of smallholder tobacco growers 
in Malawi. Data used in this section includes both findings from the survey of 
Lilongwe district (described above) and from the nationally representative 1 1S2 
survey conducted by the National Statistical Office in 2004/05. The study used 
findings of II-1S2 to build a profile of smallholder farmers in Malawi primarily 
because INS2 had a nationwide coverage and the study benefited from such a wider 
coverage. However, discussion on the last part of the profile, which looks at 
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cxtcnsitication of tobacco fanning among smallholclcr fanncrs, is bascd on findings of 
the Lilongwc survcy. 
6.3.1 Smallholder tobacco farmers' profile 
Nationally, (NSO, 2005) survcy data show that 20% of fanning households in Malawi, 
cstimatcd to be 350,000, grow tobacco. In terms of regional concentration, the central 
region has the highest concentration with 25% of smallholder fanners growing 
tobacco followed by the Northern region where 21% grow tobacco then the Southern 
rcgion %vlicrc only about 6% of smallholdcr fanncrs grow tobacco. At district lcvcl, 
Kasungu has the highest proportion of smallholder farmers growing tobacco estimated 
to be 64% and this is followed by hichinji (63%), Dowa (51%) and Lilongwe (50%) 
whereas in some districts, mainly Thyolo and Mwanza, no smallholder farmers are 
rcportcd to be growing tobacco. As for sex of household head, tobacco cultivation is 
dominated by male headed households. The NSO (2005) survey revealed that 70% of 
households growing tobacco in Malawi are headed by males compared to 30% of 
tobacco growing households who arc headed by females. In terms of the type of 
tobacco grown by smallholder farmers, 93% arc reported to cultivate burley while the 
remainder of 7% grow other types of tobacco, mainly flue cured. 
The NSO (2005) survey catcgorizcd 42% of tobacco growing houscholds as poor 
while 58% arc classified as non poor. The dividing line between poor and non poor 
households in Malawi is level of per capita consumption. Households with per capita 
annual consumption equivalent to K16,165 (approximately USS116.00) and above arc 
considered non poor whereas those with lower per capita consumption than this arc 
considered poor. Table 35 gives a breakdown of households growing tobacco and 
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their percentages in terms of per capita cxpcnditurc quintilcs. As the table shows, 
11.1% of households in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile grow tobacco. In 
the sccond quintilc, the numbcr jumps to 18.8% thcn to 22.9% in the third followed 
by 24.2°ßö in the fourth and 22.9% in the fifth. This statistic indicatcs that tobacco is 
gown by farmcrs from all cxpcnditurc quintilcs spanning from the poorest to the 
richcst houschold in Malawi. iiowcvcr, proportions of fanncrs growing tobacco 
incrcascs with increasing wealth of households. 
Table 35: Agricultural households growing tobacco 
Household Per 
Capita Expenditure 
Quintile 
Annual average household 
expenditure (MK 
Percent of agricultural 
households gro%iIng 
tobacco 
12.1 48,000 (US$345) - poor 11.1% 
2 60,000 (US$432) - marginal 18.8% 
3 75,000 (US$540) - non poor 22.9% 
.} 93,000 (US$669) - non poor 24.2% 
5 175,000 (US$1259) - non poor 22.9% 
s.. rcr. rso (2oos) 
In terms of national household incomes, the (NSO, 2005) reports that average 
incomcs arc around K51,000 (or US$367) annually, of which K18,000 (or US$129) 
comcs from wagcs/salaries, K20,000 (or USSI44) from agricultural activities while 
K30,000 (or US$216) comcs from houschold enterprise activitics. Urban houscholds 
have higher household incomes estimated at K129,000 (or US$928) compared to 
K40,000 (or USS288) of rural households. Male headed households havc higher 
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incomcs cstimatcd to be K56,000 (or USS403) compared to K34,000 (or US$245) of 
female headed households. At district lcvcl, outside the two cities of Lilongwc and 
Blantyre, Kasungu and Dowa arc the two districts with the highest household income 
levels. But also, compared to all the other districts in Malawi, Kasungu has the 
highest incomes earned from agricultural activities estimated at K66,000 (or US$475) 
per household per year. Kasungu is followed by Mzimba at K41,000 (or US$295) 
then Dowa at K40,000 (or US$288), thereafter hichinji at K30,000 (or US$216) then 
Ntchisi and Lilongwc rural both at K26,000 (or US$ 187). Thcsc statistics demonstrate 
that all major tobacco growing districts in Malawi conic top in tcrms of agricultural 
household income earnings. This supports arguments about the importance of tobacco 
to houschold incomes in major tobacco growing districts and in the country as a 
whole. 
On cducation, NSO (2005) survey reports that 64% of Malawians are considcrcd 
literate, 52% in the first expenditure quintile, 57% in the second quintile, 61% in the 
third, 68% in the fourth and 82% in the fifth. A survey of Lilong vc tobacco growers 
by this study observed that 77% of farmers attended primary education, 7% went 
further to attend secondary education, 2.3% continued to undertake tertiary education 
while 14% never attended any education at all. What these statistics show is that 
although the education of tobacco farmers ranges from none to tertiary cducation, the 
majority of farmers attended at least basic primary education only. 
On landholding sizes, Table 36 shows that 33% of farmers in Malawi hold bctwccn 
1. Oha and 2. Oha, 30% hold between 0.5ha and 1. Oha, 20% hold between 0.2ha and 
0.5ha, and 15% hold mors than 2ha whilc 2.8% hold Icss than 0.2ha. This statistic 
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suggcst that thrcc quartcrs of Malawian fanncrs hold bctwccn 0.2ha and 2.0ha with 
tic rcmaindcr owning cithcr loss than 0 2ha or grcatcr than 2.011a. In tcnils or 
owncrship of landholdings, the survcy of Lilongwc tobacco growcrs by this study 
obscrvcd that two thirds of tobacco smallholdcr farmers had thcir landholdings passcd 
on to thcm through inhcritancc, 14% accessed their landholdings through renting 
while 6% through purchase. In terms of crops grown, the NSO (2005) survey r ported 
that virtually all farming households in Malawi wow the staple food crop, maize. It is 
gown by 97% of farming households in Malawi inrespcctivc of the region of 
residence, poverty status (poor and non poor), expenditure and landholding quintiles. 
Two thirds of agricultural households in Malawi also grow pulses (mainly groundnuts, 
beans and pigeon peas) while a third include root crops such as cassava and sweet 
potatoes in their crop combinations. As for tobacco, Table 36 shows that only 2.8% of 
farmers in the lowest land holding quintile grow tobacco, the proportion increases to 
6.9% in the second quintile then 18.1% in the third, 27.8% in the fourth and finally 
44% in the fifth quintile. From this statistics, it is clear that the proportion of farmers 
growing tobacco increases with increasing household landholding sizes. Thus, the 
higher the household land holding size, the higher the likelihood that the household 
may allocate part of its landholding towards production of tobacco. In terms of 
specific land allocation to tobacco, the survey of Lilongwe district by this study 
observed that 72% of farmers allocated a maximum of 1.0 hectare while the 
remainder of 28% allocated between 1.0 ha and 2.0 ha. 
Table 36: Land holdings for tobacco growers 
Land Holding I Distribution of farming I Distribution of households 
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[size quintiles houscholds in Malawi growing tobacco 
i >0-02ha 2.8% 2.8% 
>0.2 - 0.5 Its 19.6% 6.9% 
>0.5 - 1.0 ha 29.7% 18.1 % 
> 1.0 - 2.0 ha 32.7% 27.8% 
>2.0 ha 15.1% 44% 
Sauur Ittsa burvcy uuusu3 j 
In summary, the abovc statistics indicatc that tobacco is grown by a spectrum of 
houscholds ranging from ultra poor houscholds to non poor houscholds, cxtrcmcly 
low landholders to medium scale holders, male headed houscholds to female hcadcd, 
litcratc hcadcd households to illiterate headed ones, houscholds with larger 
membership (with an average of 5.4 members) to those with lower membership (2.9). 
From those with low incomes and expenditures to those with reasonably higher 
incomes and expenditures. All these have implications on access of inputs (mainly, 
sccds, fertilisers and finance) and output markets and other services (in particular, 
labour and transport) within the tobacco supply chain. 
6,3,2 Extensification abilities of tobacco farmers 
On cxpansion of acreage under tobacco cultivation, the survcy of Lilongwe district 
found that when farmers want to increase the area of land under tobacco, fanners 
either switch more land from other crops such as maize and cassava into growing 
tobacco or simply acquire additional picccs of land through such measures as fresh 
allocations from cithcr family mcmbcrs or Villagc Headmen who arc custodians of 
customary land, renting or purchasing of land. When asked about fcasiblc options on 
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how households acquire more land, 27% indicated they could bet more land through 
inhcritancc, 23% indicatcd through purchasc, 47% indicatcd through rent. Ilowcvcr, 
in all these options, fanners indicated money ranging from US$12 to US$300 as 
rcquircd for acccssing an additional hectare of land, hence the major limiting factor 
for cxpanding arca undcr cultivation is availability of cash. In terms of switching land 
bctwccn cntcrpriscs by allocating more land to tobacco, farnurs indicatcd food 
sccurity concerns limit their ability to switch more land from maize to tobacco. 
Whichever is the case, farmers indicated decisions to allocate more land to tobacco as 
also dependent on the ability of the household to access additional inputs and services 
necessary for growing the additional acreage for tobacco. Considering that tobacco is 
grown by farmers ranging from the lowest cxpcnditure and landholding quintiles to 
the highest, those in the highest quintiles find it relatively easier to allocate more land 
under tobacco than those in the lower quintiles. 
633 Market for tobacco seed supply 
633.1 Structure of tobacco seed supply in Malawi 
Malawi has one major supplier of tobacco seeds of all types and the name of the 
supplier is Agriculture Research and Extension Trust (ARET). Formerly, ARET was 
an arm of government, which was instituted by an Act of Parliament to conduct and 
coordinate all kinds of research in the tobacco supply system, but not to supply seed 
(MOAFS, 2006). ARET undertook this role and responsibility throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s and during this time the National Seed Company of Malawi (NSCM) 
was the sole supplier of all agricultural seed types in Malawi including tobacco secds. 
As part of the overall restructuring process of the agricultural sector in Malawi, 
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Govvcrnmcnt decided to handovcr the managcmcnt of ARET to tobacco fanners in 
1997. To this cnd, a Board of Trustas was sct up to providc guidancc on operations 
of ARET. In a bid to broadcn its scrvicc basc, ARET diversified into scicction, 
scrccning, brccding, multiplication and salc of tobacco sccds of all typcs. This vcnturc 
crcatcd compctition with NSCM, but this competition did not last as NSCM cxitcd the 
markct within two ycars of ARET starting to supply tobacco sccd. lntcrvicws with 
kcy informants in the industry rcvcaled that NSCM did not compete favourably with 
ARET, primarily because the latter successfully established quality reputation for its 
sccds ovcr a short period of time, and this enabled the company win over the cntirc 
markct sharc for supply of tobacco sceds to farmcrs. Thus, whilc NSCM was simply 
importing its sccds, ARET was brccding and multiplying its sccds locally and 
conducted adaptability and viability tests which ensured superiority in quality and 
also affordability in prices (MOAFS, 2006). Hence, what really happened in structure 
of tobacco sccd supply in Malawi over the last four dccadcs was simply the change of 
supplier from NSCM to ARET. To date, the structure of tobacco seed supply is still 
monopolised by a single supplier who breeds and multiplies 90% of marketed tobacco 
seed types locally and imports the balance of 10%, mainly highly specialism seed 
types, from Zimbabwe, the United States and South Africa. 
On sccd distribution, ARET has extension agents who arc located in various tobacco 
growing communities throughout the country. These agents Provide farmers with 
advisory services as well as acting as distribution agents for tobacco seeds of all types. 
Thus, farmers come to their offices to buy their seeds as well as to access the 
necessary advisory services they need. It can be argued that in this respect, ARET has 
vertically integrated breeding, multiplication and tobacco seed marketing functions as 
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u"cll as horizontally integrated scat programs and fanncr cxtcnsion scrviccs. 
Intcrvicws with growcrs rcvcalcd that although ARCT is the solc supplicr of tobacco 
sccd, growcrs arc fairly satisfied with the structurc of tobacco sccd supply. Up to 92% 
of growers intcrvicwcd indicated that they know one, two or thrcc ARCT distribution 
points where growers access tobacco seed within their communities. Two thirds of 
thcsc growers indicated they hardly incur any costs in order to get to the ARET 
distribution points as these points arc either within walking or cycling distances. A 
quarter indicated they spend a maximum of US$0.60 while the remainder of 3% 
spend slightly over that amount on transport to an ARET tobacco seal distribution 
point. 
The market for supply of tobacco seed in Malawi is monopolistic, however the kind 
of monopoly is through joint venture company between the state and tobacco farmers 
themselves. Interviews with key informants in the supply system indicated that pursuit 
of profits is not the overriding goal of ARET but rather coordination of supply of 
improved seeds of all tobacco types to farmers across the country. The privileged 
position of ARET through the ARET levy (as explained below) also makes it difficult 
for other players to enter the market as to be a successful seed supplier, a firm needs 
to invest in research for superior varieties, in addition to investments in seed 
multiplication and distribution activities. In the case of ARET, all research and 
multiplication activities are funded by a levy which is deducted from all growers at 
the point of sale in the auction floors. The only activity for which farmers arc charged 
for their tobacco seeds is the distribution cost for the seed as costs for seed 
multiplication and viability tests arc paid for by the ARET levy. This scenario makes 
it difficult for any aspiring seed supplier to enter the market for seed supply. Growers 
242 
do seem not to complain on prices for seeds, but certainly they complain over the 
dcduction of the ABET lcvy, which they arguc is high. It is reported that calls for the 
reduction or ultimatc removal of the ARET levy havc always sparked controversy as 
to how rcscarch and cxtcnsion systcms for tobacco fanncrs could be financed in the 
abscncc of ARET and its lcvy. The kcy qucstion howcvcr is whether this is the most 
cost cffcctivc way of funding and providing thcsc scrviccs. For the purposcs of this 
study we noted the strong coordination mechanism ABET is providing to the tobacco 
seed market. 
6.33.2 Conduct of suppliers in tobacco seed marketing 
As pointed out earlier, on top of sccd multiplication and distribution, ARET 
coordinates all research in the tobacco industry in Malawi, and provides advisory 
services to both small and large scale tobacco growers. This level of integration 
ensures coordination of seed supply and as observed ensures ready availability of 
tobacco seed to farmers throughout the country. Every year, ARET works out the 
quantities of tobacco seed requirements for each type of tobacco sccd and multiplies 
this before distribution to various distribution points. At thcsc points, fanners are only 
allowed to conduct spot cash payment of the seeds. The prices arc pan territorial and 
arc set in consultation with Government and arc described as lower than market prices. 
For the 2005/06 season, thcsc prices Were USSO. 33/kg and considering that thrcc 
quarters of small scale growers buy a maximum of 3kg, their total seed cost came to 
USS 1.00. Obviously, those with medium to large scale enterprises spend more. With 
respect to financing of expenses of seed purchases, the survey found out that 88% of 
growers used proceeds from sale of crops to finance their seed purchases, 7% use 
proceeds from sale of assets while 5% use income from hiring out their labour. 
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In terms of preferred seed supply arrangement, 48% considered the current spot 
market purchase as suitable since it does not leave fanners with the burden of loan 
repayment. These farmers argued that tobacco seed prices arc relatively low and 
affordable. however, 52% viewed purchase on credit either to be repaid as deductions 
during sale of produce (32%) or to be repaid anytime during the course of the growing 
season (20%) as most favourable. These farmers consider unavailability of cash at the 
time of purchase of tobacco seeds as the main bottleneck for accessing adequate 
quantities of tobacco seeds. With respect to transaction risks and cost, this study did 
not establish any rent seeking behaviours associated with the arrangement of seed 
supply and procurement. However, 2% of the growers reported elements of 
opportunism on the part of ARET in which the institution deliberately sometimes sells 
seeds that have expired and hence have difficulties with germination. In that case, 
growers lose both in terms of time wasted and also in terms of the cost of the scads 
since they simply go and buy for the second time to replace the seeds that did not 
germinate. This survey observed that these losses may go as high as US$6.00 in a 
season for a farmer in that experience and these costs include cost of seeds, loss in 
labour costs for replanting the seeds and an estimated loss in final output due to delay 
caused in planting seedlings. Although these costs may seem to be small, but 
considering that 10% of the poorest tobacco farmers cam mean incomes of US$150 
from tobacco farming in a season, then the US$6.00 represents 4% of their incomes. 
6.3.3.3 Performance of tobacco seed supply market 
The tobacco seed supply market in Malawi supplies 95% of seed requirements for 
large scale growers and supplies close to half of small scale growers. The remainder 
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of 5% of large scale grower's seed requirements is nut by imports from neighbouring 
countries while half of small scale growers use indigenous land race tobacco varieties 
which are recycled from one season to the next. Fanners who use land races argue 
that these varieties arc better in terms of (i) resistance to pests and diseases; (ii) 
adaptability to local growing conditions including different moisture regimes; and (iii) 
do well under low chemical fertiliser usage. Although the number of small scale 
tobacco farmers adopting ARET hybrid seed varieties is growing, up to half of small 
scale growers continue to use indigenous land race varieties. Major weaknesses of 
these varieties arc that they arc low yielding and have lower leaf quality. The 
consequence for use of these land race varieties is that they push down the national 
average yield for tobacco in Malawi and also lower the national average quality of 
Malawi tobacco leaf. Apart from fertiliser use, the single most limiting factor for 
tobacco yields and quality in Malawi is usage of land race varieties (Koester et al, 
2004). 
With respect to performance of the seed supply market, interviews with both growers 
and the supplier indicated that the supply side of the market is fairly satisfactory both 
in terms of quantities of seed supplied and availability of supplies. All growers 
interviewed in this survey indicated that in the last five years, they were able to get all 
their tobacco seed requirements every time they visited an ARET tobacco seed 
distribution point. In terms of seed quality as measured by germination percentage, 
two thirds of growers indicated they were satisfied with germination percentages of 
their purchased seeds in the past five seasons while a third reported poor germination 
in either one or two seasons. 
245 
On access of tobacco sccds, only a third of fanners interviewed in this study indicated 
that they were able to access all their seed requirements at the time of their choice in 
the last five years. These farmers pointed to low seal cost and availability as two of 
the main reasons why they are able to access all their seed requirements. A significant 
majority, two thirds, of farmers however, indicated they could not access all their sccd 
requirements and these farmers pointed to household cash flow problems (75% of 
respondents) and general lack of credit facilities (23%) as the main reasons for their 
failure to access all their seed requirements. These findings suggest that while the 
tobacco seed supply market may supply tobacco seeds of all types at all times, the 
majority of small scale growers simply fail to access their required quantities of 
tobacco seeds due to household cash flow problems and lack of credit access. 't'hus, 
although US$0.33/kg may sound to most Malawians as pretty small, to the majority of 
resource poor farmers this amount of money is significant as demonstrated by their 
failure to access required quantities of their seed requirements. This problem also 
explains in part why up to half of small scale tobacco farmers in Malawi continue to 
cling to land race varieties because they cannot access ARET tobacco seeds. The 
consequences for failure of farmers to access required quantities for their tobacco 
seeds are low tobacco yields, low output, poor leaf quality and subsequently low 
income and profits. 
6.3.4 Market for tobacco fcrtiliscr supply 
6.3.4.1 Structure of tobacco fertiliser supply 
This section discusses the structure of tobacco fertiliser supply system in Malawi. 
However, because of the difficulty of isolating the tobacco fertiliser supply system 
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from that of all other types of fcrtiliscrs, the section discusses the gcncral structure of 
fcrtiliscr supply in Malawi and whcrc rclcvant, specific rcfcrcnccs me madc to 
tobacco fertiliser supply. 
In tcrms of historical pcrspcctivc of the fcrtiliscr supply system in Malawi, sincc 
indcpcndcncc in 1964, importation, pricing and distribution of fcrtiliscrs of all typcs 
has bccn affcctcd by different Govcrnmcnt policies and strategics for overall 
agricultural dcvclopmcnt (Mataya, 2005). Such policics have varicd from statc 
ownership of institutions involved in importation and distribution of fcrtiliscrs, setting 
of fcrtiliscr priccs, provision of subsidies, and dcrcgulation of the market for fcrtiliscr 
supply and pricing (Mataya, 2005). 
Between 1964 and 1994, Malawi maintained a segmented fertiliser marketing system, 
with one system for small scale farmers and another for large scale growers. Each of 
these sub sectors had a different market arrangement for the supply of fertilisers 
(Westlake, 1999). Fertilisers for large scale farmers were imported directly by 
Optichcm and Norsk Hydro Malawi Limited and sold commercially to farmers at 
market determined prices (Sahn and Arulpragasam, 1991). On the other hand, 
fcptiliscrs for small scale growers were imported by ADMARC and later SFFRFM 
under directions of the Ministry of Agriculture and distributed by ADMARC through 
its network of markets throughout the country (China et al, 2006). SFFRFM 
imported two sets of fcrtiliscrs, one for the staple food crop maize and the other for 
cash crops such as tobacco and rice. These fertilisers were subsidised by the state and 
wert sold to farmers on loans (Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration - 
SACA loans) which wert recovered by ADAMARC during salt of crops. As a result of 
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the subsidy and the credit scheme with interlocking loan rcpaymcnt arrangement, a 
good proportion of small scale famurs growing cash crops thcn were able to access 
fcrtiliscrs and repay their loans. It must be pointcd out howcvcr, that smallholdcr 
tobacco farmcrs enjoyed this privilege of subsidiscd fcrtiliscr and credit from the 
SACA program for only a vcry short pcriod of timt, as only after 1989 were 
significant numbcrs of smallholdcr farmers allowed to grow tobacco, while fcrtiliscr 
subsidics wcrc rcmovcd in 1992 and SACA finally collapscd in 1994. 
The removal of the fcrtiliscr subsidy was implemented in a reorganisation of the 
fcrtiliscr market system as part of economy wide reforms during the mid 1980's. First, 
the state phased out and completely withdrew the smallholdcr fertiliser subsidy 
program in 1992. Secondly, Government liberalised and deregulated the structure of 
fertiliser market supply by allowing entry of other private sector companies to 
compete with SFFRFM and ADMARC in importation and distribution of smallholder 
farmer fertilisers. In this respect, Govcrnment rcorganiscd ADMARC and SFFRFM in 
order for than to compete with other private sector fertiliser companies in supplying 
fcrtiliscrs to large and small scale growers of all crops. Thirdly, the SACA credit 
system through which smallholder farmers previously accessed their fcrtiliscrs 
(mainly maize for a relatively longer period) on loan faced severe challenges and was 
rcorganiscd into a more commercially oriented Malawi Rural Finance Company 
(h1RFC) with a much greater emphasis on serving smallholder burley tobacco farmers. 
Fourthly, bctwccn 1996/97 and 2005/06 scasons, Govcmmcnt intcrvcncd in the 
fcrtiliscr market through various programs such as the Agricultural Productivity 
Invcstmcnt Program (APIP - bctwccn 1996/97 and 2004/05), the Startor Pack Scheme 
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(SPS - bctwccn 1998/99 and 1999/2000), the Tarbctcd Inputs Program (TIP - 
bctwccn 2000/01 and 2003/04), the cxtcndcd TIP program in 2004/05 and the targctcd 
fcrtiliscr subsidy program bctwccn in 2005/06 and 2006/07. APII' was a program 
through which smallholder fanners accessed fcrtiliscrs on loans which wcrc repaid 
during sale of their produce. SPS was on the other hand a universal fcrtiliscr 
intervention program in which small packs of fcrtiliscrs and hybrid seeds were 
distributed to all small scale resource poor producers for free, while TIP was targeted 
distribution of the same quantities of free packs of fertilisers and hybrid to the most 
vulnerable groups of the smallholder farming community. The fertiliser subsidy 
program however involved selling of two bags of fertilisers (one basal and another top 
dressing fertilisers) to small scale resource poor households at subsidised prices. 
These interventions impacted significantly on the volume of fertilisers that 
smallholder households and the country as whole used in an agricultural season and 
such impacts have been documented in detail by Dorward ct at (2007). 
In terms of structure of fertiliser supply, before reforms, three companies dominated 
importation of fertilisers of all types in Malawi and these were; Optichcm10, Norsk 
Uydro" (now known as Yara Malawi) and SFFRFAM. Optichcm was a state owned 
company through ADMARC and Malawi Development Corporation (h1DC) until 
2001 when foreign investors acquired majority shares in the company. Similarly, 
SFFRFM was and still is a state o%%med company organised as a Trust Fund under the 
10 The company aas established in 1975 and was owned by Government through ADMARC and MDC 
Mith majority share of 84%. In 2001, hICFi Limited of Mauritius bought 51% shares in the company 
making it majority share. The company owns a fertilizer granulation plant which formulates different 
fertilizers Within hfala%i. The company does not operate any distribution network of its own but rather 
uses the existing wholesale system as outlets for its fertilizers on cash basis. The company deals 
in 
different fertilizers including tobacco fertilizers. 
"? he company has branches throughout Southern Africa and in Malawi it distributes its fertilizers 
ugh regional Warehouses and wholesalers come and purchase fertilizers for onward retail marketing. 
The company is not involved in retail marketing. 
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Ministry of Agriculturc. Norsk Hydro was thcrcforc the only privatc scctor company 
in fcrtiliscr importation. Ilowcvcr, following restructuring of the fcrtiliscr markct, 
new companics cntcrcd the market for importation and distribution of fcrtiliscrs in 
Malawi. These companies included Malawi Fcrtiliscr Company (MFC) 12 , 
NASCOMEX'3, Nyiombo Invcstmcnts, Omnia, Agrimark, Agora 14, Farmers World", 
16 ' farm Wisc, Intcrfcrt, h1axifcrt, Rab Proccssors, Export Trading and Transglobc7. 
With cntry of thcsc new companies, both structure of fcrtiliscr importation and 
distribution in Malawi changed significantly. On fcrtiliscr imports, which arc mainly 
sourced from South Africa, Europe (mainly Romania and Greece) and the Gulf states, 
sharc of private sector imports incrcascd substantially since the reforms in mid 1990's. 
Figure 54 shows that despite the annual fluctuations, quantities of imports by private 
sector companies have generally increased from just under 100,000 metric tonnes in 
1997/98 agricultural season to 213,000 metric tonnes in 2005/06 season. On the other 
hand, fertiliser imports by public sector companies, thus ADMARC and SFFRFh1, 
have fluctuated between zero in 2001/02 and 77,000 metric tonnes in 2005/06. 
1= r1FC is a fertilizer blending company and is now owned by Farmers World. The company has been 
involved in repackaging of Government fertilizers for different intervention programs. 
'r mis is commercial division of NASFANI. Apart from selling fertilizers in their local farmer 
association shops, NASCOMMEX also trade in other inputs and output markets. 
'4 Agora was established in Malawi in 1996. The company later merged with Farmers World. 
" Farmers World started operations in Malawi in 1997. Subsequently, the company mcrgcd with Agora 
and MFC. Apart from selling different types of fertilizer to farmers in its market outlets, the company 
also sells other inputs and other household effects. The company also participates in output markets. 
" Rab processors is involved in many other markets and functions such as food manufacturing, agro 
processing. commodity trading and supply of inputs including fertilisers. The company distributes 
its 
products through its network of markets. 
1 Tranglobe is an export commodity oriented company. Its main activity is agro processing and export 
of commodities. In farm inputs, fertiliser is the main 
business. 
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Figure 54: Imports of fertilisers het een public and private sector companies in 
Malawi 
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On commercial sales of fertilisers to farmers. Figure 55 shows that sales by private 
sector companies have fluctuated between 120,000 metric tonnes and 190,0(1(1 metric 
tonnes between 1997/98 season and 2006/07 season while those of public sector 
companies have fluctuated between 20,000 metric tonnes and 40, (X)0 metric tonnes 
over the same period. It must he noted that one of the reasons why total sales are 
higher than imports is because Farmers World and Optichem companies produce 
locally blended and granulated fertilisers respectively, which they also sell to fanners. 
It must he noted too that sharp increases in fertiliser sales by public sector companies 
in 2005/06 and 2006/07 were mainly due to the fertiliser subsidy program in which 
Government used the infrastructure of SFFRFM and ADMARC to distribute the 
fertilisers to farmers. In terms of specific market shares for marketing of unsubsidized 
fertiliser by different fertiliser supplying companies in 2004/05, the market was 
dominated by three major fertiliser suppliers, namely. Farmers World (33%), Yara 
(26%) and Export Trading (22%) which had a total market share of 83°° (SFFRFM, 
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2(XY ). Market share for SF FRFM and A[)MARC were only 3°,,. Based on the 
criteria set out Table 34 on concentration levels of market structures, the structure cif' 
fertiliser supply in Malawi was strongly uligopolistic: as it had a CR4 ot'K$°p. 
Figure 55: Commercial sales of fertilisers between public and private sector 
companies in Malawi 
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On distribution of fertilisers to market outlets across the country. the standard package 
for selling fertilizers to farmers is a 50 kilogram bag although Rab Processors is now 
including 10kg and 5kg bags in their fertiliser sales. During fertiliser distribution, 
suppliers contract transporters to carry their fertilisers to different market outlets. 
Suppliers either use their own market outlets or through a network of wholesale and 
retail shops across the country (Table 37). SFFRFM has its own market outlets but 
also sells its fertilisers through ADMARC market outlets. In this way, SFFRFM has 
the largest number of distribution points and most of these are located in rural areas. 
Other private sector companies have their outlets and agents concentrated in towns 
and trading centres which are in many ways far from smallholder farming households. 
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Table 37: Channels for fertiliser distribution in A1alawwl 
Supplier Own distribution points Regions covered Use of ugcnls 
; SFFRFM 24 3 Yes 
Optichcm 0 3 Yes 
j Farmers World 
and Agora 
114 3 Yes 
Yara 2 1 Yes 
Rab Processors 
(Kulima Gold 
Shops) 
58 3 Yes 
NASCOMEX ? 3 No 
Transglobc 0 2 Yes 
ADMARC 288 3 No 
Agrimark 0 1 ? 
S.. /r; r, ) au Cf u eavvv; 
In addition to these outlets, suppliers also use ago dealers whose development has 
been supported by the Intcmational Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC) and Citizen 
Network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA) to distribute their fcrtiliscrs. In 2005, CNFA 
(2005) reported that there were over 1,000 agro dealers who had been trained and 
supplied with fertilisers on credit as start up capital for their businesses. It must be 
pointed out however, that while the number of 1000 may report those actually trained, 
the number of those actively engaged in actual fcrtiliscr distribution may be lower 
largely because they have been sidelined in the recent subsidy program and other 
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Govcrnmcnt intcrvcntions, and hence arc squcczcd out of the markst. CNFA (2005) 
indicatcd that up to sight fcrtiliscr supply companics are using agro dealers to 
distributc and salc thcir fcrtiliscrs. 
Dcspitc the cxisting distribution nctwork and initiativcs, intcrvicws with growcrs 
rcvcalcd that 23% of farmers livc in communitics where thcrc is only one known 
source of fcrtiliscr market outlet, which effectively means that thcsc fanners arc 
supplied fertilisers by monopolists. 33% of farmers indicated they know two fertiliser 
market outlets, 20% know three outlets, 14% know four while the remainder of 10% 
know more than four places. Focus group discussions revealed that ADMARC 
markets are the most commonly found markets in rural areas. What these findings 
suggest is that even at retail or local level, fcrtiliscr marketing is dominated by 
oligopolists and monopolists. When asked about transport expenses, half of farmers 
indicated that they simply buy fertilisers from suppliers nearest to them and as such 
do not incur any transport expenses. Thus, they either carry fertiliser bags on their 
heads or use own transport arrangements, such as bicycles and ox-carts, which do not 
require transport expenses. However, 22% of farmers indicated to have spent up to 
USS3.30 in transport expenses while 15% spent between USS3.30 and USS7.00 and 
the remainder of 12% spent over USS7.00 in transport expenses for their fertilisers. 
In terms of tobacco fertiliser market demand, there arc numerous farmers who 
participate or seek to participate in the fertiliser market in Malawi. Interviews with 
small scale farmers in 2005/06 agricultural season revealed that 55% of 
farmers 
participated in the fertiliser market by buying either one or two bags of 50kg tobacco 
fertilisers at a maximum cost of USS28.00.35% indicated to have bought between 
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thrcc and fivc bags of tobacco fcrtiliscrs at a total cost ofUSS70.00.6% of small scale 
tobacco growcrs indicated to have bought over six bags of tobacco fcrtiliscrs whilc 
the remainder of 4% indicated they did not buy any tobacco fcrtiliscrs although they 
wishcd to participatc in the tobacco fcrtiliscr markct. Considcring that thcre arc 
approximatcly 350,000 small scalc tobacco growcrs in Malawi and that 96% of than 
constitutc cflcctivc demand of different magnitudes of tobacco fcrtiliscrs, this shows 
that the dcmand sidc for the fcrtiliscr markct in Malawi is cornpctitivc markct 
structurc. It must be pointed out though that focusscd group discussions with 
smallholder farmers revealed that the majority of smallholder fanners that bought one 
or two bags of fcrtiliscrs in 2005/06 do not under normal circumstancc buy any 
fertilisers. It was reported that these farmers were able to buy fertilisers in 2005/06 
courtesy of the fertiliser subsidy program but otherwise in the absence of the subsidy 
program they could not buy any fertilisers. 
63.4.2 Conduct of fertiliser suppliers 
ßcforc the reforms, Government set and announced pan territorial subsidized fcrtiliscr 
prices for smallholder farmers at the beginning of each season. Private sector fertiliser 
supplying companies were obviously setting commercially viable prices. After the 
removal of subsidies, SFFRFhi adopted commercial practices in setting prices to 
rccovcr costs as well as provide a profit margin. Table 38 show costs and prices for 
selling 50kg bags of different types of fertilisers by SFFRFht. As the table shows, in 
some fertiliser types especially those for tobacco (D compound), the mark up is 
cxccptionally high while in fertilisers for maize, the selling prices are lower than costs 
rcprcscnting a loss. Howcvcr, the overall margin is shown to be positivc suggesting 
that tobacco fcrtiliscrs arc cross subsidizing maizc fcrtiliscrs. Interviews with 
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SFFRFM indicatcd that Government intcrvcncs in its priccs, in particular, in setting 
maizc fcrtiliscr priccs. With compctition, when SFFRFM scts lowcr than rccovcry 
cost priccs for maizc fcrtiliscrs likc that, other fcrtiliscr supplicrs also follow suit in 
ordcr to stay in busincss. In this way, although SFFRFN1 is a small playcr in the 
industry, the company continucs to maintain its position as pricc leadcr. As a 
conscqucncc of price compctition, margins for some fcrtiliscrs arc lower than they 
would be with a competitive market structure. Table 39 shows how the average 
margins have been narrowing down since 1998 and this explain why some players 
have exited the market while others simply fail to enter the market because of low 
margins. It was reported by SFFRFM that intervention by the State in prices of 
SFFRFM keep out the other side of oligopolistic behaviour where firms form a cartel 
and enjoy super normal profit margins. However, for D compound fertilisers which 
arc the main fertiliser type for tobacco growers, the case is rather different. This 
fertiliser has the biggest positive margin and it is clear from Table 38 that it is its 
exceptionally high margin that has enabled fertiliser companies to break even in their 
businesses. Hence, while conduct of suppliers in setting prices is benefiting maize 
growers in that they enjoy relatively low prices, it is tobacco growers who arc 
adversely affected by the market behaviour and who arc being penalised with high 
fertiliser prices. In other words, pricing of tobacco fertilisers seem to follow 
oligopolistic price discovery and seems to be done in such a way that it must pay for 
losses elsewhere. This kind of pricing is likely to be affecting demand for fertilisers 
by smallholder tobacco farmers. 
Table 38 SFFRFAM margins for different fertiliser types in 2004 (mk/SOkg bag) 
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fcrtiliscr S/A Urca CAN DAP 23: 21: 0 +4 D. Compound Nct Circt 
Cast (k) 240 357 265 395 344 325 
Salc pricc 250 352 260 388 340 369 
Nct (k) A 10 (5) (5) (7) (4) 32 21 
efts Si I Rr M (1006) 
Table 39 Changes in average retail price /FOB ratios for fertilisers 
Ycar Ratios 
1998 3.0 
2003 2.21 
2005 1.67 
! Nrc JtrKrIII Iswo/ 
Apart from conduct of suppliers on fertiliser pricing, other forms of suppliers' 
behaviour have been apparent in horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontally, 
some companies have merged to consolidate and improve their position in the markct 
while others have diversified into supplying other farm inputs and buying produce. 
Vertically, some companies have gone into blending and granulation of fertilisers in 
order to bring down the costs of fertilisers. Optichcm is one such company which 
ganulatcs fertilisers by incorporating 30% of local matcrial into the final product 
while Farmcrs World owns a plant which blends some of its fcrtiliscrs. Nationally, 
close to a third of fertilisers sold arc granulated or blcndcd locally. Interviews with 
management of SFFRFM indicated that one of the downside of thcsc processing 
activitics is that they have given way to some opportunistic behaviour in which 
fcrtiliscr companies put less of the active ingredient in fcrtiliscr bags. It must be 
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pointed out, however, that tests to establish these assertions were done by SFFREM, 
which is competitor to the companies undertaking the processing exercise and it is 
thcrcforc difficult to establish impartiality in SFFRFM tests and findings. Nonetheless, 
the difficulty on the part of farmers is that they do not have the ability to verify levels 
of active ingrcdicnts and the Malawi Board of Standards (NIBS), a body mandated to 
ensure quality standards for various products, is seriously underfunded and 
undcrstaffcd (Mataya, 2005) and as a result, these assertions become difficult to verify. 
The other accusation is that sometimes suppliers simply put less net weight of 
fertilisers than the actual net weight figure labelled on the fertiliser bag. Although this 
is easily spotted by large scale growers who use weighbridges, it is difficult for 
individual small scale farmers to check on fertiliser weights. Quantification of the 
scale of these opportunistic behaviours nationally proved extremely difficult during 
the course of the survey period. However, specific growers were able to indicate how 
much they believed that such opportunistic behaviours impacted on their farming 
activities. 
In terms of contractual arrangements for selling fertilisers to farmers, before the 
reforms ADMARC acted as the supplier of subsidised fertilisers to smallholder 
farmers on loans which were deducted by AIIL at auction markets. Farmers were 
organised into clubs in order to receive subsidised fertilisers on loan. Following the 
reforms of fertiliser marketing, six types of contractual arrangements operated at 
different times, evolving in response to changing conditions and to experience with 
these arrangements. The first arrangement to emerge after the reforms involved 
TANIA, Government, AHL and fertiliser suppliers. In this arrangement, Government 
through TAMMA negotiated with fertiliser companies to supply tobacco farmers in 
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farmcr clubs with fcrtiliscrs on loans which wcrc deducted by AIIL at the auction 
market. TAMA registered all growers under this arranbcincnt, howcvcr, some fanncrs 
bchavcd opportunistically and registered and rcccivcd fertilisers under one name 
while selling their tobacco under another name. In this way, they escaped paying back 
the loans, but the consequence of this was that the scheme collapsed and was 
discontinued in 2000 as a result of large unsettled loans with fertiliser suppliers. 
The second arrangement involved farmers, financial institutions and AIIL and it 
operated alongside the first arrangement. In this arrangement, farmers accessed cash 
loans from financial institutions, including commercial banks and MRFC which they 
used to purchase fertilisers and pay for other farm expenses. The loans were repaid 
through deductions by AHL at the auction market. Opportunistic behaviour by 
farmers again led to a high default rate which forced financial institutions to scale 
down their operations and the majority of them eventually pulled out. This 
arrangement is still benefiting a section of growers, especially medium to large scale 
growers who continue to get loans from MRFC and other commercial lending 
institutions. 
The third arrangement involved fcrtiliscr suppliers supplying fcrtiliscrs on loan to 
individual growers who repay loans through deductions at the auction market. This 
arrangement was popular among medium and large scale tobacco growers and 
it is 
still benefiting some of these growers. The fourth arrangement involved National 
Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAh1Ia), financial institutions and 
Auction Holdings Limited (AHL). In this arrangement, NASFAM farmers get a 
" NASFANI is an association of smallholder farmers in Malaal. It mw borne out of a project of United 
Sates Agency International Development (USAID) 
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purchasc ordcr from financial institutions which thcy use to purchasc fcrtiliscrs from 
supplicrs. NASFAM acts as guarantor for the loans and repayment is through stop 
orders at auction market. This arrangement continues to bcncfit class to the 20°ßö of 
smallholdcr tobacco growers who arc members of NASFAAM. 
The fish arrangcmcnt is spot cash purchascs of fcrtiliscrs by fanncrs using own 
houschold incomcs. With the collapse of the first arrangement and vcry low numbers 
of smallholdcr farmers bcncßting from the other arrangements in which thcrc are 
credit arrangcmcnts, spot cash purchases using own incomes is currently the dominant 
means by which majority of smallholdcr tobacco farmers in Malawi access thcir 
fcrtiliscrs. The sixth and final arrangcmcnt involved the purchase of Government 
subsidized fertilisers. This arrangement operated in 2005/06 and 2006/07 agricultural 
seasons. In this arrangement, a substantial number of tobacco farming households 
«"crc issued with coupons which enabled them to access one or two bags of subsidized 
fcrtiliscrs. Farmers indicated prcfcrring this arrangement over other arrangements (i. c 
direct purchases and those with built-in credit arrangement) because the subsidy 
reduced the price of tobacco fertilisers. The only set back howcvcr, was that farmers 
could only access a limited quantity of tobacco fertilisers through this arrangement. 
An evaluation report on the 2006/07 subsidy program suggests that among other 
impacts, the subsidy had a significant displacement effect on other forms of 
contractual a rangcments for transacting fcrtiliscrs and as a direct consequence, 
privatc scctor companies and distributors including agro dcalcrs cxpcricnccd 
contraction of businesses of various magnitudes, particularly in 2005/6 (Dorward ct al, 
2007). 
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Up to 89% of smallholdcr farnicrs intcrvicwcd in this study indicatcd to have sourccd 
thcir fcrtiliscrs through spot cash purchascs of fcrtiliscrs using own household 
incomcs in 2005/06 scason. These fanncrs were givcn coupons from statt sponsored 
fcrtiliscr subsidy program which they used to buy at least a 50kg bag of subsidised 
tobacco fcrtiliscrs. The rcmaindcr of 8% indicated to have sourced their fcrtiliscrs 
through NASFAM while 3% sourced cash credit from lending institutions which thcy 
used to buy fertilisers and 1% bought fertilisers on credit from fertiliser suppliers. 
This study observed that among fanners who used own household incomes to finance 
purchases of fertilisers, 86% used incomes from sale of produce from the previous 
season while 5% used income from sale of other household assets and off season 
agricultural activities. Other important sources of incomes for buying fertilisers 
included wages from ganyu and other non farm activities. In terns of criteria for 
selecting fertiliser suppliers, farmers' priority was the availability of subsidised 
fertilisers (only available from ADMARC and SFFRM in 2005/6) and other factors 
included distance to supplier's outlet and the reputation of suppliers. 
In terms of relative ranking of fertiliser marketing arrangements, two thirds of fanners 
ranked fertiliser marketing arrangement in which there is credit component as 
superior. Farmers argued that the credit attribute is helpful as it enables them access 
required quantities of tobacco fertilisers for their agricultural activities. However, 
fanners pointed to unforeseen circumstance of failure of crop due to a variety of 
reasons, not least adverse weather conditions, as a major risk associated with credit 
arrangements. A third of farmers ranked spot cash purchases using own household 
income as superior to arrangements with loan components because they do not need 
to worry about loan repayment or deductions once they have done their agricultural 
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work. A risk with this arrangement is that if due to any circumstance a household does 
not have adequate cash for purchasing fertilisers it means it will not use fertilisers. 
Farmcrs also attributed the price of fcrtiliscr as critical in this arrangement as 
household incomes are always stretched, hence where the state has provided subsidy, 
it helps in such cases. On rent seeking, the study was unable to identify any rents in 
fcrtiliscr sourcing arrangements. However, 5% of farmers reported some form of 
opportunism experiences in which they were Ict down by suppliers on quality and 
quantity of fertilisers. They found out that some of their fertiliser bags contained 
stones and they took them back to suppliers and exchanged the faulty bags for other 
bags. 
63.43 Performance of the fertiliser market in the MalawIan tobacco industry 
Interviews with growers and suppliers indicated that the market for the supply of 
fertilizers operates satisfactorily in terms of regular supply of fertilizers despite the 
fact that some farmers have to move long distances to get to the market and that many 
rural communities are serviced by monopolists and oligopolists. Up to 95% of farmers 
indicated that they were able to find fertilizers from market points every time they 
traveled to those market points to buy tobacco fertilizer types of their choice in the 
last five year. It must be noted though that focused group discussions indicated that in 
some areas, seasons and times, fertilizer supply arc not timely and in such cases, 
farmers may either travel to places where they can access the fertilizers or wait until 
stocks arrive in their areas. 
The major probicm however was on the dcmand sidc on the part of fanncrs. Two 
thirds of farmcrs failed to acccss the rcquircd quantitics of tobacco fcrtilizcrs in any of 
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the past five seasons. A quarter of farmers indicated that they managed to access all 
thcir tobacco fcrtilizcr rcquircmcnts in only one scason out of the five scasons, and 
that was in the 2005/06 scason when Government subsidized fcrtilizers. Only 1% of 
farmcrs indicatcd that they acccsscd the rcquircd quantitics of fcrtilizcrs in all the five 
scasons. The study found out that a combination of houschold cash flow problems and 
lack of crcdit facilitics %vcrc the main rcasons why farmers wcrc unable to acccss all 
thcir fertilizer rcquircmcnts during the last five years. Asked as to trends in household 
fcztilizcr acccss in the last five years, two thirds indicated their access has been 
worsening while 20% indicated it fluctuated and 10% indicated it rcmaincd constant. 
Falling houschold cash incomes and rising fcrtilizcr prices were reported as two of the 
most pressing problems why farmer's fertilizer access had been declining for majority 
ofsmallholdcr farmers. 
In terms of fertilizer application, 95% of farmers indicated having applied much lower 
fertilizer rates than recommended. According to recommendations by Ministry of 
Agriculture in Malawi, farmers are advised to apply 12 bags of 50kg Supcr D 
Compound (with 10% Nitrogen, 18% Phosphorus and 8% Potassium) or D compound 
(with 8% Nitrogen, 16% Phosphorus and 6% Potassium) to a hectare of tobacco crop 
as basal dressing fertilisers and 8 bags of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) as top 
dressing fertiliser (Malawvi Government, 2001). The study observed that 90% of 
farmcrs interviewed only applied up to a third of rccommcndcd fcrtiliscr requirements. 
Low household incomes, high fertiliser costs and lack of credit access arc three of the 
most constraining factors to adequate usage of fcrtiliscrs. Being the single most 
limiting input to tobacco production in Malawi, low usagc of fcrtiliscr is a major 
causc of low national avcragc yiclds of only 1.0 tonnc/ha instcad of global average of 
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2.5 tonncs/iha, declining quality of tobacco leaf with extremely low processing 
conversion ratios, low prices in the auction and consequently low profitability at farm 
level (Koester ct al, 2004). Farm budgets and Gross Margin analysis by ARET in 
2005 showed that Profitability for low input tobacco growers declined from 
USS790.40/ha in 1994/95 to US$373/ha in 2004/05 mainly duc to decline in yield. It 
is clear from these observations that smallholder tobacco ability to respond to prices is 
constrained by their ability to access fcrtiliscrs, and this in turn is constrained by 
difficulties in accessing cash and credit for its purchase. 
63.5 Market for finance 
6.3.5.1 Structure of credit supply 
The structure of agricultural credit supply in Malawi is dominated by four groups of 
suppliers. The first group comprise registered commercial banks, the second is MMRFC, 
the third is Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACO's) and the fourth and final group 
arc individual village lenders. Commercial banks have a long history of credit supply 
to the agriculture sector in Malawi and in particular to the tobacco sub sector. Banks 
remain the main and vital source of credit for large scale tobacco growers in Malawi. 
While access by small scale tobacco growers is limited, partly due to high collateral 
requirements, access has been further weakened by history of high default rate among 
small scale tobacco growers. MRFC on the other hand remains the major source of 
credit supply to smallholder tobacco growers in Malawi partly due to its origins and 
SACA credit connection. The company bears some kind of social responsibility to 
supporting the smallholder fanning community in Malawi and this is reflected in 
its 
conduct of business. SACO's arc borne, owned and managed by communities and 
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thcir conduct rcflccts this charactcristic as %vcll. Villagc Icndcrs on the othcr hand till 
the gap of supplying crcdit cspccially %vlicrc othcr Icndcrs cxpcrictnccs high 
transaction risks and costs. 
Intcrvicws with growcrs indicatcd that 75% of farmers livc in communitics where 
thcrc is not cvcn a singlc crcdit supplicr, 5% indicatcd presence ofonc crcdit supplicr 
in their communities, 2% indicated two suppliers, 5% indicated four suppliers, 5% 
indicated five suppliers and the remainder of 8% indicated presence of more than six 
suppliers. The first thing that these figures demonstrate is that credit suppliers arc 
highly localised in Malawi. Formal lenders are concentrated in cities, towns and 
trading centres with no branches or credit market outlet points in rural remote areas 
where farmers live and undertake their farming activities. This implies that if farmers 
have to access credit from formal lenders, they have to travel long distances to these 
cities and towns to access credit which alone posses several other problems. The 
second thing these results highlight is that not only is the credit market highly 
concentrated and oligopolistic at national level, it is strongly monopolistic and 
oligopolistic in most rural areas. Thus, the majority of farmers who access credit arc 
served by monopolists and oligopolists. In terms of whether the number of credit 
suppliers has improved or gone down in the last five years, 61% indicated the 
situation to be the same, 26% reported to be unsure while 12% believed number of 
credit suppliers has worsened. These results show that credit supply situation is not 
improving in rural areas despite a number of national efforts aimed at improving 
access to finance by farmers. 
265 
63.5.2 Conduct of credit suppliers 
The four major groups of credit suppliers in Malawi behave in unique ways. 
Commercial banks charge commercial interest rates and require collateral 
commiserate with the amount of loan obtained. 
The majority of large scale tobacco 
growers arc able to meet thcsc conditions and often use their land and other farm 
assets as collateral for their loans. On the other hand, many small scale growers fail to 
access loans from banks primarily because of high collateral requirements. The main 
advantage of sourcing finance from commercial banks, however, is that farmers can 
easily access large amounts of cash for their farm work. As for individual village 
lenders, these operate in many villages in Malawi and they lend their money to people 
they know but the interest rate is usually extremely high, ranging from 50% to 200% 
per annum. In many ways, this is the easiest form of sourcing credits among poor and 
farming households in Malawi, due to closeness of lenders to borrowers and lack of 
collateral requirements. It is, however, very costly. SACO's provide loans to farmers 
in clubs and their loans have low interest rates, almost half those of commercial banks. 
The main problem with SACO loans is that they arc limited and farmers receive very 
small loans. MRFC loans are given to small scale farmers who are organised in 
groups which act as security for loans. In areas where there arc NASFAM and TAMA 
associations, MRFC provides loans to smallholder farmers through their respective 
associations. Estate farmers also access credit from MRFC using whatever collateral 
they are able to produce. Smallholder tobacco farmers fill-in forms which they take to 
MRFC for approval and once endorsed, they take the forms to input suppliers who 
give them the requested inputs. In this case, MRFC gives the money straight to input 
suppliers. Difficulties with MRFC loans include; delays in processing loans, relatively 
high interest rate and collateral requirements, and harsh credit recovery mechanisms. 
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It must be noted though that apart from NASFAM and TAMA fanners who rclativcly 
casily acccss loans from MRFC, small scalc farmcrs who arc indcpcndcnt find it hard 
to acccss loans from h1RFC on thcir own. 
lntcrvicws with tobacco growers indicated that in the 2005/06 agricultural season, 
only about 16% of farmers interviewed indicated to have accessed credit for their 
tobacco farming activities while an overwhelming 82% failed to access any credit. 
This result is broadly consistent with NSO (2005) survey findings which reported that 
13% of households in Malawi received loans in 2004/05. On rural versus urban 
locations, NSO (2005) rcportcd a higher figure of 14% for rural households compared 
to 8% for urban dwellers. Similarly, at regional level, central region where the bulk of 
tobacco growers are located, NSO (2005) survey observed that 16% of houscholds 
accessed loans compared to 14% and 11% for northern and southern region 
respectively. Kasungu and Dowa districts which arc dominant tobacco growing 
districts, NSO (2005) found out that up to 19% of the households had obtained loans. 
Basing on land and per capita expenditure quintiles, NSO (2005) survey found out 
that numbers of households receiving both agricultural and any loans increased with 
increasing landholding size and per capita expenditure quintiles. Only 2% and 8% of 
households in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile received agricultural loans 
and any loans respectively compared to 11% and 17% of households in the highest 
per capita expenditure quintile. 
NSO (2005) observed that a third of all households that borrow money in Malawi 
borrow in order to start businesses while 20% borrow money to buy inputs for 
tobacco farming. Less than 1% of households borrow money to purchase inputs for 
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agricultural purposcs in bcncral. Of thosc that secured loans for tobacco inputs, this 
study obscrvcd that 380,; sccurcd a maximum of USS 14.00,31 °, ö borrowed bctwrccn 
USS20.00 and USS35.00 while 30% borrowed bctwccn USS36.00 and USS80.00. III 
terms of sources of loans, 82% of borrowing farmers intcrvicwcd in this study 
indicated to have sourced credit from commercial tending institutions such as banks, 
NIRFC and SACO's while 18% indicated to have sourced their loans from local 
village lenders. 111S2 survey disaggrcgatcd further sources of loans and reported that 
210, % of borrowing households obtained loans from r1RFC, 20% from relatives, 1800,41 
from the NGO community, 16°ßö from neighbours, 91% from village lenders, 3.4 from 
SACCO's, 3% from religious groups, 2.50.9 from work places, 2.1°, % from local shops, 
29.0 from commercial banks and 2.9% from other non specified sources. Proportions 
were observed to be higher for rural areas for sources such as relatives, neighbours, 
local shops, village lenders, religious groups and NMRFC while for urban dwellers 
proportions were higher for SACCO's, Banks, work places and NGO's. 
In terms of the nature of repayrncnt, this study observed that 44% of fanners 
borrowed loans to repay through deductions during sale of proceeds while 56% of 
fanners borrowed credits through an arrangement in which farmers had to pay back 
through cash repayment in the course of the season. Farmers that borrowed finance 
through an arrangement to pay back through deductions involved farmer associations, 
input suppliers and credit lenders in the loan sourcing arrangement whereas farmers 
that simply borrowed cash to pay back cash involved credit suppliers only in their 
credit arrangement. In terms of sources of cash for paying back loans, 72% of farmers 
indicated to pay back loans using proceeds from sale of produce, 13% rrcportcd to use 
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incomc from non farm activitics, 7% indicatcd wagcs from salt of their labour (ganyu) 
while 6% indicated using loans from other credit arrangement. 
On prcfcrrcd arrangcmcnts for sourcing credit, 70% of farmers indicated they prcfcr 
credit arrangements in which they pay back loans through cash deposits at agreed 
times while the remaining 30% opt for credit arrangements in which repayment is 
done through deductions on proceeds of produce sale. Fanners indicated they prcfcr 
cash repayment because it prevents them from having their proceeds deducted while 
the other group of farmers prefer deductions because they feel that is the only way 
they can access loans and be able to pay back. Fanners who opt for direct cash 
payment view the loan deduction method as risky as it takes away their earnings, 
while those who prefer the loan deduction method consider the direct cash repayment 
method as risky because it may deprive them of the opportunity to access loans and 
repay back. This study established the existence of opportunistic behaviours among 
borrowers in that they default on their loans, forcing lenders to incur more costs in 
trying to recover their credits. 
63.53 Performance of the credit market 
On performance of credit market, 88% of farmers interviewed indicated that the 
market for supply of credit is inadequate in terms of volume of credit supply, quality 
of credit supplied and timing of supply of credit. They feel the market is so thin and 
that it is not able to serve the farming community, especially those in rural remote 
areas. Although individual village lenders have come in to try to fill the gap and 
supply farmers with loans, their interest rates are high and prohibitive. Farmers 
interviewed in this study view the market for credit as a failing market which is not 
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hclpful cnough. With respect to the ability of farmers to access credit. 82% ö of farmers 
indicated they simply fail to access credit and that their credit situation is worse now 
compared to five years ago. Lack of sources ofcrcdit was r ported by 86% of farmers 
as the reason for failure to access credit while 10% indicated problems of collateral 
and the remaining 4% indicated high interest rates. NSO (2005) also found out that a 
third of households failed to secure loans because they did not know any lcndcr 
capable of supplying them credit. 16% simply fail to obtain loans to avoid the hustle 
of going through the process of getting the loan whereas 15% believe they would be 
denied credit if they applied. 8% indicated they do not borrow money because they do 
not like to be in debt, while 10% and 6% complain of high interest rates and collateral 
requirements respectively. 
This study observed a number of dilemmas relating to the Malawi credit supply 
system. First and foremost, lenders legitimately require some form of collateral for 
them to give out their money to transacting partners, but poor rural fanners do not 
have such tangible assets which they can use as collateral. In this way, a dilemma is 
created as to how the market can operate. Secondly, where collateral conditions have 
been relaxed and arrangements have been made to allow fanners pay their loans 
through deductions at auction markets, then a significant number of farmers 
opportunistically register and receive loans through one name and then sell tobacco 
through another name to avoid loan deductions. In this way, lenders have suffered 
losses and most importantly, the trust that was there between lenders and borrowers 
has been destroyed. Thirdly, where village lenders have come in to fill the gap created 
by departure of other lending institutions, they often charge very high interest rates. 
The end result of all this is that fanners are simply failing to access loans for their 
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agricultural work resulting in low yiclds and poor quality tobacco loaf. Conscqucntly, 
problems of credit access have undermined smallholdcr tobacco farmers' ability to 
occcss critical inputs such as land, labour, fcrtiliscrs, sccds and othcr csscntial scrviccs 
ncccssary for thcir tobacco production and markcting activitics. Credit acccss problem 
thcrcforc has bccn idcntificd as one critical rcason affecting supply of quality tobacco 
Icavcs in Malawi. 
63.6 The labour market 
6.3.6.1 Structure of ganyu labour market supply 
'ilhcrc are two main forms of labour supply in the tobacco sub scctor in Malawi. The 
first is hired labour and this is the dominant form of labour supply in the large scale 
tobacco sub sector while in the smallholder sub sector, both family labour and hired 
labour in the form of ganyu (casual) labour prevail alongside each other. 66% of 
farmers interviewed in this study indicated sourcing and using ganyu labour for land 
preparation activities, 35% indicated hiring labour during weeding and fertiliser 
application while 51% indicated using hired labour during harvesting and curing of 
tobacco. This finding shows that while smallholder fanners require hired labour in all 
stages of their tobacco farming activities, more labour is demanded during land 
preparation followed by harvesting and curing and finally weeding and fertiliser 
application. In terms of numbers of labour suppliers hired, 57% of farmers indicated 
to have hired one or two people during land preparation, 25% hired three to four 
people while 17% hired more than five people. During weeding and fcrtiliscr 
application, 44% reported hiring one or two people, 30% hired three to four while 
26% hired over five persons. During harvest, 27% indicated to have hired one or two 
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pcrsons, 34% indicated to have hired thrcc to four pcoplc while 31% hired mors than 
five people. NSO (2005) observed that in terms of man-days, hired labour increases 
with landholding sizes and that those in the smallest two landholding quintilcs hires 
labour equivalent to an average of 20 man-days compared to 25 man-days for the 
other two landholding quintiles in the middle and 37 man-days for the largest 
landholding quintile. 
On the labour supply side, half of farmers interviewed indicated to know more than 
SO people in their communities seeking ganyu'9 labour in the course of the tobacco 
growing season while the other half indicated to know between 10 and SO people 
willing to supply their labour service to tobacco farmers at any time in the growing 
season. As to whether labour supply is increasing or going down, 35% ö of farmers 
interviewed indicated that number of those supplying their labour fluctuates during 
the tobacco season, 32% feel it is constant while 27% think it has gone up. Half of 
farmers use wages as the main criteria for selecting labourers, 37% use labourers with 
good reputation, especially those known for doing a good job. The other factor that 
farmcrs take into account when hiring someone is their personal closeness or 
relationship. Overall, the market for supply of labour from a smallholder point of 
view appears to be satisfactory from a competitive point of view as there arc many 
suppliers on one hand willing to supply their labour resource and many farmers on the 
other hand seeking to acquire farm labour service. Howevver, it is hardly a perfectly 
competitive market given the nature of social relations between people living in the 
samc community. 
"casual hired labour 
272 
6.3.6.2 Conduct of players in ganyu labour supply market 
13cing a fairly compctitivc markct, wages arc dictated by labour supply and demand 
forces. ? Bose hired to provide labour scrvicc negotiate with fanners seeking labour 
service as to how much they should charge each other for a particular piece of work, 
depending on prevailing market charges. In the 2005/06 season, 30% of farmers 
interviewed in this study indicated spending a maximum of USS3.75 on labour for 
land prcparation, 33% spent between USS3.75 and USS7.00 while 25% spent bctwccn 
USS7.00 and US$35.00. On weeding application, 30% indicated to have spent up to 
USS3.30,32 %'o spcnt bctwccn US$3.30 and US$7.00 while 46% indicated to have 
spcnt bctwccn USS7.00 and USS35.00. On harvcsting and curing, 26% indicatcd to 
havc spent a maximum of US$3.75,27% spent bctwccn US$3.75 and US$7.00 while 
42% indicated spending between US$7.90 and US$63.00.76% of farmers indicated 
using proceeds from the sale of farm produce to pay for their labour charges while 
18% indicated sale of assets as the source of funds for paying labour. In terms of 
arrangements for engaging ganyu labourers, one arrangement was observed to be 
dominant and this was paying ganyu labourers immediately after they finish their task. 
In estates, the majority of labour providers arc engaged for long periods of time that 
cover the whole season. 
in terms of preferred contractual arrangement with labour suppliers. 73% of 
smallholder tobacco farmers indicated that thcy preferred the dominant arrangcmcnt 
in which labourers arc paid their money once they finish their work. 23% preferred 
dcfcrring payment of labour charges to produce marketing time. The former group 
indicate fears of seeing their proceeds being deducted as the major reason for opting 
for prompt payment. However, their problem still remains the ability to pay 
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immediately. Tiic latter group considers their inability to pay promptly labour as the 
main reason for opting for differing payment for labour costs. \Vhat these results 
rcvcal is that majority of farmers arc not comfortable seeing their proceeds from sale 
of produce being deducted either due to loan deduction or due to input/scrvicc charge 
deduction. This explains to some extent why farmers play opportunistic actions of 
avoiding deductions during sale of their produce. Furthermore, these results suggest 
that farmers prefer paying for all their farming requirement using money from own 
resources, which unfortunately they do not have. This looks to be yet another 
dilemma as to how smallholder farmers' access to inputs and services can be 
improved in circumstances where farmers do not have money to pay for such services 
and inputs and yet they arc unwilling to have their proceeds deducted in order to 
cover for costs of services and inputs rendered to them during the farming season. 
Almost all farmers interviewed in this study indicated to have been let down with 
suppliers of labour to their tobacco f ields. The majority of farmers were let down once 
or twice during each season in the last rive years while some were let down more than 
three or four times in a season. Farmers complained of being let down on quality of 
service delivered and time of delivery of the services. Thus, the majority of labour 
providers would not do a good job as agreed, but also not respect agreed schedules. 
Half of the time such things happen, farmers argue with suppliers of labour service, 
26% of the time they would change the supplier while 23% of the time they would not 
take any action. In terms of costs of such opportunistic behaviour, 65% of farmers 
indicated they did not lose any money in monetary terms, 11% indicated to have lost a 
maximum net of US$1.60,19% reported net loss of between US$2.10 and US$8.00 
while the remainder of 6% indicated net loss of between US$8.00 and US$15.00. In 
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toms of loss in time, two thirds of farmers indicated that such opportunistic 
bdu%iours have dclaycd thcir field opcrations for an additional werk or two %vliilc the 
'indcr of farmers indicated slightly more than that. 
6.3.6.3 Performance of ganyu labour market supply 
in terms of performance of market for labour supply, smallholder farntcrs indicated 
trot supply is not a problem. 95% of farmers interviewed indicated that in the last live 
scz-wns, every time they needed some ganyu workcrs, they were able to get them. 
1; o, v^-cti"cr. when asked about their ability to access all their labour requirements, 40% 
irdicatcd could not access required labour in all the fire seasons, 37% indicated they 
wily accessed once while 15% indicated they were able to access in two to three 
s. =sons of the last five seasons. 97% of farmers indicated finance as the main 
bottleneck limiting their ability to access adequate quantity of labour supply while 30.0 
dddcd the problem of rising labour costs. Labour supply is particularly critical for 
gatcs as the majority of tenants who used to supply their labour service to estate 
os,, -ncrs no longer render their services under tenant system. NSO (2005) also added 
the problem of seasonality to labour supply. The report reveals existence of labour 
s, *y ges during peak periods of the season and undcrcmplo)mcnt of labour during 
off pc; i; periods. 45% of households interviewed in the survey indicated lack of 
lour as main limiting factor for expanding area under cultivation. This shows that 
Our accessibility is also a factor that determines the ability of households to either 
srtrnsify or expand their tobacco production. 
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GA Organisation of tobacco marketing In Malawi 
6, x. 1 Structure of tobacco marketing 
6A. 1.1 Marketing arrangements for selling tobacco in Malawi 
Table 40 shows the diffcrent marketing arrangcmcnts that major tobacco growing 
co=trics use in transacting tobacco leaf 
from growers to buyers. As the table shows, 
%, c rtdw"idc there arc four common types of tobacco 
leaf marketing arrangements and 
&Ome arc; (i) state procurement as practised in China, Turkey, Thailand and Italy, (ii) 
contract farming as in US, Brazil, India, 
Mexico and Thailand; (iii) auction system, 
g ainly in Malawi and Zimbabwe; and, (iv) spot market purchase of tobacco 
leaves 
cý ally used for residual tobacco 
leaves in Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico and 
T iland. As observed, outside the US where the auction system is used to transact 
tidual tobacco leaves only, Malawi and Zimbabwe arc the only two countries in the 
stwld where the entire national tobacco crop 
is sold through the auction system. 
g to ct al (2004) reported that world%vidc, up to 90% of flue cured tobacco leaves 
=d 65@, '@ of burley tobacco arc transacted 
from growers to buyers through contract 
fsnning systems. These contracts however, differ from one country to another in 
ins of their nature and scope. 
For instance, contracts in the US arc limited to market 
3i, =ncnts as they cover prices, quantities and 
delivery schedules only whereas 
contracts in Latin American countries go 
further to include provisions of supply of 
fi sts on credit and delivery of 
farmer extension systems (Koester ct al, 2004). 
Table 40 Marketing arrangements for different countries 
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Country Major marketing arrangement Minor marketing arrangement 
mina State procurement (100°ßö) 
L'nitcd Statcs Contract fanning (80%) Auction (20%) 
Zimbabwe Auction (100%) - 
Auction (100%) 
1 Contract fanning (90%) Market purchase (1(Y° ö) 
Contract tanning Market purchase 
Twtcy State procurement Markct purchase 
j iIco Contract farming Market purchase 
-T1=3land State procurement Contract fanning 
ICY State procurement 
e+*= eNe* ( i4J 
ýfa1awi, the auction system of tobacco marketing began in early 1930's. The first 
=ction market to be opened was Limbc auction market, located in Southern Malawi. 
-dis markct served the country`s tobacco industry until 1979 wbcn a sccond auction 
ri-ct was opcncd in Kancngo (Lilongwc) to scrvc the booming tobacco industry in 
" Central region. In 1993, another market was also opcncd in N1zuzu, the main city 
in the north of the country, to cater for growers in the region. Construction of a fourth 
: s1ºct is underway in Kasungu district, the major tobacco growing district of the 
try. The opening of this market will bring the total number of auction markets in 
Malawi to tour. Eiowcvcr, Kancngo is currently the biggest tobacco auction market 
with sales close to 60°a of the nationally traded tobacco leaves (TCC, 2006). The 
ignal intention of adopting and using the auction systcm of markcting tobacco in 
tiWawi aas to enure that priers arc discovered through competition and according to 
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Malawi law all tobacco lcavcs produccd in Malawi arc sold through the auction 
sptcm and any othcr markcting arranbcmcnts arc illcgal. 
6,4,1.2 Stakeholders in the auction system and their roles 
-Ibcrc arc five major groups of stakeholders in the Malawi tobacco auction system and 
tic include growers and their representative groups, buyers and their buyer group, 
= auctioneers or owners of auction market premises, the regulator of the 
Wb3cco industry, and Government. Each of these groups are considered, describing 
tatst their supposed role in the marketing system, and then potential w eakncsscs in 
1Wtilling such roles. 
6A. 11.1 Auctioneer- Auction Holdings Limited (AIiL) 
All tobacco auction markets in Malawi arc owned and run by a single private limited 
cmnpany called Auction 
Holdings Limited (AIIL). Government through ADMARC is 
a major shareholder with a 
51°6 share. The remaining shares arc spread among several 
1c scale tobacco growers and an association of small scale tobacco growers known 
as Tobacco Association of 
Malawi (TAMA). AHL acquired the Limbc auction market 
zd established itself as tobacco auctionccring company 
in 1962. Since then, the 
y opened Kancngo and rtzuzu auction markets to cater for the growing sales 
of tobacco leaves. 
In particular, the construction of Kancngo market and its 
1- uartcrs in 1979 involved large investments from ADMARC, a state owned 
company which eventually made 
Government the majority shareholder of A1IL. 
pwncrship of all three tobacco auction markets in Malawi means AlIL is a monopoly 
klier of the market place for tobacco marketing. As for legislation, Malawi law 
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&cs providc for morc tobacco auctioneers as long as they obtain liccnccs for their 
incsscs. however. discussions with key informants from the industry indicate that 
chasing of tobacco leaves is highly ccntraliscd by buying companies and any 
fmhcr opening up of more markets will mean decentralisation of their buying policies 
=4 pmctices, which buyers would resist or protest by simply shunning away from 
uch new markets. 
The primary role of AIIL in the Malawi tobacco auction system is to provide premises 
%bac buyers interact and transact with growers on tobacco leaves. In pursuant of this 
responsibility. AIIL liaises with relevant authorities as to opening of auction markets, 
s=ngcs with growers and their representatives on dates they should bring their 
co leaves for marketing, receives tobacco leaves from growers, maintains a 
+da. ssbasc for tobacco sales, and provides temporary storage facilities in terns of 
w unity and insurance of all tobacco leaves sold through the auction markets. The 
5, crondary role of AIIL is to auction tobacco leaves during sale of tobacco leaves in 
r auction floors. As an auctioneer, AHL has a cadre of staff who announces the 
. sing price 
for a bale of tobacco leaves based on the physical look of the leaves and 
the initial grade attached by TCC. Once, the starting price is announced, buyers begin 
go bid for the bale of tobacco leaves and the last bidder is the one who ultimately bets 
ihr bale. Aftcr sales have been concluded in the auction floors, AIIL completes cash 
1, stsactions of the sale by arranging payment through banks. Alongside this role. 
Al IL also operates a centralised cash deduction system known as a stop order system, 
ssbc= AM deducts any loans and other statutory and non statutory levies on 
g mcr's incomes before remitting proceeds 
from tobacco sales to bank accounts for 
ýOwcrs. All cash dcductcd in this way is 
forwardcd to organisations in question. In 
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nsurn for thcsc scrviccs, AHL charges 3.5% of the sales value cif all tobacco Mold can 
t auction markct, as commission, and a furthcr 3% on stop orders charges, tvhich 
wcrs pay. 
Logistically, AI IL opcratcs what is known as dclivcry quota system whereby different 
powers and grower groups arc given schedules as to when to bring their tobacco to 
t, ')c auction markets for sale. This system used to work fairly well when tobacco 
; vuduction was restricted to relatively few major growers (latlcc, 2003). however, 
(olbu-ing removal of production restrictions and the subsequent influx of small scale 
tob3cco growers, the system has become overwhelmed by the sheer number of 
powers and trucks coming to the auction market. AIIL finds it practically difficult to 
=age the system hence, there arc long queues and congestion of trucks and tobacco 
ogles at auction markets during sales. Interviews with transporters at Kanengo market 
gtv alcd that at the beginning of the tobacco marketing season, during the first month 
of sales, trucks take on average 2 to 3 days to be off loaded at the market, while from 
L*c second month, when sales pick up, trucks take a fortnight to a month to be off 
jvaded. Interviews with AIIL officials indicated the presence of Non Tobacco Related 
Materials (NTRNI) in tobacco bales due to poor handling and grading by growers as 
00e of the reasons slowing down marketing of tobacco. Focus group discussions with 
powers and transporters also suggested that some prominent and well connected 
growers connive with AHL officials to jump queues and this again is alleged to 
wnpound the congestion problem at auction markets. This assertion was denied by 
AIIL and could not be validated by this study. 
6, A. 1.2.2 Rcgulator-Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) 
2S0 
Lcgislation of Malawi as provided for in the Act of Parliament Control of Auction 
floors Act caption 65: 03 establishes the Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) as a 
body which regulates the tobacco industry in Malawi (NIOAFS, 200(j). The Act 
drf: ncs the roles of TCC as including; advising government on sale and cxlxort of 
tohscco. promotion of tobacco sales, collating statistics on tobacco, distribution of 
ma ket studies and information relating to tobacco, and controllrcgulation of sale of 
to#)acro in the auction floors in Malawi (AMOAFS, 2006. Specifically for tobacco 
tnxi. cting, the Act authorises TCC to licence premises for sale of tobacco by auction 
zz, d their commission charges, to licence and regulate buyers of tobacco, to register 
tobjcco growers, to define tobacco classes and grades, to licence tobacco graders and 
t it premises and to prescribe penalties for breach of regulations. During auction of 
t, joco leaves in auction markets, TCC officials attach a grade to all tobacco bales so 
t, ºxa1 auctioneers from AHL have a basis upon which they set their starting price. In 
case of industrial actions such as protest from growers due to low prices, TCC act as 
,, itrator 
for such cases. TCC also advises A1IL on dates of opening and closing 
U)WCco auction markets in Malawi. In return for all its roles in the industry, the Act 
provide for a TCC levy of 0.10% of tobacco sales in auction market and a fee of 
035%: on all tobacco marketed through the auction market as tobacco classification 
c gcs. 
6,, 1.1.2,3 Legislator- Government 
Govctnmcnt is primarily involved with setting legislation for the tobacco industry as a 
%hole. which include tobacco auction 
legislation. The process of formulating 
legislation is usually highly consultative and once regulation is in place, the state 
crpccts all stakeholders 
in the industry to play by the rules. In cases of industrial 
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c--umt. Govcmmcnt stcps in to rcsolvc the dispuics. I lowcvcr, in 2005100 sca. n, for 
the first timt, Govcmmcnt wcnt a stop furthcr to sct up minimum prtxluccr prices for 
t, gbxxo in response to calls from growers that prices arc low in auction floors. 111CSc 
iaicxs were sct at USS I. 40Ikg but were ncvcr rcspcctcd as G wcrttmcnt had no 
mcc}unism for cnforcing thcm. 
64,1.24 Growers and their associations 
In the tobacco auction marketing system the role of growers and their associations is 
to transport their leaf to the floors and once there, their role is reduced to mere 
'tors of the auction marketing processes. Whether a Bower is satisfied with the 
icc or not, there is no room for refusal of sale or bargaining of any kind. Growers 
3:, c price takers just 
like in any perfectly competitive market structure where 
transacting partners arc price takers. However, in circumstances where growers arc 
hwl by persistently low prices, they organize themselves and stage a protest to stop 
sAcs so that through their respective associations their g 
ievanccs arc formally 
iunchcd and so that negotiations take place with buyers to improve prices. 
( transportation role, before reforms, growers, who largely constituted large scale 
Iyrmas, used their own or easily hired vehicles to transport their tobacco leaf to the 
z; iction market. However, with the 
influx of small scale growers, the majority of 
-horn do not possess their own vehicles, 
but also, are likely to have difficulties to 
s hired vehicles and even where accessed unit costs arc likely to be high, two 
f cr transport and logistics arrangements flourished in post libcralisation period. 
-IbC first arrangement was via tobacco Intermediate Buyers' (1ß's). Government 
intnjucrd the 113 system in 1994 so that farmers with difficulties in taking their 
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zobscco to auction markcts should scil thcir curcd lcavcs to 113's who would in turn 
sx)l the leaf at the auction markets. In this way, Intcnncdiatc buyers bore all transport 
and logistics costs associated with ferrying tobacco leaf to the auction markets. 'hic 
. usumption was that merchants registering 
for the 113's scheme would have past 
experience in tobacco handling. i3ctwccn 1995 and 1997, there were a total of over 
. 4.000 registered intermediate 
buyers accounting for close to 1511,, Q of the national 
Scco output (laffcc, 2003). The system however collapsed in 2000 amidst 
criticisms that 1ß's were offering unjustifiably low prices to farmers, supplying poorly 
graded and sorted tobacco leaves to the auction market, encouraging thcft of tobacco 
leaves from estates and that the system encouraged credit default. Although lafcc 
(2003) did not validate these concerns in his report, hostility against the system at the 
time resulted in Government dropping the system altogether in 2000. 
-J second arrangement was through farmer groups such as clubs and associations. 
% ith the fall out of the lß system, the only wa)s through which tobacco is brought to 
the auction market are either by individual efforts or as part of a particular group of 
fjMCM With respect to the latter, there arc two main groups or associations of 
fsrmcts, the first group constitute roughly about 3,813 (20%) smallholder fanner 
clubs comprising 15 to 30 
farmers who arc members of the National Smallholder 
Fassnot Association of Malawi (NASFAM) and the rest of the smallholder fanner 
dubs 18,288 (80%) belong to Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAiý1ri). NASFAM is 
a relatively rcccnt organisation 
in Malawi and was bomc out of a USAID funded 
pcvjcct in 1995. On transportation, 
NASFAhl negotiates arguably favourable rates 
, mith transportcrs to transport tobacco 
for its members from roadsides to the auction 
; cts. Jaffcc (2003) rcportcd that NASFAM also managcd to crcatc a rclativcly 
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cfficicnt smallholdcr tobacco transport systcm by among others climinating bribes, 
tips, losscs and damagcs in its transport systcm, thcrcby considcrably bringing down 
costs of transporting smallholdcr farmcr tobacco to half of what TAMA charges its 
mcmbcrs. On average, he reported costs of USSc4.00/kg for NASFAAM farmers and 
USScS. 00/kg for TAMA fanners. 
With TAMA, its roots date back to 1929 when the Nyasaland Tobacco Association 
(NTA) was formcd. Upon indcpcndcncc, NTA changcd its name to TAMA and its 
main aim was to protect and advance the interests of its members. Among others. 
TA MA achicvcs its goals through rcprcscntation of its mcmbcrs to Govcmmcnt on 
matters affecting the industry, lobbying for changcs in legislation and through 
management of the smallholder farmer tobacco transport system (NMOA1+S, 2006). On 
transport, the principle is collective bargaining and is aimed at bringing down unit 
costs for individual farmers. However, the system is criticised for two main 
drawbacks. 
First, TAMA officials negotiating prices with transporters fail to reach favourable 
rates for its members on three grounds, (i) bribes which some TAAMA of cials arc 
forted to receive from big transporters, (ii) vested and conflicting interests in which 
some TAMA officials also own vehicles and (iii) long queues in auction floors which 
forces transporters to charge more. A survey conducted as part of this study found that 
tobacco leaf from TAh4A farmers take much longer to be off loaded and sold in the 
auction market compared to NASFAM members and other individual medium to 
large scale farmers. About 6% of TAMA farmers indicated their tobacco takes 
between 15 to 25 days, 73% indicated between 26 and 59 days while 19 % indicated 
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their tobacco takes over 60 days to get sold in the auction market. About USS2.20 to 
USS30.00 is spent by TAMMA farmers in tracking down their tobacco from the time it 
leaves home to the time they bet their pa)vcnt. This money is spent as transport and 
communication expenses and translates into median expense of 0.06/kg. 
Secondly, management of satellite temporary storage units have been criticised for 
gross mismanagement and handling of farmer tobacco. With the TAAMA transport 
system, tobacco has to be moved first from homestead to satellite depots where it is 
picked in bulk for the auction. However, two major problems are prominent in 
management of satellite depots (i) the principle of first-in first-out is not respected in 
these satellite depots due to bribes, tips and vested interests, particularly where 
satellite depot owners also double as growers, and (ii) structures in some satellite 
depots are dilapidated and poorly protected especially where owners arc also TAMA 
local representatives, hence, these conditions end up in damages and losses to tobacco. 
A survey conducted in this study observed that losses to tobacco arc a major and 
growing problem to smallholder tobacco growers. Up to 20% of fanners interviewed 
indicated to have lost some of their tobacco on its way to the auction market during 
the 2005/06 tobacco marketing season. The quantities lost ranged from 30kg to 100kg 
with a median of 50kg and considering an average auction prices of USS 1.00/kg, 
these losses translate into USS30.00 to US$100.00 with median monetary loss of 
USS50.00. These losses are substantial considering median tobacco gross earnings for 
these farmers arc only US$340.00. Poor handling, poor storage conditions, poor 
security, theft and long holding times were revealed as major sources of losses and 
damages to in-transit tobacco. 
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6.4.1.2.5 Buyers 
As thcir namc suggcsts, the rolc of tobacco buycrs (also known as Merchants) in the 
Malawi tobacco auction systcin is to buy tobacco Icavcs from the auction markets and 
partially proccss them bcforc selling them to cigarcttc manufactures. Table 41 show 
tobacco buycrs and their market shares for the period 2000/01 to 2004/05. As the 
table shows, during this period, there wcrc thrcc principal buyers accounting for over 
90% of sales, namely, Limbc Lcaf, Dimon and Stancom and the balance of 10% was 
shared between Africa Leaf, 
Wallace and Premier Leaf The three principal buyers arc 
aff liatcs of US multinational companics and thcy buy tobacco leaf from Malawi and 
ncighbouring countrics including Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe on 
bchalfof four or five major multinational cigarcttc manufacturers. 
Table 41: Market share for tobacco buyers in Aialaw l (%) 
Company 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004105 
Limbc l caf 52.9 51.2 47 45.4 47.9 
Dimon 21.6 21.6 22.6 22.5 23.1 
Stancom 20.4 22.1 24 24.5 23.7 
Africa Leaf 4.2 4.7 6.1 6.1 7.4 
Wallacc 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.2 
prCMcrc 0.1 0 0 0 0 
. ý,.. rcr. 
TEAM Pooe) 
Limbs Leaf is a joint venture of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company (of Richmond, 
USA) and Press Corporation. Universal Lcaf has majority shares and is the world's 
best independent leaf buyer with nearly 60 affiliate companies in all tobacco 
286 
growing countrics. As Tablc 41 shows, Limbc Lcaf is the largest buycr among the 
main tobacco buycrs in Malawi. The company buys roughly 45 to 55% of the leaf 
annually. Limbc leaf also owns two big tobacco proccssing plants in Malawi which it 
uscs to proccss its tobacco before cxport. The company cxports 90% of its tobacco as 
thresh"-0 and the rcmaindcr of 10% is exported as strip21 or partially stcmmcd tobacco. 
Dimon and Stancom arc two othcr principal buyers of similar staturc in many ways. 
Both thcsc companies arc owned by Americans and as Tabic 41 shows, they both 
have market shares of between 20% and 25% with a combined total share of roughly 
around 45%. Worldwide, Stancom is known as Standard Commercial Corporation and 
is one of the largest global tobacco buying companies. The company got established 
in Malawi in 1975 after buying majority shares in another tobacco processing 
company. On the other hand, Dimon is a company which was formally owned by two 
US brothers known as Dibro and Monkey and the company came to Malawi and 
established itself as a tobacco buying company in early 1980's. Worldwide, Dimon 
Malawi is part of Dimon Corporation, the world's second largest independent tobacco 
leaf merchant. In 2005, the two international corporations, Dimon and Stancom 
merged to form one company known as Alliance One Tobacco company. For Malawi, 
the merger meant that the market became even more concentrated as Alliance One 
assumed a combined market share of around 45%. This means that the current 
principal merchants, namely, Limbc Leaf and Alliance One now account 
for over 
90% of the tobacco leaf sold in Malawi auction floors. The balance of close to 10% is 
shared between Africa Leaf, a British tobacco 
buying company and Malawi Leaf, a 
newly introduced Malawi Tobacco 
buying company. This company is partly owned 
Thresh tobacco constitute shredded tobacco leaf blades only Without seins. 
Strips constitute all tobacco leaf veins. 
287 
by the Malawi Government and Auction holdings Limited and the 20051061 marketing 
season was the first year of its operations. 
The business of buying tobacco involves large investments in spccirc asscts in 
processing plants, to the tune of over USS 10 million. At present Malawi has two 
companies who have investments in these mills: Limbo Leaf Tobacco Company and 
Alliance One. Africa Leaf and Malawi Leaf do not own any mills but rather process 
their tobacco leaf through the two companies with mills. Sometimes, these companies 
send their leaf to South Africa where processing fees arc much lower. It appears 
companies with processing mills charge high processing fees in order to push others 
out of the market. Apart from investments in mills, tobacco buyers also need to invest 
in warehouses with good air conditioners and in the market intelligence compctcnccs. 
Tobacco processing also exhibits large economics of scale in that the bigger the line 
capacity, the less the unit costs in terms of energy, water and labour. It is these 
elements that act as barriers to entry in the tobacco buying business. 
6.4.13 Type of market structure 
From the description above, with over 90% of Malawi tobacco being bought by only 
two buyers on one hand from numerous sellers on the other, the tobacco auction 
market system in Malawi is interpreted as a strongly concentrated oligopsony. Buyers 
have an edge and added advantage over their transacting partners. Depending on how 
they use their advantageous position through their conduct and behaviour, it is 
possible that buyers can influence market outcomes in their favour. The market 
structure in Malawi is different from that of the Zimbabwe auction market where 
there arc over sixteen buyers with competitive market shares such as 16% for 
288 
Univvcrsal Lcaf, 15% for Dimon and 10% for Stancom. The markst in Zimbabwc is 
thcrcforc a low gradc oligopsony. One distinguishing fcaturc bctwccn the two 111: Irkcts. 
howw-cvcr, is that thcrc arc more tyres and styles of tobacco leaves in the Zimbabwe 
auction markct mcaning that the product is morc hctcrogcncous as opposed to Malawi 
auction markct system whcrc ovcr 90% of the crop is buricy tobacco. Noncthclcss, it 
is clcar from the cxisting markct structurc in Malawi that the markct is olibopsonistic. 
Interviews with ALIL indicatcd that the problcm lics largcly with the rcgulator TCC 
for failing to attract more buycrs to the Malawi auction markct systcm. AIIL argucd 
that bcing one of their core responsibilities of attracting and licensing buycrs, TCC 
should have attracted more buyers to the market. 
In addition to oligopsonistic buyers, the Malawi tobacco auction marketing system 
also has a monopoly provider of the market prcmiscs, AIIL. As a monopoly provider 
of the service, it is possible that AEIL could behave like other monopolists who enjoy 
super normal profits while at the same time exercising considerable control over the 
level and quality of delivery of service. This issue is investigated and discussed in 
detail below both under conduct and performance of AIIL's delivery of service. The 
role of the state and TCC in the framework of the market system is also of interest in 
terms of operations of the market. This issue is also discussed in detail below under 
conduct and performance of the market, as government's intervention in markets may 
be for better or worse in as far as efficiency of the market is concerned. 
6,4,2 Conduct of playcrs in the tobacco marketing systcm 
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6A. 2.1 Mechanism for price discovery 
h1OAFS (1995) outlined that the idea behind choosing the auction system of tobacco 
marketing was the creation of a transparent and competitive system of tobacco 
marketing. Government had hoped that in the long run, the market would have many 
buyers and sellers of tobacco all competing for the same product thereby creating an 
cf cicnt mechanism for discovery of prices of tobacco lcavcs. As highlighted in the 
section on structure of market, the current structure is not yet perfectly compclitivc. 
however, in terms of procedure for discovery of prices in the market, there arc two 
main steps that arc followed: 
6.4.2.1.1 Step One: Tobacco classification 
All tobacco going through the auction market system in Malawi is classificdlgaded at 
thrcc levels. The first classification or grading is done by growers right in their farms, 
in the curing stages and packing. During harvesting, farmers arc supposed to separate 
tobacco leaves according to their position on the plant so that leaves at the bottom of 
the plant arc put separate to those in the middle and top end of the tobacco plant. 
Generally, leaves on the bottom end of the tobacco plant are considered superior due 
to their large size and thickness. Not only do these leaves mature earlier but also 
require more curing time due to their dark green colour. Knowing that farmers fetch 
relatively better prices on these leaves, farmers take extra care in curing these leaves 
so that they do not become mouldy but also they package them in such a way that 
they appeal to buyers in the auction market. 
Once tobacco is in the auction markst, TCC officials attach a gads to all balcs of 
tobacco before salc of thosc balcs commcnccs. The objcctivc of this classification is 
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to givc gradcs to all tobacco balcs according to industry sct classcs. This classification 
is supposcd to be indcpcndcnt and impartial, and to guidc tobacco auctioneers as to 
the starting pricc for tobacco balcs during the proccss of auctioning. The third grading 
is dons by buycrs as they buy tobacco during tobacco auction. During the auction 
process, buyers make their own quick assessment of the quality of tobacco leaf in the 
auction as they bid for the price of each bale. Interviews with AIIL and TCC staff 
indicatcd that gcncrally, the starting pricc for tobacco balcs in the auction markst is 
bascd on the classification of the TCC. Ilowcvcr, the final pricc generally dcpcnds on 
buycr's classification to a large extent. The main advantage of farmer's classification 
is that farmers arc able to sort and grade their tobacco so that bales containing 
supcrior grades fetch a higher price compared to those with inferior or mixed grades. 
TCC classification on the othcr hand was supposed to bring in objectivity and 
uniformity in prices so that bales with the same grade should fetch the same prices. 
However, interviews with growers, TCC and AIIL indicated that tobacco bales may 
have the same TCC grade and yet fetch different prices. This suggests that ultimately, 
it is the buyer's classification that is the basis for the price. Suggestions within the 
industry arc either to do away with TCC classification or to better align the TCC and 
buyer classifications. 
6,4.2.1.2 Step Two: Tobacco auctioning 
This stage begins with the setting of stating price by All L's nuctionccring staff. Once 
the start price is announced, buyers begin to bid their offer prices for the bale of 
tobacco and the last bidder is the one who ultimately pays for the bale and gets it. 
From the outset, the price discovery mechanism in Malawi auction market system is 
objective and similar to many othcr auction markets across the world. llowcvcr, 
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intcrvicws with different stakcholdcrs in the Malawi auction market system revealed 
some uncompetitive behaviours which arc discussed in the next section. 
6.4.2.2 Potential weaknesses of price discovery mechanism In auction market 
6.4.2.2.1 Allegation of influence of bribery in setting starter prices 
Interviews with growers indicated that there is perception among growers and other 
stakeholders in the industry who feel that auctioneers in AHL receive bribes and 
inducements in order to announce low starter prices of tobacco bales during 
auctioning of tobacco bales. This is simply an allegation which could not be proved or 
verified although potentially this is an area which buyers and auctioneers can indeed 
exploit if they so wish. Interviews with both AHL and buyers rejected these 
allegations. AHL indicated they do their job professionally and that as a company 
they have never verified any such allegations. Hcncc, in the absence of evidence, it 
cannot do anything to any of its officers. However, in the unlikely event of such a 
thing happening the company would not condone such behaviour by its staff. Buyers 
also denied giving bribes to auctioneers. They argued that the starting price is largely 
dictated by the quality of the tobacco leaves. If the quality is not good enough and yet 
the auctioneer starts with a higher price, buyers do no not bid until the auctioneer 
comes down. Buyers also indicated having no incentive to bribe the auctioneer to give 
a lower starting price because they said what matters most is the final price and not 
the starting price. Interviews with TCC indicated that lack of existence of national 
competition commission which investigates non-competitive behaviours of businesses 
is the main problem in this case. They argue that if the commission was established 
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and operational, thcn it could invcstigatc such issues and pmvidc redress. Just as the 
existence of this allegation is not verified, its impact on prices, if at all there is an 
impact, remains speculative and cannot be established conventionally. This study only 
noted this to be potential area of weakness associated with auction marketing. 
6.4.2.2.2 Allegations of collusion among buyers 
'there is a widespread perception among growers, Al I L. TCC, Government and other 
stakeholders in Malawi that oligopsony buyers of tobacco in Malawi do collude on 
tobacco bidding through their buyer's association (Tobacco Exporters Association of 
Malawi). lntcrvicws with grower representatives, Alit., TCC and Government 
officials expressed these suspicions. Interviewces allege that tobacco buyers practice 
what is called 'bale share out'. Under this system, rather than competing on prices 
during bidding, buyers simply agree to share the marketed output in their various 
respective market share proportions. For instance, out of every five bales, they may 
agree that Limbc Leaf should get the first and third, Alliance One the second and 
fourth and Africa leaf the fifth. In this way, bidding is effectively rendered irrelevant 
and simply blindfolding of viewers and spectators. This allegation was denied by 
buyers and this study could not establish its validity owing to the very nature of the 
practice. Hill (2003) indicated that everywhere practices of collusion and cartel arc 
always difficult to establish in oligopoly/oligopsony market structures owing to 
sensitivity and secrecy surrounding such business practices. This study did not 
attempt to directly verify these assertions but rather indirectly investigated aspects of 
such conduct and behaviour through performance tests of the auction market prices as 
discussed in the following sections. 
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6.43 Pcrformancc of the tobacco auction market system in 1ltalawvl 
As highlighted in analytical mcthods, under performance, this study used industry 
basal indicators and pricclcost margins to determine whether markcts arc e icicnt or 
not in a neoclassical economic scnsc. In this analysis, the study examined first how 
auction market prices compared with corresponding prices in other comparable 
tobacco producing countries. Secondly, the study analysed trends in auction and 
export prices and critically examined the trend in the gap between the two consecutive 
price series. Thirdly, the study examined the various components making up the 
average auction price in Malawi following the pricc%st margin analysis procedure. 
'These issues are discussed one after the other in that order in the corning three 
sections. 
6.43.1 Comparison between Malawi auction prices and other countries 
in order to determine how good the auction market system in Malawi is at discovering 
prices, the study first explored how auction market prices in Malawi compared with 
corresponding producer prices in other countries. Figure 56 shows a comparison of 
mean annual auction market prices in Malawi and those of Brazil, aggregate world 
market prices and export prices in Malawi. As the figure shows, while prices in Brazil 
and the aggregated world market prices seem to be close to each other and move 
together in a fairly predictable fashion, auction prices in Malawi are much lower than 
these two price series. Kyydd et al (2006) also compared producer prices between the 
Malawi auction market and several other tobacco producing countries including the 
neighbouring country to Malawi, Zimbabwe, and they observed and reported a similar 
trend in that auction market prices in Malawi are lower than all other tobacco 
producing countries. This observation is not conclusive on its own to suggest that the 
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auction markct in Malawi is failing to discovcr compctitivc priccs although othcr 
obscrvcrs do concludc in this way. This analysis considcrs this disparity in priccs as 
starting point for invcstigation aimed at cxplaining why Malawi auction prices trail 
bchind othcr tobacco producer prices both in the region and the world at large. 
One reason pointed out by buyers was that international buyers offer slightly lower 
prices to Malawi tobacco because they incur slightly more transport and shipment 
costs to ship Malawi's tobacco to destinations in consuming countries. Interviews 
with the biggest buyer in Malawi indicated that on average international buyers spend 
USS17ccnts/kg to transport tobacco from a point in Malawi to a nearest port and 
another USS12cents/kg to ship to a tobacco manufacturing plant either in US or 
Europe. Considering that the shipment expense is likely incurred by all major tobacco 
producing countries, the cost of conccm in terms of 
disparity in price is the inland 
expense. Considering that the gap between Malawi auction prices and aggregate 
world market prices range from USSc4OIkg to USSc252lkg, the argument of 
higher 
transport costs in Malawi alone still leaves a big difference to be explained. 
This takes us to the next point which almost all buyers in Malawi indicated during the 
course of discussion and that is low quality of Malawi tobacco leaf. Buyers argued 
that the main reason for low prices in Malawi is the lower quality of the leaf 
compared to other countries where tobacco leaf quality is high. In order to examine 
this aspect conclusively, it required comparing prices of tobacco of the same grade 
across countries but this could not be done because of lack of disaggrcgatcd 
data at 
grade level. The only comparison that the study undertook was to compare the gap 
in 
prices between pre and post structural reforms to assess whether the gap 
between 
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auction prices and aggregate world market prices was smaller during the time tobacco 
was exclusively grown by estate compared to the time that smallholder I Inner, were 
allowed to grow tobacco. This examination showed that despite annual fluctuations. 
the gap in real prices between pre and post rcfimn were high in me reform and 
relatively lower in post rcfimn suggesting that even in time when quality of Malawi 
tobacco was considered to he high in pre reform periml when growers were 
exclusively large scale farmers, the gap in prices was still high. Although this study 
could not conclusively establish whether the gap in prices between Malawi auction 
prices and aggregate world market prices is fully explained by dit1crcnces in tobacco 
quality, the study observed possibility that all could not he due to differences in 
quality. 
Figure 56: Comparison of real market tobacco prices (in ['SSccnts/kg) 
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6.43.2 Comparison t)CIWCcn auction prices anti export prices In Alalatti 
The study also examined efficiency of auction market prices by way of analysing their 
relationship with next level supply chain prices, in this case, export prices. 
Thcorctically, the gap in prices between two successive points of the supply chain will 
equal the cost of supply chain function between the two points plus normal profit in 
an efficient market system (hill, 2003). In order to explore this relationship. three 
assessments were conducted beginning with simple eye observation of the trends in 
gap between the two prices followed by a detailed examination of the movements in 
the gap and concluded by a conventional econometric analysis of price transmission 
between the two prices. In physical eye assessment what became interesting is the fact 
that graphs in Figure 56 showed that export prices in Malawi arc at par with producer 
prices in Brazil and the rest of the world. This observation suggests that unprocessed 
tobacco elsewhere including Brazil is of equal value to processed tobacco in Malawi. 
Although comparisons were not made with export prices elsewhere, what this 
observation means is that both producer and export prices in Malawi arc lower than 
their comparative prices elsewhere outside Malawi. interviews with buyers pointed to 
lower export prices as evidence that Malawi tobacco fetches low prices internationally 
hence explanation for low auction market prices. Interviews with other stakeholders 
how ever, mainly AHL and grower representatives and some government officials 
suggested that tobacco exporters in Malawi under declare export prices for Malawi 
tobacco. These views are difficult to substantiate and this study was not able to 
investigate these claims further. However, what this simple eye observation revealed 
is that if indeed the value of processed tobacco in Malawi is the same as that of 
unprocessed tobacco elsewhere then it is an issue which the Malawi Government may 
need to explore further and take action in order to improve auction prices. 
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In the sccond asscssmcnt, a dctailcd examination of the variation bctwccn the two 
price series was conducted to further understand the nature of the relationship 
between the two price series. Figure 57 plots movement or trend in the gap between 
auction market prices and export prices between 1980 and 2005. As the figure shows, 
although it is imperative that the two price series should be different due to value 
addition in export prices, the variation is volatile and unpredictable. Basing on the law 
of one price, Bain (1959) interprets and suggests that in a perfectly cornpctitivc 
marketing chain, the difference in prices between two successive stages of the supply 
chain will equal the costs of value-addition and mark-up for those providing the 
service. Using this understanding, it would be argued that the gap between export 
prices and auction prices in Malawi should be flat when adjusted for inflation or if not 
adjusted then the slop should reflect changes in inflation. However, what Figure 57 
shows is a different relationship between the two price series. Notably, there arc big 
year to year variations in the gap from USSc5OIkg to USS254/kg. Such variations 
raise a lot of questions as to the actual cost of processing and profit margin, thus 
whether it is the processing cost that is causing the variation or profit margin. What 
this variation suggests is that processing costs keep fluctuating up and down from one 
year to another and one can be tempted to suggest that it is profit margin and not 
processing costs which keeps fluctuating up and down and that buyers simply enjoy 
super normal profits in years when the margin is high. Kyydd (2006) suggest that 
buyers in Malawi allocate a fixed amount of money to buy tobacco from Malawi 
irrespective of the quality and quantity. In this way, he argued Malawi tobacco faces 
unitary elasticity of demand which is determined by the fixed budgets of international 
buyers. He went further to suggest that this is the reason why Malawi experiences 
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high tobacco priccs when the quantity is low and vicc vcrsa. What this observation 
suggest is that thcrc is possibility that actions of oligopsony buyers may have some 
influence on auction market prices. 
Figure 57 also shows that during the 1980's, the gap in real prices averaged about 
USS2.10/kg compared to USSO. 99Jkb in the 1990's. This observation is astonishing 
because it is in sharp contrast to what we expected. The fall in the gap therefore raises 
a lot of questions because it may mean that actual processing costs have been lower 
all along and that it is the profit margin which has been falling. if this is indeed the 
case, then it means that in the 1980's, tobacco buyers enjoyed supernormal profits 
which means that auction market prices were not competitive and efficient. Finally on 
the price gap, the study was also fascinated by presence of some pretty low margins 
between the two prices which were as low as USSO. 50/kg in 2002 and 2003. These 
figures also raise a lot of other questions. It could be that it is because of errors in 
reporting which is purely an issue of data quality which some stakeholders in the 
industry have argued is deliberate on the part of buyers to under declare their export 
prices. But this could also be an indication that actual processing costs are small and 
that any time the margin is high it is an indication of supernormal profits on the part 
of buyers. On these issues it is difficult to make conclusive judgements because of 
inadequacies in data and information. However, the overall analysis of the gap from 
1980 to 2004 show that there are many areas of suspicions which do not stop analysts 
suggesting that the auction market prices are not competitive and efficient in 
neoclassical economic sense. 
Figure 57: Variation in difference between auction and export prices (USSclkg) 
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In the third assessment. a conventional econometric analysis of price transmission 
between export prices and auction prices was conducted to determine whether 
changes in export prices are fully passed on to the auction market. Theoretically. 
where two or more markets are linked to each other. in this case these prices are 
successive points of the same supply chain, changes in export prices should he easily 
transmitted to the auction market (FAO. 2004). This analysis followed the theoretical 
and analytical methods outlined in Chapter Three and the argument is the same, and 
thus, to determine whether changes in exfx-)rt prices are fully transmitted to the 
auction market. Results f om this analysis showed a complete lack of price 
transmission between the two price series and this is astonishing given that export 
prices are FOB Malawi prices and that these prices are successive marketing points of 
the tobacco supply chain in Malawi. What this result means is that changes in export 
prices, say in terms of increases or falls in export prices, are not passed on to the 
auction market. Considering that buyers are the only players at this market link. the 
explanation as to why this is the case is likely to lie in the conduct of the buyers. This 
observation led the study to suggest that the structure of the tobacco market system 
together with conduct of its players, mainly buyers, explains why there is lack of price 
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transmission bctwccn the auction markct in Malawi and the world markct. 111c study 
further suggcstcd that having looked at various lines of invcstigation in relation to 
auction prices and other tobacco prices elsewhere and in particular in relation to 
export prices, a number of observations have been made suggesting that the auction 
prices in Malawi are far from cffcient. Thcy arc distorted by the very nature of 
oligopsonistic market structure and uncompetitive conduct of players. 
In the next section, the cost/pricc margin of tobacco prices in Malawi is analysed to 
furthcr invcstigatc the issue of cfricicncy of the auction markct prices. 
643.3 Analysis of buyer price/cost margin 
Performance of the auction market in Malawi was also analysed basing on pricelcost 
margins in order to determine whether various components of the prices arc 
considered efficient basing on industry level assessments. In a perfectly competitive 
market structure, which is standard for efficient markets, any price should constitute 
costs for performing the market function and normal reward for undertaking such a 
function (Hill, 2003). In this analysis, the tobacco price was broken down to various 
cost components and profit margins using information provided by Limbe Leaf 
Malawi and ARET. It must be noted that this information was taken and discussed as 
supplied. It could not be verified as the study could not have access to other industry 
sensitive data and information which understandably could not be released by 
companies as some of the data constitute company secrets which cannot be easily 
paused-on to third party stakeholders for fear that competitors may also access and use 
such information against them. 
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Tablc 42 givcs a brcakdown of cxport pricc margin as supplied by Linibc Leaf 
Malawi in 2005 using priccs for 2004 tobacco production and markcting scason. 1'his 
is the samc data that the Government of Malawi and othcr research analysts such as 
laffcc (2003) and Kocstcr ct al (2004) used in their analysis of the industry. As Tablc 
42 shows, the starting point is the cxport pricc (CIF, Europc pricc) itscll This pricc 
according to this table was US$c290ikg in 2004. This figure differs remarkably from 
USSc237/kg and USSc260/kg which were reported by the Unital Nations Statistic 
Division and the Reserve Bank of Malawi respectively. Since this is an aggrcbatcd 
price, this could simply be a problem of aggregation dif erences, however, some 
stakeholders, mainly grower representatives, attribute the differences in prices to 
under declaration of prices by buyers when reporting to the Reserve Bank. This is 
difficult to verify, however, Koester ct al (2004) adds another dimension by 
suggesting that if Malawi CIF prices arc this low, then there is a likelihood that 
Malawi is charged high tariffs and that it is not benefiting from preferential trade 
arrangements with EU. He argues that with these prices Malawi may not be benefiting 
from the Everything But Arms preferential trade arrangements. What this means is 
that the CIF price could have been improved if tobacco exports from Malawi were not 
attracting tariffs. This is an area which could further be explored by the Government. 
The first cost to be taken out of the CIF Europe price is the freight and insurance cost. 
Table 42 shows that importers spend US$cl2.90JIcg to ship Malawi tobacco from 
neighbouring ports to Europe. International shipping markets are competitive and 
therefore this cost may be regarded as efficient. Ilowcvcr, a cost of USScI7.0/kg for 
transporting tobacco from a destination in Malawi to a port in neighbouring countries 
is considered high and inefficient by exporters in Malawi. Chiputula ct al (2005) 
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suggests that transport costs arc 50% highcr in Malawi than in neighbouring countries 
and this is one cost which could be rcduccd in order to improve the price margin. 
improvements in transport system and subscquctit decline in domestic transport costs 
could lead to better prices in the auction market as well. 
The second cost margin is processing cost and as Table 42 shows, it is USSc43.00/kg. 
This cost cartcrs for principal activitics of buyers which includc; transportation of 
tobacco Icaf from auction markcts to buycr's prcrniscs; storabc cxpcnscs and 
processing and packaging costs. It also covers costs rclating to labour, cncrgy, othcr 
raw matcrials, maintcnancc of prcmiscs, dcprcciation on fixed asscts and ovenccads. 
In the absence of financial statcmcnts from buyers, it is difficult to quantify whcthcr 
this cost is cfrcicnt or not. Intcrvicws with buyers however, indicated that this cost is 
high because part of the money is used to cover costs relating to opportunistic 
bchaviours of growers. IIuycrs reported a growing problem of presence of what arc 
called Non Tobacco Related Materials (NTRM) in tobacco bales. These materials 
include; insect particles, stones, paper, feathers, metal pieces, plastics and grass. Most 
of these materials are accidental and arc found in tobacco bales because farmers did 
not take adequate care of their crop during sorting, grading and packing. I lowever, in 
certain circumstances, farmers deliberately put materials such as rock or metal pieces 
to make their bales heavier or deliberately put good quality tobacco leaf on top and 
the sides of the bale while hiding poor quality tobacco leaf in the middle with a view 
to deceive buyers on prices, an act technically known as nesting. This practice affects 
up to 0.5% of all tobacco sales in the auction market. Buyers indicated that the cost of 
this deception is huge as buyers spend extra costs and time to re-grade and rc-sort 
purchased tobacco leaf. In addition, re-grading and subsequent removal of NTRM's 
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mcans buycrs cnd up with loss tonnabc. Furthcrmorc, if buyers fail to identify 
NTRM's and if cxportcd, they risk their consignments being sent back by importers 
and this leads to very large losses. For instance, Africa Lcaf lost USS300,000 in 
2004/05 season when their export consignment was sent back due to the prcscncc of 
plastics in their exported tobacco consignment. incidences of this magnitude arc 
however rare and in the absence of such major incidcnccs, buyers estimated NTRSI 
costing roughly between US$c6.00lkg and USSc10.0/kb. 
The third cost margin is convcrsion (yicld) loss and as Table 42 shows, this cost is 
USSc78.42/kg and it covers losses in weight of proccsscd tobacco due to moisture, 
removal of stems and dust. This loss is calculated based on 61% yield and is a 
function of how thick and wide the lamina is in comparison to mid-rib and is in turn a 
function of field management and input usc. A better grown crop yields more lamina 
while a poorly grown crop result in low processing conversion percentage. The 
industry reported the range in yield from 50% to 75%. Comparing with other 
countries, this range is low, as countries like Brazil achieve conversion percentages as 
high as 85%. In part, the low conversion percentage reflects the types of varieties and 
styles grown in Malawi but also the low input use of the production system. Other 
stakeholders have also suggested that the loss of USSc78.42/kg is overestimation on 
the part of exporters. They argue that buyers simply inflate these figures to justify 
their prices. These assertions are difficult to verify, however, the issue of improving 
the thickness and breadth of the lamina is something which could easily be improved 
with increased uptake of better crop varieties and fertilisers. 
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The fourth margin is buycr/proccssor/export profit margins. Table 42 shows that this 
cost is USSc15.00/kg and it translates to 6% of FOB price. Considering that this is 
remuneration for a relatively low intensity capital activity, Kocstcr ct al (2004) argues 
that this margin is high by international standards because the majority ofconmpanies 
in Ocvclopcd Countries cam much less than 6% hence suggesting that tobacco buyers 
enjoy higher profit margins. Furthermore, although it Evas not possible to calculate 
conventional profitability ratios due to lack of data, what this profit margin suggests is 
that in seasons when the gap between FOB and CIF is wider, the margin is even 
bigger suggesting that buycrs enjoy supernormal profits. 
Table 42: Breakdown of buyer margin 
Pricing point 
CIF 
Sca Frcight & Insurance 
Transport to port 
Buyer Profit Margin 
Interest on capital 
Margin/Cost (USSc/hg) Nct (USSc/kg) 
290.0 
12.9 277.1 
17.0 260.1 
15.0 245.1 
1.02 244.1 
processing cost 43.0 201.1 
Conversion loss (yield) 78.42 122.66 
ßuycr commission 5.0 117.66 
Auction Price 
unthe t. CstGOO5) 
117.66 
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Costs in Tablc 42 includc both absolutc costs and transaction costs. In particular, apart 
from the NTRh1 transaction cost, tobacco buycrs incur transaction costs in countcring 
risks rclating to two main arras. First and as already elaborated clscw"hcrc, tobacco 
buying involvcs largc invcstmcnts in specific asscts such as installation of proccssing 
plants, building of air conditioncd warchouscs and dcvclopmcnt of mark-cl 
compctcncics. The bulk of thcsc invcstmcnts arc donc at the commcnccmcnt of the 
marketing function and the hope is always that cvcry season, they will always buy 
tobacco for processing and subsequent export. Unlike in Ica and sugar industries 
where investors in specific processing facilities also ventured into commodity 
cultivation, tobacco buyers arc not allowed by law to wow tobacco leaf, 
hence they 
simply wait for outputs from farmers. intcrvicws with buyers indicated that their main 
source of risk is the state, as the state may decide overnight to turn tobacco buying 
into state procurement venture or bring fundamental changes to the tobacco marketing 
system. Buyers argue that the best mitigation measure was to venture in tobacco 
production, just like in tea and sugar sectors but the state does not allow them to 
engage in tobacco production while they arc buyers at the sane time. As such, the 
only thing buyers do is to lobby with the state through TEAM so that their interests 
are protected. Growers allege that in some cases, buyers give bribes to some top lcvcl 
Government officials in order to protect various interests of buyers. In terns of 
estimated costs for lobbying with Government on buyers' interests, current chairman 
of TEAM gave a figure of only US$ 1200 per season as total cash expenditure for all 
buyers. This money is spent in lobbying with Government officials. 
The second risk relates to declining quality of tobacco and certain types of tobacco 
styles in the auction floors, in particular Fluc cured tobacco and oriental tyres. 
306 
Intcrvicws with growcrs indicatcd buycrs sign contracts with imporicrs for supply of 
tobacco of specific quality attributes and tyTcs. If they fail to procure the required 
quantities of these types and quality attributes, buyers end up losing contracts to 
others. A very good example pertains to contracts for supply of Flue cured tobacco 
types which buyers could not meet bctwccn 2001 and 2005. In a bid to reduce losses 
in businesses contracts, buyers went into contract farming with growers to produce 
this type of tobacco. In the past thrcc seasons, Limbc Lcaf Tobacco Company and 
Alliance One went into contracts with growers, both large and small scale. to grow 
tobacco and sale to them. In thcsc arrangements, buyers signed contracts with big 
estates such as Kasungu Fluc Cured Tobacco Company, General Fanning, and Press 
Agriculture-, and several other small scale growers in which buying prices and 
quantities were agreed beforehand at the beginning of the season. For small scale 
g owcrs, contracts included provision of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides on loan to 
farmers to be deducted from proceeds of their produce during sale of their tobacco 
leaf to the contracting buying partner. Through these contracts, quantity and quality of 
tobacco produced improved. For example, in 2005106 growing season, up to 15 
million kilograms or 9% of national tobacco leaf in the season came through these 
contracts. T he major difficult with contracts with small scale growers so far is that 
some farmers arc cheating buyers by selling their leaf to vendors and other buyers in 
contravention to the contractual terms. Farmers go into this form of deception in order 
to avoid paying back the loans that were given to them at the beginning of the season 
through their contract agreements. As a consequence of this deception, companies 
have been unable to recover large sums of money given to small scale growers under 
this program. For instance, Tobacco Association of Malawi (TANIA) which also went 
into such contracts with its farmers ended up with unrecoverable loan amounts to the 
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tunc of USS3.0 million. Apart from low crop output clue to weather conditions and 
other generally bad credit untrustworthiness, some farmers have absconded from 
repaying their loans simply because they sold their inputs at the beginning of the 
season to other fanners to get away with cash for their home usc, and hence were 
unable to produce enough output to repay their loans. Buyers arc at the moment not 
committed or considering stopping supporting smallholder tobacco production 
contracts. 
6.4.3.4 Analysis of Grower price/cost margin 
Table 43 summarises the marketing costs growers incur in marketing their tobacco 
through the tobacco auction marketing system in Malawi. All these costs arc deducted 
beforehand by AHL before remitting money into tobacco grower's account. As the 
table shows, the first cost is withholding tax and this is deducted on all large scale 
tobacco growers. Smallholder farmers have been cxcmptcd from this cost since 2003. 
Being a Government tax, this is corporate tax which is applicable to any business and 
the only debate can be whether it is reasonable or not. The second cost is the Al1L 
levy of 3.5%. Koester ct al (2004) indicate that this levy is high and reflects the 
monopoly status enjoyed by AHL as comparable auctioneers in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe get a maximum of 2.5°ßö. Hence, this is another cost of inefficiency to the 
fanner from the marketing system. The third cost is TCC levy and this is statutory 
levy which goes to finance the functions TCC plays in the tobacco auction marketing 
system. This levy is down from USScO. 13/kg in 1990's to USScO. I Olkg in 2000's and 
stakeholders still ask whether this is optimal, looking at the high perks of officers of 
TCC. With respect to TCC classification levy, growers argue it is simple capturing of 
rents because the classification TCC does during sale of tobacco does not correlate 
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with the pricc buycrs pay for a balc of tobacco, as discusscd carlicr. Proposals arc 
cithcr to compictcly do away with this classification or align it with buycrs' 
classification and priccs. 
On the ARET levy, views from the industry arc that the levy is cxtrcmcly high for 
small scale tobacco growers considering that they benefit very little from the scrviccs 
of the organisation. Some growers simply look at this cost as rent since apart from 
buying seeds from the institution which they pay for, thcrc is no other service they gct 
from the institution worth the levy deducted. With respect to the TAMA levy, 
Government brought it down from USSc0.85/kg to US50.71kg and made it voluntary 
in 2003. This means that farmers can opt out of the system as long as they arc 
prepared to arrange their own transport to auction markets. Key informants fron the 
industry indicated that there arc many growers who have opted out ofTAAMA but their 
numbers could not be verified. As an association, the main services to farmers were in 
organising transport to the auction, which farmers paid for, and in arranging credit 
programs with input suppliers, but since the collapse of the credit scheme the services 
of TANIA arc limited to provision of transport only. Growers indicate this cost to be 
high also considering the weaknesses in the TAh1A transport system. I fence, this cost 
is simply a cost on top of another cost which can be avoided in order to improve the 
farm gate price. On Hessian charge, Government brought this down from 
USSc0.92/kg to USScO. 39 in 2003 while TAMA reported a brcakcvcn point of 
USScl. 28 for provision of this service. Koester ct al (2004) argues that TAh1A 
broakeven point includes payment for inefficiencies within TAMA and that since 
these sacks are recycled from year to year, it is possible to bring the cost further down 
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and improvc the farm gatc pricc. Transport costs and their inefficiencies and costs to 
gowcrs havc aircady been discussed clscwhcrc. 
As regards stop orders, transporters and more importantly lending institutions use this 
facility as security without which these institutions would not be willing to provide 
their services to the majority of smallholder fammcrs. Views from the industry arc that 
this cost should have been a fcc rather than a commission because as a commission it 
mcans that if it is a loan, thcn the 3% charge of stop order immediately inflates the 
intcrest on loan by 3% which automatically raiscs the cost of borrowing. Critics argue 
that this is another form of rent seeking because this service can be delivered at much 
lower costs. The system is also criticised on the grounds that it is unable to stop 
multiple registrations of some growers who get loans under different names and sell 
their produce under a different one so that those loans arc not deducted from their 
proceeds. AIIL `sellers' sheet charge' is a cost for retrieving and printing out sale 
information for tobacco growers. Originally, this cost included posting but due to 
flaws in the mailing system, posting was stopped. Growers simply travel to auction 
floors and request for their sheets, which implies another cost for growers as they 
incur transport expenses and possibly accommodation costs. In some cases, growers 
bribe ALIL staff in order to get their sellers' sheets quickly, in the process incurring 
more transaction costs on top of the AIIL fcc. On bank exchange commission, the 
cost translates to 2% interest which is higher than other bank commissions, indicating 
another form of market power and rent by commercial banks involved in the market. 
As Tablc 43 shows, dcduction of all marketing costs together with transaction costs 
result in low farm gatc priccs for tobacco gowcrs. As dcmonstratcd in the 
discussion 
310 
nbovc, the majority of thcsc costs contain an amount of rcnts, ovcrclharging and 
paymcnt for incfficicncics in the marketing system and these could be significantly 
brought down with improvements in operations of the market. The presence of 
monopolists, oligopolists, rent capturing and opportunistic behaviours arc all 
responsible for excessively high marketing costs which arc eroding profitability of 
tobacco growers in Malawi. 
Table 43: Marketing costs for growers 
Pricing point Margin/Cost (USScIkg) Net (USSc/kg) 
Auction price 117.66 
Withholding tax 8.26 109.74 
AIIL commission 4.13 105.61 
TCC ccss 0.10 105.51 
TCC classification 0.35 105.16 
ARET levy 1.18 103.98 
TAAtA fcc 0.70 103.28 
f lcssian charge 0.39 102.89 
Transport to AIIL 4.86 98.03 
At1L stop order charge 0.15 97.89 
Sellers sheet charge 0.05 97.84 
Bank Exchange 1.96 95.88 
Farm gate -21.73 95.88 
y . rrs: ARET (2005) 
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6.5 Summary of findings from the tobacco supply chain analysis 
This section has discussed the structure, conduct and pcrfonnancc of markct linkages 
for supply of inputs (mainly seeds, fertilisers and finance), services (mainly labour) 
and produce markets in Malawi's tobacco supply system. This summary draw from 
the discussion in this section and explain how market linkages for inputs, services and 
produce impact on supply responses (cxtcnsification and intensification) and price 
transmission from the world market to Malawi 
On supply responses, findings from Chapter four showed that supply responses in 
Malawi's tobacco supply system arc inelastic (ranging from 0.6 to 0.69 for burley) 
and that they arc predominantly area responses. The discussion in this chapter shows 
that area responses in Malawi's tobacco supply system arc mainly because tobacco 
fanners, who are predominantly small scale farmers, easily switch their land between 
cntcrpriscs annually dcpcnding on prices offered for different commodities. Thus, 
farmers increase area of tobacco either through switching more land from other crops 
such as maize and cassava into tobacco growing or simply acquire additional pieces 
of land through such measures as fresh allocations from either family members or 
Village Headmen who arc custodians of customary land when they expect high 
producer tobacco prices in that season. Similarly, if they expect poor prices for 
tobacco, farmers reduce the amount of land they allocate to tobacco by growing more 
of other crops. The study observed that the extent to which farmers make such 
adjustments depend on such factors as; (i) tenurial and financing difficulties in renting 
land; (ii) prioritisation of land allocation to food crops; and, (iii) labour and cashflow 
problems on labour hire and other inputs. 
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On sccd usc, the study obscrvcd that despitc the ciThits ABET is making in 
coordinating research into tobacco sccds, multiplication and distribution of such high 
quality sccds, half of tobacco fammcrs in Malawi do not acccss and use improved 
tobacco scads. Cash flow problcros as a result of lack of credit facilities wcrc 
obscrvcd as the main obstaclc. As an altcrnative, the study obscnved that half of 
smallholdcr farmers that do not use improved tobacco sccds use low yiclding and low 
quality land racc tobacco varictics. The study obscrvcd this to be one area that is 
limiting both cxtcnsification and intensification abilitics of smallholdcr tobacco 
fartncrs in Malawi. 
Similarly, on fertilisers, the study observed that while supply by both public and 
private sector companies is described as satisfactory, uptake and use of fertilisers by 
smallholder tobacco farmers is poor. The study found that two thirds of farmers failed 
to access required quantities of tobacco fertilizers in the past fire seasons and that 
lack of credit was the main bottleneck. The study observed that inadequate fertilizer 
usage coupled with low uptake and use of improved tobacco sods as main factors 
constraining tobacco yields and quality in Malawi's tobacco supply system, hcncc, 
main reasons for limited cxtcnsification and intensification responses. 
On hired labour, the study also observed difficulties among tobacco farmers in 
acccssing required numbers and hours of hired labour. Lack of finance was noted to 
be the underlying constraint in this as well. The study obscrvcd labour access problcm 
as yct anothcr factor that is impacting on smallholdcr farmcrs' ability to cithcr 
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intcnsify or cxpand tlicir tobacco production, hcncc another supply response 
limitation. 
On crcdit acccss, the study obscrvcd a number of problems associated with both 
supply and acccss. On credit supply, the study observed limitcd gcographical 
coverage of the currcnt credit supplicrs. They arc non cxistcnt in majority of rural 
communities whcrc there arc infrastructure and thin market problems. On demand, the 
study noted problems such as; high collateral rcquircmcnts. high credit interest and 
history of default as some of the constraints affecting majority ofsmallholdcr tobacco 
farmers from accessing credit. The study observed credit problems as one of the 
factors affecting smallholder farmers' financing abilities of inputs and services and in 
turn, this limit both their cxtcnsification and intensification abilities. 
In leans of overall organisation of market linkages in the Malawi's tobacco supply 
system which include organisation of market linkages for supply of seeds, fcrtiliscrs 
and credits, the study observed dominance of monopolistic and oligopolistic market 
structures both at national and local levels. The study observed that monopoly and 
oligopoly input suppliers have vertically and horizontally functions such as breading, 
multiplication and distribution of tobacco seeds, importation and distribution of 
fertilisers alongside purchase of various farmers produces and interlocking of 
smallholder credit with other banking services. The study observed such coordination 
mechanism as having helped ensured transactions with smallholder tobacco farmers to 
proceed. The study has concluded by agreeing with postulations of NIE that where 
perfectly competitive markets fail, monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures 
can be viable alternatives for enabling transactions to take place. Specifically for 
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smallholdcr demand for tobacco sccds, fcrtiliscrs, land and labour, inputs which are 
crucial for better yields, quality and cxtcnsif ication among farmcrs, the study found 
finance to be the major limitation. The study concludcd that apart from other 
weaknesses in individual inputs markcts, failing crcdit markcts limit the ability of the 
tobacco supply systcrn in Malawi to cxtcnsify and or intensify its output in responses 
to incrcascs in produccr prices. 
on markcts for tobacco loaf, the study found that the auction markct system is the 
only contractual arrangement by which tobacco is transactcd in Malawi. The original 
intcntion of establishing an auction marketing system was the creation of a transparent 
and perfectly competitive market structure where prices arc discovered through forces 
of market competition. The study has established that the buying market is a strongly 
concentrated oligopsony. It has two companies with over 90% market share. 
Investments in mills, specialised warehouses and market intelligence compctcnccs are 
important barriers to market entry. The study took note of potential weaknesses of 
price discovery mechanism in auction market, including allegations of bribery 
between buyers and auctioneers and of collusion among buyers. The study could not 
directly validate these allegations, but through a series of tests, the study pointed to 
the likelihood of market distortions influencing price discovery mechanism in the 
auction market system. Specifically as to the reasons for lack of price transmission 
between the world market for tobacco and Malawi's auction market system, the study 
concluded that structure of tobacco market system together with conduct of its players, 
mainly buyers, explains the lack of price transmission between the auction market in 
Malawi and the world market. Furthermore, from the various tests and investigations 
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conductcd, the study concluded that the priccs in the auction systcm may be distorted 
and that the distortions may havc lcd to low grower margins. 
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Chapter Seven: An analysis of supply chain linkages in 
cotton, sugar and tea sub sectors in Malawi 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2a review of partial and general equilibrium model results on the impact 
of the removal of global distortions on world cotton, tea and sugar production and 
trade suggested that removal of global distortions in these commodities would raise 
world market prices by 10 - 20%, 7- 100#9 and 20 - 40% respectively and this will 
increase export volumes for countries with lower production support. These results 
suggest that if indeed global distortions in these commodities arc removed, then the 
cotton, tea and sugar supply chains in Malawi will benefit from improved export 
prices and increased market access for these commodities. I owvever, results on price 
transmission analysis between the world markets for these commodities and Malawi 
in chapter 3 showed weak price transmission elasticities between world markets of 
these commodities and their corresponding markets in Malawi. These results suggest 
that gains in domestic market prices due to removal of global market distortions in 
these commodities will be constrained by weak price transmission. 
in addition, results of the commodity supply response analyses in chapter four also 
revealed negligible supply responses (both due to cxtcnsification and intensification) 
in tca and sugar and inelastic supply responses in cotton. These results suggest that 
further to the weak transmission of prices, gains fron global liberalisation of tea and 
sugar supply systems will be further weaken by negligible supply responses. In cotton 
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supply systcrn, inclastic supply rcsponscs also mean that gains from global markct 
libcralisation will also be limited. This charter presents results of SCP analyses that 
investigated the underlying features and explanations behind the observed supply 
responses and price transmission elasticities. The chapter begins with a discussion of 
the cotton supply system followed by discussion of the sugar sub-sector and then ends 
with a discussion of the tea supply system. 
7.2 The cotton supply chain 
7.2.1 Data collection Methods Used 
As with the investigation of tobacco supply chain, both quantitativc and qualitativc 
mcthods of data collection and analysis methods were used to cxplorc market linkages 
in the cotton supply system. Quantitative methods involvcd administration of 
structured questionnaires to sixty cotton farmers who teere randomly selected from a 
complete list of cotton farmers in Chikwawa and Salima districts. These two districts 
were purposively selected as they are the two major cotton growing districts in 
Malawi. A total of thirty cotton farmers were randomly selected in each district and 
wcrc interviewed by enumerators using a structurcd questionnaire which included 
questions on land and labour use patterns, their linkages with input suppliers (mainly 
scud and pesticide suppliers), arrangements for credit supply and produce marketing, 
their association with known farmer groups, and opportunism and rent seeking 
bcha%iour in the supply system. The survey was conducted after the tobacco supply 
systcm survey described in chapter 6 and it involved the same team of enumerators 
from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Qualitativc data collection and analysis methods on the othcr hand involved focussed 
group discussions with four groups of cotton farnmcrs, two groups from cacti of the 
sclcctcd districts. The study also conductcd in dcpth interviews with kcy informants 
from the supply systcm linkcd to producc buying and supply of inputs. A list of thosc 
intcrvic%vcd and thcir organisations is attachcd in Anncx 3. The main instruments used 
in thcsc intcrvicws and discussions wcrc stakcholdcr checklists and thcsc instrumcnts 
arc attached in Anncx 4. The study also used findings of the nationwidc 11152 survey 
by the National Statistical OtTicc (2005) and findings from othcr sccondary sourccs to 
triangulatc with findings in this study. 
7.2.2 Profile of cotton growers in Malawi 
This section outlines some of the underlying features of cotton fanners in Malawi. 
First and foremost, it is worthwhile highlighting that traditionally in Malawi, cotton 
farming is exclusively a preoccupation of small scale farmers, although there are no 
known barriers to entry, legislative or otherwise, for large scale farmers. Small scale 
farmers grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton competes with alternative cash crops 
grown by the same households, such as groundnuts as well as with the staple food 
crop, maize. 
Nationally. NSO (2005) reported that 2.9% (or 60,000) of farming households in 
Malawi cultivated cotton in the 2004/05 season (NSO, 2005). Historical data of cotton 
fanning households from Ministry of Agriculture howcvcr show annual seasonal 
variations in number of households growing cotton ranging from 1.5% (33,000) to 
5.709 (112,000) between 1990 and 2005. Geographically. cultivation of cotton in 
Malawi is concentrated in three main arras, namely, low lying arras of the lower 
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Shirr rivcr (Chikwawa and Nsanjc districts whcrc 18% and 6% of farming houscholds 
Vow cotton rcspcctivcly according to NSO (2005) survey), low lying arras along the 
shores of Lake Malawi (mainly in Salima and Karonga wnccrc 27% and 10% of 
farming houscholds respectively grow cotton) and finally in some medium altitude 
areas, in particular, in Balaka where 22% of fanning households grow cotton. In 
Zomba, Dcdza, Ntchcu and Rumphi proportions of households growing cotton arc 
around 2% while in all other districts, proportions of cotton fanning households are 
negligible. MOAFS, (2004) indicated that in all the dominant cotton growing districts, 
soils and other climatic conditions (mainly, rainfall and tcnmperatures) favours among 
other crops, cotton cultivation. The report further states that cotton cultivation does 
well where annual rainfall is between 625mm and 875mm and mean temperatures are 
as high as 30 degrees Celsius. These conditions are found in all the dominant cotton 
growing districts of the country. World Bank (1996) also added that fanners in these 
arras have little choices in terms of alternatives to cotton, as cotton is the most 
suitable cash crop for the climatic conditions of these districts. 
With respect to the sender of heads of cotton growing households, NSO (2005) 
sorted that nationally, 72% of cotton growing households arc headed by males 
while the balance of 28% arc headed by women. The survey by this study in 
Chihu"awa and Salima found that 78% of cotton growing households were headed by 
males while 22% were headed by females, which is very closely related to the 
national statistics. However, when narrowed down to district level sender balances, 
the study observed significant differences to national level NSO (2005) survey results. 
In Salima, the study found that 93% of cotton growing households were headed by 
males compared to 62% in Chikwawa. These statistics highlight some of the 
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undcrlying socio cconomic and cultural differences between the two districts in that 
thcrc arc morc malc hcadcd houscholds in Salima growing Cotton while in Chikwawa, 
the proportion of fcmalc hcadcd houscholds engaged in cotton cultivation is Wist high. 
On cducation, this survcy found that a third of hcads of cotton growing houscholds 
intcrvicwcd in Salima and Chikwawa ncvcr attcndcd any cducation, 45% nttcndcd 
primary lcvcl education, whilc only 220,9 rcachcd secondary level 
education (Table 
44). At district and household Icvcls, the study found significant ditrcrcnccs in that 
Chikwawa has morc fanncrs who arc cithcr illitcratc or only nttcndcd primary 
cducation while Salima has more farmcrs that attcndcd primary and secondary 
cducation. On the other hand, the study also observed that over two thirds of female 
houschold hcads ncvcr attcndcd school %vliilc over half of the male houschold heads 
attcndcd at Icast primary lcvcl cducation. 
Table 44: Education Status of Household Heads 
Education status or llouschold Status 
Desegregation level 
No 
education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Aggregate 33!: 45:: 22% 
District Chilm2wa 52% 31% 17% 
lei el Salima 16% 5841: 26% 
Male headed 38% 530,: 38% 
Gender Female headed 69': 15:: 13': 
Source: Study survey (: uuo) 
The NSO (2005) survey categorised half of cotton farmers in Malawi as non poor and 
the othcr half as poor. NSO (2005) also categorised cotton farmers in Malawi into five 
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cxpcnditurc quintilcs and four landholding quintilcs (Tablc 45). As the table shows, 
cotton fanncrs arc sprcad across the cxpcnditurc quintilcs with more farmers in the 
lo%vcr lcvcl cxpcnditurc quintilcs. By contrast, more cotton farmcrs arc catcgoriscd to 
be in higher lcvcls of landholding quintilcs with nonc in the lowcst landholding 
quintilc. This obscrvation is not surprising bccause districts %vilcrc cotton is 
conccntratcd arc not catcgoriscd as dcnscly populatcd districts in Malawi. NSO (2005) 
survcy results show that no farmcrs fall in the first land quintilc, 8% in land quintilc 
two, 15% in land quintilc thrcc, 39% in land quintilc four and 39; in the fifth land 
quintile. The mcan, median and mode houschold land holding sixes arc 2.5,2.4 and 
3.0 hcctarcs respcctivcly. No significant differences in landholding sizcs were 
obscrvcd bctwccn Salima and Chil. -wvawa districts or bctwccn malc and fcrnalc hcadcd 
houscholds. 85% of land owned by houscholds at the time was acquired through 
inheritance (60%) and new allocations from village headmen (25%) while the balance 
of 15% was rented. 
Table 45: Expenditure and landholding quintiles for cotton farmers 
Quintile% Expenditure Land holding 
1 20% 0% 
2 27% V's 
3 20% 15% 
4 20% 39% 
5 13% 39% 
Source: NSO (2005) 
'This survey found out that compcting crops in tams of houschold land allocation 
choiccs wcrc maizc (78%), pulscs (12 oo), sorghum/millct (3.4%), cassavalswcct 
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potato (3.4010) and tobacco (2%). There w ere significant22 differences in icons of 
choices of allocation with respect to houscholds in Chikwawa and Salima. The main 
choices for households in Salima were between cotton, maize and cassava/swect 
potatoes while for Chikwawa competition is between cotton and crops such as maize, 
pulses and sorghum/millct. In terms of final land allocations to cotton in 2005/06 
season, the study observed a mean allocation of 1.2ha, median and mode allocations 
of I. Oha. No significant differences were obscrvcd between Chikwawa and Salima 
and male and female headed households. 
In terms of expanding area under cotton cultivation, the study found that apart from 
switching more land from other crops to put under cotton, 46% of households 
indicated they could also expand through renting, 22% could ask for more allocations 
from family members, 24% could get new allocations from village headmen and 2% 
could buy. 7% indicated do not have any potential option for expanding area under 
cotton cultivation. The study found significant differences between Salima and 
Chikwawa districts in that households in Chikwawa would either expand their cotton 
acreage through allocation from family members or rent while those in Salima would 
either seek new allocations from chiefs or rent. No significant differences were 
observed between male and female headed households. When asked as to what factors 
farmers take into account as to whether to switch more land to cotton production or 
acquire additional plots for cotton cultivation, 35% indicated expected prices for 
cotton as main determining factor, 20% indicated ability of households to switch 
between enterprises or acquire additional plots to grow cotton, 26% indicated ability 
of households to access necessary inputs for cotton production while 23% indicated 
'2 Chi square tat 
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assurancc of availability of buycrs. There were no significant differences in the 
undcrlying factors bchind allocations of land to cotton bctwccn male and female 
hcadcd houscholds and bctwccn Chikwawa and Salima districts. The cost for buying 
an acrc of land is in cxccss of USS180 and this is why many fanncrs simply don't 
view this as a one-off seasonal viable option. The costs for acquiring an additional 
hcctarc of land by all other means arc negligible, while the rental for a hectare of land 
is an average of US$11.00 per season. 
7.2.3 Linkages between cotton growers and markets for seeds, pesticides, 
fertilisers, finance and cotton 
This section discusses organisation of markets for supply of critical inputs (seeds, 
fertilisers, pesticides and finance) and services (mainly transport and advisory) to 
cotton growers in Malawi and arrangements for marketing of cotton. The study uses 
the structure, conduct and performance analysis framework for analysing the various 
market linkages in the cotton supply chain. 
The general organisation of market linkages in the cotton supply chain in Malawi has 
cvolvcd significantly in the last four decades, with three distinct phases. The first 
phase runs from independence to early 1990's when the state was central to the 
overall coordination of various market linkages in the cotton supply chain. The 
second phase is a transition stage and it bridges the gap between the first and the third 
phase. In this phase, the state and its machinery for linking various market linkages in 
the cotton supply system were being withdrawn gradually and new market structures 
and contractual arrangements were beginning to take shape. In the third phase, more 
open market structures and arrangements had completely taken over all transactions 
324 
and markct linkagcs in the cotton supply systcm. Bccausc of the intcr-conncctcdncss 
of market linkages for inputs (seeds, fcrtiliscr, pesticides and finance), outputs (scat 
cotton) and services (transport and advisory) as a result of horizontal integrations of 
these functions, the study presents the analysis of these linkages simultaneously as 
opposed to discussing each one of these market linkages separately. 
7.2.4 Structural changes in Malawi's cotton supply system 
7.2.4.1 Phase One: 1964 - 1991 (State Control) 
The organisation of cotton production in Malawi between independence in 1964 and 
1991/92 season mainly involved three key players, namely, the state, ADMARC and 
smallholder cotton farmers. The state was responsible for setting 'Rules of the Game' 
for all transactions relating to cotton seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, transport, advisory 
services, produce marketing and credit arrangements. There were five main pieces of 
legislation that the state enacted to govern transactions in the cotton supply system. 
These were the Seed Act (this regulated and controlled breeding, multiplication, sale, 
importation and export of cotton seeds and others); the Fertiliser, Farm Feeds and 
Remedies Act (it among other things regulated importation and distribution of 
fertilisers to smallholder farmers); the Agricultural and Livestock Marketing Act 
(regulating sale of all farm produce including cotton); the Special Crops Act (which 
designated cotton as special crop to be promoted and developed by the state 
machinery) and finally, the Cotton Act (which regulated production, processing and 
marketing of cotton and all its by products) (MOAFS, 2002). The state used these 
pieces of Legislation to coordinate supply of inputs necessary for cotton farming, to 
provide extension systems to farmers, and to 
buy seed cotton from farmers at the end 
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of the fanning scason. Through its countrywidc nctwork of markcts, the state used 
ADMARC to interface with fanners during transactions for inputs and outputs. 
Wc now consider the conduct of players in spccific market arrangements: 
In sccd supply, the state, through the Dcpartmcnt of Research in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, undertook all cotton seed breeding programs. Through their screening 
programs, three cotton varieties were bred, one for each of the three cotton growing 
regions (ADMARC, 2002). Once bred, the varieties were then given to ADMARC 
who in turn contracted smallholder farmers in those growing regions to multiply the 
seeds for ADMARC at agreed prices. Subsequently, ADMARC distributed the 
multiplied seeds to cotton farmers free of charge (ADMARC, 2002). In case of 
recycled cotton seeds, ADMARC distributed these seeds for free to fanners once the 
corporation had ginned its seed cotton. 
With regard to the supply of fertilisers, traditionally cotton fanners did not apply any 
inorganic fertilisers to cotton fields. It was argued that cotton does not require 
application of inorganic fertilisers. However, recent research indicates that the 
majority of soil types in Malawi lack one or two of major nutrients mainly Nitrogen, 
Phosphorous, Sulphur and Boron (MOAFS, 2004). This being the case, efforts arc 
currently under way to change the mindset of cotton fanners so that they start 
applying fertilizers. On the other hand, pest and diseases arc arguably the single most 
limiting factor to increased cotton yields in Malawi. Some of the major troublesome 
pests with adverse effects in Malawi include bollworms, stainers, jassids, aphids and 
red spider mites (Malawi Government, 2001). If left unchecked, these pests have lcd 
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of the farming season. Through its country%vidc network of markets, the state used 
ADMARC to interface with farmers during transactions for inputs and outputs. 
We now considcr the conduct of playas in spccitiic markct arrangcancnts: 
In seed supply, the state, through the Dcpartmcnt of Rcscarch in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, undertook all cotton sccd breeding programs. Through their screening 
programs, three cotton varieties were bred, one for each of the three cotton growing 
regions (ADMARC, 2002). Once bred, the varieties teere then given to ADMARC 
who in turn contracted smallholder far mcrs in those growing regions to multiply the 
sccds for ADMARC at agreed prices. Subsequently, ADMARC distributed the 
multiplied seeds to cotton farmers free of charge (ADMARC, 2002). In case of 
recycled cotton seeds, ADMARC distributed these seeds for free to fanners once the 
corporation had ginned its seed cotton. 
with regard to the supply of fertilisers, traditionally cotton fanners did not apply any 
inorganic fertilisers to cotton fields. It was argued that cotton does not require 
application of inorganic fertilisers. However, recent research indicates that the 
majority of soil types in Malawi lack one or two of major nutrients mainly Nitrogen, 
phosphorous, Sulphur and Boron (MOAFS, 2004). This being the case, efforts arc 
currently under way to change the mindset of cotton farmers so that they start 
applying fertilizers. On the other hand, pest and diseases arc arguably the single most 
limiting factor to increased cotton yields in Malawi. Some of the major troublesome 
pests with adverse effects in Malawi include bollworms, stainers, jassids, aphids and 
red spider mites (Malawi Government. 2001). If lets unchecked, these pests have lcd 
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to stuntcd growth of cotton crop stand, rcduccd numbcrs of cotton boils, pcrfciratcd 
and shrunk cotton bolls, stained lint with reduced quality, and damaged sccds with 
rcduccd and poor quality oils and poor germination of the recycled scat (Malawi 
Govcrnmcnt, 2001). To mitigatc and minimisc impact of these pcsts and discascs, the 
state through the SAGA credit scheme gave pesticides to farmcrs on an interlocking 
arrangement whcrcby repayments were deducted from procccds of produce at the 
time of sale of the cotton (World Bank, 1996). In this way, pests and diseases were 
not so much of a problem to smallholder farmers at the time. Again, ADMARC was 
involved in distribution of pesticides, administration of the credit program, and 
recovery of the loans during sale of farmers produce. 
With regard to cotton marketing, ADMARC was a monopsony buyer of cotton from 
farmers (h1OAFS, 2004). Prices both for inputs and outputs were set by the state and 
were pan territorial prices which were announced at the beginning of each growing 
season. The state was also responsible for all farmer extension systems through the 
Department of Extension. 
With respect to performance of the cotton production system during this phase, it 
could be argued it was stable and progressive. Overall output doubled from 20,000 
metric tonnes in the 1970's to 40,000 metric tonnes in late 1980's. Yields also almost 
trebled from 300kg/ha to 790kgtha between 1973 and 1990. The Ginning Out Turn 
(GOT), an indicator of quality of seed cotton, was 33%, but this was reported to be 
suppressed by worn out ginning equipment (World Bank, 1996). 
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7.2.4.2 Phase Two: 1992 - 2000 ('Transition Phase) 
Tlic second phase covered the period between 1990 and 2000 and during this phase, 
the state repealed the five pieces of legislations which were used to regulate and 
control transactions in the cotton supply system. The state withdrew its interventions 
in market linkages for the supply system while ADMARC reorganised itself into a 
compctitor company. T1ic first playcr to cntcr the cotton supply system was the 
National Sccd Company of Malawi (NSCA1) in the 1992/93 scason and its focus was 
only to buy cotton from farmers (Malawi Government, 2002). 11c company bought 
two of the five ginning factories previously owned by ADMARC and in the process, 
ADMARC ended up holding 23% of shares in NSCM. For two seasons, ADMARC 
and NSChi were oligopsony buyers of cotton in Malawi. On seed supply. ADMARC 
had stopped multiplying and distributing free seeds and fanners were using recycled 
seeds only. On pesticides, SACA credit was winding up leaving farmers to buy 
pesticides on their own from shops of chemical supplying companies. It is widely 
reported that during the two seasons ADNIARC and NSCM operated as buyers of 
cotton in Malawi, they colluded on the prices they offered to farmers, partly because 
ADMARC was used to the former system of setting prices and also because NSCM 
was partly owned by ADMARC. In the 1994195 season, ES Marketing joined the 
supply system as a third buyer of cotton and N1RFC also joined in the same season as 
a credit provider (NIOAFS, 2004). In 1999/2000 season, NSCM was taken over 
by 
Great takes company. In 2001/02, another company known as Clark Cotton took over 
ADMARC's remaining Ginncrics and market share. ES Marketing on the other hand 
had pulled out of the supply system. 
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In many ways, this phasc is vicwcd as the most unstablc and unccrtain pcriod of the 
cotton supply systctn. Markct linkagcs for supply of sccds, pesticidcs, crcilit, advisory 
systcm and producc purchasc were advcrscly affccted. Farmas were using rccycled 
and untreated sccds, crcdit for purchasc of pesticides was difficult to comc"by, 
producc purchasc priccs and markct arrangements were unccrtain, and provision of 
cxtcnsion was seriously undermined (NMOAFS, 2004). As a result of all the changes 
that were taking place, output of cotton plummeted to 13,000 metric tonncs, yiclds fell 
at some point to as low as 200kg/ha and GOT dropped by 1% (Malawi Government, 
2002). Sincc 2000, howcvcr, Great Ickes Company and Clark Cotton have both 
consolidated their market positions and functions in the cotton supply system to 
include other functions other than simply buying of cotton from farmers. Other 
players, namely. Tponga and Produce Africa have also joined the supply system with a 
new sct of contractual arrangements for supply of inputs, provision of credit and 
purchase of produce. 
7.2.43 Phase Three: From 2000 (Current Structure) 
The current structure of cotton supply system in Malawi primarily consists of two sets 
of key players. The first set of players is composed of smallholder farmers together 
with their village level committees and associations who arc actively engaged in 
Bowing cotton. The other set of players consists of four private sector companies, 
namely Great Lakes, Cark Cotton, Iponga and Produce Africa. The four companies 
have horizontally integrated functions of produce buying, supply of seeds, sale of 
pesticides, hiring out of pesticide spraying equipment, supply of fertilisers, provision 
of credit, delivery of extension services and transportation of produce. As individuals 
and a group, these companies have taken on all supply chain functions that the state 
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and ADMARC were undcrtaking in the first phasc. In this respcct, the four companies 
arc input supplicrs, crcdit supplicrs, extension scrvicc providcrs and produce buycrs. 
Among the four cornpanics, Grcat Lakcs was the first to join the cotton supply system 
in Malawi and as a company it is a joint venture bctwccn South African invcstors 
(with 5(rof the shares) and British invcstors (also with 50% of the shares). 'i lac 
company has a 45% markct sharc in both supply of cotton input and in purchasc of 
cotton. Clark Cotton, a company jointly owned by South Africans (51 % shares) and 
ADMARC (49%) also accounts for 45% of the market share in both supply of inputs 
and purchase of final cotton produce. Iponga and Produce Africa share the remaining 
10% market share in input supply and produce purchase in the ratio of 3: 1 
respectively. All four companies have established nctworks of extension agents with 
Geld offices located throughout the communities where cotton is grown and fanners 
come to these to access inputs and other services and also to sell their produce. On top 
of that, Great Lakes and Clark Cotton each have three ginning factories, one in each 
of the dominant cotton growing regions, while Iponga has one ginning factory located 
in bower Shire. Produce Africa does not have any ginning machinery; it hires those 
with ginning facilities to gin its lint before onward marketing. Once cotton has been 
ginned, these companies export 60% of lint to South Africa, 20114'o to China and the 
remaining 20% goes to India. With respect to the major by-product of ginned cotton, 
cotton seeds, 20% is treated for redistribution to farmers in the coming season, 50% is 
sold to local edible oil manufacturing companies and the remaining 30% is exported 
to South Africa. 
The core busincss for the four private sector companies is to buy cotton from farmers. 
Thus, they entered the cotton supply system as cotton buyers. however, with the 
330 
upparcnt problcms in cotton supply systcm, boll, in terms of quantity and quality of 
cotton produccd, the companics came together and agrccd on a framcwork to support 
production. This strategy was particularly important for companies that had 
invcstmcnts in fixed asscts (principally ginning factorics) bccausc low cotton volumes 
and poor quality scat cotton mcant that thcy wcrc bound to incur high running costs 
and low rcturns for their invcstmcnts. In this respcct, all the support (tcchnical and 
financial) givcn to production activitics is complimentary investment to the core 
business of buying cotton. In sccd supply, the companies imported high valued cotton 
scads from South Africa which were tested, treated and sold to fanners at subsidised 
priccs. T he subsidy was possible because the companies had negotiated with 
Department for Intcmational Development (DFID) to fund procurement of cotton 
sc«i treatment plant. In pesticide and fertiliser supply, the companies sourccd these 
materials either locally or regionally and supplied them to farmers at market prices. 
The companies also procured pesticide spraying equipment which they keep in their 
village officcslshops for farmers to hire for a day's fee. On top of these inputs and 
unviccs, extension officers of these companies who arc based in their local field 
o ccs/shops also provide cotton farmers with extension services necessary for their 
cotton farming. 
As described, markets for the supply of inputs, provision of services and purchase of 
produce in the cotton supply system in Malawi are oligopolistic. They have many 
farmers on the one hand who are transacting with only four players, two of which 
have a market share of about 90%. Hence, this is a strongly oligopolistic market 
structure. However, weak market entry into most of these markets is apparent despite 
the fact that there arc no barriers to entry other than capital investments into each of 
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the busincsscs vcntures. Interviews with cotton growers revealed that 
Great Lakes and 
Clark Cotton have cstablisbcd markct structures for supply of inputs and purchase of 
produce within reach of all the cotton farming communities. A further 20% of the 
farming community indicated to be serviced by one additional private sector company 
either lponga or Produce Africa. What these results reveal is that at local level, the 
largest two input supplying and produce buying companies dominate smaliholdcr 
transactions. When asked to compare the present market structure to that of five years 
ago, 90°'0 of farmers indicated it is a big improvement. They argued that rive year ago 
farmers had difficulties to access market points for both inputs and produce. Entry of 
current players together with their decisions to establish market structures in rural 
communities has meant that farmers have access to these markets and functions. 
7.2.5 Conduct of Players in the cotton supply system 
In terms of conduct of players, the first thing already higl lighted is the fact that 
private sector companies in the supply system have horizontally and vertically 
integrated functions for purchase of produce with supply of inputs and provision of 
scrviccs to cotton farmers. As indicated, private sector companies arc doing this in 
order to fill the apparent gap in providers of these inputs and services at terms and 
levels that arc able to stimulate improvements in both quality and quantity of cotton 
production. The second aspect to be noted from the conduct of players is that the 
four 
private sector companies operate in many ways as a team. Interviews with 
management from these companies indicated that they meet, discuss and agree on 
various issues relating to the provision of support to production and produce 
marketing arrangements. Chir%va ct al (2006) reported that initially in the early 2000's, 
the meetings of the private sector centred around fixing cotton producer prices, but 
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increasingly, thcy have includcd detailed agreements on lcvcl of support to cotton 
production so that nonc of the buycrs is a frcc ridcr who simply conics to buy already 
produccd cotton. In this way, thcsc companies providc support to cotton production in 
proportion to their markct sharc of cotton volumc. The third aspcct in behaviour or 
private scctor companics is that they dccidc on prices for inputs, scrviccs and producc. 
These priccs arc uniform across all the thrcc cotton growing rcgions in Malawi. For 
instance, in 2005/06 season, cotton seals were sold at USS0.33/rack, the two main 
tyres of pesticides at USS1.47/bottlc and USS3.01/bottlc respectively, hiring of 
sprayers at USS0.02/day and produce at USSO. 241kg. 
In terms of arrangements for transacting with growers, all the four private sector 
companies give farmers a choice either to buy inputs for cash or to register with them 
to get inputs on loan and repay later in the season or at the end of the season during 
sale of produce. Farmers are not necessarily obliged to sell their produce to the 
company that gave them the inputs in the first place - they arc free to sell to any of the 
four companies as long as they repay back their loans to companies that borrowed 
them. Extension agents for the four companies play a critical role in these contracts. 
First, they register all farmers who want to get inputs from their companies. They 
liaise with village cotton liaison committees to make sure that all registered farmers 
arc within their villages and that they can be traced to their homes. When all farmers 
arc registered, including their quantities of inputs, extension agents communicate with 
their regional off ces and arrange for transportation of all the inputs in tinmc. Once the 
inputs arrive, extension agents use their houses as temporary warehouses for storing 
inputs and farmers are told to come and collect all their inputs. Extension agents then 
follow up with these farmers to give them necessary technical advice on better crop 
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husbandry practices until harvest. During markcting of produce, these extension 
agcnts act as buycrs of produce and thcir houses arc used as temporary storage fror 
producc. Ilcncc during salc, fanncrs arc only rcquircd to transport their cotton fmm 
thcir farms to the housc of an cxtcnsion agcnt which in most c cs is in the ccntrc of 
thcir villagcs. On top of acting as buyycrs of produce during product markcting. 
cxtcnsion agcnts also collcct all outstanding loans from farmers bcforc remitting all 
the moncy to thcir rcgional otliccs. 
All farmcrs intcrvicwcd in this study indicatcd to have accessed cotton sccds from the 
four companics in the 2005/06. The avcrage quantity of seed procurcd was 4 packs. 
98% of farmers indicated accessing pesticides of which 60% procured one bottle of 
pcsticidcs, 30% procured two bottles and the balance procured more than two bottles. 
Farmers that bought pesticides also indicated hiring pesticide spra)ing equipment. 
Only about 3% of farmers indicated accessing at least one bottle of liquid cotton 
fcrtiliscrs from thcsc companies. With respect to the type of contractual arrangement, 
two thirds indicated setting sccds and pesticides on loans whilc a third chosc to buy 
sccds and pcsticidcs on cash basis. Farmers indicated hiring of spraying equipment 
and purchase of fertilisers required farmers to access them on cash basis only. The 
study observed that hiring of spraying equipment was removed from the credit list 
because the price was considcrcd to be very low and affordable to fanners while 
fertilisers were not included because farmers traditionally do not apply fertilisers to 
their cotton fields. When asked about their Access to improved seeds and pesticides, 
82% of farmers indicated it had improved as a result of the readily available supplies 
from the four supplying companies and the credit component. Farmcrs argued that 
loan purchasing of thcsc inputs had greatly improved their ability to access these 
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inputs. The only problcm howcvcr is that thcy cnd up having loan rvpa)mcnts 
dcductcd from the Proceeds of their pr ducc and this is why a thind of fanncrs opt to 
raisc their own incomc through othcr means and use the money carnal to buy inputs 
from thcsc companics. The sources of income for pa)ing for costs of inputs include 
procccds from salc of crops (53%), ganyu labour (18%), salt of livcstock (10%) and 
OLhcr sourvcs (19%). 
7.2.6 Performance of the cotton supply system 
Pcrformancc of the linkages in the cotton supply system was analysed from tivc view 
points: the first was from the viewpoint of the cfficacy and stability of the busincss 
model being used in the market linkages; the second was the assessment ofthe ability 
of markcts to mcct the rcquircmcnts of smallholder farmers; the third was fron the 
viewpoint of smallholder farmers to access required quantities of inputs and services 
for their businesses; the fourth was from the viewpoint of supply side indicators of 
yicld, output and quality, and finally the fifth was from the viewpoint of margins. 
In the first analysis, the study noted that the business model private sector companies 
uscd to supply their inputs is based on loosc contracts which have limited 
cnforccmcnt mechanisms. The only thing that makes farmers pay back their loans is 
the fear of being denied credit in future once labelled defaulters. Otherwise, there arc 
no collateral or community peer pressure mechanisms in the credit package to help 
companies ensure that all loans in the program arc paid. At the same time, the 
freedom that farmers have to sell their cotton to any buyer and simply make sure to 
may their loans has potential of being abused by any grower who may so wish. So 
far. the business model is observed to be working wcll. Repayment is recorded in 
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cxccss of 90% ovcr the last four years and this is indicator that the nuxlcl is so far 
doing wc11. Ilowcvcr, intcrvicws with some of the buyers indicatal that the busincss 
model is thrcatcncd on two fronts. First, the state is beginning to intervene in the 
produce market through setting of producer prices. I uycrs argue this is 
counterproductive as produce prices arc linked to invcstmcnts the companies arc 
making to support smallholder production. Thcy indicated that the Government is 
passing for higher prices which do not match with overall costs of their business 
model. The second threat involves the emergence of other buyers who do not 
participate in input supply but are involved with buying cotton from fanners and 
illegally taking it across the border to Mozambique. This is a problem to buyers who 
arc supplying inputs because principally they support production in order to buy 
produce at harvest and if other buyers buy the crop, then that defeats the purpose of 
supporting farmers among buyers that support production. These two problems 
together with other generic enforcement mechanisms of the business model are likely 
to threaten the sustainability of the model. 
In tcnms of pcrfonnancc of inputs, service and producc market linkagcs, the study 
found out that gcncrally, cotton farmers find them to be serving their nccds fairly well. 
93% of farmers indicated that every time they nccdcd particular inputs, service or 
produce markets, the four private sector companies were ready to transact with them. 
These markets arc able to transact with them cvcry time they needed any volume of 
transaction at qualitics farmers indicatcd arc satisfactory. In tcmis or access of inputs 
and scr%iccs, the study found out that as a result of the crcdit componcnt, 85% of 
fanncrs were able to access all their sccd requirements. On pesticides, only 40% 
indicated accessing all their pesticide acquirements in 2005/06. In answer to a separate 
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qucstion. 60% indicatcd pesticides arc expensive and do not justify bu)ing the 
rcquircd quantitics bccausc ultimatcly the profit margins become croded. 
in terms of yield, output and quality of lint, the study found out that compared to the 
second phase in the cycle of structural changes in the cotton supply system. yiclds, 
output and quality have recovered and arc improving. Output has doubled since 2000 
from 30,000 metric tones to 60,000 metric tones in 2005106 season. Yields have 
increased from 600kg/ha in 2000 to 9S0kg/ha in 2005/06 season while GOT has 
improved from 33% to 39% over the same period (MMOAFS, 2004). These increases 
arc a reflection of improvements in market linkages in the cotton supply system over 
both phase one and two. Interviews with stakeholders in the cotton supply system 
indicated that the main sources of improvements in the market linkages included: 
improvcmcnts in supply of pcsticidc treated high quality cotton scads; improved 
uptake of these seeds and pesticide use owing to the credit facility; prcscncc of 
pesticide spraying hiring facilities; provision of farmer extension; and general stability 
and guarantee of markets for inputs, services and outputs. Howw"cvcr, it must be noted 
that when compared with other cotton supply systems indicators elsewhere, Malawi 
yiclds and GOT still trail behind. Cotton yields in htala%%i arc 5 to 10 times lower than 
those in Zimbabwe and USA respectively while GOT in neighbouring countries such 
as Zimbabwe and South Africa arc as high as 42°ßo and 45% respectively (Malawi 
Govcmment, 2005). Interviews with key industry individuals indicated that one area 
that nceds to be cxploitcd further in ordcr to makc progress in yicld, output and GOT 
indicators is improvements in cotton fertiliser uptake. The main bottleneck to be 
overcome in this is to change the mindset of fanners so that they can understand the 
importance of adopting this technology. The private sector companies have already 
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bcgun mounting dcmonstrations to show farmers that fcrtiliscr application has the 
potcntial to incrcasc thcir yiclds and quality of cotton lint. 
On producc priccs, the study notcd that thcrc is a widc disparity in priccs bctwccn 
world markct priccs for cotton lint and produccr priccs for sccd cotton in Malawi (scc 
Figure 36 and associated discussion in chapter 3). Malawi prices fluctuated around 
USSO. 241kg between 1972 and 2004 while corresponding world market prices 
fluctuated between USS 1.00/kg and USS 1.50/kg over the sane period. The gap in the 
two prices ranged between USSO. 85/kg and USS 1.25/kg and considering that 
shipment costs to South Africa (one of the major export destination) is USS017/kg 
and a further USSO. 12/kg for freight costs to India and China markets, transfer costs 
alone do not explain all the disparity in prices. Thus, while far ncrs end with a 
minimum of USSO. 25/kg to pay for all production costs including labour costs, scents, 
pesticides, fertilisers and other costs, buyers remain with margin ranging from 
USS0.40/kg to USS1.00/kg to cover for ginning costs and profit margin. The study 
could not decisively determine whether private companies cam normal profits or 
super normal primarily due to lack of comparable data both from the domestic 
industry and abroad. The study however, did not talc out possibility of high buyer 
profit margins owing to the cartel model of price discovery mechanism. 
In tcrms of pricc transmission bctwccn the world markct for cotton lint and Malawi, 
results in chapter thrcc showed that transmission was poor during the period the state 
was setting prices while in the post structural cra, price transmission was bcttcr. It 
would appear from the SCP analysis that the state's pricing policy insulated domestic 
producers from changes in world market prices for cotton while private sector 
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companics have on the othcr hand armed up the Malawi's cotton supply system to 
influcnccs from the world markct. The pricing policy of privatc sector companics is 
scnsitivc to changcs in world markct priccs for cotton lint and as a result chhangcs in 
world markct priccs for cotton lint arc bcing transmittcd to the domestic markct. It 
must be pointed out though that the transmissions arc still wcak. suggcsting that the 
discovery mechanism of domestic prices through the cartel still limit the extent of 
price transmission from the world market to Malawi. One other feature that also 
explains better price transmission in post structural reforms is the fact that before the 
reforms about 90% of Malawi's cotton lint was sold and used domestically while in 
post structural reforms, over 95% of Malawi's cotton lint is exported and hence 
producer prices in Malawi arc directly linked to their world market prices. 
7.2.7 Summary of findings from the cotton supply system 
This section has discussed the structure, conduct and pcrformancc of market linkages 
for supply of inputs, services and product markcts in Malawi's cotton supply system. 
This summary draw from the discussion in this scction and cxplain how markct 
linkages for inputs, services and produce impact on supply responses and price 
transmission from the world market to Mala%%i. 
On area (or extcnsification) responses to producer prices, the study found that factors 
such as (i) prioritisation of food crops in their cropping pattcrns; (ii) weak financial 
ability of farmers to sccurc additional land for cotton; and, (iii) gcncral wcak financial 
ability of farmers to access more inputs for cotton production limit the ability of 
farmers to adjust their cotton land in lint with changes in cotton prices. T he study 
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obscrvcd thcsc factors as cxplaining the lack of arca supply responses in cotton supply 
systcm in Malawi. 
on intensification of cotton production, the study obscrvcd that market linkages for 
supply of inputs such as seeds and pesticides and purchase of produce arc organised 
through interlocking arrangements with buyers. The study obscrvcd that initially 
buyers had entered the cotton supply system with the main aim of buying cotton. 
IIOWCvcr, with apparent supply problems both in terms of quantities demanded and 
quality required, buyers ventured into complimentary investments to support 
production - in seed supply, in pesticides and spraying equipment supply, and in 
provision of extension services. In neoclassical sense, markets for supply of inputs, 
provision of services and purchase of produce in cotton supply system in Malawi arc 
strongly oligopolistic. From an NIE point of view, however, this is classical 
interlocking system where oligopoly market arrangements arc enabling transactions to 
be completed where they would otherwise fail. 
The study observed that while the interlocking system has improved supply of sccds, 
pesticides and spraying equipment to smallholder farmers, uptake by farmers of these 
inputs and services and fertilisers is low. High input costs and profitability problems 
were identified as two critical bottlenecks constraining access and usage of better 
technologies among cotton farmers in Malawi. As a result of low uptake of 
technologies, the study noted the impact on yields and quality of cotton and hence 
impact on intensification responses. The study concluded that while interlocking 
systems have helped the cotton supply system in Malawi in post liberalisation period 
to respond to changes in producer prices through output responses, low access and 
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usagc of inputs by famos cxplains the obscrvation of wcak output supply responses 
in supply system. 
On cotton markcting, the study obscrvcd that before structural policy rcfimns in 
Malawi's cotton supply systcm, the statc through its pricing policy insulatcd cotton 
farmers from pricc changcs in world markct. llowcvcr, following policy rcfonns, 
interlocking buyers in the current markct structure have opened up the cotton supply 
system to changes in world market prices for cotton. Transmission of prices from the 
world market to Malawi has therefore been possible although it is still low. The study 
observed conduct of buyers in price discovery through cartel as possible explanation 
for the weak price transmission between world market and Malawi. The study 
observed that buyers agree on production support mechanisms as wcll on prices of 
inputs, services and produce and in this way they interfere with both price 
transmission and smallholder farmer profit margins. 
7.3 The Sugar Supply System 
7.3.1 Data collection methods used 
Data used in this analysis was collected through quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods. Under quantitative data collection methods, a structured 
questionnaire was administered to a total of forty smallholder sugar growers who 
were randomly selected from the three smallholder growing schemes in Chikwawa 
and Nkhotakota. In Chik-wawa, ten farmers were randomly selected from a complete 
list of one hundred and sixty nine smallholder farmers under the Kasinthula 
Smallholder Canc Growers Scheme. In Nkhotakota, a total of thirty farmers were 
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randomly sclcctcd, ton from the smallholdcr Outgrowcrs group and twenty fromm the 
Dwangwa Smallholdcr Canc Growers Scheme. 11c survey was done together with the 
surveys for the other commodities in March to May 2006 and the qucstionnairc 
included questions on issues of land and labour use patterns, linkages with input and 
output markets, arrangements for supply of inputs and services and association among 
farmers, their companies and SUCOMA. In addition to the structured qucstionnaires, 
the study also hold focus group discussions with thrcc groups of fanncrs, one group 
from each scheme (Kasinthula schone, Dwangwa scheme and Dwangwa outgrowcr 
schcmc) as part of the qualitativc data collcction cxcrcisc. The study also mct and 
hcld discussions with managcmcnt of the two smallholdcr sugarcanc growing 
companies, namely, Kasinthula Canc Growcrs Limitcd (KCGL) and Dwangwa Canc 
Growers Limited (DCGL). Another discussion was also held with management of 
SUCOMA Company as part of the qualitative data collection. List of individuals 
interviewed in this survey are attached in Annex 3 while sample of questionnaire used 
is attached in Annex 2. 
7.3.2 Profile of Sugar growers in Malawi 
This research is ccntrcd on smallholder fanners who grow sugarcane commercially 
for eventual processing into sugar and these farmers are catcgoriscd into three broad 
groups depending on the scheme in which they belong (Table 46). 
": " DCGL is the oldcst smallholdcr sugarcanc growing schcmc and is basal in 
Dwangwa in Nkhotakota district. The schcmc bccamc operational in 1976 and 
has a total of 189 smallholder fanners each growing 3ha plot of gravity-fed 
irrigated sugarcane. Total area in this scheme is 700ha. 
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V The second smallholder schone to open in Malawi is the smallholdcr sugar 
outgrowcr schcmc situated in the sank area as DCGL. This scheme was 
dcvclopcd in the 1980's afcr DCGL failcd to cxpand area undcr the scheme to 
accommodatc othcr farmcrs. These farmers therefore simply dcvclopcd their 
customary land as sugarcanc ficids. Currently. a total of 116 fanncrs havc 
convcrtcd closc to 600ha, cach cultivating 2 to 3 hcctares of irrigatcd 
sugarcanc plots. 
V The last scheme is KCGL and is based in Nchalo, Chikwawa. The scheme was 
dcvclopcd in 1997 and has a total of 169 farmcrs with total schchnc area of 
795ha. Each farmer cultivates roughly 3. Oha. 
Table 46: Features of smallholdcr sugarcane schemes 
Scheme KCGL DCGL OutgrorcrScheme 
Location Chikw-awa Nkhotakota Nkhotakota 
commencement 
date 1997 1976 1982 
, Number of 
farmers 169 189 116 
Total area (ha) 793 700 600 
loditidual plot 
size (ha) 3 3 2 to 3 
Source of Data: KCGL and DCGL 
Land holding sizes for smallholdcr farmcrs undcr thcsc schcmcs is fixed at thrcc 
hcctarcs. Farmers under KCGL and DCGL were given already developed plots and do 
not have flexibility to cithcr reduce or increase their sugarcane plot sizes. Farmers 
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under the outgrowcr schcmc face a similar problem in that they arc only allowed to 
convcrt a maximum of three hcctares of their landholding to sugarcanc cultivation. 
Allocation of plots in DCGL and KCGL was bascd on first conic basis although in 
somc cases priority was given to local inhabitants. In tcnns of gender balance of 
household heads in smallholder sugarcane irrigation schemes, overall 70% of the 
households are headed by malts while 30% arc headed by females. When comparison 
is made between the schemes, only 10% of the households in KCGL arc headed by 
fcmalcs compared to 37% of female headed households in DCGL and outgrowcr 
scheme. With respect to education, overall, 18% of household heads ncvcr attended 
any education, 45% attended primary, 35% attended up to secondary level education 
while 3% reached tertially level education. Comparisons between schemes showed no 
significant differences in education of household heads between the schemes, 
however, gender comparisons were strongly significant as 93% of malts were 
observed to have attended some level of education compared to only 59% of females. 
7.3.3 Linkages in sugar supply system 
In the sugarcane supply system in Malawi, there are three closely inter related 
governance structures that govern market linkages for inputs, services and produce 
markets for each of the smallholder sugarcane production schemes. This being the 
case, discussion on all market linkages will be done simultaneously in this analysis. 
7.3.3.1 Structure of market linkages in sugarcane supply system 
With respect to structure of sugarcane production in Malawi, thcrc arc two groups of 
institutions that are key and directly involved. The first is Sugar Corporation of 
Malawi (SUCOMA), a limited company owned by Illovo Sugar Group (61% shares), 
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ADMARC Investments Holdings Company (24% shares) and a collcction ofminority 
investors (1S%). SUCOMA owns the two biggest sugarcane plantations in Malawi, 
which accounts for 90% of the country's sugar production. The company also 
invested in specific assets in the form of sugarcane processing mill/plants, one in 
Dwangwa, Nkhotakota and another in Chikwawa around the sugarcane plantations. In 
this respect, the company vertically integrated sugarcane production, processing, 
domestic distribution, marketing and exportation of sugar. The company began 
cultivation of sugarcane in Malawi in the early 1960's and between the 1970's and 
early 1980's, the company expanded area six fold, reaching 15,000ha of sugarcane 
plantation. As one of the big companies in Malawi directly linked to external markets, 
SUCOMA either sources domestically or regionally all inputs and services required 
for its sugarcane plantations. 
The second important stakeholder group in sugarcane production is the collection of 
smallholder sugarcane growing farmers who produce the remaining 10% of Malawi's 
sugar. As noted earlier, these farmers are organised into three schemes, namely, those 
under the Kasinthula smallholder sugarcane scheme, those under the Dwangwa 
smallholder sugarcane scheme and those categorised as independent sugarcane 
growers or outgrowcrs. At the heart of all transactions involving these smallholders 
arc Management Companies who undertake all transactions on behalf of smallholder 
sugarcane growers. In Dwangwa, DCGL procures all inputs and services for both 
smallholder farmers under the scheme and for outgrowcr farmers. The only difference 
between the services supplied to the two groups is that inputs and services for farmers 
under the scheme are determined by DCGL while inputs and services for outgrowcr 
farmers are supplied on request. KCGL on the other hand is the company that 
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transacts inputs and scrviccs for smallholdcr fanncrs undcr the Kasinthula smallholder 
irrigation schcmc. As with DCGL, farmers in Kasinthula simply rcccivc inputs and 
scrviccs determined and supplicd by thcir management company. 
On inputs, the first to be considered arc irrigated sugarcane plantation plots. In the 
case of DCGL, the scheme was developed by the Government of Malawi using 
borrowed funds from the African Development Hank (ADD). Upon completion of 
development work of sugarcane plantation fields (which included installation of 
irrigation facilities, and cultivation and planting of the first sugarcane plantation) 
Government instituted DCGL as the management company responsible for the day to 
day running of operations of the sugarcane plantation. DCGL advertised for farmers 
willing to own plots in the scheme and all successful applicants were eventually given 
cultivation rights to three hectares of already developed sugarcane fields each, on 
which they were to provide their labour service. DCGL was responsible for the supply 
of all inputs and services during the growing season and marketing of cane sugar at 
harvesting, while providing farmers with technical know how on sugarcane 
cultivation at the same time. All beneficiary farmers were and arc being deducted 
development costs for their fields annually among other deductions. As for the 
Kasinthula smallholder sugar irrigation scheme, SUCOMA was the one that 
developed the scheme using borrowed funds from an overseas bank in Western 
Europe. Similarly, on completion of development work of the sugarcane plantation, 
KCGL was set up as Management Company to oversee the operations of the 
sugarcane plantation. As in Dwangwa scheme. KCGL in collaboration with 
Government identified farmers who were given cultivation rights of three hectares of 
sugarcane plots each. KCGL continued its role as Management Company while 
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farmcrs providcd thcir labour scrviccs to their plots. The only difference between the 
two schcmcs is that KCGL managcs Kasinthula as one cntity and thcrcforc costs are 
not brokcn down to individual fanncrs' plots hcncc, fanncrs arc not individually 
paying for their dcvclopmcnt costs. For fanners under the outgrowcr schcmc, the plots 
already belong to them and DCGL assisted them to develop the plots and whcrc 
development costs were accessed by DCGL on bchalfofthe fanners. such farmers are 
being deducted for those development costs. 
Apart from dcvclopmcnt costs for plantation plots, which arc cffcctivcly fixcd costs to 
smallholder sugarcanc growers, farmers face variablc costs for inputs which include 
fcrtiliscrs, pesticides, hired labour and transportation expenses of cane from fields to 
factories for processing. KCGL procures all fcrtiliscrs and pesticides required for the 
Kasinthula farmer irrigation scheme and also contracts transporters who transport 
cane sugar from fields to factories. DCGL on the other hand, procures all fertilisers 
and pesticides for smallholder farmers under the DCGL scheme and also provide 
transport for smallholder sugarcane. DCGL also provides similar services to farmers 
under the outgroWcr's scheme, on request. 
Management Companies source fertilisers and pesticides from open markets and 
supply to smallholder sugarcane growers as sole providers of these services. They 
also source and arrange contracts with transporters to transport sugarcanc from 
smallholder farmers' fields to factories and also negotiate terms of trade of sugarcane 
for smallholder farmers. In this respect, the role that management companies play is 
synonymous to the role that ADMARC played in prc-structural changes in Malawi. 
Just like ADMARC, management companies provide a coordination mechanism for 
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market linkages for the supply of inputs, scrviccs and producc markcts for the 
smallholdcr sugarcane sub sector in Malawi. From an N1C pcrspcctivc, manabcmcnt 
companies can be viewed as hybrid or hierarchical Eons of bovcrnancc structures in 
which there arc in- built protection and safeguard measures to ensure that transactions 
for fcrtiliscrs, pesticides, transport and produce markets for smallholdcr sugarcane 
farmers go through without risks of opportunism or transaction failure, in the right 
quantities, qualities and right time. These companies have vertically and horizontally 
integrated several smallholder sugarcane supply system market linkages and functions 
and as a result of pooling together individual farmer transactions into one under bulk 
purchasing, there is a likelihood as postulated by NIE theory that not only do 
transactions succeed, but also that they take place at relatively lower costs. This issue 
is explored further under later discussion of the performance of smallholder sugarcane 
supply system market linkages. 
7.3.3.2 Conduct of market linkages in the smallholder sugarcane supply system 
Management Companies procure inputs for smallholdcr farmer schemes using funds 
borrowed from local commercial banks. These inputs arc bought from local fertiliser 
and chemical supplying companies under a spot cash purchase arrangement and arc 
transported to the plantation areas using company vehicles. During fertiliser and 
pesticide application, farmers are only told to report for application of these inputs in 
their plots. In cases where farmers fail to report for application of these inputs, the 
Management Companies hire other people to apply these inputs on behalf of farmers. 
In this case, farmers are deducted both input costs and costs for hired labour. Prices 
for inputs are determined by Management Companies and they include the initial 
costs of inputs (which arc their retail or wholesale prices), interest on the borrowed 
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capital, administration and transportation costs. Input costs deducted from farmers are 
conscqucntly much higher than actual wholesale prices for these inputs. 
As for haulage arrangements for transporting smallholdcr sugarcane from fanners 
fields to processing mills, the Manabcmcnt Companies also hire haulage companies 
on behalf of smallholder farmers. During harvesting, fanners arc given dates on which 
their sugarcane is scheduled to be moved to processing mills and they arc asked to 
harvest their sugarcane by a given date so that these schedules arc not missed. 
Management Companies hire ganyu labour to harvest all fields of fanners who fail to 
meet harvesting deadlines. In this case, farmers arc again deducted expenses for such 
hired labour. This also goes for weeding activities so that where fanners fail to weed 
in their fields, Management Companies come in with hired labour to weed those rcids 
and farmers are deducted the costs of this. Management Companies make all these 
strategic activities in order to ensure high productivity of the smallholder sugarcane 
plantations. Other roles of management companies include; provision of extension 
services, overseeing development and replanting of plantations, arranging for bank 
loans for financing operations in smallholder sugarcane plantations, contracting 
transporters to move sugarcane from fields of farmers to processing mills and other 
administrative and management services. In return for these services, DCGL charges 
30% of turnover from every individual farmer in the scheme while Outgrowcr farmers 
arc charged 20% of their individual turnovers. KCGL charges about 15% of total 
turnover of the scheme in a year. These fees arc dctcrmincd by Management 
Companies, in addition to input, transport and labour costs, and as to whether the 
companies arc earning normal or supernormal profits, the issue is explored later under 
discussion of the performance of market transactions. 
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With respect to marketing of smallholdcr sugar, once the sugarcane leaves fan ncrs 
fields, it goes to SUCOMA processing mills where it is processed, packaged and then 
sold to available domestic or export markets. SUCOAMA sells smallholder sugar on 
behalf of farmers and deducts 40% of the proceeds fron smallholder farmers' sugar 
as payment for processing and marketing of sugar. Considering that there arc six main 
markets of Malawi sugar with significant differences in prices (Table 47), the choice 
of market where smallholder sugar goes is entirely done by SUCOMA. Table 47 also 
compared weighted average prices for sugar from smallholder sugarcane schemes and 
the next section explores whether SUCOMA's choice of market destinations for 
smallholder sugar favours the small scale farmers. In addition, the processing and 
marketing fee of 40% SUCOMA charges smallholder sugarcane schemes is cxplorcd 
in the next section to determine whether it is normal or supernormal profit on the part 
of SUCOAMA. 
7.333 Performance of market linkages in the smallholder sugarcane supply 
system 
Interviews with smallholder farmers under DCGL, KCGL and outgowcr schemes 
revealed that all smallholder farmers access all required inputs and services at the 
right time due to the activities of the Management Companies. In each and every 
growing season, farmers access all their required fertilisers, pesticides, labour and 
transport services from the Management Companies. Smallholder farmers are issued 
all these inputs and services on loans which are deducted from their proceeds during 
sale of sugar. In this respect, smallholder sugarcane growers always secure adequate 
quantities of inputs and services required for their farming activities in the right 
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qualities and times. As a result of this arrangement, yields for smallholdcr sugarcane 
farmers under both KCGL and DCGL arc high. Smallholder fanners' yields range 
from 101 metric tonnes per hectare to 105 metric tonnes per hcctarc while those for 
SUCOMA arc around 91 metric tonnes per hectare. The management style in terns of 
timely application of inputs, weeding and replanting of sugarcane plantations and the 
fact that smallholder sugarcane schemes arc relatively newer plantations compared to 
sugarcane plantations of SUCOMMA arc among the main reasons explaining why 
yields for smallholder sugarcane producers under KCGL and DCGL arc hither than 
those achieved by SUCOMA. On the other hand, yields for independent smallholder 
farmers under Outgrowcr scheme are the lowest at only 44 tonnes per hectare. Two 
main reasons explain this low yield level, the first is that outgrowcr fanners access 
fertilisers and pesticides on request and in many cases, they request much lower 
quantities than are recommended, in order to avoid higher deductions from their 
proceeds. The second reason is that the majority of outgrowcr farmers planted high 
sucrose content varieties and these varieties generally have the attribute of low cane 
yield. Compared to regional sugarcane yield statistics, yields for smallholder farmers 
under KCGL and DCGL are the second highest in Southern Africa after Zambia 
(Chiputula et a, 2004). Thus, they surpass yields for leading producers of sugarcane 
such as South Africa, Mauritius and Swaziland. Other factors responsible for higher 
yields under smallholder sugarcane production in Malawi (apart from good 
management practices) arc use of high yielding sugarcane varieties, better irrigation 
methods, relatively favourable climate and good fertile soil conditions. 
Apart from yields, sucrose content is another indicator of how well a sugarcane 
plantation is performing, although to a large extent sucrose content is a rcflcction of 
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the variety of sugarcane planted. Interviews with individuals from the industry 
indicated that generally sugarcane varieties do not posses strong attributes of both 
yields and sucrose content at the same time, thus, a variety with highest yielding 
attributes normally turns out to be poor in sucrose content levels and vice versa as 
such growers try to balance combinations of the two in order to attain maximum sugar 
yields from their plantations. At national level, sucrose content lcvcls ranges from 
13.46% (for KCGL), 13.83% (for DCGL), 14.14% (for SUCOMA) to 14.91% (for 
OutgroWcrs) (Malawi Government, 2002). With a national rangc of 13% to 15% 
sugarcanc sucrose content, Malawi is regarded as the highest in Southern Africa and 
is competitive with Brazilian sugarcane which has sucrose content of 16% (Chiputula 
ct al, 2005). Better sugarcane varieties, good management styles, access to irrigation, 
favourable climate and good fertile soils in growing regions have been viewed as 
reasons for high yields and sucrose content. 
Overall, processed sugar output per hectare is the best performance indicator which 
takes into account both yields and sucrose content attributes. DCGL, KCGL and 
SUCONIA achieve between 13.0 tonnes per hectare and 14.0 tonnes per hectare while 
sugar yields for Outgrower farmers arc much lower at 7.0 tonnes per hectare as a 
result of low sugarcane yields. The other industry level indicator of performance of 
sugarcane plantation is the cost used to produce a unit of sugar. ODI (2004b) ranked 
Malawi as third least cost producer of sugar in the world after Brazil and Zimbabwe. 
The report by ODI estimates the cost of producing sugar in Malawi to be around 7-8 
cents/lb making Malawi a competitive producer of sugar in the world. 
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Whhilc access to inputs, scrviccs and product markets was observed to be gcxxl 
comparcd to smallholdcr tobacco and cotton growcrs, 9S% or sugar anc smallholder 
farmcrs indicated that they arc dissatisfied with their prevailing market arrangcmcnts. 
Ilic study found that farmers distrust thcir Management Companics in coordinating 
market transactions for inputs, outputs and scrviccs. Smallholder fanners in all the 
three plantations feel Management Companies cheat them on prices they quote on 
inputs, scrviccs and producc. Fanncrs argucd that ge ncrally, prices fanners are 
dc ducted on inputs and scrviccs arc higher than prevailing market pried while prices 
for proccsscd sugar arc lowcr than cxpcctcd and as a result, their profit margins arc 
low. This to than defeats the whole purpose of being in the scheme since they joined 
the schcmcs in order to cam incomc for their households. Consequently, farmers sec 
the supposcd cheating as the main obstacle to their cntrcprcncurship. 
In order to validate these claims, the study first compared prices for finished product, 
sugar, quoted by their Management Companies and that of sugar prices for diffcrcnt 
markets to establish whether sugar prices quoted by their Management Companies are 
lower than prevailing market prices and secondly compared prices for inputs and 
services and their corresponding prevailing market prices. 
Table 47 show comparisons of sugar prices for smallholder sugarcane schemes, FOB 
prices for different sugar markets and weighted average prices for all the sugar 
produced in Malawi. As the table shows, average sugar prices received by smallholder 
farmers under DCGL scheme arc competitive with prices from all lucrative markets 
and the weighted Malawi prices for all the rears except for 2005. Apart from 2005, 
there is no reason to suggest that sugar prices for smallholder farmers under the 
353 
DCGL scheme arc lower than prevailing market prices. As for Outgrown sugar prices, 
Tabic 47 show that their prices wcrc compctitivc as compared with at icast some of 
the more lucrativc markcts in 2000,2001 and 2004. In 2002.2003 and 2005 howcvcr, 
Outgowcr priccs wcrc loss competitive as comparcd With most orthc more lucrativc 
markct priccs and with wcightcd Malawi prices. Only two years or rices me 
available for smallholder fanncrs under KCGL, but these prices are obscrvcd to be 
lowcr than both the more lucrativc markcts and weighted Malawi prices. Interviews 
with KCGL and DGCL indicatcd that oncc thcy supply sugarcane to SUCONIA 
processing mills, SUCOMMA takes over the processing and marketing functions of 
smallholdcr sugar, as such, it is at SUCOMA's discretion as to which markct thcy 
supply smallholdcr sugar. In this respect. any low prices arc as a result of decisions of 
SUCONIA and not Management Companies. 
Table 47: Comparison of sugar prices (USSch: g) 
Year 
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 200$ 2005 
Domestic 51 48 53 48 52 
EU 47 52 53 52 42 
SADC u 40 40 42 38 
US 41 44 43 46 33 
HOW 34 38 41 33 26 
'eighted prices 43 46 48 46 43 42 
DCGL 43 50 45 42 44 36 
Outgroucr 48 43 39 36 41 30 
KCGL 34 30 
Sources constructed using aura irom zu'. vs'wt, u, -ui- arw M . UL 
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On inputs, in particular fcrtiliscrs and scrviccs, mainly haulage cost for sugarcane to 
processing mills, the study again did not establish evidence that Management 
Companies arc cheating their smallholder farmers on priccslcosts. l'riccs quoted for 
both fertilisers and haulage were competitive with the ones quoted by SUCOMA. In 
fact for haulage costs, which arc one of the biggest costs in sugarcane plantations, 
both for smallholder and estate, Management Companies were able to negotiate 
slightly lower costs than SUCOMA. For fertiliser prices, the quoted costs include 
interest on borrowed capital and a transport cost margin, because both KCGL and 
DCGL procure fcrtiliscrs directly from fcrtiliscr supplying companies based in 
Blantyre and Lilongwe respectively because of the large volumes involved. When 
compared to SUCOMA, costs for smallholder fertilisers w ere equally competitive and 
as such there is no evidence to suggest Management Companies cheat smallholders on 
prices quoted for fertilisers. What the study established was a problem relating to now 
of information from Management Companies to smallholder farmers. The study 
observed that while there is consistent flow of this information to farmers to explain 
all the operations by their Management Companies, it appears that in some cases, 
some farmers fail to fully understand the operations of their Management Companies 
while others seem to hold other views and therefore do not agree with operations of 
their Management Companies. As a result, all this is translated to dissatisfaction with 
their Management Companies and in some cases some groups of farmers have 
become angry and violent. 
To furthcr understand the dissatisfaction of farmers, the study carried out a gross 
margin analysis of the three smallholder schemes. Table 48 shows gross margin 
analysis for smallholder farmers under DCGL. As the table shows, average total 
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turnover for individual smallholdcr fanners under the scheme varied between 
USS5,400 and USS6,800 per hectare bctwecn 2000 and 2005. The variation in total 
turnover was mainly as a result of changes in sugar prices and yiclds. Table 48 shows 
that from the average total smallholder earnings per hectare, the sum of between 
USS2,200 and USS2,700 was dcductcd by SUCOMA as payment for processing and 
marketing costs while a further USS1,600 to USS2,000 was also deducted by 
management companies as fees for their services. These deductions meant that 
smallholder farmers were left with between USS1,600 and USS2,000 as pay ent for 
production expenses and net profits for their enterprises. As the table shows, 
production expenses varied between USS900 to USS1,600 mainly due to variations in 
individual production expenses. Average net incomes for farmers, which is payment 
of their labour, land and capital deployment ranged between USS400 and USS660 
over the five year period. Compared with burley tobacco where high input enterprises 
cam USS800 while low input cntcrpriscs cam USS400 over the sank period, it can be 
argued that net incomes in sugar arc low considering that DCGL scheme is a high 
input enterprise. Table 48 also shows net incomes for farmers in DCGL scheme as 
falling from USS660 to USS412 over the five year period. Decline in sugar prices in 
some years and increases in production costs in other years arc two of the reasons 
why net incomes in smallholder fanners under DCGL have been gradually falling, in 
percentage terms, net incomes of farmers under DCGL represent 5% to 10% of total 
turnover for the hectaragc. 25% to 30% is used to pay for production costs, 30% goes 
to Management Company while the balance of 40% is paid to SUCOMA as 
processing and marketing fees. 
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Table 48: Cross Margin for farmers under DCG1. 
fear 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
I'ricc (USS/ton) 432 500 449 423 441 356 
Total Revenuc 6397 5443 6461 6260 6840 5426 
I'a)mcnt to SUCOMA 2558 2178 2585 250m1 2736 2170 
i 1anagcmcnt Co fcc 1919 1633 1938 1878 2052 1628 
earnings 1920 1632 1938 1878 2032 1628 
Costs 
1'cttiliscr 331 295 474 383 533 328 
Irtigation 28 60 78 80 143 101 
Replant expenscs 72 0 89 86 146 89 
Field cultivation 121 29 10 28 0 108 
Trust ccss 148 23 30 28 33 24 
Cane Cutting 496 163 198 183 213 160 
Cane ITaulage 301 324 350 483 388 
Net Profit/ha 660 563 518 592 459 412 
SOUrCC Of data: IXXiL (ZUM) 
Tablc 49 shows goss margin analysis for smallholdcr farmcrs undcr the Outgrowcr 
scheme. As the table shows, average total turnover for farmers under the scheme 
ranged bctwccn USS2,300 and USS3,400 per hectare bctwccn 2002 and 2005. 
Comparing with DCGL schcmc, avcragc total tumovcr for Outgrowcr farmcrs arc half 
those achicvcd by farmers under DCGL and the main reason is the low )iclds 
achicvcd by Outgrowcr farmcrs. In tcrms of dcductions by SUCOMA, Tablc 49 
shows that they have ranged between USS900 and USS 1,400 over the four years. 
These deductions arc also half those paid by smallholder farmers under DCGL 
scheme primarily bccausc proccssing and marketing charges are bascd on proportions 
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of sugar proccsscd and markctcd. As for paymcnts to Mannbcmcnt Company, Table 
49 shows that thcsc paymcnts have rangcd from USS46O to USS6XO per hectarc. 
Comparing with those paid by smallholder farmers under UCGL, these payments me 
threc to four times lower for two reasons: (i) fees to Management Companies me 
proportion to volume of sugar produced, and, (ii) percentage of fees for Outgrowcr 
farmers is lower than that for DCGL farmers. 
As the table shows, after deductions for SUCOMA and Management Companies are 
made, Outgrowcr farmers remained with gross earnings of bctwccn USS900 and 
USS 1,400 to pay for production expenses and remunerate their labour, land and 
capital usage. When compared to gross earnings of DCGL farmers, earnings by 
Outgrowcr farmers arc lower primarily because of their low yields. In terms of 
production costs, Table 49 shows that they ranged between USS300 to USS8Q0 and 
major causes for such variation included; changes in fertiliser costs, variations in cane 
cutting costs and changes to cane haulage costs. In comparison with production costs 
of farmers under DCGL, outgrowcr farmers spend half to a third of costs incurred by 
DCGL farmcrs. Canc cutting, haulagc and fcrtiliscr cxpcnscs arc all lowcr in 
smallholdcr farmers under the outgrowcr schcmc. Fcrtiliscr costs are lower under the 
outgrowcr scheme because fanners use Icss fertilisers while cane haulage and cane 
cutting costs arc lower under the outgrowcr scheme because farmers find alternative 
means for doing these operations. Records of such alternative means arc not properly 
documented and as such could not be taken into account in these calculations. 
however, what this means is that apart from these recorded costs, there are other costs 
which arc missing in the gross margin analysis. 
358 
As the table shows, nct incomcs for pa)mcnt of labour, land and capital for outgn)%vcr 
fanners ranged from USS330 and USS830 per hectare and thcsc net inam»t ha c 
bccn increasing between 2002 and 2005. Two reasons explain the increase in nct 
incomcs for farmers under the outgrowcr schöne: (i) bcttcr sugar prices explain 
incrcascs in nct incomcs in 2004, and (ii) low rccordcd cane haulage and cant cutting 
costs which farmers used alternative sources which have not been costed in the 
analysis. Comparing with nct incomes for fanners under DCGI, it is observed that 
while nct incomes for fanners under Outgowcr schemes arc increasing, net incomes 
for farmcrs undcr DCGL arc falling. Nct incomcs for farmcrs undcr the outgrowcr 
schcmc were double those achieved by smallholdcr farmers under DCGL scheme in 
2005. Low producer costs by smallholder farmers under Outgrowcr schcmc and high 
production costs under DCGL fanners arc the main reasons explaining the differences 
in trends of net incomes between farmers of the two schemes. It would howcvcr be 
argued that actual net incomes by farmers under Outgrowcr schemes may be 
undcrestimatcd duc to the fact that costs for alternative expenses for cane cutting and 
cane haulage may not have been fully costed and included in the calculations. In 
pcrccntagc terms, net incomes for farmers under the Outgrowcr scheme have 
; ncrcascd from 14% to 29% of turnover while costs have fallen from 26% to 11% 
over the same period. Payments to SUCOMMA and Management Company arc stable 
at 40% and 20% respectivcly. 
Table 49: Cross Margin for Outgroivcr farmers 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
price (USS/ton) 385 362 403 296 
1ots) Rc%vnue 2432 2290 3409 2840 
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Payment to Illovo 972 916 1364 1136 
Management Co fcc 486 458 682 564 
Gross earnings 974 916 1363 1140 
Costs 
f'cnilixct 253 201 252 138 
%Vccding costs 16 12 60 32 
Trust cans 15 14 20 0 
Cane Cutting 134 101 117 17 
Cane 11au1age 225 191 373 119 
Total costs 643 519 822 306 
tract income/ha 331 397 541 834 
Table 50 shows gross margin analysis for farmers under KCGL schcmc. As the table 
shows, avcragc revcnucs for a hectare of land in 2004 and 2005 were US$4,381 and 
USS3,800. Revenues in KCGL scheme arc higher than those in Outgrowcr scheme 
mainly bccausc of high yields of KCGL schcmc and arc lower than DCGL scheme 
primarily bccausc of low sugar priccs of KCGL sugar. The table shows that KCGL 
schcmc paid USS 1,750 and USS 1,500 to SUCOMMA as payment for processing and 
markcting costs in 2004 and 2005 rcspcctivcly. Thcsc payments wvcrrc tower than 
thosc paid by DCGL schcmc becausc of rclativcly low rcvcnucs in KCGL and were 
higher than Outgrowcr schcmc in lint with higher revenues that KCGL achieved in 
comparison with the Outgrowcr farmcr schcmc. In tams of fees to Managcmcnt 
Company, Table 50 shows that the scheme paid USS440 and USS511 per hcctarc in 
2004 and 2005 respectively. Management Company fers are the lowest in KCGL 
compared to DCGL and Outgowcr schemes primarily because KCGL is managed as 
one cntity and staff of Management Company are paid monthly wagcs which arc part 
of administration cxpcnscs, whcrcas the Managcmcnt Company rcsponsiblc for 
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DCGL and the outgrowcr schcmc is paid fixcd pcrccntagc or (cc, 'j't1I)1C 50 Shows 
that once fccs for SUCONIA und cxpcnscs for Managcmcnt Company %vcrc taken into 
account, gross earnings for a hcctarc of sugarcanc at KCGL wcrc USS2,000 and 
USS1.800 in 2004 and 2005 rcspcctivcly. Thcsc Virnings compare vcry wc1I will, 
those of DCGL. 
Table 50: Cross Margin Analysis for KCCL farmers 
Year 2004 2005 
Price (USS/ton) 335 303 
Total Revenue 4381 3847 
Payment to Illovo 1752 1538 
Management Co fee 440 511 
Gross earnings 2189 1798 
Costs 
Fertiliser 81 87 
Weeding costs 16 25 
Irrigation 183 126 
Field cultivation 38 0 
Cane Cutting 7 10 
Cane ITaulage 707 707 
Total Costs 1032 955 
Net Profit 1129 671 
in sen ice costs 1074 928 
Net profit after loan repayment 55 "257 
Payment to farmers 404 377 
As for production costs of KCGL schcmc, Tablc S0 shows that thcsc costs totalled 
USSI0000 and USS955 in 2004 and 2005 rcspcctivcly. Total costs bctwccn KCGL 
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and DCGL compares vcry wcll, lio%vcvcr, w"hcrt bmkcn down to individual cxpcntsc , 
difcrcnccs cxist. In KCGL, two costs arc promincnt and these arc; canc haulage und 
irrigation cxpcnscs. Cane haulage costs for KCGL arc double those of DCGL bccausc 
the plantation at KCGL is located far away from SUCOMMA's processing mills and the 
scheme therefore incurs higher costs in transporting cane to the mills. Irrigation costs 
arc also higher at KCGL compared to DCGL because the scheme at KCGL uses 
sprinklcr irrigation which requires a lot of clcctricity power and maintenance costs. 
The plantation at DCGL uses gravity fad irrigation system which uses less po%vcr and 
his low maintenance costs. On the other hand, fcrtiliscr and replanting expenses arc 
high in DCGL compared to KCGL primarily because KCGL is a rclativcly new 
plantation with soils high in fertility. 
On nct income per hcctarc, Table 50 shows that KCGL achicvcd USS 1.100 and 
USS670 in 2004 and 2005 rcspcctivcly. A rclativcly good pricc in 2004 cxplains the 
variation bctwccn the two net incomes. Net incomes for KCGL are competitive with 
DCGL and in particular bcttcr in 2004 mainly due to low management costs. In tcnns 
of actual carvings smallholder farmers under KCGL receive. they arc paid a defined 
amount of money monthly as wages for their labour services to the scheme. In 2004 
and 2005, these wages were cquivalcnt to USS4O4 and USS377 annually respcctivcly. 
The potential problem with this arrangement is that since farmers' rewards arc not 
based on the amount of sugar produced, farmcrs may not have incentives to put more 
of thcir labour and other resources in ordcr to product more and cam more. It must be 
pointed out though that the study did not establish whether indeed thcrc arc significant 
diffcrcnccs in the amount and quality of labour farmcrs in KCGL put in the schcmc 
comparcd to those in DCGL and Outgrowcr schcmcs. As for pcrcrntagcs, the study 
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obsctvcd that camings for smallholdcr farmers undcr KCOL rcrrescntcd about 2% of 
total tumovcr. Dcductions to SUCOMA and Management Company arc 40% and 
15% rcspcctivcly. Production costs account for the remaining 180, % while 25% is used 
annually to service the plantation loan. 
On top of gross margin analysis, the study also conducted a price cost margin analysis 
for the three smallholder schemes (Table 51). As the table shows, average sugar 
prices for KCGL were the least at USSc32/kg compared to USSc36.5/kg and 
USSc43/kg for Outgrowcr and DCGL schemes. As pointed out in earlier discussion 
on price disparity, the discretion is with SUCOMA who decide to which market 
smallholder sugar is sold and since prices differ in these markets, if the bulk of 
smallholder sugar is sent to high priced markets then the weighted average prices for 
such a smallholder sugar scheme is also high. In the case of KCGL, it would appear 
that the bulk of its sugar has been sent to low priced markets. It must be pointed out 
however that SUCOhtA could not give reasons as to why this is the case. They simply 
argued that they make business decisions. In terms of payment to SUCOMA, Table 
51 shows that DCGL paid USSc17.31kg. Outgrowcr farmers USSc14.5/kg and KCGL 
USSc12.8/kg. With respect to payments to Management Companies, DCGL farmers 
paid USSc13. O/kg, Outgrowcr farmers USSc7.3/lcg while KCGL fanners paid 
USSc3.7/kg. DCGL farmers pays the higlicst bccausc their Management Company 
charges 30% of the sugar price. Outgrowcrs farmers arc charged 20% of their price 
whilc staff of Managcmcnt Company arc only paid wages and not as a fcc as in the 
case of DCGL and Outgrower schemes. Because of low deduction by the 
! Management Company at KCGL, its producer price is higher than that achieved by 
DCGL and Outgrowcr schemes that havc high factory priccs. On the othcr hand, 
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production costs for KCGL are lowcr than DCGL and Outgrowcr xchcmcs und n% a 
combination of low costs and low Management Costs, crop margin is higher in KCGL. 
However, when loan repayment in KCGL me taken into account, farmer margin 
becomes the least. Farmer margin in Outgrowvcr and DCGL schcmc* me high mainly 
bccausc famrcrs in thcsc schcmcs finished repaying all thcir loans.. 
Table 51: Price/cost margin analysis for smallholder farmer schemes 
Price/Cost Margin (in US$c/kr. ) DCGL Outgro"cr KCG1. 
factory price 43.33 36.5 32 
margin for SUCOMA 17.33 14.5 12.8 
Margin for Management Companies 13 7.3 3.7 
Producer Price 13 14.7 15.5 
Total Costs 9 9.7 7.4 
Crop Margin 4 5 8 
Loan Service Costs 0 0 7.3 
Farmer Margin 4 5 0.6 
What thcsc findings indicatc is that, ovcrall, earnings for smallholdcr sugarcanc 
farmcrs in Malawi arc low and in particular in Kasinthula Schcmc arc vcry poor. In 
fact, if these earnings arc compared to tobacco earnings, it is clear sugarcanc growers 
have the lowest margins and this study suggest low margins to be the reasons why 
farmers distrust their Management Companies. Farmers perceive Management 
Companies as the ones capturing all their returns. The study did not validate 
suggestion that Management Companies are indeed cheating fanners on prices or 
costs but rather that there is problem of flow of information between the two sides. 
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©cttcr flow of information bctwccn the two partics is Iikcly to clcar such 
misundcrstandings. 
With respect to low fanner earnings, the study pointed to a number ofarcas that could 
improve the margins for farmers. The first is the weighted average prices for 
smallholder sugar. The study observed that if the bulk of smallholder were sent to 
high priced sugar markets, then weighted average prices for their sugar would go up 
thereby helping improve their margins. The second is the fcc smallholder schemes 
pay to SUCOMA as sugar processing and marketing fee. The study could not 
establish how competitive the 40% charge is compared to other countries, but 
interviews with key informants in the industry indicated that 40% is on the higher side. 
However, the study observed that determination of prices and setting of terns of 
contract are one way in that SUCOMA unilaterally 
determines the prices and terms of 
contract for all transactions. The study proposes the idea of a fairly strong contract 
negotiation team on 
behalf of the smallholder schemes so that smallholder farmer 
schemes also have voice in determination of negotiated prices and terms of 
engagements. 
The third area is the possible reviews of Management Company fees. The study 
observed that while their roles are similar 
in many ways, their charges arc different. 
KCGL charges only about 15% of turnover as cost for running the scheme, DCGL 
charges are double the amount of 
KCGL at 30% of turnover while that for Out grower 
farmers is 20%. The study observed that if charges for outgrowcr and DCGL farmers 
are reviewed downwards, then they can 
improve the earnings of the farmers in the 
schees. The study was not able to 
investigate the actual cost structures of the two m 
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management companies, but the very large difference in commission charges would 
appear to be difficult to justify, especially since DCGL has a high throughput of sugar. 
The fourth area possible production cost cuts. Thus, the study observed differences in 
cost structures and where relevant cuts can be achieved, then they can improve further 
the margins of smallholder fanners. 
7,3,4 Concluding remarks on sugarcane production and marketing system 
This section has discussed the structure, conduct and performance of market linkages 
for supply of inputs, services and produce markets in Malawi's sugar supply system. 
This summary draw from the discussion in this section and explain how market 
linkages for inputs, services and produce impact on supply responses, intensification 
and price transmission 
from the world market to Malawi. 
On area (or extensification) responses to prices, the study observed that land under 
sugar cultivation is not easily switched 
for other enterprises. T us, when a piece of 
land is committed to sugarcane plantation, there are issues of asset specificity in terms 
of irrigation installations that are specific to sugarcane cultivation which arc installed 
in sugarcane plantations. In addition, once a field is planted to sugarcane, the 
plantation stays 
for several years before the plantation is ploughed out for fresh 
replanting. In this respect, 
decisions to commit more land to sugarcane plantation or 
completely plough out a sugarcane plantation and put the 
land under a different 
enterprise are 
based on long term strategic goals and decisions as opposed to short 
term variations in such 
factors as annual prices. The study observed this asset 
specificity problem associated with perennial crops as main reason explaining why 
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there arc weak supply responses in Malawi's sugar supply system in us far tos 
cxtcnsification is concerned. 
The study observed that out of the three groups of growers, namely, SUCOMA, 
smallholder farmers in schemes such as DCGL and KCGL, and independent 
sugarcane outgrower farmers, it is SUCOMA and Outgrowcr farmers who have the 
potential to increase or decrease their plantation sizes. SUCOMA has on the one hand 
a program of replanting its sugarcane plantations over several years and it can choose 
to plough out a piece of plantation and not replant it if it intends to reduce its size of 
plantation or on the other hand, it has significant amounts of land which arc not 
currently developed and if it is interested in expanding its plantation, it can develop 
this land in the long run. However increase or decreases in sugar cane area have 
implications for the utilisation and capacity of the sugar mill - increases in area may 
run up against processing capacity constraints while reductions in sugar cane 
plantations lead to under utilisation of existing capacity. Both factory and plantation 
investments are long term strategic decisions which involve large asset specific 
investments. As for independent outgrowcr farmers, our interviews indicated that 
apart from land they committed to sugarcane production, they have other pieces of 
land which they can develop into sugarcane production if they so wish. however, the 
main problem is the asset specificity problem of such plantation developments. In the 
case of KCGL and DCGL, 
farmers are allocated a fixed amount of land and have no 
flexibility to either increase or decrease, either in the short run or long run. There arc 
also no structures 
for bringing new farmers with new land into these schemes. The 
study concluded it is the asset specificity problem which explains in part the limited 
supply response in Malawi's sugar supply system. 
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In terms of market arrangements for inputs and services, the study has cstablishcd that 
these markets arc satisfactory in as far as access and utilisation of growers are 
concerned. Both SUCOMA (estate sugarcane producer) and smallholder sugarcane 
producers arc able to access all their inputs and services required for their plantations 
mainly as a result of coordination mechanisms in their market linkages. For 
SUCOMA, the company is able to access from the open market, both locally and 
internationally, all its inputs and services required for its plantation. For smallholder 
farmers, there are Management Companies in place who source all inputs and services 
required for smallholder sugarcane growers and supply these to then in a timely way 
using funds borrowed from commercial banks. The farmers are given these inputs and 
services on loans which are 
deducted from their proceeds at the end of the season. 
Apart from providing extension services to farmers, Management Companies also rill 
gaps in farmers operations 
in such activities as weeding and cane cutting so that on 
top of having all inputs and services in required levels, field activities are also done 
timely and to required standard. As a result of this kind of coordination both yields 
and sucrose content are 
high and competitive with other efficient sugar producers in 
the world. The study has therefore concluded that given long term prospects of better 
sugar prices due to reforms 
in world markets, the sugar supply system has potential of 
up scaling production 
in response to better border prices on condition that the industry 
makes relevant asset specificity 
investments. 
On price transmission, the study observed that SUCOMA is the only player involved 
with Malawi's sugar marketing and that the company is directly linked to its markets. 
This being the case, price changes in all its markets arc directly transmitted to the 
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company. The study considered this strong link as the reason why there is price 
transmission between the world market for sugar and Malawi's sugar market. As to 
the reason why price transmission elasticity is only 0.36, the study considered use or 
weighted prices as one of the reasons. Malawi sugar is sold in different markets with 
different prices and in order to derive the domestic market price, the study had to 
aggcgatc the prices and come up with weighted average prices. World market prices 
arc also aggregated prices by FAO and the study considers use of agaggregated prices as 
one of the reasons explaining the 36% price transmission in Malawi's sugar. 
On net earnings of smallholder farmers under sugarcane schemes, the study observed 
that their earnings are very low especially smallholder fanners under KCGL. The 
study observed a combination of low weighted average producer prices, high 
processing and marketing fees, high Management Company fees and high energy and 
transport costs as some of the reasons explaining the low margins in smallholder 
sugar sub sector. The study observed strengthened bargaining position of smallholder 
farmers as essential for improving terms of trade for all their transactions. 
7. q The Tea supply chain 
7,. x, 1 Data collection methods 
Data used in this analysis was collected through both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods. Under quantitative 
data collection methods, the study 
administered structured questionnaire to randomly selected 
forty smallholder tea 
, rowers twenty in Thyolo 
district and another twenty in Mulanjc districts, the only 
districts in Malawi where smallholder tea is grown. Under qualitative data collection 
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methods, the study made use of both focus group discussions and in depth interviews 
with key informants in the tea industry. Under focus group discussions, the study held 
meetings with two groups of smallholder tea growers, one group in Thyolo district 
and another in Mulanje districts. In terms of interviews with key informants, the study 
held consultations with six owners of tea plantations and factories, management ofthe 
sole tea brokerage company, country executives in the six tea buying companies, 
Chairman of the Tea Association of Malawi and General Manager of the Stttallholdcr 
Tca Factory Company. Among others, the two data collection instruments, namely, 
questionnaires and checklists, gathered information on aspects of land and labour use 
patterns, linkages and arrangements 
in input and output markets, arrangements for 
credit supply, behaviours of opportunism and tent socking in the supply chain. A list 
of those interviewed is attached in Annex 3 and template for questionnaire is attached 
in Annex 2. The study also used findings of the nationwide NSO (2005) survey by the 
National Statistical Office and findings from other secondary sources to triangulate 
with some of the findings of this study. 
7.4.2 Profile of tea growers 
Tea in Malawi is grown by two groups of farmers, namely, large scale plantation 
owners and small scale tea growers. 
Large scale plantation owners arc estimated to be 
12 while small scale tea farmers are about 6,500. Apart from owning tea plantations, 
large scale farmers also own one or two tea processing plants in their plantations, 
which they use to process their tea 
leaves. Small scale farmers on the other hand, 
either send their tea to these 
large scale producers for processing or use their 
smallholder tea processing 
factory known as MATECO Tea Company. In terms of 
national contribution, 
large scale tea planters account for 87% of tea produced in 
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Malawi while the smallholder sub sector accounts for the remainder of 13°ßö. Large 
scale plantation owners are either multinational companies or family owned 
businesses of individuals of European origin who are well endowed in terms ofcapital, 
and access to capital, and hence participate fully in markets for inputs, outputs and 
services. On the other hand, small scale tea growers constitute fanners of diverse 
characteristics ranging from poor to non poor houscholds, litcratc to illiterate 
household heads, small landholdings to average landholding sizes, low cxpcnditurc 
quintiles to higher expenditure households and from female headed households to 
male headed ones. The rest of the discussion in this section concentrates on discussing 
in some detail the profile of small scale tea growers in Malawi. 
On poverty conditions, NSO (2005) data show that, nationally, 67% of smallholder 
tea growers are poor households of which 35% arc categorized as ultra poor. In 
Thyolo district, the proportion of tea farmers categorized as poor and ultra poor is 
65% and 33% respectively while in Mulanje the proportions are slightly higher at 
69% and 37% respectively. These statistics suggest that only one third of smallholder 
tea farmers in Malawi are non poor households while two thirds arc poor. 
Furthermore, the statistics indicate that half of the poor tea growing households fall in 
the category of ultra poor households. On gender of household head, our survey found 
that 63% of tea growing households in Malawi arc headed by males while the 
remainder of 37% are 
headed by females. The study did not establish any significant 
differences between Thyolo and Mulanje in terms of heads of households that grow 
tea. However, on education status, the study established significant differences 
between Thyolo and Mulanje tea growers. The study observed that while only about 
14% of smallholder tea fanners never attended any education in Thyolo district, the 
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proportion incrcascd to about a third of farmcrs in h1ulanjc district. Furthcr norc, the 
proportion of those attending primary and secondary cducation is significantly highcr 
in'Thyolo district compared to Mulanjc. In Thyolo, 72% and 14% of houschold heads 
attended primary and secondary education compared to 59% and 10°ßö in Mulanje. 
In terms of tea holding sizes, Table 52 shows that 44% and 47% of fanners in Thyolo 
and Mulanje districts respectively cultivate tea fields ranging from 0. Olha to O. Sha. A 
further 24% and 23% in Thyolo and Mulanje rcspectivcly cultivate bctwccn 0.5ha and 
1. Oha suggesting that two thirds of smallholder tea growers in both districts allocated 
a maximum of one hectare to tea cultivation. Table 52 also shows that there arc more 
farmers (29%) in Mulanje that allocated between 1. Oha and 2.0ha of their 
landholdings to tea production compared to 21% in Thyolo. Statistics in the fourth 
quintile show the opposite as there are more 
farmers in Thyolo that allocated in cxccss 
of 2.0ha to cultivation of tea compared to 
5% of h1ulanjc. Overall, the statistics in 
Table 52 shows that one third of farmers in Thyolo and Mulanjc cultivate ovcr 1.0ha 
of tea fields. In addition, the study established that tea fields constituted a third of 
overall household landholding. 
The balance of two thirds of household landholding is 
cultivated to food crops such as maize, cassava, sweet potato, pulses and vegetables. 
In contrast to tea plots where 
farmers practiced monocropping, in all other plots, 
farmers intercropped one or two crops at a time. 
Table 52: Tea holding sizes in Mulanje and Thyolo districts 
Quintiles Thyolo Mulanje 
Land sizes 
1 44% 47% >0.01- 0.5 ha 
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2 24% 23% >0.5 - 1.0 ha 
3 21% 29% >1.0 - 2.0 ha 
q 12% 5% >2.0 
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in terms of ownership of household plots, 68% indicated to have inherited their pieces 
of land from their parents while 28% got fresh allocations from Village l kadmcn, 
who arc custodians of customary land. The rcmaindcr of 5% of houschold farm land 
was reported to have been sourccd through land purchases and rents. The study did 
not establish significant differences between Thyolo and Mulanjc in terms of their 
land ownership patterns. In terms of reasons that either induce or hold back fanners 
from expanding their acreage under tea cultivation, 28% pointed to problems of 
agricultural finance as the main 
bottleneck stopping them from expanding area under 
tea cultivation, 23% indicated problems of low tea prices which arc currently a major 
disincentive, 19% indicated high input costs while only 10% attributed thcir failure to 
cxpand acreage under tea to 
land acquisition problems. What these findings suggest is 
that land as a problem comes 
bottom in terms of key constraints limiting 
extensification of tea cultivation 
in smallholder sub sector. Other critical factors 
include price for tea leaves and inputs; and credit access constraints. These results 
therefore suggest that in order to 
incentivise tea farmers to allocate more land to tea 
cultivation, concerted efforts needs to 
be put towards improving farmers' access to 
agricultural finance, 
improvement in tea prices and possibly subsidisation of fcrtiliscrs 
for smallholder tea farmers on top of support towards farmer's access to more land. In 
terms of practical measures 
for getting more land, 34% of farmers indicated they can 
expand their tea acreage 
by renting an already established tea field, 16% indicated 
they can buy either virgin land or an already established tea 
field, 21% indicated they 
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could ask their Village Headmen for fresh land allocations while 1C1!: indicatcº1 they 
could ask their family mcmbcrs for more inherited land. 19% indiratnl to he unsure 
of strategics they can use to acquire more far Ica cultivation. These stati licit'how 
tl t renting and purchase of land constitute half of the mechanisms by which tcl 
farmers can expand area under tea cultivation while a thin! of the times by which tea 
fawners can expand area under tea cultivation is through inhctitancc and frr: ºh 
allocations from customary land. 
7A3 Market linkages in the Tea supply chain 
7A. 3.1 Structure of tea supply system 
The tea supply system has five key stakeholder groups in as far as matkct linkages for 
inputs (primarily, fertilisers and plant seedlings), credit, services (mainly transport 
and to some extent processing) and outputs (specifically, lea leaves) are concerned 
and these arc; smallholder growers, large scale plantation and processing mill owners, 
the smallholder tea processing factory, buyers, and fertiliser supplying companies. 
Market linkages involving large scale tea plantation owners have rcmainal pretty 
stable over the last four 
decades With growers directly transacting with credit 
suppliers, fertiliser dealers and buyers. On the other hand, market linkages involving 
smallholder Ica farmers have evolved significantly and the next section discusses 
thcsc changes. 
7A. 3.1.1 Evolution in structure of smaliholdcr tea supply system 
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Before Malawi's indcpcndcncc, a small group of smallholdcr fatntcm cultivating Ica 
thcn %vcrc close to plantations oflarge scale tea growers and were ditecily liniýcd in all 
a cts to owners of large scale plantations. Smallholder fanners accc»cd tnatkcti for 
all inputs, services and outputs through owners of plantations. Tcnn* for all 
transactions were decided by plantations owners and small scale grower were 
scncrally assured of market access for inputs, services and outputs. 
Aflcr independence, however, the Government established the Smallhnlifcr Tca 
Authority (STA) with the main aim of promoting and fostering development of tea 
cultivation by smallholder farmers. The core functions of the STA included 
transportation and marketing of smallholder tea, provision of advisory scnices to 
sn=llholdcr tea farmers, provision of credit and inputs to smallholder tca farmers. 
maintenance of relevant infrastructure to support smallholder tea growing, and 
processing of smallholder tea (O'Neill, 1996). The STA was supported financially by 
oovcrnment and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and ror three 
decades, the organisation was at the centre of all transactions involving smallholder 
to growers. Throughout the 1970's, and 1980's, STA facilitated conversion of'. irgin 
ficids into smallholder tea plantations, including such activities as land acquisition, 
tillage, planting of tea seedling and 
distribution of developed fields to farmers at 
highly conccssional fees which were progressively dcductcd from subsequent 
proceeds of their tea sales. 
The STA also supplied necessary farm inputs, mainly 
fcrtiliscrs, to small holder tea farmers in addition to prt ision of advisory and 
extension services. 
During harvesting, STA transported tea leaves from farmers' 
fields to factories where tea leaves were processed into made Ica on behalf of the 
miners. Once processed, STA organised the marketing of smallholder tea and 
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s-ubsc1ucnt paymcnt arrangcmcnts to fanncrs. In this mlv'ct. STA rntvidlc I an 
in aluablc scrvicc linking smallholder Ica farmers to tnarkcts for all inputs, scrvifM 
and outputs. In return, the STA charged a fcc to all farmers for the icnlccs tcn4lcre 
and payments were effected through deductions from fannc s' proceeds during sale or 
produce (Malawi Government, 1989). It was compulsory that that all smallholder tea 
fanners belonged to the STA and at peak production. STA managed about 20 tnillion 
kilograms of Ica lcavcs annually (or close to 4 million kilograms of made Ica) hid 
U- . as processed 
by the company's processing mill. 
i; oWcvcr, following political changes in Malawi in 1993194, interviews with 
management of STC indicated that the new administration persistently interfered with 
the operations of the STA. First, it is reported that appointments to top level 
management positions of STA were based on political allegiances and appca'cmcnt 
rather than on merit, compctcnccs and professional abilities. Only those that 
sympathized with the ruling party were compensated with high ranking positions in 
STA. Secondly, interviews with key informants in the industry indicated that apart 
from lack of sound managerial skills, the new management r gime in STA ran down 
the finances of the company through corrupt practices and general financial 
mismanagemcnt" The result was that STA 
became financially unstable as more money 
from STA went to service the interests of politicians. STj then became a drain on 
smallholder tea farmers' proceeds. 
Thirdly, industry sources indicated that politicians 
w. crc making counterproductive and misleading announcements about the loans STA 
as giving to farmers. Politicians were advising farmers not to repay their loans, as a 
tcvº rd for following particular political parties. 
Thcsc messages led farmers not to 
rcpay their loans on inputs and services they received 
fmm STA and as a consequence. 
376 
dcbts or STA grau furthcr and comrromiscd the ability of STA to mulct iti usual 
scr vccs to smallholdcr tca fanncrt. lntcrvicwrs with key infbnnants in the industry 
r vcalcd that between 1994 and 2000, STA went through tIirrcult tinics. As it 
company. its liabilities bccamc unsustainablc to the point that STA could no 14ongcr 
mange its operations. Some creditors also dragged STA to courts as a last tcMntt to 
r, ccovcr their money and this eventually led to impounding or sonic vital capital a. -octs 
of the company, including company vchiclcs which were normally used to tran`pott 
tca leaves from farmers' fields to the factory. Utility pmvidcrs, mainly watet, power 
and telecommunication service providers, also stopped their scrvicc provision to STA 
offices and the Ica factory on several occasions due to unsettled hills. 
, '%s a result of these dcvvclopmcnts, the 
following conscqucnccs fo11ow%-cd: 
First, STA no longer sustained its ability to provide vital sen ices to smallholdcr Ica 
fanners, such as supply of tea seedlings, fertilisers and advisory services. on tea 
filings, until 1994, STA used to multiply tea seedlings in its nucscrics to supply in 
smallholder farmers to 
fill gaps in their fields or to plant new fields. Ilo% cct, with 
growing financial and managerial 
hardships in STA, the company could no longer 
perform this scrvicc and 
farmers had no%vlicrc to go to access Ica scrdlings. Failure to 
access tea seedlings meant that 
farmers could no longer (a) "lace their dead plant 
stations in their tea 
fields and this lad to poor plant population and field roper. (b) 
open new fields of tea plantations; or (c) pursue the rcplanting program in %hich Old 
Indian tea varieties wcrc being replaced by high yielding and high value clonal tea 
%. arictics. On fertiliser supply, 
before the crisis. STA used to buy fcrtiliscrs from 
suppliers either on cash or through 
NIRFC loans and distribute these to fanners on 
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crcdit with rcpaymcnts deductcd from the procccds of farntcti' tci sales. IInwc%. cr, 
with the politicisation of the credit system. STA was unable to ucecss fcttilieerx tin 
credit to supply its fanners. The company also strugglal to tepay the unrcitlc%l dellt 
with both fertiliser supplying companies and 1\1111T. 
Sccondly, with the seizure of STA vchiclcs. the company could no longer sustain Its 
ability to ferry tea leaves from smallholder 
fanners' fields to factories for rrx sing. 
It is reported that out of a possible 20 million kilogram quantity of ficld Ica leaves, 
only about 2 million kilograms could 
be transported in a )rar by STA. The tc t was 
cithcr wasted or diverted to nearby plantation owners. The immediate consqucncc, 
for this included; 
STA factories could no longer work at full capacity, and hence operated 
inefficiently and at high unit costs as mills w ere Ding idle for long periods 
while incurring fixed costs. It is rvportcd that pmc sing capacity fell front 
100 tonnes of tea leaves per day in 1994 to 15 tonnes in 200. Not only did 
this raise unit processing costs, but also it inczcascd maintenance and scmice 
costs of the processing mills; 
r (ii) tea leaves in farmers fields were ovcrgro%%ing and %%herc farmers triel to 
pluck their tea leaves, they ended up seeing them withering away and drying 
before being collected by STA; and, 
(iii) Whcrc farmers were lucky in that STA trtnsportcd their tea lca%-cs, oflcn 
this was done after long periods of waiting which could be as long its a weck. 
In this case, farmers lost out on quality and quantity (weight) of tea leaves due 
to withering, but also long periods of waiting for STA vehicles meant that 
farmers had to waste more time and money (both in terms of opportunity cost 
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of doing othcr things and actual moncy span on buying fiIxl %%hitr waiting fr1r 
vchiclcs to comc and pick thcir tca Icavcs from ficitl ahadcs). 
Thief, on market arrangements for smallholder tea, it is reported that before 1') 4. 
60% of processed smallholder tea was sold through the Limbc auction market %%lillc 
30% and 10% were sold through direct contracts and forward contracts rc: slVCjivcly' 
However, since 1994, the proportion of tea sold through the auction market feil to 
10% by 2000 while that of forward contract grew fn)m 10% to 90%. 57'A changed to 
forward contract for three main reasons; (i) to reduce on waiting time of payment by 
half from 14 days of auction market to 6 days of lbrwanl contract in a bid to impflivc 
cash now problems; (ii) to avoid paying auction market fees thereby improving its 
prices and turnover, and, (iii) to take advantage of credit arrangements shier buyers 
gave STA to help alleviate cash flow problems. The main disadvantage of for and 
contracts however is that prices arc negotiated in advance and growers do not then 
take advantage of seasonal price increases as their tea gets locked up in long contracts 
with buyers. The problem of 
low smallholder tea prices was compounded by high unit 
costs of STA due to low throughput and 
high transport costs. A combination of these 
factors led STA fail to pay its workers and farmers their earnings. taking as long as 
six months or more to 
have them paid. 
In the light of these developments, many farmers decided to negotiate with large scale 
plantation owners so that they could supply their tea 
leaves to them. Estate owners 
wcrc delighted by this move 
because it meant more throughput of lea lea cs in their 
factories, especially of clonal teas; they therefore quickly came to negotiations with 
f crs" groups. They agreed to negotiate a seasonal contract which included prices 
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for buying tea leaves from farmers, a loan package for provision cif cssanial inputs in 
be repaid through deductions from proceeds, and monthly and timely ra)tncut (jr 
fancrs" revenues in return for commitment fronm fanners together with their fanner 
associations to cnsurc that tea leaves arc not divcricd to a third ratty. By 2C 0ß, m"ct 
4.000 smallholder tea growers producing roughly around 18 million kilograms or tea 
leaves switched from STA in favour of estates contracts. 'slic majority of these 
farmers claimed they could no longer cling to SPCA hCCausc of the operational 
problems of the company. 
f ionvcvcr, about 400 smallholdcr growers producing about 2 million kilograms of tea 
leaves still remained with the smallholder tea company. They argued they could not 
lave STA in favour of large scale plantation owners. Reasons given for this included 
a strong sense of ownership especially in their active involvement in decision making 
of STA, flexibility in 
loan deductions such that when their are other pressing 
problems such as 
funerals, STA could understand and adjust repayment schcdulcs, 
provision of credits which were not related to tea 
farming, rescheduling of deductions 
during difficult seasons especially when there were prolonged dry spells. provision of 
annual bonuses, and, security concerns especially concerning acceptance of cstatcs of 
some smallholder 
low quality Was. Farmers argued they preferred to stick to STA in 
the hope that it may recover and 
become viable once again. 
7, l, 3,1,2 Prevailing structure In smallholder tea supply system 
Currcnt structures for market linkages for supply of inputs, scr%iccs and purchase of 
to lcavcs from smallholder 
farmers are dominated by interlocking systems. 9ON; of 
lliioldcr tea farmers arc in interlocking arrangements with large scale plantation 
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owners while the remaining 10% of farmers arc in interlocking artangc, ncnts as 
members of the Smallholder Tca Company (STC), a company that was lxtm out of the 
mtructuring of STA. Through these interlocking systems. smallholder fannc , nccc. s 
inputs and services on loans which arc deducted during sale of prckfucc. fanners are 
Also required to sell all their tca leaves to transacting partners only, and in onlcr that 
this is fully enforced, farmers surrounding a particular factory organise than chh-cs 
into what arc known as Zones which have leadership which negotiates on twhalfof nll 
the fanners in that zone with plantation owners on the tams of their contract 
agrccments. During the production period, the leadership of the zones register all 
fanners belonging to their zones and coordinate input mquicanents for all their 
farmers and their subsequent delivery. Leadership ofzoncs also negotiate on bchaifof 
their farmers on prices of tea leaves with factory owners at the beginning of each 
season. During 
harvesting (plucking of tea leaves), leadership of zones draw up 
}ar csting plans which they agree with factory owners so that harvesting by all 
farmers follows a recommended 21 day plucking period. Leadership of zones also 
follow up on every farmer under their zones to ensure that they do not breach the 
agreement by selling their tea 
leaves to another factory owner. On their pari factory 
owners enforce this agreement 
by sharing lists of farmers with each other so that they 
know which farmers are under which zone and factory owner ag gcm. 
me section now discusses specific details of individual market linkages beginning 
7th seed market then fertiliser market, transport scr% ice and finally produce market: 
ýp Seed Market linkages 
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On tea sccdling supply, large scale plantation owners manage Wurmes ahcrc they 
raise their tea seedlings and when smallholder famcrs under their ntntractx 11cinand 
thcsc tea sccdlings, they arc provided to them at prices dctcnninc%l by plantalinn 
ovºWncrs and payments arc made through deductions from pz cols of smallholder 
farmcrs" tea. With respect to farmers under STC. the company does not cuttvrntly (1%% 11 
and manage any nurseries so they arc not filling laps in their fields and expansion of 
fields is also temporarily suspended. Interviews with smallholder farmers indicated 
that 99% of tea seedlings in their plantations were sourced fromm the former STA 
company. Only 1% indicated to have secured some of their tea seedlings from large 
plc plantation owners. Interviews with fanners indicated that in the last Ike )rare, 
farmers found it increasingly difficult to access any Ica sccdlings. As a cult, farmers 
were unable to fill gaps 
in their tea fields and were at the same time unable to cxparxl 
their tea fields. 84% of fanners interviewed in this study indicated that curnantly their 
fields do not have recommended plant population stand while 16% indicated to have 
fairly good plant populations. Farmers attributed poor field cover due to unavailability 
of suppliers of tea seedlings. 
They argued that since STA stopped suppling planting 
materials to them, they 
have been unable to get Ica cuttings from anywhce. They 
argued that even where 
farmers had gone into contract agrccmcnts with large 
plantation owners, supply of 
tea cuttings is never a priority for both farmers and 
plantation owners. 
Farmers argued that on their part they do not demand tea seedlings 
for fear of deductions at the end of the season. They argued that plantation o%%-ncrs 
deduct all loans in one season whereas such dcv clopmcnt costs ww en: spread ov c 
longer periods of time when they were sourcing tea sccdlings from STA. On the other 
}and, supply of tea cuttings from tea plantation owners is more limited as plantation 
oµ. ncrs only graft them 
if they themselves need them. In addition, it is not 
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cconomically viabic for cstatcs to bran a handful of Ica sccdlings fier a fov 
smallholdcr farmcrs. Apart from poor crop stand among smallholdcr tea growc". 111e 
study also cstablishcd that 87% of smallholdcr Ica fanner still have tea liclds %vitlr tow 
quality and low yielding Ica varictics. It arrears that the replanting cxctrixc ha% not 
y, ct bone very far in smallholder Ica sub sector and the argument is that availability of 
clonal tea cuttings is the main reason constraining smallholdcr tea farmers from 
replanting their fields. 
Fertiliser market linkage 
J, C On fcrtiliscr supply, smallholder fanners under contract with owners of large Ic tea 
plantations forward their fertiliser requests in tcrms of quantities and t) C to large 
scale estate owners at the beginning of the growing season. Once infonnation on 
quantities and types of fertilisers is consolidated, plantation owners go ahead and 
pumhaSc these fcrtiliscrs in bulk using 
funds borrowed from commcrcial banks. These 
fertilisers arc supplied to farmers on loan at prices dctamincd by plantation owners 
d recovery of these loans is done through deductions from proceeds of sale of 
smallholder farmers' tea. 
Interviews with key informants in the industry revealed that 
plantation owners have 
been able to recover their money since the inception of the 
credit program. A similar arrangement 
is also applicable in theory to farmcrs under 
STC, but in practice no one has been able to benefit from the atrsngcmcnt over the 
past five years due to current 
financial difficulties of STC. In 20O5'O6 season, the 
study established that 
half of smallholder tea farmers accessed bctwrccn one and three 
cgs of fertilisers from large scale plantation owners on loans %%hich were deducted 
during sale of produce. A third of farmers indicated they did not access any fcttiliscrs 
bccausc STC did not supply them with any fertilisers. The remainder of a quarter of 
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firmcrs indicatcd thcy did not acccss any fcrtiliscrs fm", tca plantation owncni ! `sir 
fcar of deductions at the cnd of the scason. All fan ncrx intcrvicww-c I in tills xtudy 
indicatcd using Icss than recommended ratcs23 of fcrtiliscrs in their Ica liclck at a 
result of cithcr fearing dcductions or failure of STC to supply than with fcitilisc u. 
(iii) Transport arrangements 
On transport, both owners of large scale tea plantations and SIC arrnnge with 
smallholder farmers and their zone group leaders harvesting schedules that fit with 
factory processing and throughput plans. Once these har esting plans are agrvcd. 
farmers pluck their tea leaves on agreed dates and put their tea leaves in field shades 
u-here vehicles from factory owners come and pick up the tea leaves. In many cases, 
farmers would hire workers to help them with tea plucking and once harvesting is 
finished, farmers would wait at field shades until these vehicles arrive. WW'hcn vchiclcs 
arrivc, clerks from company owners together with 
farmers weigh the Ica leaves and 
record the fresh weights 
before collection. They also sign and countersign against 
quantities of leaves transacted as these cvcntually act as basis for pamcnts of farmers. 
In terms of payment for transport costs, the study cstablishcd that both plantation 
owners and STC buy 
farmers' tea leaves at faun gate prices: costs for transporting tea 
leaves from farmers fields to factories arc borne by factory owners and not individual 
fa ncrs. Interviews with farmers under contract agrccmcnt with plantation o%%-ners 
rcvcalcd that 
factory owners abide by their harvesting schcdulc so that transport is 
sent on agreed 
dates and times. As such, farmers do not have problems with %%-ailing 
for long periods for these vehicles to arrive and also do not experience their Ica leaves 
µithcring and/or 
drying. On the other hand, inter iews with smallholder fanners 
zI If axse recommendations are indeed optimal. taking into s«ount input and output niece. Cowl or 
capital and risks 
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under STC indicated that STC do not stick to the ngr cd time table. Our survcy round 
that 30% or the timcs, STC vehicles took two days to (lick tea Ic. wcs 6x, 111 (an11Ct% 
f clds, 25% of the timcs, thcy took thrcc days, 230,: of the timcs four days and 1)% if 
the timcs over five days and only l3°9 of the times did they stick to the b}ivJJ 
timcframc. 
STC highlighted vehicle shortages and cash flow problems as reasons (or their failure 
to stick to the agreed time schedules. T ey also attributed this to wide gmgn pbical 
coverage of their farmers between the two major tea growing districts. T h)olo und 
liulanjc. Thus, while their factory is located in hfulanjc district. their %-chiclCs neat to 
go to all corners of the two districts to pick tea leaves of farmers all the way to their 
factory. This is in sharp contrast to their counterpart lac scale plantation owners 
who arc in contract agreement with smallholder farmers %%ithin dctincd surroundings 
of their factories. In this respect, STC incurs more transport costs compared to tea 
plantation owners. On the part of smallholder 
farmers however, delays in plucking 
their tea leaves has a number of implications. First, it means that farmers have to incur 
more costs in terms of opportunity cost of time and expenses on food and other things 
0 they wait for these vehicles. Our study found out that farmers incur costs ranging 
from USS0.30Iday to USS 1.17/day in form of payment for hired labour to look aller 
their tea leaves, food expenses and in some cases phone expenses inquiring of the 
whereabouts of STC vehicles. 
Secondly, delays in picking tea leaves also lead to 
uythcring and drying which reduces the weight and quality of Ica leaves. In cases, 
, where the tea leaves arc 
finally picked, farmers do not worry so much about the 
quality because they agree with 
STC a uniform purchasc price but %%hene there is loss 
in weight, farmcrs worry as that becomes a direct cost to than. Interviews with 
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farmers indicated losses ranging from valucs of USS20 and USS320 per (aaltet' Ill 
2005/06 as losses farmers incurred due to losses in quantity of thcic tea tatest. tu 
some extreme cases, the loss to farmers may mcan either throwing away the c mite 
harvest because it dried to the point that it could no longer he t'c ovctd far lpnmc ºing 
or in some cases their fields may overgrow because STC companies ncvcr conrnnal 
picking of Ica leaves and farmers did not go to their fields and harrest their mature Ica 
leaves. in this respect, fanners lost their crop as they could not harvest in time and 
sale hence the loss is the value of the crop and in our survcy we found that in 2003 all 
farmers interviewed under STC reported to have incurred losses either due to 
overgrowing or drying or both in one or more of their harvesting cycles. In tams of 
value, farmers estimated these losses to be in excess of hundreds of dollars. 
(iv) Tea marketing arrangements 
Slarkcting of tea leaves in Malawi is done at two lcvcls. The first lc%cl cxclusi%. cly 
involves marketing of smallholder fresh tea leaves from fam crs to buyers, who arc in 
this case, STC and plantation owners. This marketing account for roughly 13% to 
15% of the tea leaves produced in Malawi and all tea leaves produced by the 
smallholder sub sector. Under this marketing arrangement, as notal melier, leaders of 
f. uncr zones agree with plantation owners and STC at the beginning of the season an 
contract teems which among other things include farm gate prices by i hieb these 
buyers would buy tea leaves from farmers during that season. lntcnicws %itl, key 
informants in the industry revealed that plantation owners and STC a pm bcfarchand 
on the prices that they would buy tea leaves from farmers and since these prices arc 
ddcrmincd at the beginning of the season, they are based on processed prices (mitt 
the previous season. In 2005/06 season, these prices were pegged at USSO. tl. 1; g 
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to, mparcd to Limbc auction markct pricc of proccsscd lea of U5S 1. O(l, I4 . i'a}mciti la 
rarmcrs on their tea lcavcs is cfTcctcd monthly during the tea scauott and ranncnt arc 
gz cn procccds lcss all dcductions. Oncc plantation owtl cvs and SIC buy Ica 1cat-cs 
from farmcrs, they takc the tca leaves to their factorics u. hctc they prm ci s the Ira 
leaves into processed tea and this is the tea that plantation owners and SIC matkct In 
the second stage of tea marketing. At this stage, there are two main channels by a hiclt 
praccsscd tea is marketed. 
The first channel is through the auction markct in Limbe. This market was c, %tablishaf 
well before independence of htala%vi in 1964 and is among the leading ten major tea 
auction markets in the world, 
in particular, it is one of the only two tea auction 
markets in Africa, the other one being Mombasa market in Kenya. Apart (mm Ica 
from Malawi, Limbe market also transacts other teas from Tanzania., Mozambique, 
Zambia and other countries in the region. Tea Brokers (Malawi) Limited is the owner 
of Limbe tea auction market premises and 
is brokerage company for all teas sold 
through the market. As a company, Tea Brokers (Nlala%%i) Limited was established in 
1966 and is privately owned by two multinational companies, namely, Global Tea and 
Commodity Group (with over 501 oleo shares) and Africa Leaf Tca Brokers (35% sham). 
The remaining shares are owned by staff of the company. In terms of Ica buyers, the 
market has around 28 registered tea 
buyers but only five to eight are regular and 
active buyers and these 
include; Lipton (a subsidiary of Unilcv-cr %%ith a market share 
of 20°iä to 30%), Standard 
Central Africa Limited (a subsidiary of Tctlcy UK 
Company with a market share of 10% to 15%), Global Tca and Commodity (ahiclt 
has a market share of around 10%), Van Rces Company (has market share of 10% to 
15gß. ), International Tea Services (which has a market share of about 124.: ), Targct 
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(with a 10% market share), Rab Processors (witli an 8% matkct share) and 1. Tea 
Investments (with about 9% market share). These burrs arge among inicntational tea 
merchants who buy tea from auction markets all over the world on behalf elf parenlt 
tca blending companies who ultimately blend their tea and supply to supCnnatkct* 
across the globe using their brand names. It is cstimatcd that up to 40% of Malawi tea 
, op 11 is sold through 
the auction market. As a market, Limbc auction is olol- K istic and Is 
difcrcnt from Mombasa where over 60 buyers compete vigorously on pricer, and thi±t 
is why an estimated 5% to 10% of Malawi tea is transported and sold thmug. 11 tile 
Mombasa market as growers search for better prices. 
The second method is through direct and forward contract sales of tea to bu)rnc and 
this method is steadily growing in its importance. Under direct sales, Plantation owner 
and STC sell their tea directly to merchants aller negotiating on prices and terms of 
payment. Plantation owners and STC argue that they are able to save expenses on 
auction market brokerage fees while at the same time being able to ncgotiate for short 
payment periods which effectively assist them with short term cash now problems. In 
y cases, negotiated prices arc benchmarked against those prevailing at the auction 
market, and some observers, including the Tea Association of Malawi, have argued 
that direct contracts negatively affect grower margins as buyers usually dictate prices 
that arc lower than those of auction market. On the other hand, plantation owners and 
SIC find such contracts attractive as they act as hedging mechanism against market 
price volatility. This arrangement also ensures cash flow management plans. On their 
part, buyers see this as the only way they can cnsurc getting the right quantities of teas 
at the right time, quality and price 
for their furthcr merchandise. 
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Summarising the structure of tea production and marketing system in Malawi, two 
things are prominent in the production system while one theme seems to underline the 
marketing system. The first feature prominent in the production system is that 
plantation owners have vertically and horizontally integrated their production system, 
Vertically, plantation owners have integrated tea production and processing thereby 
avoiding problems of supply of tea leaves to their processing mills. In this way, 
plantation owners are assured of continuous supply of adequate quantities of tea 
leaves for their processing mills. Horizontally, plantation owners have integrated their 
activities through mergers and acquisitions of other plantations and processing mills 
which have improved their economics of scale and subsequently ensured their 
survival. The second feature prominent in the production system is the interlocking 
practice in which smallholder tea farmers are interlocked with richer STC or 
plantation owners. Through the interlocking system, smallholder farmers arc able to 
access markets for inputs, services and outputs. This has parallels with the vertical 
integration by plantation owners. In the structure of tea marketing, the auction market 
for tea in Malawi is oligopolistic. The next section picks up on prevailing structure of 
tea production and marketing and examines conduct of players in these market 
arrangements. 
7.4.4 Conduct of players in the tea supply system 
This analysis discusses the conduct of players in market linkages for supply of inputs, 
services and purchase of produce 
in Malawi's sugar supply system. In the seedling 
market, being a perennial crop, purchase of seedlings is catcgoriscd more as a fixed/ 
capital or development cost, unlike 
in annual crops where seed purchases are regarded 
as variable costs. Thus, once tea seedlings are purchased and planted, they take a 
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gestation period of five to eight years for the plantation to achieve a full rcld rf%ct 
and give out maximum harvcstablc quantities of tea leaves and fnnn Ihcn on, the 
plantation can carry on for over forty years without bring n placcxl. Fett the case of 
! Malawi however, there is a replacement program going-on in %%hich old plantations 
arc being replaced by high yielding and high valued tea plantations. So far, $01. of 
national acreage has already been replaced and the balance of 90% is fixt it, be 
replanted. This exercise is however expensive as it denies smallholdcr fannc and 
plantation owners opportunity to harvest and sell anything during the period the new 
plantation is regenerating and maturing. In the absence of a large scale replanting 
program like this one, tea seedlings arc still demanded by farmers in order to rill gars 
in their fields where original plants die, but also where there is an expansion program 
into new tea fields, tea seedlings would be demanded by farmcrs. 
This study established apparent demand for tea seedlings among tea gmwcrs in 
Malawi. On the supply side, plantation owners and STA integrated their other supply 
chain functions with tea seedling multiplication using cultisvars that acre bred by a 
government sponsored Tea Research Foundation (TRF). The TRW conducted selection 
and breeding of the current clonal tea varieties while plantation owners and STA 
multiply these cultivars in their nurseries for onward planting in their fields. `slic 
European Union with STABEX (Stablization of Export Earnings) financing has 
assisted the tea industry 
in this programme, both in the selection and breeding of 
clonal tea varieties and in the establishment of nurseries. As a rault of both 
government and EU support, tea seedlings for both large scale plantation owners and 
smallholder farmers are produced and supplied at subsidised prices as opposed to full 
cost. In fact, the main cost that worries both large scale farmers and small scale 
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farmcrs in the rcplanting program is not the actual cost of the tea walling . but rather 
the loss in revenue during the period of re-growth of the plantations, lntcrvic%%-% with 
plantations owners revealed that the replanting program arrears to he slow Ix use 
oWncrs of plantations have phased their replanting program in such a way that they 
still remain in business and viable even during the rcplanting program. llo vci"cr, a 
related problem to this is that plantation owners only raise tea sccdlingi w-hcn they 
know they will need tea seedlings, otherwise they would not manage nurscric*. 1lic 
conscqucncc for this is that there is no readily available market for tea seedlings 
where small scale farmers may easily go and source tea seedlings for their fields. 
Interviews with key informants indicated it was this apparent lack ofrcadily available 
markets for tea seedlings which prompted the EU Stabcx support program to support 
the industry. The idea in this program is to support plantation o%%-ners manage 
nurseries for tea seedlings so that there is a supply of tea seedlings for both small 
scale growers and large scale gowcrs. Prices for tea seedlings arc therefore agreed 
bctwccn Government, EU's country office and growers, and are subsidized prices. 
Conduct of players in the tca fertiliser market can be viewtiwed fmm two market points. 
The first market point is transaction between fertiliser supplier and large Scale 
plantation owners, STC and some small scale farmers. At this mar et point, lame 
scale plantation owners, STC and some small scale farmers, just like any other burrs 
of fertilisers, go to market outlets of 
fertiliser supplying companies and buy fertiliser. 
Details of conduct of fertiliser suppliers together Willi the way fcrtiliscr prices are 
discovered arc the same as those discussed under tobacco in charter six. The sand 
market point involves fertiliser transactions between large scale plantation owners and 
STC on one hand and the rest of small scale farmers on the other hand. As alrcady 
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claboratcd in the previous section, fcrtiliscr transactions are part of the intcrlocking 
system between smallholder farmers and plantation owncts and STC in the Malawi 
tea supply system. In this market transaction, plantation owners and Si`C give xtnall 
scale farmers (who cannot afford to buy on their own) fcttiliscm tin loins a1IICh are 
dcductcd during sale of produce. It is part of their interlocking ag rctttettt that small 
scale farmers sell their tea to no one else other than their transacting partners on 
fcrtiliscrs. The system has in-built cnforccmcnt mechanisms which ensure that all 
players especially smallholder farmers abide by contractual tcrnts. In this t,, «1. 
plantation owners and STC integrate 
fertiliser supply to smallholdcrs with oll er 
supply chain functions. As 
for prices farness pay for these fcrtiliscts, they ate 
determined by plantation owners and STC. Interviews With plantation owners 
indicated that apart from the actual purchase price of fertilisers from fertiliser 
supplying companies, on one 
hand these fertilisers arc purchased in bulk and therefore 
in principle unit prices were likely to be lower, however, due to transport costs and 
capital costs (mainly due to 
interest on money borrowcd from commercial banks), 
final prices of these fertilisers fall within retail prices of 11yolo and hfulanjc districts. 
an assertion which this study verified. 
Smallholder tea farmers in Malawi thcteforc 
havc two options for sourcing fertilisers, either through interlocking partners or 
dough direct sourcing from retail fertilizer market outlets. Interviews with 
smallholder farmers showed that two thirds preferred sourcing 
fertilisers through their 
interlocking partners, mainly due to the credit arrangement bile a third prcfcnvd 
direct sourcing from suppliers arguing loan deduction reduces their profits. 
on transport and processing functions, they are both intcgmtcd within the supply 
chain functions of largc scalc plantation owncrs and STC. Smaliholdcr fannct arc not 
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dircctly linked to markcts for thcsc two services bc+causo they rcl1 Ira lc. %t tight to 
thcir Tann gatcs. On thcir part, hawcvcr, plantation owncri and STC have thcir twit 
tractors or vehicles which they use to transport their purchased teas to thcir factctrics, 
in this respect, these markets arc fully intcgratcd in their other functions. On 
marketing, transaction of tea leaves between plantation owncrr and SIC on one hand 
and smallholder farmers on the other hand arc done as part of the interlocking 
aanbcmcnt. As already highlighted, prices for Ica leaves at this market point are 
uniform and arc discovered through negotiations between plantation owners. SIC and 
leaders of smallholder farmer groups. In this respect, faun gate prices for tea are 
discovered through cartel like arrangement and the next section examines the extent 
of efficiency of these prices. Marketing of processed teas, on the other hand, is done 
both through the auction system and contracts. intenicws from key informants also 
indicated existence of weak competition in auction market system due to cartel like 
conduct of buyers. Again this issue is investigated 
further in the next section. 
7A. 5 Performance of the tea supply system 
Discussion in this section is approached from two main view points. First, the section 
discusses how well markets for seedlings, fertilisers, transport, processing and output 
.c operating in the tea supply system and secondly, the section discusses impacts of 
performance of these markets on supply system 
indicators of yield, quality and profit 
margins. On performance of the 
tea seedling market, the study established apparent 
difficulties in supply of tea seedlings. As already indicated. plantation owners 
integrated multiplication of tea seedlings within their business models and only 
multiply tea seedlings as and when they need than themselves: therm are no 
independent bodies specializing at multiplying and distributing tea seedlings. Als a 
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result of this, smallholdcr farmcrs who in most cascs demand only a handful or tca 
scailings at a time rind it difficult to ncccss tca sccdling whcn thcy nom! 96% 
of farmcrs intcrvicwcd in this study reported lack of a tnaact for Ica smiling supply 
as major obstacle constraining them from filling cxisting gaps in thcir tea plantatiart±t 
and mccting recommended plant populations. Failure to acct s Ica smilings is alms 
hampcring their prospects for cxpanding their tea fields. As fier plantation ownci, the 
study cstablishcd that they have no problems with tea seedling supply as ihcy sitttply 
multiply on their own as and when they need them. 
On fcrtiliscr market, the study cstablishcd that supply is not a prol)lcin to both large 
scale and small scale farmers. They both can access fcrtiliscm fcom trtail market 
outlets of fertiliser suppliers across the two districts. however, %%-hilc this is ficasiblc 
for plantation owners and small scale farmers under contract with plantation annrncrs 
who get their fertilisers on loan from plantation owners as Patt of interlocking 
rangcmcnt, smallholder fanners under STC find it increasingly difficult to access 
fertilisers on their own. Thus, although farmers under the STC interlocking 
arrangement have a clause in their agreement that includes fanners' access to 
fertilisers on loan, STC does not supply these farmers with fertilisers owing to the 
financial difficulties which STC is going through. 9S% of farmers intcr%icuwc 1 in this 
study in interlocking arrangement with STC pointed to difficulties in accessing 
fertilisers as a major bottleneck in their tea production activities. Tic study 
established that these farmers do not apply any fertilisers to their tea fields due to 
failure to access fertilisers as a result of problems in accessing credit. on the other 
}and, although smallholder farmers under interlocking arrange ncnt with plantation 
owners arc able to access fertilisers on loan from their interlocking partners, these 
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farmcrs do not acccss rccommcndcd quantilics for their (iclds. Thcy atqucd Ihcy 
demand and apply less than recommended ratcs because they fear cxrcticttcin8 Large 
deductions from their proceeds. In this respect, the study cstablisbed low usal-, c or 
fertilisers across smallholder tea fanncrs in Malawi. 
on transport arrangements, as already highlighted, it is smallholder farmers under 
interlocking arrangement with STC who arc experiencing difficulties and losses. This 
function is integrated within the functions of buyer and therefore in principle 
smallholder farmers should not have been worrying about this function. l loww-c%-ct, as 
already pointed, smallholder fanners under interlocking arrangement with SIC are 
worrying about their transport arrangements. Similarly, the processing function is also 
integrated within supply chain functions of plantation owners and S`i'C and to a large 
extent it can be argued it is a market which is weil under the control of plantation 
owners and STC. On marketing of tea leaves howc%-cr, fanners under interlocking 
arrangement with STC indicated dissatisfaction. Thus, while the agreement is there 
within their interlocking arrangement, STC does not send vehicles in time and 
regularly and this cost these farmers a lot as already discussed. Othcr%visc, apart fnMm 
this problem, the other marketing problem faced by all smallholder tea suppliers is the 
perceived low market prices 
for unprocessed teas. All fanners intervic wcd indicated 
their dissatisfaction over the prices they arc offer d by plantation OWncts and STC. As 
highlighted, in 2005/06 season, these prices were pegged at USS0.091 g compared to 
Limbo auction market price of pros ssed tea of USSI. 001; g. Fanners argue these 
prices are low and do not cover costs of production. This study established that these 
prices arc formed through measures of cartel arrangements and sugScstions of being 
inefrcicnt prices could therefore not be ruled out. 
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With respect to marketing of processed Ica, interviews with plantation u%%Ilct% ntu! 
STC also revealed that market access is not much or n pmblcttm as prices. 71hcy argued 
that prices they get from the auction market are lower than thoc prevailing in 
? Mombasa market. Plantation owners argue that the Limbc auction market is tint 
competitive enough and that the buyers arc in a cartel. On the tither hand. buy m 
argue that they buy low prices in Limbc compared to Mombasa bceausc till top of the 
purchase price, buyers incur 10 ccnts/kg on inland transport from Limbc to the nearest 
port, another 1.0 ccnt/kg for logistics and 5.0 cent/kg for intcm. t on capital due to the 
time lag in the tea business between Limbc and Mombasa markets. They argue that as 
a result of these additional costs, they 
buy Malawi tea at lower prices compared to that 
of Mombasa. In 2005/06 season, average Limbe auction market prices wart 
USS1.00/kg compared to USSI. 55/kg for Mombasa. interviews with plantation 
owners highlighted the remaining unexplained gap 
between the two prices as an 
indication that Malawi prices arc low and they argued it is the gap in prices that make 
some plantation owners transport their tea 
for sale at the Mombasa market. 
in terms of the impact of performance of individual supply chain markcts ott the 
overall supply system, the study observed that %vcakncsscs in seed and fertiliser 
markets arc adversely affecting yield, quality and quantity of tea pmduccd by the 
smallholder tea sub sector. 
The study observed that out ofa possible 25,000 kglta of 
unprocessed tea leaves, smallholder 
farmers arc only producing 5.000 I; g1ia. 11oor 
plant population and 
low usage of fertilisers are reported to be the main mason 
. plaining the 
low yields in smallholder tea sub sector. Similarly, on quality of Ica cy 
from the smallholder sub sector, the study established that out of a possible 9S% of 
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proccsscd tea bcing first grade, the smallholdcr sub sector is currcnily only achieving 
G0% and this is down from 85% in 1994. Again, low fertiliser usage anti failure, to 
abide by the 21 day plucking period arc considered two of the main rea . Ins %%hy Ihcte 
is a decline in first grade tea from smallholder teas. The declining trend in xtnallholilcr 
fumcr yields coupled with lack of expansion in the industry due to Ica s Bing 
problem have stalled output from the Malawi tea supply system. For n%vr two (imulc% 
now, production of processed teas in Malawi has rtmaincd stable at 40.000 metric 
tones. Key informants in the industry indicate that national output can easily he up 
scaled if impediments in smallholder seed and fertiliser markets am addrMr i. At 
smallholder farmers' level, declining )iclds and static prices means that their 
profitability is also declining. Thus, with prices of USS0.091g their margin gets 
down to less than US$0.01/kg after deductions on fertilisers and other costs have been 
made which effectively means their profitability is low. 98% of smallholder fanncri 
intcr%ic%vcd in this study indicated that they have cxpcricnccd falling profits in the last 
f vC years and they attributed this to low yields and to static produccr prices. 
74.6 Summary of tea supply and marketing systcm 
This section has discussed the structure, conduct and performance of market link gcs 
for supply of inputs, services and produce markets in Malawi's tea supply s»»xtcxn. 
this summary draw from the discussion in this section and explain how market 
linkages for inputs, services and produce impact on acreage Supply responses. 
intensification responses and price transmission from the world market to Mala%vi. 
on arca rcsponscs to prices, the study considers asset sjxrificity problems associated 
with processing and perennial crops as main reasons explaining the negligible or= 
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responscs to priccs in Malawi's tca supply systctit. Tlic study obscncd that (mcc a 
field is planted to tca, then the plantation stays tikc that for sc cnd )cat% bc(iitr 
ploughing it out as dccisions to cithcr incrvasc or dcctcasc ar a or tea ate bast Ott 
long term strategic goals and decisions as opposed to short tcnn %-ariati ons in such 
factors as annual prices. The study also observed that inct asc s or dcarases in tea 
Icavcs output has implications on processing capacity in that output or tcI leaves 
beyond existing processing capacity means that more in%vstmcnts in pnicc. Ming 
capacity should be made and where output of tea is less than existing capacity that it 
means there is undcrutilisation of processing capacity. In this rv. pcct. output of ica 
leaves needs to be balanced with processing capacity, hence any adjuatrncrnt in tea 
area and output has implications on processing. 't'his being the case, supply responses 
in as far cxtcnsification is concerned is both dctcnnincd by asset specificity rmblcrim 
associated with perennial nature of the crop and processing. 
On intcnsification of tea production, the study obscrvod that the tea industry in 
Malawi constitutes both large scale and small scale producers and that large scale 
producers have vertically and 
horizontally integrated key functions of the supply 
»stcm including production, processing and export of processed teas in some rases; 
thereby better linked to various markets associated with their supply syste n. On the 
other hand, smallholder 
farmers are linked to various markets in the supply systcm 
through interlocking arrangements with 
large scale plantation owners or STC and in 
this way, smallholder farmers arc as well 
better linked to markets for inputs. services 
and produce. However, 
farmers under interlocking arrangement with STC still have 
weak market conditions 
for supply of inputs, services and produce matkcts due to 
other administrative problems within 
STC. Furthermore, though small ldcr famtcrrs 
398 
undcr interlocking arrangements with large scale plantation owNepal are axsumi of 
tnarkct acccss of inputs such as seeds and rc tiliscrs, but thcir uptake is con%trainctl by 
Profitability problems, as a result, intensification under snta1111oldlcr Ica fafmcm 14 
generally low. The study considers the low intensification under small) oldcr fanner 
sub sector as impacting on intensification responses of the Malawi's Ica irklustry. 
on price transmission within the supply s}stcm, the study vicwcd dominance ()r 
capital intensive players only in the market transaction for rnrccsscd tca% as the 
reason for the perceived weak price transmission. The study obscnvtl that the supply 
side of processed tea markets comprises hvclve large scale plantation owncm and SIC 
while the buyers' side constitute five to eight buyers who either transact through the 
auction market or through direct or forward contracts. In rases, %%-here plantation 
ou-ners and STC arc dissatisfied with prices on offer on domestic markets, they export 
their Was for sale through the Mombasa auction market. In this Way, plantation 
owners and STC arc directly 
linked to their world market prices, hence the apparent 
price transmission. On the other hand, transmission to smallhnldcr farnncm (which 
was not studied in chapter 3) is considered to be impact cd by the cartel type of price 
discoverY mechanism which plantation owners use in determining prices for tea 
leaves. The study considers this mechanism as also responsible for the low producer 
margins in smallholdcr tea farmers apart from the quality and )icld constraints. 
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Chapter Eight: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and 
Policy Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This chaptcr presents a summary of the main findings, major conclusions and policy 
rccommcndations of this rescarch, as wcll as proposed , as of furthct tc«ýcarch 
towards the cnd. Summary of findings, conclusions and policy trwnimcndal ions 
follow each other in that order after a brief summary of background infomtation. 
8.2 Research Background 
The main aim of this research was to investigate the impacts an small scale t outtc 
producers in Malawi of removal (partial or complete) of market distortions (tariffs and 
subsidies) in world production and marketing systems of tobacco. cotton, sugar and 
tp. The research was conducted against the backdrop of on going negotiations in 
%%P TO and demands from other lobby groups who arc calling upon the international 
community to remove tariffs and subsidies in world agricultural markets for the 
benefit of resource poor small scale farmers in developing countries. The literature on 
market distortions postulates that removal of tariffs and subsidies on %%vrld markets 
would; (i) increase world market prices of commodities which would translate into 
inked producer incomes; and, (ii) increase market access for commodities from 
developing countries. These predictions arc, however based on ncaxlassical gnomic 
assumptions that market structures would allow prices to be fully tranunittcd to 
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domestic markets in diffcrcnt producing countries and that rnxlucctx and iki10n11at 
produccrs in these countries would fully respond to price changes. In reality howc%-cr. 
markets arc far from perfect, they have imperfections t%hich call liftfit both mice 
transmission and supply responses. Removal of tariffs and subsidies may. ihctc(tifc. 
result in differential impacts across supply systems. This study pur xni%-cty Wck icd 
four export supply systems in Malawi with different arrangements or maikct linkages 
for supply of inputs and services and purchase of prcxfucc and investigatcal the 
impacts of global removal of tariffs and subsidies on resource poor fanners producing 
each of these crops. Lessons from this study are likely to apply to other ixmr r . ourec 
fanners locked under similar commodity supply systems in other parts ofSub Saharan 
African countries. 
The study invcstigatcd each of the four commodity supply systems in the following 
four phases; (i) a review of world market price predictions in post tariff and subsidy 
conditions; (ii) an analysis of price transmission between world markets and 
corresponding domestic markets 
in hfala%%i; (iii) investigation of commodity supply 
responses in Malawi; and, (iv) examination of the organisation of supply systems in 
Malawi to explain patterns of price transmission and supply responses. 
8.3 Main Findings of the Research 
Tabic 53 presents a summary of results of percent changcs in world markst prices duc 
to rcmoval of tariffs and subsidics and Price transmission and supply rrsp nsc 
clasticitics for the 
four commoditics. As the tablc shows, re mov-Jl of tariff, and 
subsidics is projcctcd to 
increase world market priccs for tobacco. Cotton, sugar anti 
tca by 81;, % - 12%, 10% - 20%, 
20% - 40% and 7% - 10% respcctivcly. l Iiglicr price 
401 
incrcascs in sugar and cotton arc cxplaincd by curmt high tcti cts or market 
distortions in tcrms of both high tariffs and large subsidics in the c co nn litics. It Is 
thcrcforc concludcd that global rcmoval of tariffs and subsidirt will indcol incjcadc 
world markct priccs of commoditics and that the magnitudc of price inctrarc* will 
dcpcnd on the cxtcnt of cxisting markst distortions in global pimtuclicin nntid! 
tnarkcting systems of individual commodities. This amclusion is con. istalt with 
postulations from standard economic theory. This supports argumcnts for ranin al or 
reductions in global market distortions to benefit poor producers of these commodities 
in dcvcloping countrics. 
Table 53: Summary of Findings 
Crop World Afarkct Elasticity of Price Supply Response 1ct ctt'cct of 
Price Changes Transmission Elasticities liberalisation 
on small 
(armen 
Tobacco 8%-12% 0 0.4-0.69 0 
Cotton 10%-20% 0.31 0.23 - O. G 4 odcrate 
Sugar 20%-40% 0.36 0.17 ? ýi final 
Tea 7%-10% 0.36 0.01-0.04 Marginal 
The study found price transmission elasticities of 0.36 in bath sugar and Ica: 0.31 in 
cotton and zero for tobacco 
(Tablc 53). In tobacco and Cotton, the study analysed 
pricc transmission 
between world market priccs for these commodities and Malawi's 
smallholder farmer producer prices 
for unprocessed commoditics %%hilc in sugar and 
tea, the study analyscd pricc transmission 
bctu"ccn world tnari: ct price. fier these 
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products and Malawi's processed prices far Ihcsc products. abich the c1r«tivcly 
factory owners prices, and not smallholdcr farmers' prices like in cotton and tobacco. 
Ilic study could not use smallholder fanner producer prices in price fratt... tttixsºion 
analyses for tea and sugar primarily because of lack of pnmpctly rvconlcal time Mies 
data sets in these commodities. As the results in Table $3 stow. the study found price 
transmission in cotton, sugar and tca and no transmission in tobacco. hie at cnce or 
any evidence of price transmission in tobacco suggests that smallholder fanners will 
not benefit from increases in world tobacco prices unless there arc structural changes 
in the tobacco market system in Malawi that allow transmission or inct=scs in world 
r arket prices to be passed on to farmers. 
The study examined the organisation of produce markets in the four commodities to 
cxplain results of price transmissions in these commodities. Table 54 summarises 
features of produce markets with effect on price transmission. As shown in the table, 
processed sugar in Malawi is marketed directly to domestic and export markets by a 
single company (SUCONMA) through a number of trade protocols and the study 
considered the direct links of SUCOMA to its foreign markets as the main reason why 
there is observable transmission of prices bct v ccn the world market for sugar and that 
of Malawi. As for the reason why the elasticity of price transmission is only 0.36. the 
study considered use of weighted prices as one of the reasons. As for transmission of 
prices to smallholder sugar 
farmers, the study considers that this is likely to be the 
same as that of SUCOMMA since the company sells smallholder fanner sugar on their 
behalf with smallholder sugar prices directly and transparently dctc mincd by the 
factory sale price according to a system set up by the government to proloct tile 
interests of smallholder producers. In tea, the study obscr%vtl that the twclve suppliers 
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of proccsscd tcas in Malawi havc the option of cithcr sclting their Ica in dnincxtic 
msrkct through the auction markct systcm or through für%vard contracts or niatkct 
their teas through the Mombasa markct in Ken)-a. The study obsct-%"al t11., 1t the 
presence of other marketing options other than the auction market alone t%hcte there 
arc oligopsonic buyers exerts some competitive pressure on auction mathct and the 
study considers this as the reason why there is obscrvahlc price transmission between 
world market prices for tea and those of Malawi's tea auction market. The study 
observes that more competition in the tea auction would inipn n"c transmission or 
prices further. As for transmission of prices to smallholder tea fanncni, transmission 
of factory price to farm gate price is likely to be low because of the lack of 
transparency and competition in the contractual arrangements and price discovcry 
mechanism for fresh tea leaves. 
In cotton and tobacco, the study obscrvcd that small scale famicrs scil their produce to 
oligopsonistic merchants who have significant market power and are exercising such 
powers through collusion in 
discovery of producer prices. 11owc%cr. the diflcr=cc 
bctwccn the two crops is that while oligopsony buyers in cotton are more concerned 
about offering smallholder 
farmers with prices that attract then, to ow cotton, in 
tobacco, buyers assume that supply will always be there whatever the price is offered 
considering that tobacco 
is so far the highest remunerating crop in hlala%%i and as such 
buyers arc under no pressure to offer farmers attractive prices that gives than 
; nccntives to continue producing tobacco. 
Donvard et al (1998) suggest that for cv-cry 
crop there is a minimum threshold price 
(which is determined by the opportunity costs 
of farmer inputs and alternative 
land and labour uses) below which farmers %º-ill shift 
to other crops/activitics unless there are no viable alternatives, The study sugl, csts that 
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cotton priccs havc bccn opcrating below the threshold price and that bu)v" try to p. 1±. % 
prices to fanmcrs to gct them grow the crop whereas in tobacc , the pride may ha c 
been above the threshold price and as such buyers have had no inccnthc to pus-on 
bcttcr prices to farmers (but this may be changing, prices may have in 2(X)5 and 2000 
fallcn bclow the threshold leading to contractcd supply in 2007 %hich cxcttcxl 
prcssurc on buyers to offer farmers higher prices). The study considers this rcalure as 
explaining why oligosponistic buycrs in cotton transmit priccs io (arme" ubifc in 
tobacco thcy arc not doing the samc. 
The study concludcd that structurc of the markcts and the colss lucnt conduct of 
mcrchants linking smallholdcr farmers to border markets determine %hcthcr pnccs arm 
transmittcd to smallholdcr rcsourcc poor farmers and also dctctmincs the cstcnt of 
pricc transmission. 
Table 54: Features of produce markets with effect on price transmission 
Dctcrminants Tobacco Cotton Sugar Tca 
Structurc of rlixcd (small 100% Small Alixcd (I larrc 1Iixcd (12 
produce scale 87% - scalc 
farmcrs scalc pla). cr large scalc 
large scale accounting for players 87%. 
13%) 90%, many many small 
small scale s le 1310,: ) 
10%) 
NIarl; cting Individual Individual The sole large Small scale 
mscmcnt producers sell producers sell scale pnxluccr fanncrs srlt 
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for disposing their tobacco their seed sell its sugar their Ica 14, I: 
producer to buyers cotton directly and that of in- c t+cMle 
output through the to buyers who small fanner fanner %ho in 
auction market in turn export directly to tunt sell in 
who in turn domestic and auction 
export c*ports markets car } 
markets dimity to 
intctnatkinal 
buyers 
ij cr Strongly Strongly Monorsony. Clt for made 
concentration oligopsonistic oligopsonistic hic sole tea Is 9(r. 6, 
in domestic with 2 buyers with 2 buyers plantation and 'thus, 12 large 
market in accounting for accounting for factory owner scale producers 
Malawi 90% of market 90% of market sell both its and factory 
share. share sugar and that owners sc11 tea 
International of smallholder to 8 mcmclants. 
market is also famos to Smallholder 
concentrated domestic and faro c seil 
intcmational their tea to 
markets factory owners 
price discovery Auction Buyers fix Sugar prices Auction 
methods market exhibit producer prices 
determined by tnatkct prices 
elements of trade cxhihit dcgrrc 
cartel protocols. of price 
rnmixtition. 
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Sntatlhnti 
# Fýt'Ctl Ica, 
rricc% are 
(ictctitilnciti b)y 
price Ciztng 
structurýct. 
Domestic price Auction Producer Weighted Auction pried 
data used in market prices prices which average pried for rnsty ci 
Pricc which can be buyers pay for rmccsscd Ica from large 
transmission regarded as smallholder sugar fmm wale 
analysis producer prices 
farmers for both small and plantation and 
of unprocessed their seed large scale factory o%%-ncr% 
tobacco leaves cotton producers 
pn supply responses, the study found supply r sponse elasticities ranging rmm 0.4 to 
0.69 in tobacco; 0.23 to 0.55 in cotton; 0.15 to 0.17 in sugar and 0.01 to 0.04 in Ica. In 
tobacco, the study analysed pricc supply ttsponscs using national arra'output data 
(which included both smallholder and estate area1'output) and producer prices: in 
cotton, the study used smallholder producer prices and sma11holdc r arm! output uullile 
in tea and sugar the study used prices for processed Products (effccti%-cly prim or 
factory owners) and national crop arca/output (which included lx)th small and iargc 
scale farmers' acrcagcstoutputs). 
The study had these diflcmnccs due to data sourcing 
problems. in tobacco and cotton, 
due to liberalisation of the supply s)stcins, the study 
also used dummy variables 
in their supply responsc analyses tu imestigaic the impact 
of libcralisation to supply tcsponscs. 
Furthcrmorc, in tobacco duc to [tic oconomic 
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importancc of buricy and flue cured tobaccos, the study u1sci diuf rrgatc%l lhcir 
findings into thcsc two varictics. In tca and sugar. due to pctrnnial nature or thcac 
crops, the study laggaf thcir prices to thrcc scasons in onlcr tt invcsti . atc 
lxOlh S1htitt 
and long tcrm responscs. 
From the findings of the analysis of supply responses for the four C11111111Mlitic-. 4. file 
study concluded that supply responses are inelastic and Wrak across the ccmrrticxfity 
supply systems and that responses arc particularly very small and negligible (under 
both short term and long teen scenarios) in tea and sugar. The study also cuncludcs 
that any observable supply responses in all the four commodities arc predominantly 
due to area (or cxtcnsification) except for cotton where responses are obscrval to be 
due more to output responses. These findings suggest that tobacco fanners arc 
relatively better at adjusting their area but not their intensity ofprduction in t rconse 
to changes in producer prices whereas in sugar and tea fannctrss find it difficult to 
adjust both their area and intensity of production in response to changes in producer 
prices. In cotton, farmers respond to changes in prices by altering their kids of inputs. 
The study examined market linkages for supply of inputs and scn-iccs in the four 
commodities to determine underlying 
features that explain elasticities of supply 
responses. Table 55 summarises 
features of the commodity supply systems which 
impact on supply responses. Increased supply can be achieved by cxtcnsircation 
(where land, labour and other inputs are requir d) and, 'or intensification (%%here 
mainly labour and inputs are 
intensified). Tobacco farmers have mode ate potential 
for extcnsification as they easily and quickly switch or acquire more land into 
cultivation of this crop, 
but their ability to do this is limited by (a) tenurial and 
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financing difficulties in buying or rcnting land; (b) prioritisation of land allocation to 
subsistcncc food crops (and difficulties with fool crap intensification); and. (e) tatxtur 
and cash flow constraints on labour hire and to some cxtcnt on buying minimal inputc 
'These factors were also observed to constrain cotton farmers from adju%ting their 
cotton land in response to changes in producer prices. In sugar and tea. cxtcn. ilication 
is limited by asset specificity problems associated with establishment of rctcnniat 
crops and their processing. Thus, for sugar and Ica farmers to expand arrt t undcr 
cultivation, they need investments in specific assets such as irrigation facilities, 
commitment of land for long periods, and investments in processing facilities. 
On intensification, the study observed that the sugar industry in Malawi is alrrady 
intcnsivc except for outgrowcr farmers. The study obsm cd that following their strong 
links to markets for inputs and services, SUCOMA. KCGL and DCCL uho 
constitutes a combined total of 9S% of h1alaw"i's sugar output. arc intensive anti 
operating at full capacity and therefore 
do not exhibit potential for further 
intensification. The study considers this observation as the main reason explaining 
why there is an apparent lack of observable intensification in Mala%i's sugar industry. 
Similarly in tea sub sector, the study observed that large scale producer's two account 
for 87% of Malawi's tea outputs arc already intensive and at pull capacity and as such 
do not exhibit any potential for further intensif i cation. On the other hand, sanallholdcr 
tp farmers have room for further intensification, however, considering that their 
contribution is only 13% of national output and that 
during the pcriod of supply 
response analysis, not much 
has changed in their intensification lc%rls, the study 
consider these observations as explaining why 
intensification response in A1ala%ºi's 
tca industry is negligible. 
409 
In tobacco, the study obscrvcd that while both public and rnvatc scictcor ammranic% 
coordinate supply of inputs, in particular, sccds and fcnilisas. uptal c atul use by 
smallholder farmers is low mainly due to 
financing problcans and the Study obacnc 1 
the inadequate usage of these inputs as explaining the lack of intatsificaticin tvrp rn c 
in tobacco supply system. Similarly for the cotton supply systan. the study ()I) cº1 
that while interlocking private sector companies have improval supply u1' srnlic. 
pesticides and hiring out of spraying cquipmcnt to smallholdcr fanner on lc%ant. 
uptake and use by farmers is still 
low due to what fanners dc`cribcd as high input 
costs and profitability problems. 
The study obscrvcd the low input uptake and usage 
problems as major reasons explaining the 
low intcnsirication n lxonse in cotton 
supply system. The study concludes that 
bchind the border smallholdcr tv ourcc p or 
farncrs' constraints such as; low household income lcv-cls combincd with poor crrdit 
access; high input costs partly 
due to high transaction costs on the part of these 
supplying inputs; and, weak market arrangements 
for supply of inputs and scn-ices 
and purchase of produce will 
limit the ability of supply systems in Alala%%i and more 
generally other Sub Saharan 
African countries to benefit fully from global commodity 
market liberalisation. 
Table 55: Features of supply systcros frith effect on supply response 
Supply Response Tobacco Cotton Sugar Tca 
Features 
Specific assets Low Low 
liiFlt - i 
finial cmp, rcmmnial crop. 
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irrigation and and rnk ring 
pmccssing thick must be 
which must he Clow to 
close to rttAuction 
prtxluction 
Potential for Modcratc Moderate Poor duc to 1'mr due to 
short tcm asset mct 
in ýncrcascs i'oc y s ifcit y si specs f oily 
supply through Problems pmblcxns 
cxtcnsification 
prganisation of Poor. Good Generally Mixed and Ila% 
market linkages Majority of following good, -anal over 
for supply of farmers recent smallholder time. Large 
inputs and individually improvements-. farmers scale 
scr%. iccs to linked to ßuyvrs supply orianiscd into Comranics 
smallholders markets 
inputs and Management locally 
while few services to Companies monopsonistic 
through farmers on which link suppliers in 
farmer loans which farmers to interlocking 
associations arc repaid after inputs and syztcms With 
sale of produce sm ices smallholder 
farmers 
,l xs and use 
Poor due to Low due to Generally high Moderate 
of inputs and linkage, profitability 
due to hater Interlocking 
sctviccs affordability and cost coordination impmving 
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and cost problems ýºituatirm. C4111 
problems despite still an imc. 
improving 
interlocking 
opportunities 
Yiclds & quality Low Low tlijh 1\Icýctcratc to 
of produce 11igfi 
potential for High Iligh Low WW 
increasing supply 
through 
intensification 
On the organisation of markct linkagcs for the supply of inputs and scn-ic s to 
smallholders, the study observed four distinct systans. In tobacco, the majority of 
fanners have separate linkages to markets for outputs and for supply of inputs and 
othcr scrviccs whcrcas in cotton, buyers havc t"crtically and hotimntally intcgratc i 
purchase of produce with supply of inputs and services on loan. In tea, large scale 
producers have gone into 
interlocking arrangements with small scale pmduccnc in 
which largc scale producers pro%idc inputs and services to srnallholdcr famncn an 
loan in return for purchase of their output. In sugar, smallholder farmers arc arganiscd 
into smallholder companies which coordinate supply of inputs and scniccs and 
marketing of produce. 
prawing from Poulton ct at (2003) and North (149ö), the stuJy cAtc ri, 
organisational systems 
for inputs and services supply as oral markcts in Iohac ci, 
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somc lcvcl of intcrlocking in cotton, intcrlocking in Ica and hicrarchical and ýcýrnr 
intcrlockinb in sugar. In linc with findings of Poulton ct al (2003) anJ Nlt? 
postulations, coordination of supply of inputs and scrviccs %, as olb%csrtt to be lcitcr 
in sugar followcd by tca, tlicn cotton and lastly tobacco. 11rtxlucti%"ity i1'kIiC. 110nc of 
supply systcros also followcd patterns of coordination with hid her )"iclds and qualify 
in sugar and lowcst in tobacco. 
In sharp contrast however, margins for smallholdcr fanners %%-cm the 10%%-C., ', In Surpr 
ter followed by tea then cotton and finally tobacco suggesting that smallhaldct Can 
margins fall in more hierarchical contractual systems with more safcr Wanfs. '% 
combination of factors were considered to explain the declinc in margins and these 
included; (i) farmers in tea and sugar allocate their land to Perennial craps %%hich 
make them difficult to switch between enterprises and they also depend on factory 
owners to process their produce immediately aflcr harvesting; (ii) factory owners in 
tea and sugar have investments in large scale plantations whic? h supply them the bulk 
of their tea leaves and sugarcane respectively and therefore do not rely so much on 
smallholder farmers to meet capacities of their processing plants as in tobacco and 
cotton, hence, factory owners in tea and sugar do not have much inceoti%vs for giving 
smallholder farmers better margins; and (iii) weak bargaining position of unalllroldcr 
farmers mainly due to concentration of buyers, except in tobacco ahem concentration 
do not directly lead to low margins. The study recommends that mechanisms should 
be devised to address the low margins in supply systems with hicrarehical and 
interlocking arrangements and to improve the market linkages in supply systans 
without such arrangements. These recommendations are, howwwc-. °cr, very challenging 
to implcmcnt. 
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8A Major Conclusions of the Study 
From the review of model predictions on post world matkct lilvn. lis. Itic I pf1cet. tile 
study concludes that tariff and subsidy removal will incrcasc world markct prices for 
most commodities and that the extent of increases will depend on cuttrnt lapis of 
distortions. Findings from price transmission and supply response unal)yscs hc»»-cr, 
show that gains to individual commodity producers in diflcrcnt countries and supply 
systems will be variable and will depend on the ability of their individual supply 
systems to transmit prices to producers and that pmduccrx" respond rully to price 
signals. The study concludes that smallholder farmers in supply systems with Zeter 
price transmission and supply responses are likely to benefit from global matkct 
liberalisation and vice versa. In other words, the study argues that supply systems 
with more behind the border constraints that limit price transmission and supply 
responses such as failure of buyers to transmit price gains in world market to domestic 
markets and weak market arrangements for supply of inputs (fcttiiisers, scc%ls and 
pesticides), services 
(credit, transportation and processing) and Purchase of p duce 
farmers will determine the cxtcnt to which commodity supply systcros %%. ill icnclit 
from global commodity market liberalisation. Ttmus, Price transmission is a necessary 
condition for smallholder 
farmers in different countries and commodity supply 
systems to gain 
from liberalisation: without price transmission, smallholder farmers 
do not gain direct benefits from 
liberalisation. Furthermore, an clastic supply tvl, onsc 
increases the direct benefits of liberalisation to smallholder farmers and to others 
directly or indirectly dependent upon than through Consumer, upstream and 
doUwnstream linkages. The distribution of these benefits depend upon the nature of 
supply responses 
(intensification or cxtcnsifcation by existing rnxluccrs or 
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cctcnsification to new produccrs) and the linkages and tnultiplim us iaic%l with 
thcsc altcmativcs. 
As for Malawi's smallholdcr producers, the research concludes that gainit (cunt glol a1 
commodity market liberalisation will be small or %-cry small as in each caw one or 
more of the necessary conditions of substantial price transanission or supply re pile e 
is missing. In tobacco, despite the good supply responses, lack of price Iranunis ion 
will constrain farmers from gaining from global tobacco libcralisstion. In sugar and 
tea, while growers may benefit from domestic price gains, overall gains hum global 
commodity liberalisation will be limited by lack of supply t pons . In cotton. 
although both price transmission and supply responses exist, wcak elasticities means 
that gains from global cotton liberalisation will as well be limited. The study 
concludes that smallholder poor resource farmers in other parts of Sub Saharan Africa 
with similar price transmission and supply response conditions as those of ! Malawi 
will not benefit fully from global liberalisation of commodity markets in a predictable 
way. The study further argues that if indeed price transmission and supply responses 
for significant numbers of countries and supply systems may ha%-c been overstated its 
suggested, then predictions on world market price changes due to liberalisation may 
be understated. 
It must be noted that the study recognises the multiplier cffcct transmitted world 
market price gains have on net incomes of resource poor fanners in Malwi and 
indeed other Sub Saharan African countries. Tus, where price gains in world market 
price of a commodity have 
been successfully transrnittctd to domestic markets, no 
mattcr how small, thcir cffcct on resource poor fanncrs' income is significant, 
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Although it was beyond the scope of the Prescnt study to dctcnnine these net gain* in 
tea, cotton and sugar where price transmission was actcnninal in a prrºlictaWWle tray, 
the study argues that overall net gains of incomes of fanncri in these surlily %)-jtcttt, t 
will be substantial. The study therefore concludes that apart fmm au tmsing behind 
the border constraints that limit both price transmission and supply ttsixin cs, 1: lnhai 
market liberalisation is a good policy likely to benefit tesourcc poor cxlxulcn or 
commodities in developing countries. 
on the organisation of markets for supply of inputs and scnvices, the study concludcs 
that coordinated markets such as interlocking and hierarchical market linkages have 
the potential of addressing bottlenecks of access and utilisation of inputs and scnlccs 
by smallholder fanners in rural remote areas of Sub Saharan Africa where there arv 
problems of thin markets. In such contractual arrangements, hmever, it is imlvriant 
to increase the bargaining power of smallholder producers without undermining the 
mechanisms and incentives which inhibit opportunistic behaviour by famtcrs and 
hence incentives for commercial investments in provision of scniccs to them. This 
may require actions by the state, or by civil society organisation. or a stronger tote for 
farmer organisations, but it is very difficult to design and implement institutional 
arrangements which balance the commercial 
interests ofproduce buyers and input and 
vice suppliers with those of smallholder farmers. 
ßS Policy Recommendations 
With respect to global commodity market libcraiisation, the study las ohsa cd that 
rcmoval of tariffs and subsidies on commoditics of cxlxm intcn: st icy dorloping 
countries has the potential to 
increase export priccs. From that point of %iCW, global 
416 
libcralisation policics arc a good starting point for supporting initiati%v% eimal at 
improving livelihoods of poor resource farmcrs in developing countrics. lloiaºcsu. 
weak supply responses and price transmissions in different countries und rotmmxditics 
arc likely to limit benefits from global liberalisation of commodities. since the 
reasons for weak supply responses and price transmission vary fnunt one Supply 
system to the other, more research and action is nccdcd to undcntand the factors 
responsible for weak supply responses and price transmission in difl"ctcnt countries 
and commodity supply systems and effective mechanisms by %%hich thew %%-caknc. scs 
can be addressed. 
For Malawi, the findings of this research show that tobacco fanners will not benefit 
from global liberalisation of commodity markets due to lack of price transnussion as a 
result of concentration and consequent likely collusion of bu)vm. As pointed nut 
earlier, it is suggested that mechanisms possibly involving the state but with more 
safeguards should be found to reduce the concentration and opportunities for 
collusion among buyers. With respect to organisation of market linkages for the 
supply of inputs and services in tobacco supply system, it is rrcontmc niled that machet 
linkages for majority of farmers should be improved for example through expansion 
of NASFAM program (but with caution regarding rapid expansion of farmer 
associations as observed by Chirwa ct al (2006)) and. 'or interlocking systems with 
buyers (but being cautious of tightrope between too much lower for either party). In 
the tea, sugar and cotton supply systems, the state should focus on finding ways of 
improving the bargaining power of smallholder farmers during ncb-otiations with 
interlocking partners. It is clear from the findings of the study that uhile coordination 
mechanisms in these commodity supply systems have improved )iclds and quality of 
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smaliholdcr farmers producc cspecially in two suer schancs. mart; ins ror 
smallholdcr farmers arc low. As pointed out carlicr, niedianicros r or impn)%ing i)$c 
bargaining position of smallholder farmers must be found and intttxluced. 
For Sub Saharan Africa, given that similar Production and matkct conditicros rrc ciit 
in Malawi's commodity supply systems are prevalent in smallholder rarniing 
communities in other Sub Saharan African countries, the study suggests that 
coordination of supply systems through such measures as inlctlocking and 
hierarchical systems have the potential for improving market access and u"c or inputs 
and services by smallholder farmers. The study therefore recommends that the 
potential for encouraging more effective establishments and opcrationalisatinn of such 
systems should be investigated so as to address the thin market trap. Ilene too, as 
pointed out earlier, solutions to weak bargaining power of smallholder fanners must 
be found. 
8.6 Limitations of the study and areas of further research 
The research encountered significant data problems which affected the robustness of 
its outcomes, with interrelated difficulties in (i) scope of coverage of price and other 
supply chain information systems and (ii) data quality. On lack of availability or 
required data, for each crop, the study required time scrics data on 1P °ct prices (that, 
for partially processed tobacco and processed cotton lint, sugar and tea), producer 
prices of these commodities (thus, prices paid to farmers for unpr css J 
commodities) and disaggrcgatcd 
data on area for large scale and small scale producers. 
The study could not get time series export prices for cotton or time series producer 
price data for sugar and tea. As a result of these bottlenecks, rather than using price, 
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for unprocessed sugar and tea prices which are paid to smallholdcs fannrrn, the xtuhly 
used export price data which arc cfT'cctivcly prices for factory o%%-ncti n iippilxcd to 
smallholder farmers' prices. On supply response analyses, the study c ouldj not Ed 
disaggcgatcd data for large scale and small scale Producer arras in the 1obaCcu. sugar 
and tea supply systems and as a result the study used national data which includal 
both large and small scale fanner areas. In cotton, because the crop is cxcluti%cc1y 
gown by smallholder fanners, national data was available on smallholder area. 
Unavailability of data therefore, compromised robustness of Price transtnisaian And 
supply response analyses and their findings. 
The second problem with data used in this research relates to the quality of data in 
general terms. Rather than sourcing price and acreage data from respcctih. c industries 
which can be regarded as primary sources, 
data was sourccd from secondaryº so=cs 
such as Government Departments (mainly, cotton and sugar), International Apencics 
(mainly, tea) and regulatory institutions (mainly, tobacco). The industries could not 
supply the data partly because they argued price 
data is scnsitis-c and partly lxvausc of 
poor record keeping and 
data management systems by the majority of industries it, 
I. ialawi. The study observed that where data was sourced from two or three sc-condary 
yourccs, it sometimes varied significantly and this raised problems of dctcmtining 
which source was correct; and the study considered this as c%idcncc of qucstionability 
of quality of some of the 
data from secondary sources. Wcakncsses in bath 
availability and quality of 
data affected robustness of outcomes of Pricc transmission 
and supply response analyses. 
Nevertheless the triangulation approach of using 
multiple sources and of relating empirical quantitative price transmission and supply 
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responsc analysis with quantitativc and qualitativc study of matkc, sttucatures ha, 4 
produced a gcncrally consistcnt sct of robust results. 
With regard to primary data collcctcd in surveys as part of the study. iamplc sirc* it, 
tobacco and cotton arc slightly smaller than would have been dcsirvd. but compatiMun 
with the nationally representative NSO (2005) survcy suggests that the %3,11111c% did 
yicld representative information. It would, however. have been dcsirablc to rumlief 
disaggrcgatc smallholder tobacco farmers into NASE, l and other fanners and in 
smallholder tea farmers into Smallholder Tca Company and other rannen. 
Categorisation of these fanners into their respective groups could ha%, c 1highliphtcd 
more issues pertaining to structure, conduct and performance of their vatious market 
linkages. 'Miese issues can be picked up and improved in further t scam: h work. 
Further research on the impacts of global libcralisation should also focus on 
determining price transmission and supply response elasticities for all commodities 
and supply systems so that more realistic parameters, 
based on actual estimates, are 
used in models that predict outcomes of global 
liberalisation. 'lltus, rather Than using 
. guessed estimates' as 
is the case in many global market level models, actual 
elasticities should 
be determined and used. Failure to use actual estimates has led to 
cxaggerated predictions of the effects and 
benefits of liberalisation both at local and 
global level, as 
for example, in predictions rc%ica"ed in chapter tar. At local lc%-cl. 
this study has shown that 
Malawian smallholder farmer benefits from global 
liberalisation will be much less than predictions from global model results teic%%-cd in 
ch, aptcr two. Research 
into getting and using correct elasticities in modelling of 
outcomes of global 
liberalisation would help determine how each country. irgion and 
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group of individuals arc going to brnctitllosc from global lila aliutinn. Jill% ix b 
major conclusion from this work. 
rurthcr rcscarch should also focus on the issuc or lxn%"cr tclations in c 1ntrartual 
systcros involving smallholdcr rcsourcc poor farnncrs. This study has shown that with 
the poor business climate in most rural areas of Malawi (and in other parts of %. -uh 
Saharan Africa), competition among input suppliers and senvice pruwwidcts is %%-eak and 
coordination through interlocking and hicrarthical systcros can provide Jxjlcr 
solutions for improving farmers' access and use of inputs and scniccs, but such 
systems often result in low farmer margins. Further research should therefore loo; at 
this question of power relations with the aim of determining altcmative approacbcs 
for improving the bargaining power of smallholder farmcm. 
Further research in Malawi should also focus on analysing the welfarc effects or 
global market liberalisation 
in Malawi. These studies should look at pnxluccr surplus, 
changes in gross margins and net 
incomes of fanners and changes in labour markets 
and other secondary effects of 
impact of global market liberalisation on Mala%%i, hntli 
at household and national 
levels. Household models that also take further findings 
from this research would provide further useful insights into gains that ncunurrc poor 
fanners in Malawi will benefit from global commodity market liberalisation. 
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Annex 3 
LIST OF COMPANIES INTERVIEWED IN T1115 STUDY 
TOBACCO 
1. ARET (The Executive Director) 
2. SFFRFM (The General Manager) 
3. ADMARC (The General Manager) 
4. FARMERS WORLD (Executive Director) 
5. OPTICHEM (The General Manager) 
6. YARA (formally, known as NORSK HYDRO) (Tic General Manager) 
7. CNFA (Country Representative) 
8. AHL (The General Manager) 
9. TCC (The General Manager) 
10. LIMBE LEAF (Production Manager) 
11. AFRICA LEAF (Buyer) 
12. ALIANCE ONE (Production Manger) 
13. TEAM (The Chairman) 
14. MRFC (The General Manager) 
COTTON 
1. CLARK COTTON (The General Manager) 
2. GREAT LAKES (The GencralManagcr) 
3. ADMARC (The Marketing Manager) 
4. MAPETO DAVID WHITEHEAD (The General Manager) 
S. IPONGA (The General Manager) 
TEA 
1. TEA BROCKERS MALAWI LIMITED (The Executive Secretary) 
2. MAILANDE TEA ESTATES (Productions Manager) 
3. NAMING'OMBA TEA ESTATES (Productions Manager) 
4. SATEM\VA TEA ESTATES (Productions Manager) 
5. CONFORZ TEA ESTATES (Productions Manager) 
6. EASTERN PRODUCE ESTATES (Productions Manager) 
7. LIPTON COMPANY (Tea Buyer) 
8. STANDARD CENTRAL AFRICA (Tea Buyer) 
9. VAN REESE (Managing Director) 
10. SMALLHOLDER TEA COMPANY (The General Manager) 
11. TEA ASSOCIATION OF MALAWI (Executive Secretary) 
SUGAR 
1. SUCONiA (Group Chief Executive Officer) 
2. DCGL (Operations Manager) 
3. KCGL (Operations Manager) 
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Annex 4 
Checklists for different stakeholders' Interviews 
(Research on Impacts of world agricultural liberalisation on Commodity Supply 
Chains in Malawi, Imperial College London) 
7.1 PLANTATION AND FACTORY OWNERS 
Section 1: General Issues 
V When was the company first established in Malawi? 
V What has been the ownership of the company since its inception? 
V What is the vision and mission of the current set up? How have these changed 
over the years? 
V How is the company organised in terms of the various functions of production, 
processing marketing e. t. c. Enquire about any re-organisation over the years? 
V What prompted the company to establish itself in Malawi. How much capital 
was invested and what have been the changes in capital stock over the years 
V What associated investment did the company require? How much of this was 
available and what was missing? What associated investment did the company 
forced to undertake to facilitate its business. 
V Discuss about asset specificity issues and how the company is dealing with 
this issue. Also to include discussion on licensing costs, process, difficulties 
and rent seeking behaviours involved. 
Section 2: Crop production 
2.1 Land use 
V How much land does the estate own? What has been the trend in land 
ownership and under what ownership agreements? How the various pieces of 
land were acquired and what are the prospects for future expansions and 
acquisitions? 
V What has been the trend in crop hectarage and what has influenced decisions 
on how much hectarage to be cultivated? What are the future plans of land 
utilisation? 
V What are the trends in varieties grown and what are the plans for the future 
(medium to long term) 
V Enquire how land was generally acquired in terms of process, costs, 
difficulties, and other forms of rent seeking behaviours 
2.2 Labour use 
V What has been the trends in relationship between farm labour requirements 
and supply? . Is the labour supply able to meet all farm labour needs of the 
company? 
V What forms of farm labour contracts (casual or permanent) does the company 
uses (including proportions of their utilisation). What are the proncs and cones 
of each contract arrangement and overall which arrangements suit the 
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company most? What processes arc followed in each case to recruit faun 
labour and at what average cost? 
V What are the current minimum wages for farm labour and how arc these 
wages derived at? 
V How does the company view the quality of its farm labour? What has the 
company done to improve performance of its farm labour and at what cost? 
What else can be done to improve productivity of fame labour further? 
V What are the overall difficulties in accessing good quality fame labour in this 
area? 
V How prevalent arc incidences of labourers not working full time as agre d, not 
finishing the agreed jobs in time and simply not doing the work to standard as 
agreed? How much do such behaviours cost the company? What does the 
company in such cases and how much does the company incurred in the 
process? 
V Does the company need to pay any licences, commission, fees, tokens, tips or 
bribes to anyone in recruiting its farm labour? If so, to who and costs roughly 
how much on average? 
2.3 Sourcing planting materials, fertilisers, pesticides and farm machinery 
V Where does the company source these materials? 
V How many suppliers are available in each and how competitive arc these 
markets? 
V What criteria does the company use to select its suppliers? 
V What are the various forms of contracts that the company has gone into with 
suppliers in order to access its various inputs? How do these contracts 
compare with each other in terms of attributes and costs (transformation and 
transaction) involved? 
V Are the various inputs markets able to meet the needs (in terms of quality and 
quantity, time of service delivery, reliability and prices) of the company? If 
not, what does the company consider to be the major bottlenecks in each 
market? 
V Whether there are any forms of rent seeking (bribes, tips and tokens) and 
opportunism (cheating in quality, quantity and time of delivery) behaviours in 
various input market contracts. If so, how much they cost the company both in 
terms of the loss from the actual behaviour and follow up action? 
V What are the various input rates that the company uses and how do these 
compare to industry level best practices? 
V What are the trends in returns per hectare and how they compare to industry 
level best practices? What explains any observed outcomes? 
Section 3: Financing operations of the company 
V What was the source of finance for initial capital investment and subsequent 
rccapitalisation? How about sources of operating funds? 
V How many capital markets are available for the company and how competitive 
are these markets? 
V What are the various prevailing lines of credits and how do these lines 
compare with each other in terms of attributes and costs? 
": " Are capital markets able to meet the needs of the company? If not, what does 
the company consider to be the major bottlenecks in capital markets? 
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Section 4: Transportation In the company 
V How does the company meet its transport requirements? If through hiring, 
how competitive is the transport sector? 
V How does the various contracts with transporters compare with each other in 
terms of attributes and costs? Overall, what does the company consider to be 
major bottlenecks in transport sector and how much do these cost the company? 
V Is the transport able to meet the needs of the company? If not what does the 
company consider to be remedies to the system? 
V Are there elements of rent seeking and opportunism surrounding transporting? 
Section 5: Processing 
V What are the main stages in processing, their input requirements by type, 
volume and cost per unit, per unit outputs and their prices? How does input 
use and outputs (both in terms of quality and quantity) compare with 
industry's best practice? 
V What are the sources of spare parts for plant? How competitive are these 
markets? What are hiccups associated with sourcing these spare parts and 
what are the costs to the company? What is the magnitude of rent seeking and 
opportunistic behaviours in these markets? 
V What are the bottlenecks relating to power, water and packaging services and 
how do much do these cost the company? 
V What has been the trend in relationship between maximum processing 
capacity and actual utilisation capacity and what explains the observed trend? 
What can be done to improve the situation? 
V How does the company compare the current throughput and conversion rate 
(processing rate) and quality standards to industry level best practice. What arc 
the factors that may explain any discrepancies between the two? 
V What are the various kinds of contracts the company has gone into with small 
scale growers of the crop(in areas of seed, fertiliser and chemical supply, 
credit provision, processing arrangements, commodity buying and selling, and 
extension services)? When did various agreements started and what were the 
reasons? How does the company compare the different contractual relations 
in terms of attributes and costs? Are there any opportunism and rent seeking 
behaviours in these contractual relations? 
V What does the company consider to be critical constraints in commodity 
processing? What can be done to alleviate these bottlenecks? 
Section 6: Marketing produce 
V What are the different destinations for different outputs of the industry? Who 
are the main buyers in these different destinations including time series 
statistics(volume, style and prices) for different transactions? How competitive 
are markets for these different outputs (in other words, how are prices 
determined)? Under what kinds of contracts are these transactions done? How 
do the various destinations and contracts compare with each other in terms of 
attributes and profits? 
V How does the company market itself to its buyers (including prospective)? 
What has been the trend in relationship between market demand and supply of 
processed products? What are the reasons for any observed features? 
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V What are the critical constraints the company face in marketing its outputs? 
What are the various rent seeking and opportunism behaviour in these output 
markets/ 
V What have been the trends in exports in terms of volume and prices? To what 
extent do you pass the export price gains or losses to your suppliers? What 
problems do you experience in commodity export? Distinguish factors that are 
under your control, those under the control of the Malawi government and 
those that are external. Is exportation of commodity profitable? What arc the 
critical factors of success? 
V Time series data on breakdown of prices into various cost components and 
profits will be requested. Thus, from export price down to the price that the 
company gives the smallholder fanner. 
7.2 INPUT SUPPLIERS, LENDERS & BUYERS 
Section A: General Issues for all players 
V When was the business established? Who owns it and what is it worth (Asset 
specificity? What was the source of the initial capital and subsequent 
recapitalisation? What motivated establishment of the business and current 
vision? 
V How the business is organised in terms of procurement or production of its 
outputs, logistics and marketing? Enquire about any re-organisation? 
V What associated investment did the business require at inception? How much 
was available and what was missing? What associated investment did the 
company forced itself to undertake to sec through its business and at what cost? 
V What were the different kinds of legal licences you paid to set up this business? 
How problematic was the process of acquiring a license? Wcrc you faced with 
any rent seeking behaviours, and if so, how serious were they? 
Section B: Specific issues for input suppliers (fertiliser/seedlings/pesticides/farm 
equipment) 
Part 1: Sourcing of items 
V Where do you source this item? What is the level of competition in sourcing 
the item? What criteria does the company use to select its suppliers? How arc 
prices arrived at in sourcing the item? Who pays for transport costs? 
V What are the different forms of contracts that exist between you and suppliers 
of this item? How do these contracts compare with each other in terms of 
attributes and costs (transformation and transaction) involved? 
V Is the item supply mechanism able to meet your needs in terms of quality and 
quantity, time of service delivery, reliability and prices? If not, what does the 
company consider to be the major underlying bottlenecks? 
V Whether there are any forms of rent seeking (bribes, tips and tokens) and 
opportunism (cheating in quality, quantity and time of delivery) behaviours in 
sourcing the items? If so, how much serious and cost to you? 
V Need to get figures of unit cost of item from suppliers, plus transport cost, 
logistics cost and mark up. (trend information would be useful) 
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Part 2: Selling items 
V How much is the market demand of this item in this area? What is the share of 
this company? Who are the other major suppliers of this item in this arra'? 
Overall, how competitive is the market? What relations exist among supplictm 
of this item? 
V How does the company market its item? What arc the different nJtcrnativvC 
market outlets available to the company and how do these compare in terms of 
attributes and profits? 
V How does the company's marketing strategy compare to others (in terns of 
4P's)? 
V What are the main promotion methods the company uses? 
V How does the company price its item? 
V Has the company gone into any form contractual relations with buyers of its 
items? What are these different forms and how do they compare to each other? 
V What has been the trend in relationship between market demand for this item 
and supply in recent seasons? What arc the reasons for any observed features? 
Section C: Credit suppliers 
V How much is the market demand for credit this item in this area? What is the 
share of this company? Who are the other major suppliers of credit in this area? 
Overall, how competitive is the market? What relations exist among credit 
suppliers? 
V How does the company market its credit and ensure repayment? how does the 
company's marketing strategy compare to others? 
V What criteria does the company use to screen its farmers? What arc the major 
forms of contractual relations the company has gone into with farmers? I low 
do these different forms of contractual arrangements compare with each other? 
V How does the company comes up with interest? What arc the main strategic 
methods the company uses to have its loans repaid 
V What has been the trend in relationship between market demand for credit and 
general supply in recent seasons? What does the company consider to be 
major obstacles in disbursing loans in this area? What can be done to rectify 
these problems? 
V How serious are opportunistic behaviours in credit supply markets in this area? 
How much did the company lost through this kind of behaviour? What was 
done to redress the problems and at what cost was it? How do different 
contractual arrangements compare in terms of opportunism behaviour? 
Section D: Produce Buyers 
Part: Buying fron farmers/growers 
V How many product buyers operate in this local area? What proportion of the 
total product does the company command? What is the general level of 
competition prevailing during procurement ofproducc from farmers? 
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V What is the strategy that company uses to buy more produce in thiß area (Does 
the company operate buying points or use Agents or somc other strategy)? 
How does the strategy compare to other strategies by other produce buyers? 
V What are the different forms of contractual arrangements the company has 
gone into with farmers? How do these compare 
V How are produce prices derived at? 
V How does the company view the quality of produce from fanners? What do 
you think are the reasons for such quality level? What then can be done to 
improve the quality of the produce? 
V Over the recent seasons, how has produce supply compared to buyers demands 
and what has been the resultant effect? 
V Are there and problems of rent seeking and opportunism in produce buying? If 
so, to what magnitudes and how much do they cost your company? 
Part B: Disposing the commodity 
V Where do you sale the produce? Do you do any partial or complete rncsing 
or ale in the same way as you bought the commodity from farmctsfgmwcrc? If 
any kind of conversion is reported, at what unit cost is it done? 
V How big is the market of your product and what is the share of )tour company? 
What is the nature of competition on this market? Ilow prices arc arri%-cd at 
and what are the different forms of contracts signed with buyers of your 
commodity? How do these contracts? 
V Are there any forms of rent seeking and opportunism behaviours in these 
markets? If so, what are their magnitudes and how much do they cost your 
company? 
V What is the strategy that the company uses to sale its products? Ilow does the 
strategy compare to other strategies by other companies? 
V What are the different forms of contractual arrangements the company has 
gone into buyers of your products? How do these compare 
V How are prices arrived at? 
V Over the recent seasons, how has product supply compared to demands and 
what has been the resultant effect? 
SECTION F: EXITED PLAYERS (Mainly to Key informants) 
V Statistics on how dynamic entry and exit into each function in supply chain 
has evolved. Thus, for growers, statistics on how many have exited or cntcrvd 
production both for small and large scale fanner groups. Similarly, for input 
supply, produce purchase, credit provision, service provision c. t. c 
V Reasons need to unearthed why others quit and why others enter. 
V Statistics on concentration of growers on varieties (e. g flue versus Burley) 
including area changes, yields, volume, profits and quality trends need to be 
collected. Reasons for those shifting from one variety to the other need to 
ascertained. 
V Institutions, companies and organisations once involved in any supply chain function need to be identified and interviewed as to why they stopped. Those 
who entered the fray need to be interviewed about their reasons as well. 
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